

THE
IMMORTALITY
OF
THE SOUL,

So farre forth as it is demon-
strable from the Knowledge of
NATURE and the Light
of REASON.

By HENRY MORE Fellow of Christ's
Colledge in Cambridge.

Πάντα ὅ αἶρα ἔμπλεον εἶναι ψυχῶν, καὶ τέτυκ-
ταί μιν αἶμα καὶ ἡρώα νομίζεσθαι. Pythag.

*Quid jucundius quàm scire quid simus, quid
fuerimus, quid erimus; atque cum his etiam
divina atque suprema illa post obitum Mundi-
que vicissitudines? Cardanus.*

L O N D O N,

Printed by J. Fleisher, for William Morden
Bookseller in Cambridge. 1659.

1111

7

76

U



Handwritten text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is mostly illegible due to fading and bleed-through.

y
u
E
d
f
P
n
ra
f
y
la
th
w
T

To the Right Honourable

E D W A R D

Lord Viscount CONWAY

and KILULTA.

My Lord,

THough I be not ignorant of your Lordships aversness from all addressees of this kinde, (whether it be that your Lordship has taken notice of that usual vanity of those that dedicate Books, in endeavouring to oblige their Patrons by over-lavish praises, such as much exceed the worth of the party they thus unmeasurably commend ; or whether it be from a natural modesty that cannot bear, no not so much as a just representation of your own vertues and abilities ; or lastly, from a most true observation, that there are very few Treatises writ which are any thing more then meer Transcriptions or Collections out of

The Epistle Dedicatory.

other Authors, whose Writings have already been consecrated to the Name and Memory of some other worthy Persons long since deceased; so that they doe but after a manner rob the dead, to furnish themselves with Presents to offer to the living) Yet notwithstanding this averſeness of your Lordship, or whatever grounds there may be surmised thereof, I could not abstain from making this present Dedication. Not so much I confess to gratify your Lordship (though it be none of the best Complements) as for mine own satisfaction and content. For I doe not take so great pleasure in any thing as in the sense and conscience of the fitness & suitableness of mine own actions; amongst which I can finde none more exactly just & befitting then this; there being many considerations that give you a peculiar right and title to the Patronage of this present Discourse. For besides your Lordships skill

The Epistle Dedicatory.

skill in Philosophy & real sense of Piety, two such endowments as are rarely to be found together (especially in Persons of high quality) and yet without which matters of this nature can neither be read with any relish nor easily understood; there are also other things still more peculiar, & which naturally doe direct and determine me to the choice I have made. For whether I consider the many civilities from your self & nearest Relations, especially from your noble & vertuous Lady, whom I can never think on but with admiration, nor mention without the highest respect: or whether I recollect with my self the first occasion of busying my thoughts upon this Subject, which was then when I had the honour and pleasure of reading *Des-Cartes* his Passions with your Lordship in the Garden of *Luxenburg* to pass away the time, ('n which Treatise though there be nothing but what is handsome and witty,

The Epistle Dedicatory.

ty, yet all did not seem so perfectly solid and satisfactory to me but that I was forced in some principal things to seek satisfaction from my self:) or lastly, call to minde that pleasant retirement I enjoyed at *Ragley* during my abode with your Lordship; my civil treatment there, from that perfect and unexceptionable pattern of a truly Noble & Christian Matron, the Right Honourable your Mother; the solemnness of the Place, those shady Walks, those Hills & Woods, wherein often having lost the sight of the rest of the World, and the World of me, I found out in that hidden solitude the choicest Theories in the following Discourse: I say, whether I considered all these circumstances, or any of them, I could not but judge them more than enough to determine my choice to so worthy a Patron.

Nor could the above-mentioned surmises beat me from my design, as
not

The Epistle Dedicatory.

not at all reaching the present case. For as for my part, I am so great a Lover of the Truth, and so small an Admirer of vulgar Eloquence, that neither the presage of any gross Advantage could ever make me stoop so low as to expose my self to the vile infamy nor suspicion of turning Flatterer, nor yet the tickling sense of applause & vain-glory, to affect the puffy name & title of an Orator. So that your Lord^{sh} might be secure as touching the first surmise.

And verily for the second, though I confess I might not be at all averse from making a just & true representation of your Lordships Vertues and Accomplishments, yet considering the greatness of them, & the meanness of mine own Rhetorick, I found it not so much as within my power, if I would, to entrench upon your Lordships modesty; and therefore I must leave it to some more able Pen to do you & the World that right whether you will or no.

The Epistle Dedicatory.

And lastly, for that scruple concerning the theft or petty sacriledge of several *Plagiaries*, who, as it were, rob the Monuments of the dead to adorn the living; it is the onely thing that I can without vanity profess, that what I offer to your L^p is properly my own, that is to say, that the invention, application and management of the Reasons and Arguments comprised in this Book, whether for confutation or confirmation, is the genuine result of my own anxious and thoughtful mind, no old stuff purloined or borrowed from other Writers. What truth & solidity there is in my Principles and Reasonings were too great a piece of arrogance for me to predetermine. This must be left to the judgements of such free & discerning spirits as your Lordship: With whom if what I have writ may find acceptance or a favourable censure, it will be the greater obligation & encouragement to,

My Lord,

Your Honours humbly devoted servant

Henry More.

The Contents of the Preface.

1. The Title of the Discourse how it is to be understood. 2. The Authors submission of his whole Treatise to the infallible Rule of Sacred Writ. 3. A plain and compendious Demonstration that Matter consists of parts *indiscerpible*. 4. An answer to an Objection touching his Demonstration against the Suns superintendency over the affairs of the Earth. 5. A confirmation of Mr. *Hobbs* his Opinion, that Perception is really one with Corporeal Motion and Reaction, if there be nothing but *Matter* in the World. 6. An Apologie for the Vehicles of *Demons* and Souls separate. 7. As also for his so punctually describing the state of the other life, and so curiously defining the nature of a particular Spirit. 8. That his *Elysiums* he describes are not at all Sensual, but Divine. 9. That he has not made the state of the wicked too easy for them in the other world. 10. That it is not one Universal Soule that hears, sees and reasons in every man, demonstrated from the Acts of Memory. 11. Of the *Spirit of Nature*; that it is no obscure Principle, nor unseasonably introduced. 12. That

The Preface.

he has absolutely demonstrated the Existence thereof. 13. That the admission of that Principle need be no hinderance to the progress of *Mechanick Philosophy*. 14. The great pleasure of that study to pious and rational persons. 15. Of what concernment it would be if *Des-Cartes* were generally read in all the Universities of Christendome. 16. An excuse of the prolixity of his Preface from his earnest desire of gratifying the publick, without the least offence to any rational or ingenuous Spirit.

That the present Treatise may pass more freely and smoothly through the hands of men, without any offence or scruple to the good and pious, or any real exception or probable evil from those whose Pretensions are greater to Reason than Religion, I shall endeavour in this Preface to prevent them, by bringing here into view, and more fully explaining and clearing whatever I conceive obnoxious to their mistakes and obloquies.

And indeed I cannot be well assured but that the very Title of my Discourse may seem liable to both their dislikes. To the dislike of the one, as being confident of the contrary conclusion, and therefore secure That that cannot be demonstrated to be true, which they have long since

The Preface.

since judged not worthy to be reckoned in the rank of things probable; it may be not so much as of things possible. To the dislike of the other, as being already perswaded of the truth of our conclusion upon other and better grounds: which would not be better, if the natural light of Reason could afford Demonstration in this matter. And therefore they may haply pretend, that so ambitious a Title seems to jostle with the high Prerogative of Christianity, which has brought life and immortality to light.

But of the former I demand, by what faculty they are made so secure of their being wholly mortal. For unless they will ridiculously conceit themselves inspired, whenas they almost as little believe there is either God or Spirit, as that they have in them an Immortal Soule, they must either pretend to the experience of Sense, or the clearness of Reason. The former whereof is impossible; because these bold deniers of the Immortality of the Soule have not yet experienced whether we subsist after Death or no. But if they would have us believe they have thus concluded upon rational grounds; I dare appeal unto them, if they can produce any stronger reasons for their Cause then what I have set down (Lib. 3. Cap. 14.) and if I have not fully and fundamentally answered them. If they

The Préface.

will say their confidence proceeds from the weak arguings of the adverse party; I answer, it is weakly done of them, (their own Arguments being as unconcluding as they can fancy their adversaries) to be so secure, that Truth is on their own part rather than on theirs. But this can touch onely such managements of this Cause as they have seen already and censured. But that is nothing to me, who could never think I stood safe but upon my own leggs. Wherefore I shall require them onely to peruse what I have written, before they venture to judge thereof; and after they have read, if they will declare that I have not demonstrated the Cause I have undertook, I think it reasonable & just, that they punctually shew in what part or joynt of my Demonstration they discern so weak a coherence as should embolden them still to dissent from the Conclusion.

But to the other I answer with more modesty and submission, That the Title of my Book doth not necessarily imply any promise of so full and perfect a Demonstration, that nothing can be added for the firmer assurance of the Truth; but onely that there may be expected as clear a Proof as Natural Reason will afford us. From which they should rather inferre, that I doe acknowledge a further and a more palpable evidence comprehended

The Preface.

in Christian Religion, and more intelligible and convictive to the generality of the World, who have neither leisure nor inclination to deal with the spinosities and anxieties of humane Reason and Philosophy. But I declined the making use of that Argument at this time; partly because I have a design to speak more fully thereof in my Treatise Of the Mystery of Christian Religion, if God so permit; and partly because it was unsuitable to the present Title, which pretends to handle the matter onely within the bounds of natural Light, unassisted and unguided by any miraculous Revelation.

2. Which will be a pleasant spectacle to such as have a Genius to these kinde of Contemplations, and wholly without danger; they still remembring that it is the voice of Reason & Nature (which being too subject to corruption may very well be defectuous or erroneous in some things) and therefore never trusting their dictates and suggestions, where they clash with the Divine Oracles, they must needs be safe from all seduction: though, I profess, I doe not know any thing which I assert in this Treatise that doth disagree with them. But if any quicker-sighted then my self do discover any thing not according to that Rule, it may be an occasion of humble thankfulness to God for that great priviledge of our being

a 4

born

The Preface.

born under an higher and exacter light : whereby those that are the most perfectly exercis'd therein, are enabled as well to rectify what is perverse, as to supply what is defectuous in the light of Nature ; and they have my free leave afore-hand to doe both thoroughly all along the ensuing Discourse.

And this may serve by way of a more general Defence. But that nothing may be wanting, I shall descend to the making good also of certain particulars, as many as it is of any consequence further to clear and confirm.

3. In the First Book there occurre onely these two that I am aware of. The one concerning the Centre of a particular Spirit, whose Idea I have described, and demonstrated possible. The other concerns my Demonstration of the Impossibility of the Suns seeing any thing upon Earth, supposing him meerly corporeal. In the making good the former, I have taken the boldness to assert, That Matter consists of parts indiscerpible, understanding by indiscerpible parts, particles that have indeed real extension, but so little, that they cannot have less and be any thing at all, and therefore cannot be actually divided. Which minute extension, if you will, you may call Essential (as being such that without that measure of it, the very Being of Matter cannot be

The Preface.

be conserved) as the extension of any Matter compounded of these you may, if you please, term Integral; these parts of this compounded Matter being actually and really separable one from another. The Assertion, I confess, cannot but seem paradoxical at first sight, even to the ingenious and judicious. But that there are such indiscerpible particles into which Matter is divisible, viz. such as have essential extension, and yet have parts utterly inseparable, I shall plainly and compendiously here demonstrate (besides what I have said in the Treatise it self) by this short Syllogism.

That which is actually divisible so farre as actual division any way can be made, is divisible into parts indiscerpible.

But Matter (I mean that Integral or compound Matter) is actually divisible as farre as actual division any way can be made.

It were a folly to goe to prove either my Proposition or Assumption, they being both so clear, that no common notion in Euclide is more clear, into which all Mathematical Demonstrations are resolved.

It cannot but be confessed therefore, That Matter consists of indiscerpible particles, and that Physically and really it is not divisible in infinitum, though the parts that constitute an indiscerpible particle are real, but divisible
only

The Preface.

only intellectuallly; it being of the very essence of whatsoever is, to have parts or extension in some measure or other. For, to take away all Extension, is to reduce a thing onely to a Mathematical point, which is nothing else but pure Negation or Non-entity; and there being no medium betwixt extended and not-extended, no more then there is betwixt Entity and Non-entity, it is plain that if a thing be at all, it must be extended. And therefore there is an Essential Extension belonging to these indiscerpible particles of Matter; which was the other property which was to be demonstrated.

I know unruly Fancy will make mad work here, and clamour against the Conclusion as impossible. For finite Extension (will she say) must needs have Figure, and Figure extuberancy of parts at such a distance, that we cannot but conceive them still actually divisible. But we answer, that when Matter is once actually divided as farre as possibly it can, it is a perfect contradiction it should be divided any further; as it is also that it cannot be divided actually as farre as it can actually be divided. And no stronger Demonstration then this against them can be brought against us by either Fancy or Reason: and therefore supposing we were but equal in our reasoning, this is enough to give me the day,

The Preface.

day, who onely contend for the possibility of the thing. For if I bring but fully as good Demonstration that it is, as the other that it is not, none can deny me but that the thing is possible on my side.

But to answer the above-recited Argument, though they can never answer ours, I say, those indiscerpible particles of Matter have no Figure at all: As infinite Greatness has no Figure, so infinite Littleness has none also. And a Cube infinitely little in the exactest sense, is as perfect a contradiction as a Cube infinitely great in the same sense of Infinity: for the angles would be equal in magnitude to the Hedra thereof. Besides, wise men are assured of many things that their Fancy cannot but play tricks with them in; as in the Infinity of Duration and of Matter, or at least of Space. Of the truth whereof though they are never so certain, yet if they consider this infinite Matter, Space, or Duration, as divided, suppose, into three equal parts (all which must needs be infinite, or else the whole will not be so) the middle part of each will seem both finite and infinite; for it is bounded at both ends. But every thing has two handles, as Epictetus notes; and he is a fool that will burn his fingers with the hot handle, when he may hold safe by the other that is more tractable and cool.

The Preface.

4. Concerning my Demonstration of the Impossibility of the Suns being a Spectator of our particular affairs upon Earth, there is onely this one Objection, viz. That though the Sun indeed, by reason of his great distance, cannot see any particular thing upon Earth, if he kept always in that ordinary shape in which we should suppose that, if he were devoid of sense, he would doe; yet he having life and perception, he may change some part of his Body (as we doe our Eye in contracting or dilating the pupil thereof) into so advantageous a Figure, that the Earth may be made to appear to him as bigge as he pleases. Though some would be more ready to laugh at, then answer to, so odde a surmise, which supposes the Sun blinking and peering so curiously into our affairs, as through a Telescope; yet because it comes in the way of reasoning, I shall have the patience seriously to return this reply. First, that this Objection can pretend to no strength at all, unless the body of the Sun were Organical, as ours is; whereas he is nothing but fluid Light: so that unless he hath a spiritual Being in him, to which this Light should be but the Vehicle, this arbitrary figuring of his fluid Matter cannot be effected. But to grant that there is any such incorporeal Substance in the Sun, is to yield me what I contend for, viz. That
there

The Preface.

there are Immaterial Substances in the World. But that there is no such Divine Principle in him, whereby he can either see us, or aim at the producing any apparition on the Earth in reference to any one of us, by the activity of that Spirit in him, it is apparent from the scum and spots that lie on him. Which is as great an Argument that there is no such Divinity in him as some would attribute to him, (such as Pomponatius, Cardan, Vaninius and others) as the dung of Owls and Sparrows, that is found on the faces and shoulders of Idols in Temples, are clear evidences that they are but dead Images, no true Deities. Lastly, though we should suppose he had a particular sentient and intelligent Spirit in him, yet the consideration of the vast distance of the Earth from him, and the thickness of her Atmosphere, with other disadvantages I have already mentioned in my Treatise, makes it incredible that he should be able to frame his Body into any Figure so exquisite as will compensate these insuperable difficulties.

5. In my Second Book the first Exception is concerning the 20. Axiome, which, say they, I have not proved, but onely brought in the testimony of Mr. Hobbs for the support thereof, which therefore onely enables me to argue with him upon his own Principles, wherein

The Preface.

wherein others will hold themselves unconcerned. But I answer, first, that it will concern all his followers as well as himself, so that it is no contemptible victory to demonstrate against all those so confident Exploders of Immaterial Substances, that their own acknowledged Principles will necessarily inferre the Existence of them in the World. But in the next place, it will not be hard to produce undeniable Reasons to evince the truth of the above-named Axiome, viz. That Sense and Perception in Matter, supposing nothing but Matter in the World, is really the same with Corporeal Motion and Reaction.

For it is plain in Sensation, there being alwayes external motion from Objects when our Senses are affected. And that inward Cogitation is thus performed, appears from the heat that Thinking casts a man into: Wherefore generally all Cogitation is accompanied with motion corporeal. And if there be nothing but Body or Matter in the World, Cogitation it self is really the same thing with Corporeal Motion. Moreover as in Sensation the Corporeal Motion is first, and Perception followes, so it is necessary that universally in all internal Cogitations also certain Corporeal Motions immediately precede those Perceptions, though we did admit that Matter
moved

The Preface.

moved it self : For no Sense would thence arise without resistance of something it hits against. Insomuch that the subtilest Matter unresisted or not imprest upon, would be no more capable of Cogitation then a Wedge of Gold, or Pig of Lead. And therefore if we will but confess (what none but mad men will venture to deny) that a Pig of Lead or Wedge of Gold has not any Thought or Perception at all without some knock or allision proportionable to their bigness and solidity, the subtilest Matter must likewise have none without some proportionable impression or resistance. Whence it is plain that alwaies corporeal Reaction or collision precedes Perception, and that every Perception is a kind of feeling, which lasts so long as this resistance or impress of motion lasts, but that ceasing is extinguish'd, the matter being then as stupid as in a Pig of Lead. And that therefore as in general there is alwaies corporeal motion where there is Cogitation, so the diversification of this motion and collision causes the diversification of cogitations, and so they run hand in hand perpetually, the one never being introduced without the fore-leading of the other, nor lasting longer then the other lasteth. But as heat is lost (which implies a considerable motion or agitation of some very subtile Matter,) so our Understanding and Imagination decays, and our Senses

The Preface.

Senses themselves fail, as not being able to be moved by the impression of outward Objects, or as not being in a due degree of liquidity and agility, and therefore in death our bodies become as senseless as a lump of clay.

All Sensation therefore and Perception is really the same with Motion and Reaction of Matter, if there be nothing but Matter in the world.

And that every piece of Matter must perceive according as it self is moved, whether by it self (if it were possible) or by corporeal impress from other parts, is plain, in that Matter has no subtile rays, or any power or efflux streaming beyond it self, like that which the Schools call species intentionales, nor yet any union more mysterious then the mere Juxtaposition of parts.

For hence it is manifest that there can be no communication of any impress that one part of the Matter receives or is affected with from another at a distance, but it must be by jogging or crowding the parts interjacent. So that in every regard corporeal Motion or Reaction, with sufficient tenuity of parts and due duration, will be the adequate cause of all perception, if there be nothing but Matter in the world. This I think may suffice to assure any indifferent man of the truth of this part of Mr. Hobbs his Assertion, if himself could make

The Preface.

make the other part true, That there is nothing existent in Nature but what is purely corporeal. But out of the former part, which is his own acknowledged Principle, I have undeniably demonstrated that there is.

6. The other Exception is against that Opinion I seem to embrace touching the Vehicles of Damons and Souls separate, as having herein offended against the authority of the Schooles. And I profess this is all the reason I can imagine that they can have against my Assertion. But they may, if they please, remember that the Schooles trespass against a more antient authority then themselves, that is to say, the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Jewish Doctours, and the Fathers of the Church, who all hold that even the purest Angels have corporeal Vehicles. But it will be hard for the Schools to alledge any antient Authority for their Opinion. For Aristotle their great Oracle is utterly silent in this matter, as not so much as believing the existence of Demons in the world (as Pomponatius and Vanninus his sworn disciples have to their great contentment taken notice of.) And therefore being left to their own dry subtilties, they have made all Intellectual Beings that are not grossly terrestrial, as Man is, purely immaterial. Whereby they make a very hideous Chasme or gaping breach in the order of things,

b

such

The Preface.

such as no moderate judgment will ever allow of, and have become very obnoxious to be foyled by Atheistical wits, who are forward and skilful enough to draw forth the absurd consequences that lye hid in false suppositions, as Vaninus does in this. For he does not foolishly collect from the supposed pure Immateriality of Dæmons, that they have no knowledge of particular things upon Earth; such purely Incorporeal Essences being uncapable of impression from Corporeal Objects, and therefore have not the Species of any particular thing that is corporeal in their minde. Whence he infers that all Apparitions, Prophecies, Prodigies, and whatsoever miraculous is recorded in antient History, is not to be attributed to these, but to the influence of the Stars, and so concludes that there are indeed no such things as Damons in the Universe.

By which kinde of reasoning also it is easy for the Psychopannychites to support their opinion of the Sleep of the Soule. For the Soule being utterly rescinded from all that is corporeal, and having no vital union therewith at all, they will be very prone to infer, that it is impossible she should know any thing ad extrâ, if she can so much as dream. For even that power also may seem incompetible to her in such a state, she having such an essential aptitude for vital union with Matter. Of so
great

The Preface.

great consequence is it sometimes to desert the opinion of the Schooles, when something more rational and more safe and useful offers it self unto us.

7. These are the main Objections my first and second Book seem liable unto. My last I cannot but suspect to be more obnoxious. But the most common Exception I foresee that will be against it, is, That I have taken upon me to describe the state of the other World so punctually and particularly, as if I had been lately in it. For over-exquisiteness may seem to smel of art and fraud. And as there is a diffidence many times in us when we hear something that is extremely sutable to our desire, being then most ready to think it too good to be true; so also in Notions that seem over-accurately fitted to our Intellectual faculties, and agree the most naturally therewith, we are prone many times to suspect them to be too easy to be true; especially in things that seemed at first to us very obscure and intricate. For which cause also it is very likely that the notion of a particular Spirit, which I have so accurately described in my First Book, Cap. 5, 6, 7. may seem the less credible to some, because it is now made so clearly intelligible, they thinking it utterly improbable that these things, that have been held alwaies such inextricable perplexities, should be thus of a suddain made manifest

The Preface.

and familiar to any that has but a competency of Patience and Reason to peruse the Theory.

But for my own part, I shall not assume so much to my self, as peremptorily to affirm that the Indiscerpibility of a Spirit arises that way that I have set down, that is to say, that God has made a particular Spirit just in that manner that I have delineated. For his Wisdom is infinite, and therefore it were an impious piece of boldness to confine him to one certain way of framing the nature of a Being, that is, of endowing it with such attributes as are essential to it, as Indiscerpibility is to the Soule of Man. But onely to have said in general, it is possible there may be a particular Essence of its immediate nature penetrable & indiscerpible, and not particularly to have described the manner how it may be so, might have seemed to many more slight and unsatisfactory, Deceit lurking in Universals, as the Proverb has it. And therefore for the more fully convincing of the adverse party, I thought fit to pitch upon a punctual description of some one way, how the Soule of Man or of a Dæmon may be conceived necessarily indiscerpible, though dilatable; not being very solicitous whether it be just that way or no, but yet well assured that it is either that way or some better. But this one way shewes the thing possible

The Preface.

possible at large : (As that mean contrivance of an Indian Canoa might prove the possibility of Navigation.) And that is all that I was to aime at in that place.

So in my description of the state of the other world, I am not very solicitous whether things be just so as I have set them down, but because some men utterly misbelieve the thing, because they can frame no particular conceit what the Receptions and Entertains of those Aerial Inhabitants may be, or how they pass away their time, with many other intricacies which use to entangle this Theory ; I thought it of main concernment to take away this objection against the Life to come (viz. That no man can conceive what it is, and therefore it is not at all, which is the ordinary Exception also against the Existence of all Incorporeal Substances) by a punctual and rational Description of this future state. Which I exhibite to the world as an intelligible Hypothesis, and such as may very wel be, even according to the dictates of our own Faculties, being in the mean time fully assured, that things are either thus, or after a better or more exact order. But, as I said, to propound some particular probable way, I thought it of no small service to those who totally distrust all these things for that reason mainly, as being such as we can make no rational representation

The Preface.

sentation of to the understandings of men.

8. But there are also particular Objections. The first whereof is against our Aerial and Æthereal Elysiums, which forsooth, to make their reproach more witty, they will parallel with the Mahometan Paradise. But besides that I doe in the very place where I treat of these things suspend my assent after the description of them, there is nothing there offered in their description, but, if it were assented to, might become the most refined spirit in the World. For there is nothing more certain then that the love of God and our Neighbour is the greatest happiness that we can arrive unto either in this life or that which is to come. And whatever things are there described, are either the Causes, Effects, or Concomitants of that noble and divine Passion. Neither are the External incitements thereto, which I there mention, rightly to be deemed Sensual, but Intellectual: For even such is also sensible Beauty, whether it shew it self in Feature, Musick, or whatever graceful Departments and comely Actions, as Plotinus has well defined. And those things that are not properly Intellectual, suppose Odours and Sapours, yet such a Spirit may be transfused into the Vehicles of these Aerial Inhabitants thereby, that may more then ordinarily raise into act their Intellectual Faculties. Which

he

The Preface.

he that observes how our Thoughts and Inclinations depend immediately on a certain subtle Matter in our Bodies, will not at all stick to acknowledge to be true. And therefore whatever our Elysiums seem to the rash and injudicious, they are really no other thing then pure Paradises of intellectual pleasure, divine Love and blameless Friendship being the onely delight of those places.

9. The next Objection is concerning the state of the Wicked, as if I had made their condition too easy for them. But this methinks any man might be kept off from, if he would but consider, that I make the rack of Conscience worse then a perpetually-repeated death. Which is too too credible to come to pass there, whenas we finde what execution Passions will doe upon us even in this life; the Sicilian Tyrants having not found out a more exquisite torture then they. And as for those Souls that have lost the sense of Conscience, if any can doe so, I have allotted other punishments that are more corporeal, and little inferiour to the fire of that great Hell that is prophesied of, as the portion of the Devils and the damned at the last Day. By which neither then nor before could they be tortured (if we appeal to humane Reason, whom alone we appeal to, as judge, in this Treatise) if they were not vitally united with corporeal Vehicles.

The Preface.

10. The two last Exceptions are, the one touching the Soul of the World, the other the Spirit of Nature. The first is against our over-favourable representation of their Opinion, that make but one Soul in the whole Universe, induing her with Sense, Reason, and Understanding: which Soul they will have to act in all Animals, Dæmons themselves not excepted. In all which, say they, it is one and the same Universal Soul that Hears, Sees, Reasons, Understands, &c. This Opinion I think I have confuted Lib. 3. Cap. 16. as sufficiently as any one Error can be confuted in all Natural Philosophy. And that favourable representation I have made there of it, Sect. 4. has that in it, whereby, unless a man be very remiss and mindless, he may easily demonstrate the falseness of the Supposition. For though we may well enough imagine how, the Body being unchanged, and this Soul of the Universe exquisitely the same every where, that though the party change place, and shift into another part of the Soul of the World, he may retain the same Opinions, Imaginations and Reasonings, so farre forth as they depend not on Memory (this Universal Soul raising her self into the same Thoughts upon the same Occasions;) yet Memory is incompetent unto that part which has not had the perception before

The Preface.

fore of what is remembred. For there is necessarily comprehended in Memory a Sense or Perception that we have had a Perception or Sense afore of the thing which we conceive our selves to remember.

To be short therefore, and to strike this Opinion dead at one stroke; They that say there is but one Soule of the World, whose perceptive Power is every where, they must assert, that what one part thereof perceives, all the rest perceives; or else that perceptions in Damons, Men and Brutes are confined to that part of this Soul that is in them, while they perceive this or that. If the former, they are confutable by Sense and Experience. For though all Animals lie steeped; as it were, in that subtile Matter which runs through all things, and is the immediate Instrument of Sense and Perception; yet we are not conscious of one anothers thoughts, nor feel one anothers pains, nor the pains and pleasures of Brutes, when they are in them at the highest. Nor yet doe the Dæmons feel one anothers affections, or necessarily assent to one anothers opinions, though their Vehicles be exceeding pervious; else they would be all Avenroists, as well as those that appeared to Facius Cardanus, supposing any were. Wherefore we may generally conclude, that if there were such an Universal Soul,

The Preface.

Soul, yet the particular perceptions thereof are restrained to this or that part in which they are made: which is contrary to the Unity of a Soul, as I have already said in its due place.

But let us grant the thing (for indeed we have demonstrated it to be so, if there be such an Universal Soule and none but it) then the grand absurdity comes in, which I was intimating before, to wit, That that part of the Soule of the world that never perceived a thing, shall notwithstanding remember it, that is to say, that it shall perceive it has perceived that which it never perceived: And yet one at Japan may remember a countryman arrived thither that he had not seen nor thought of for twenty years before. Nay, which is more to the purpose, supposing the Earth move, what I write now, the Earth being in the beginning of Aries, I shall remember that I have written when she is in the beginning of Libra, though that part of the Soule of the World that possesses my Body then will be twice as distant from what does guide my hand to write now, as the Earth is from the Sun. Wherefore it is plain that such an Universal Soule will not salve all Phænomena, but there must be a particular Soule in every man. And yet I dare say, this wilde opinion is more tenable then theirs that make nothing but meer Matter

The Preface.

Matter in the world. But I thought it worth the while with all diligence to confute them both, the better of them being but a more refined kinde of Atheisme, tending to the subversion of all the Fundamentals of Religion and Piety amongst men.

II. As for the Spirit of Nature, the greatest exceptions are, that I have introduced an obscure Principle for Ignorance and Sloth to take sanctuary in, and so to enervate or fore-slack the usefull endeavours of curious Wits, and hinder that expected progress that may be made in the Mechanick Philosophy; and this, to aggravate the crime, before a competent search be made what the Mechanical powers of Matter can doe. For what Mechanical solutions the present or foregoing Ages could not light upon, the succeeding may; and therefore it is as yet unseasonable to bring in any such principle into Natural Philosophy.

To which I answer, That the principle we speak of is neither obscure nor unseasonable; nor so much introduced by me, as forced upon me by inevitable evidence of Reason. That it is no obscure Principle, the clear Description I have given of it, Lib. 3. Cap. 12. will make good. Those that pretend that the introduction thereof is unseasonable, I demand of them when they will think it to be seasonable. For this simple surmise, That although all the
Mecha-

The Preface.

Mechanical Solutions of some Phænomena which have been hitherto offer'd to the world be demonstrably false, yet future Ages may light upon what is true, can be held nothing else by the judicious, but a pittiful subterfuge of fearful Souls, that are very loath to let in any such affrightful Notion as an Immaterial or Spiritual Substance into the world, for fear the next step must be the acknowledgment also of a God; from whom they would fain hide themselves by this poore and precarious pretence. But I say, if the introduction of this Principle be not seasonable now, it will never be seasonable. For that admirable Master of Mechanicks Des-Cartes has improved this way to the highest, I dare say, that the wit of man can reach to in such Phænomena as he has attempted to render the causes of. But how in sundry passages he falls short in his account, I have both in the forenamed and following Chapter, as also elsewhere, taken notice. I will instance here onely in the Phænomenon of Gravity, wherein I think I have perfectly demonstrated that both he and Mr. Hobbs are quite out of the story, and that the causes they assign are plainly false. And that I have not mentioned the opinions of others in this way, it was onely because I lookt upon them as less considerable.

12. But you'l say that though these be all mistaken,

The Preface.

mistaken, yet it does not follow but that there may arise some happy Wit that will give a true Mechanical solution of this Probleme. But I answer, that I have not onely confuted their Reasons, but also from Mechanical principles granted on all sides and confirmed by experience, demonstrated that the descent suppose of a Stone or Bullet or any such like heavy Body is enormously contrary to the Lawes of Mechanicks, and that according to them they would necessarily, if they lye loose, recede from the Earth, and be carried away out of our sight into the farthest parts of the Aire, if some power more then Mechanical did not curbe that Motion, and force them downwards towards the Earth. So that it is plain that we have not arbitrarily introduced a Principle, but that it is forced upon us by the undeniable evidence of Demonstration. From which to suspend our assent till future Ages have improved this Mechanical Philosophy to greater height, is as ridiculous, as to doubt of the truth of any one plain and easy Demonstration in the first Book of Euclide, till we have travelled through the whole field of that immense study of Mathematicks.

13. Nor lastly needs the acknowledgment of this Principle to damp our endeavours in the search of the Mechanical causes of the Phænomena of Nature, but rather make us
more

The Preface.

more circumspect to distinguish what is the result of the meer Mechanical powers of Matter and Motion, and what of an higher Principle. For questionless this secure presumption in some, that there is nothing but Matter in the world, has emboldned them too rashly to venture on Mechanical solutions where they would not hold, because they were confident there were no other salutions to be had but those of this kinde.

14. Besides that to the rational and religious there is a double pleasure to carry them on in this way of Philosophy: The one from the observation how far in every thing the concatenation of Mechanical causes will reach, which will wonderfully gratify their Reason; The other from a distinct deprehension where they must needs break off, as not being able alone to reach the Effect, which necessarily leads them to a more confirmed discovery of the Principle we contend for, namely the Spirit of Nature, which is the vicarious power of God upon the Matter, and the first step to the abstrusest mysteries in Natural Theologie; which must needs highly gratify them in point of Religion.

15. And truly for this very cause, I think it is the most sober and faithful advice that can be offered to the Christian World, that they would encourage the reading of Des-
Cartes

The Preface.

Cartes in all publick Schools or Universities. That the Students of Philosophy may be thoroughly exercised in the just extent of the mechanical powers of Matter, how farre they will reach, and where they fall short. Which will be the best assistance to Religion that Reason and the knowledge of Nature can afford. For by this means such as are intended to serve the Church will be armed sometimes with sufficient strength to grapple with their proudest Deriders or Opposers. Whenas for want of this, we see how liable they are to be contemned and born down by every bold though weak pretender to the Mechanick Philosophy.

16. These are the main passages I could any way conceive might be excepted against in the ensuing Discourse: which yet are so innocent and firm in themselves, and so advantageously circumstantiated in the places where they are found, that I fear the Reader may suspect my judgement and discretion in putting my self to the trouble of writing, and him of reading, so long and needles a Preface. Which oversight though it be an argument of no great wit, yet it may be of much Humanity, and of an earnest desire of doing a publick good without the least offence or dis-satisfaction to any that are but tolerable Retainers to Reason and Ingenuity. But
for

The Preface.

for those that have bid adieu to both, and measure all Truths by their own humourfome fancy, making every thing ridiculous that is not futable to their own ignorant conceptions; I think no serious man will hold himself bound to take notice of their perverse constructions and mis-representations of things, more then a religious Eremitte or devout Pilgrim to heed the ugly mows and grimaces of Apes and Mon-kies he may haply meet with in his passage through the Wilderneß.


THE

THE IMMORTALITY

of the SOUL.

CHAP. I.

1. *The usefulness of the present Speculation for the understanding of Providence, and the management of our lives for our greatest happiness ; 2. For the moderate bearing the death and disasters of our Friends ; 3. For the begetting true Magnanimitie in us, 4. and Peace and Tranquillitie of minde. 5. That so weighty a Theory is not to be handled perfunctorily.*

I.  F all the Speculations the Soul of man can entertain her self withall, there is none of greater moment, or of closer concernment to her, then this of her own Immortality, and Independence on this terrestriall body. For hereby not onely the intricacies and perplexities of Providence are made more easy and smooth to her, and

B

she

she becomes able, by unravelling this clue from end to end, to pass and repass safe through this Labyrinth, wherein many both anxious and careless Spirits have lost themselves; but also (which touches her own interest more particularly) being once raised into the knowledge and belief of so weighty a Conclusion, she may view from this Prospect the most certain and most compendious way to her own *Happiness*; which is, the bearing a very moderate affection to what ever tempts her, during the time of this her Pilgrimage, and a carefull preparing of her self for her future condition, by such Noble actions and Heroicall qualifications of mind, as shall render her most welcome to her own Countrey.

2. Which Belief and Purpose of hers will put her in an utter incapacity of either *envying* the life or successes of her most embittered Enemies, or of *over-lamenting* the death or misfortunes of her dearest Friends; she having no friends but such as are friends to God and Vertue, and whose afflictions will prove advantages for their future Felicitie, and their departure hence a passage to present possession thereof.

3. Wherefore, being fully grounded and rooted in this so concerning a Perswasion, she is freed from all *poore & abject* thoughts and

and designes; and as little admires him that gets the most of this World, be it by Industry, Fortune or Policie, as a discreet and serious man does the spoiles of School-boys; it being very inconsiderable to him, who got the victory at Cocks or Cob-nut, or whose bag returned home the fullest stuffed with Counters or Cherry-stones.

4. She has therefore no *emulation*, unless it be of doing good, and of out-stripping, if it were possible, the noblest examples of either the present or past Ages; nor any *contest*, unless it be with her self, that she has made no greater proficiency towards the scope she aims at: and aiming at nothing but what is not in the power of men to confer upon her, with courage she sets upon the main work; and being still more faithfull to her self, and to that Light that assists her, at last tastes the first fruits of her future Harvest, and does more then presage that great Happiness that is accrewing to her. And so quit from the troubles and anxieties of this present world, *staies* in it with *Tranquillitie* and *Content*; and at last *leaves* it with *Foy*.

5. The Knowledge therefore and belief of the *Immortalitie of the Soule* being of so grand Importance, we are engaged more carefully and punctually to handle this so

weighty a Theory: which will not be performed by multiplying of words, but by a more frugall use of them, letting nothing fall from our pen, but what makes closely to the matter, nor omitting any thing materiall for the evincing the truth thereof.

CHAP. II.

1. That the Soules Immortality is demonstrable, by the Authors method, to all but metaphysicall Scepticks. 2. An Illustration of his First Axiome. 3. A confirmation and example of the Second. 4. An explication of the Third. 5. An explication and proof of the Fourth. 6. A proof of the Fifth. 7. Of the Sixth. 8. An example of the seventh. 9. A confirmation of the truth of the Eighth. 10. A demonstration and example of the Ninth. 11. Penetrability the immediate property of Incorporeall substance. 12. As also Indiscernibility. 13. A proof and illustration of the tenth Axiome.

1. **A**ND to stop all Creep-holes, and leave no place for the subterfuges and evasions of confused and cavilling spirits, I shall prefix some few Axiomes, of the plainness

plainness and evidence, that no man in his wits but will be ashamed to deny them, if he will admit any thing at all to be true. But as for perfect *Scepticisme*, it is a disease incurable, and a thing rather to be pittied or laught at, then seriously opposed. For when a man is so fugitive and unsettled, that he will not stand to the verdict of his own faculties, one can no more fasten any thing upon him, then he can write in the water, or tie knots of the wind. But for those that are not in such a strange despondency, but that they think they know something already and may learn more, I doe not doubt, but by a seasonable recourse to these few Rules, with others I shall set down in their due place, that they will be perswaded, if not forced, to reckon this Truth, of the *Immortality* of the Soul, amongst such as must needs appear undeniable to those that have parts and leisure enough accurately to examine, and thoroughly to understand what I have here written for the demonstration thereof.

AXIOME I.

What ever things are in themselves, they are nothing to us, but so far forth as they become known to our Faculties or Cognitive powers.

2. **T**His *Axiome* is plain of it self, at the very first proposal. For as nothing, for example, can concern the Visive faculty, but so far forth as it is visible; so there is nothing that can challenge any stroak to so much as a touching, much less determining our Cognitive powers in generall, but so far forth as it is cognoscible.

AXIOME II.

Whatsoever is unknown to us, or is known but as meerly possible, is not to move us, or determine us any way, or make us undetermined; but we are to rest in the present light and plain determination of our own Faculties.

3. **T**His is an evident Consectary from the foregoing *Axiome*. For the Existence of that that is *meerly possible* is utterly unknown to us to be; and therefore is to have

no weight against any Conclusion, unless we will condemn our selves to eternall *Scepticisme*. As for example, if after a man has argued for a *God* and *Providence*, from the wise contrivance in the frame of all the bodyes of Animals upon earth, one should reply, That there may be, for all this, Animals in *Saturn*, *Jupiter*, or some other of the Planets, of very inept fabricks; Horses, suppose, and other Creatures, with onely one eye, and one eare, and that both on a side, the eye placed also where the ear should be, and with onely three leggs; Bulls and Rams with horns on their backs, and the like: Such allegations as these, according to this Axiome, are to be held of no force at all for the enervating the Conclusion. See my *Antidote against Atheisme*, lib. 1. cap. 2. and 9.

AXIOME III.

All our Faculties have not a right of suffrage for determining of Trnth, but onely Common Notions, Externall Sense, and evident and undeniable Deductions of Reason.

4. **BY** *Common Notions* I understand what ever is *Noëmatically* true, that is to say, true at first sight to all men in their wits,
B 4
upon

upon a clear perception of the Terms, without any further discourse or reasoning. From *Externall Sense* I exclude not *Memory*, as it is a faithfull Register thereof. And by *undeniable Deduction of Reason*, I mean such a collection of one Truth from another, that no man can discover any looseness or disjoyntedness in the cohesion of the Argument.

AXIOME IV.

What is not consonant to all or some of these, is meer Fancy, and is of no moment for the evincing of Truth or Falsehood, by either it's Vigour or Perplexiveness.

5. **I** Say *meer Fancy*, in Counter-distinction to such Representations as, although they be not the pure impresses of some reall Object, yet are made by *Rationall deduction* from them, or from *Common Notions*, or from both. Those Representations that are not framed upon such grounds, I call *meer Fancies*; which are of no value at all in determining of Truth. For if *Vigour* of Fancy will argue a thing true, then all the dreams of mad-men must goe for Oracles: and if the *Perplexiveness* of Imagination may hinder assent, we must not believe Mathematicall

maticall demonstration, and the 16. Proposition of the 3^d Book of *Euclide* will be confidently concluded to contain a contradiction. See my Antidote lib. 1. cap. 4.

A X I O M E V.

Whatever is clear to any one of these Three Faculties, is to be held undoubtedly true, the other having nothing to evidence to the contrary.

6. **O**R else a man shall not be assured of any sensible object that he meets with, nor can give firm assent to such Truths as these, *It is impossible the same thing should be, and not be, at once; Whatever is, is either finite, or infinite; and the like,*

A X I O M E VI.

What is rejected by one, none of the other Faculties giving evidence for it, ought to goe for a Falshehood.

7. **O**R else a man may let pass such Impossibilities as these for Truth, or doubt whether they be not true or no, viz. *The part is greater then the whole; There is something that is neither finite nor infinite. Socrates is invisible; and the like.*

A X I.

A X I O M E VII.

What is plainly and manifestly concluded, ought to be held undeniable, when no difficulties are alledged against it, but such as are acknowledged to be found in other Conclusions held by all men undeniably true.

8. **A**S for example, suppose one should conclude, *That there may be Infinite Matter, or, That there is Infinite Space,* by very rationall arguments; and that it were objected onely, *That then the Tenth part of that Matter would be infinite;* it being most certain *That there is Infinite Duration of something or other in the world,* and that the Tenth part of this Duration is infinite; it is no enervating at all of the former Conclusion, it being incumbred with no greater incongruitie then is acknowledged to consist with an undeniable Truth.

A X I O M E VIII.

The Subject, or naked Essence or Substance of a thing, is utterly unconceivable to any of our Faculties.

9. **F**OR the evidencing of this Truth, there needs nothing more then a silent appeal

peal to a mans owne mind, if he doe not find it so; and that if he take away all *Aptitudes, Operations, Properties and Modifications* from a *Subject*, that his conception thereof vanishes into nothing, but into the *Idea* of a meer *Undiversificated Substance*, so that one *Substance* is not then distinguishable from another, but onely from *Accidents* or *Modes*, to which properly belongs no subsistence.

A X I O M E IX

There are some Properties, Powers and Operations, immediately appertaining to a thing, of which no reasons can be given, nor ought to be demanded, nor the Way or Manner of the cohesion of the Attribute with the Subject can by any meanes be fancied or imagined.

10. **T**HE evidence of this Axiome appears from the former. For if the *naked substance* of a Thing be so utterly unconceivable, there can be nothing apprehended there to be a connexion betwixt it and it's first Properties. Such is *Actuall Divisibility* and *Impenetrability* in Matter. By *Actuall Divisibility* I understand *Discerpi-bility*, gross tearing or cutting one part from another.

another. These are immediate properties of Matter, but why they should be there, rather than in any other Subject, no man can pretend to give, or with any credit aske the reason. For *Immediate Attributes* are indemonstrable; otherwise they would not be Immediate.

11. So the Immediate Properties of a *Spirit* or Immateriall Substance are *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility*. The necessary cohesion of which Attributes with the Subject is as little demonstrable as the former. For supposing that, which I cannot but assert, to be evidently true, That there is no Substance but it has in some sort or other the Three dimensions; This Substance, which we call *Matter*, might as well have been penetrable as impenetrable, and yet have been Substance: But now that it does so certainly and irresistibly keep one part of it self from penetrating another, it is so, we know not why. For there is no necessary connexion discernible betwixt Substance with three dimensions, and Impenetrability. For what some alledge, that it implyes a contradiction, That extended substance should run one part into another; for so part of the Extension, and consequently of the Substance, would be lost; this, I say,
(if

(if nearly looked into) is of no force. For the Substance is no more lost in this case, then when a string is doubled and redoubled, or a piece of wax reduced from a long figure to a round: The dimension of Longitude is in some part lost, but without detriment to the Substance of the wax. In like manner when one part of an extended Substance runs into another, something both of Longitude, Latitude and Profundity may be lost, and yet all the Substance there still; as well as Longitude lost in the other case without any loss of the Substance. And as what was lost in Longitude was gotten in Latitude or Profundity before, so what is lost here in all or any two of the dimensions, is kept safe in *Essential Spissitude*. For so I will call this Mode or Property of a Substance, that is able to receive one part of it self into another. Which fourth Mode is as easy and familiar to my Understanding, as that of the Three dimensions to my Sense or Fancy. For I mean nothing else by *Spissitude*, but the redoubling or contracting of Substance into less space then it does sometimes occupy. And Analogous to this is the lying of two Substances of several kinds in the same place at once. To both these may be applied the termes of *Reduplicatian* and *Saturation*: The former when Essence or Substance

stance is but once redoubled into it self or into another ; the latter when so oft, that it will not easily admit any thing more. And that more extensions then one may be commensurate, at the same time, to the same Place, is plain, in that Motion is coextended with the Subject wherein it is, and both with Space. And Motion is not nothing ; wherefore two things may be commensurate to one space at once.

12. Now then Extended Substance (and all Substances are extended) being of it self indifferent to Penetrability or Impenetrability, and we finding one kind of Substance so impenetrable, that one part will not enter at all into another (which with as much reason we might expect to find so irresistibly united one part with another that nothing in the world could dissever them. For this *Indiscerpibility* has as good a connexion with Substance as *Impenetrability* has, they neither falling under the cognoscence of Reason or Demonstration ; but being immediate Attributes of such a Subject. For a man can no more argue from the Extension of Substance, that it is *Discerpible*, then that it is *Penetrable* ; there being as good a capacity in Extension for Penetration as Discerption) I conceive, I say, from hence we may as easily admit that some Substance may be of

it

it self *Indiscerpible*, as well as others *Im-penetrable*; and that as there is one kind of Substance, which of it's own nature is *Im-penetrable* and *Discerpible*, so there may be another *Indiscerpible* and *Penetrable*. Neither of which a man can give any other account of, then that they have the immediate Properties of such a Subject.

AXIOME X.

The discovery of some Power, Property, or Operation, incompatible to one Subject, is an infallible argument of the existence of some other, to which it must be compatible.

13. **A**S when *Pythagoras* was spoken unto by the River *Nessus*, when he passed over it, and a Tree by the command of *Thespesion* the chief of the *Gymnosophists* saluted *Apollonius* in a distinct and articulate voice, but small as a womans; it is evident, I say, That there was something there that was neither River nor Tree, to which these salutations must be attributed, no Tree nor River having any Faculty of Reason nor Speech.

CHAP. III.

1. *The general notions of Body and Spirit.*
2. *That the notion of Spirit is altogether as intelligible as that of Body.*
3. *Whether there be any Substance of a mixt nature, betwixt Body and Spirit.*

1. **T**HE greatest and grossest obstacle to the belief of the Immortality of the Soul, is that confident opinion in some, as if the very notion of a *Spirit* were a piece of Non-sense and perfect Incongruity in the conception thereof. Wherefore to proceed by degrees to our maine designe, and to lay our foundation low and sure, we will in the first place expose to view the genuine notion of a *Spirit*, in the generall acception thereof; and afterwards of *several kindes of Spirits*: that it may appear to all, how unjust that cavill is against Incorporeall substances, as if they were meer Impossibilities and contradictory Inconsistencies. I will define therefore a *Spirit* in generall thus, *A substance penetrable and indiscerpible*. The fitness of which definition will be the better understood, if we divide Substance in generall into these first kindes, viz. *Body and Spirit*,

rit, and then define *Body* to be *A Substance impenetrable and discernible*. Whence the contrary kind to this is fitly defined, *A Substance penetrable and indiscernible*.

2. Now I appeale to any man that can set aside prejudice, and has the free use of his Faculties, whether every term in the definition of a *Spirit* be not as intelligible and congruous to reason, as in that of a *Body*. For the precise notion of Substance is the same in both, in which, I conceive, is comprised *Extension* and *Activity* either connate or communicated. For matter it self once moved can move other matter. And it is as easy to understand what *Penetrable* is, as *Impenetrable*, and what *Indiscernible* as *Discernible*; and *Penetrability* and *Indiscernibility* being as immediate to *Spirit*, as *Impenetrability* and *Discernibility* to *Body*, there is as much reason to be given for the attributes of the one as of the other, by Axiome 9. And Substance in its precise notion including no more of *Impenetrability* then *Indiscernibility*, we may as well wonder how one kind of Substance can so firmly and irresistibly keep out another Substance (as Matter for example does the parts of Matter) as that the parts of another Substance hold so fast together, that they are by no means *Discernible*, as we have

C

already

already intimated: And therefore this *holding out* in one being as difficult a business to conceive as the *holding together* in the other, this can be no prejudice to the notion of a Spirit. For there may be very fast union where we cannot at all imagine the cause thereof, as in such Bodies which are exceeding hard, where no man can fancy what holds the parts together so strongly; and there being no greater difficulty here, then that a man cannot imagine what holds the parts of a Spirit together, it will follow by Axiome 7. that the notion of a *Spirit* is not to be excepted against as an incongruous notion, but is to be admitted for the notion of a thing that may really exist.

3. It may be doubted, whether there may not be Essences of a middle condition betwixt these Corporeal and Incorporeal Substances we have described, and that of two sorts, The one *Impenetrable and Indiscernible*, the other *Penetrable and Discernible*. But concerning the first, if Impenetrability be understood in reference to Matter, it is plaine there can be no such Essence in the world; and if in reference to its own parts, though it may then look like a possible Idea in it self, yet there is no footsteps of the existence thereof in Nature, the Souls of men and Dæmons implying contraction and dilatation

lation in them. As for the latter, it has no privilege for any thing more then Matter it self has, or some Mode of Matter. For it being Discerpible, it is plain it's union is by *Juxtaposition* of parts, and the more penetrable, the less likely to conveigh sense and motion to any distance. Besides the ridiculous sequel of this supposition, that will fill the Universe with an infinite number of shreds and rags of Souls and Spirits, never to be reduced again to any use or order. And lastly, the proper notion of a Substance Incorporeal fully counter-distinct to a Corporeal Substance, necessarily including in it so strong and indissoluble union of parts, that it is utterly Indiscerpible, whenas yet for all that in this general notion thereof neither sense nor cogitation is implied, it is most rational to conceive, that that Substance wherein they are must assuredly be Incorporeal in the strictest signification; the nature of cogitation and communion of sense arguing a more perfect degree of union then is in meer Indiscerpibility of parts. But all this Scrupulositie might have been saved; For I confidently promise my self, that there are none so perversly given to tergiversations and subterfuges, but that they will acknowledge, whereever I can prove that there is a Sub-

stance distinct from Body or Matter, that it is in the most full and proper sense *Incorporeal*.

CHAP. IV.

1. *That the notions of the several kinds of Immateriall Beings have no Inconsistencie nor Incongruitie in them.*
2. *That the nature of God is as intelligible as the nature of any Being whatsoever.*
3. *The true notion of his Ubiquity, and how intelligible it is.*
4. *Of the union of the Divine Essence.*
5. *Of his power of Creation.*

1. **WE** have shewn, that the notion of a Spirit in general is not at all incongruous nor impossible: And it is as congruous, consistent and intelligible in the sundry kinds thereof; as for example that of God, of Angels, of the Souls of Men and Brutes, and of the *λόγοι πνευματικοί* or *Seminal Forms* of things.

2. The notion of God, though the knowledge thereof be much prejudiced by the confoundedness and stupidity of either superstitious or profane men, that please themselves in their large Rhetorickations, concerning

cerning the unconceivableness and utter incomprehensibleness of the Deity ; the one by way of a devotional exaltation of the transcendency of his nature, the other to make the belief of his existence ridiculous, and craftily and perversly to intimate that there is no God at all, the very conception of him being made to appear nothing else but a bundle of inconsistencies and impossibilities ; Nevertheless I shall not at all stick to affirm, that His Idea or Notion is as easy as any Notion else whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the world. For the very Essence or naked Substance of nothing can possibly be known by Axiome 8. But for His Attributes, they are as conspicuous as the attributes of any Subject or Substance whatever ; From which a man may easily define him thus ; *God is a Spirit eternal, infinite in essence and goodness, omniscient, omnipotent, and of himself necessarily existent.* I appeal to any man, if every term in this Definition be not sufficiently intelligible. For as for *Spirit*, that has been already defined and explained. By *Eternal* I understand nothing here but Duration without end or beginning: by *Infiniteness of essence*, that his Essence or Substance has no bounds, no more then his Duration: by *Infinite in*

goodness, such a benign will in God as is carried out to boundless and innumerable benefactions: by *Omniscience* and *Omnipotence*, the ability of knowing or doing any thing that can be conceived without a plain contradiction: by *Self-existence*, that he has his Being from none other: and by *necessary Existence*, that he cannot fail to be. What terms of any Definition are more plain then these of this? or what Subject can be more accurately defined then this is? For the naked Subject or Substance of any thing is no otherwise to be known then thus. And they that gape after any other Speculative knowledg of God then what is from his Attributes and Operations, they may have their heads and mouths filled with many hot scalding fancies and words, and run mad with the boysterousness of their own Imagination, but they will never hit upon any sober Truth.

3. Thus have I delivered a very explicit and intelligible notion of the nature of God; which I might also more compendiously define, *An Essence absolutely perfect*, in which all the terms of the former Definition are comprehended, and more then I have named, or thought needful to name, much less to insist upon; as his *power of Creation*, and his *Omnipresence* or *Ubiquity*, which are

are necessarily included in the Idea of *absolute perfection*. The latter whereof some ancient Philosophers endeavoring to set out, have defined God to be a *Circle whose Center is every where and Circumference no where*. By which description certainly nothing else can be meant, but that the Divine Essence is every where present with all those adorable Attributes of Infinite and absolutely perfect Goodness, Knowledge and Power, according to that sense in which I have explained them. Which Ubiquity or Omnipresence of God is every whit as intelligible as the overspreading of Matter into all places.

4. But if here any one demand, How the parts, as I may so call them, of the Divine Amplitude hold together, that of Matter being so discernible; it might be sufficient to remind him of what we have already spoken of the general notion of a Spirit. But besides that, here may be also a peculiar rational account given thereof, it implying a contradiction, that an *Essence absolutely perfect* should be either limited in presence, or change place in part or whole, they being both notorious Effects or Symptoms of Imperfection, which is inconsistent with the nature of God. And no better nor more cogent reason can be given of any thing,

then that it implies a contradiction to be otherwise.

5. That *power* also of *creating things of nothing*, there is a very close connexion betwixt it and the Idea of God, or of a Being absolutely perfect. For this Being would not be what it is conceived to be, if it were destitute of the power of Creation, and therefore this Attribute has no less coherence with the Subject, then that it is a contradiction it should not be in it, as was observed of the foregoing Attribute of Indiscernibilitie in God. But to alledge that a man cannot imagine how God should create something of nothing, or how the Divine Essence holds so closely and invincibly together, is to transgress against the 3. 4. and 5. Axiomes, and to appeal to a Faculty that has no right to determine the case.

CHAP. V.

1. *The Definition belonging to all Finite and Created Spirits.* 2. *Of Indiscernibility, a symbolical representation thereof.* 3. *An Objection answered against that representation.*

1. **WE** have done with the notion of that *Infinite and Uncreated Spirit*
we

we usually call God ; we come now to those that are *Created* and *Finite*, as the Spirits of *Angels*, *Men* and *Brutes*, we will cast in the *Seminal Forms* also, or *Archei*, as the *Chymists* call them, though haply the world stands in no need of them. The Properties of a Spirit, as it is a notion common to all these, I have already enumerated in my *Antidote*, Lib. 1. cap. 4. *Self-motion*, *Self-penetration*, *Self-contraction* and *dilatation*, and *Indivisibility*, by which I mean *Indiscernibility* : to which I added *Penetrating*, *Moving*, and *Altering the matter*. We may therefore define *this kind of Spirit* we speak of, to be *A substance Indiscernible, that can move it self, that can penetrate, contract, and dilate it self, and can also penetrate, move, and alter the matter*. We will now examine every term of this Definition, from whence it shall appear, that it is as congruous and intelligible, as those Definitions that are made of such things as all men without any scruple acknowledg to exist.

2. Of the *Indiscernibility* of a Spirit we have already given rational grounds to evince it not impossible, it being an Immediate attribute thereof, as *Impenetrability* is of a *Body*, and as conceivable or imaginable, that *one Substance* of it's own nature

ture may invincibly hold its parts together, so that they cannot be disunited nor dissevered, as that another may keep out so stoutly and irresistibly another Substance from entering into the same space or place with it self. For this *ἀντιτυχία* or *Impenetrability* is not at all contained in the precise conception of a *Substance as Substance*, as I have already signified. But besides that Reason may thus easily apprehend that it may be so, I shall a little gratifie Imagination, and it may be Reason too, in offering the manner how it is so, in this kind of Spirit we now speak of. That ancient notion of Light and *Intentional species* is so far from a plain impossibility, that it has been heretofore generally, and is still by very many persons, looked upon as a Truth, that is, That *Light* and *Colour* doe ray in such sort as they are described in the Peripatetical Philosophie. Now it is observable in Light, that it is most vigorous towards its fountain, and fainter by degrees. But we will reduce the matter to one lucid point, which, according to the acknowledged Principles of Opticks, will fill a distance of space with its rays of light: Which rayes may indeed be reverberated back towards their center by interposing some opaque body, and so this Orbe of light contracted; but, according to
the

the *Aristotelean* Hypothesis, it was alwayes accounted impossible that they should be clipt off, or cut from this lucid point, and be kept apart by themselves. Those whom dry Reason will not satisfy, may, if they please, entertain their Fancy with such a representation as this, which may a little ease the anxious importunity of their mind, when it too eagerly would comprehend the manner how this *Spirit* we speak of may be said to be *Indiscerpible*. For think of any ray of this orbe of light, it does sufficiently set out to the imagination how *Extension* and *Indiscerpibility* may consist together. See further in my *Antidote*, Lib. 1. cap. 4. as also the Appendix cap. 3. and 10.

3. But if any object, That the lucid Center of this orbe, or the Primary substance, as I call it, in the forecited places, is either divisible or absolutely indivisible, and if it be divisible, that as concerning that *Inmost* of a Spirit, this representation is not at all serviceable to set off the nature thereof, by shewing how the parts there may hold together so indiscerpibly, but if absolutely indivisible, that it seems to be nothing; To this I answer, what *Scaliger* somewhere has noted, *That what is infinitely great or infinitely small, the imagination of man is at a loss to conceive it.* Which certainly is
the

the ground of the perplexedness of that Probleme concerning Matter, whether it consists of points, or onely of particles divisible *in infinitum*. But to come more closely to the business; I say that though we should acknowledg the Inmost Center of life, or the very first point, as I may so call it, of the primary Substance (for this primary Substance is in some sort grādual) to be purely indivisible, it does not at all follow, no not according to Imagination it self, that it must be nothing. For let us imagine a Perfect Plain, and on this Plain a perfect Globe, we cannot conceive but this Globe touches the Plain, and that in what we ordinarily call a point, else the one would not be a Globe, or the other not a Plain. Now it is impossible that one body should touch another, and yet touch one another in nothing. Wherefore this inmost Center of life is something, and something so full of essential vigour and virtue, that though gradually it diminish, yet can fill a certain Sphere of Space with its own presence and activity, as a spark of light illuminates the dusky air. Wherefore there being no greater perplexity nor subtilty in the consideration of this *Center of life* or *Inmost* of a *Spirit*, then there is in the Atomes of Matter, we may by **Axiome 7.**
rightly

rightly conclude, That *Indiscerpibility* has nothing in the notion thereof, but what may well consist with the possibility of the existence of the Subject whereunto it belongs.

CHAP. VI.

1. *Axiomes that tend to the demonstrating how the Center or First point of the Primary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscerpible.*
2. *Several others that demonstrate how the Secondary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscerpible.*
3. *An application of these Principles.*
4. *Of the union of the Secondary Substance considered transversly.*
5. *That the notion of a Spirit has less difficulty then that of Matter.*
6. *An answer to an Objection from the Rational faculty.*
7. *Answers to Objections suggested from Fancy.*
8. *A more compendious satisfaction concerning the notion of a Spirit.*

1. **A**ND thus we have fairly well gratified the Fancy of the Curious concerning the *Extension* and *Indiscerpibility* of a *Spirit*; but we shall advance yet higher, and demonstrate the possibility of this notion

tion to the severest Reason, out of these following Principles.

AXIOME XI.

A Globe touches a Plain in something, though in the least that is conceivable to be real.

AXIOME XII.

The least that is conceivable is so little, that it cannot be conceived to be discernible into less.

AXIOME XIII.

As little as this is, the repetition of it will amount to considerable magnitudes.

AS for example, if this Globe be drawn upon a Plain, it constitutes a *Line*, and a *Cylinder* drawn upon a Plain, or this same *Line* described by the Globe multiplied into it self, constitutes a *superficies*, &c. This a man cannot deny, but the more he thinks of it, the more certainly true he will find it.

AXIOME XIV.

Magnitude cannot arise out of meer Non-Magnitudes.

FOR multiply Nothing ten thousand millions of times into nothing. the Product will be still nothing. Besides, if that wherein the Globe touches a Plain were more then *Indiscerpible*, that is, *purely Indivisible*, it is manifest that a *Line* will consist of *Points* Mathematically so called, that is, *purely Indivisible*, which is the grandest absurdity that can be admitted in Philosophy, and the most contradictory thing imaginable.

AXIOME XV.

The same thing by reason of its extreme littleness may be utterly Indiscerpible, though intellectually Divisible.

THIS plainly arises out of the foregoing Principles: For every Quantity is *intellectually* divisible; but something Indiscerpible was afore demonstrated to be Quantity, and consequently divisible, otherwise Magnitude would consist of Mathematicall points. Thus have I found a possibility

lity for the Notion of the *Center* of a Spirit, which is not a Mathematicall point, but Substance, in Magnitude so little, that it is *Indiscerpible*; but in virtue so great, that it can send forth out of it self so large a Sphere of *Secondary Substance*, as I may so call it, that it is able to actuate grand Proportions of Matter, this whole Sphere of life and activity being in the mean time utterly Indiscerpible.

2. This I have said, and shall now prove it by adding a few more Principles of that evidence, as the most rigorous Reason shall not be able to deny them.

A X I O M E XVI

An Emanative Cause is the notion of a thing possible.

BY an *Emanative Cause* is understood such a Cause as meerly by Being, no other activity or causality interposed, produces an Effect. That this is possible is manifest, it being demonstrable that there is *de facto* some such Cause in the world; because something must move it self. Now if there be no Spirit, Matter must of necessity move it self, where you cannot imagine any activity or causality, but the bare essence of the Matter

Matter from whence this motion comes. For if you would suppose some former motion that might be the cause of this, then we might with as good reason suppose some former to be the cause of that, and so *in infinitum*.

A X I O M E XVII.

An Emanative Effect is coexistent with the very substance of that which is said to be the Cause thereof.

THIS must needs be true, because that very Substance which is said to be the Cause, is the adæquate & immediate Cause, and wants nothing to be adjoynd to its bare essence for the production of the Effect; and therefore by the same reason the Effect is at any time, it must be at all times, or so long as that Substance does exist.

A X I O M E XVIII.

No Emanative Effect, that exceeds not the virtues and powers of a Cause, can be said to be impossible to be produced by it.

THIS is so plain, that nothing need be added for either explanation or proof.

AXIOME XIX.

There may be a Substance of that high Vertue and Excellency, that it may produce another Substance by Emanative causality, provided that Substance produced be in due graduall proportions inferiour to that which causes it.

THIS is plain out of the foregoing Principle. For there is no contradiction nor impossibility of a Cause producing an Effect less noble then it self, for thereby we are the better assured that it does not exceed the capacity of its own powers: Nor is there any incongruity, that one Substance should cause something else which we may in some sense call Substance, though but *Secondary* or *Emanatory*; acknowledging the *Primary Substance* to be the more adequate Object of divine Creation, but the *Secondary* to be referrible also to the *Primary* or *Centrall* Substance by way of causall relation. For suppose God created the Matter with an immediate power of moving it self, God indeed is the Prime cause as well of the Motion as of the Matter, and yet nevertheless the Matter is rightly
said

said to move it self. Finally, this *Secondary* or *Emanatory* Substance may be rightly called *Substance*, because it is a Subject indued with certain powers and activities, and that it does not inhære as an *Accident* in any other Substance or Matter, but could maintaine its place, though all Matter or what other Substance soever were removed out of that space it is extended through, provided its *Primary Substance* be but safe.

3. From these four Principles I have here added, we may have not an imaginative but rationally apprehension of that part of a Spirit which we call the *Secondary Substance* thereof. Whose Extension arising by graduall Emanation from the First and primest Essence, which we call the *Center* of the Spirit (which is no impossible supposition by the 16. 18. and 19. Axiomes) we are led from hence to a necessary acknowledgment of perfect *Indiscernibility* of parts, though not intellectuall Indivisibility, by Axiome 17. for it implies a contradiction that an Emanative effect should be disjoyned from its originall.

4. Thus have I demonstrated how a Spirit, considering the lineaments of it (as I may so call them) from the Center to the Circumference, is utterly indiscernible. But

now if any be so curious as to ask how the parts thereof hold together in a line drawn cross to these from the Center (for Imagination, it may be, will suggest they lye all loose) I answer that the conjecture of Imagination is here partly true and partly false, or is true or false as she shall be interpreted. For if she mean by loose, actually disunited, it is false and ridiculous: but if only so discernible, that one part may be disunited from another, that is not only true, but necessary; otherwise a Spirit could not contract one part and extend another, which is yet an Hypothesis necessary to be admitted. Wherefore this Objection is so far from weakning the possibility of this notion, that it gives occasion more fully to declare the exact concinnity thereof. To be brief therefore, a Spirit from the Center to the Circumference is utterly indiscernible, but in lines cross to this it is closely coherent, but not indiscernibly; which co-hæssion may consist in an immediate union of these parts, and transverse penetration and transcurssion of secondary substance thorough this whole Sphere of life which we call a *Spirit*. Nor need we wonder that so full an Orbe should swell out from so subtil and small a point as the Center of this Spirit is supposed. Εἰ γὰρ ὁ τῶ ὄγκου

μικρόν ἔστι, δυνάμει καὶ πριμότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον ὑπερέχει πάντων, as Aristotle somewhere sayes of the mind of man. And besides it is but what is seen in some sort to the very eye in light, how large a spheare of aire a little spark will illuminate.

5. This is the pure Idea of a created Spirit in general, concerning which if there be yet any cavill to be made, it can be none other then what is perfectly common to it and to Matter, that is, the unimagineness of Points and smallest Particles, and how what is discernible cannot at all hang together; but this not hindering *Matter* from actuall existence, there is no reason that it should any way pretend to the inferring of the impossibility of the existence of a *Spirit* by Axiome 7. But the most lubricous supposition that we goe upon here, is not altogether so intricate as those difficulties in *Matter*. For if that be but granted, in which I find no absurdity, That a Particle of Matter may be so little that it is utterly uncapable of being made less, it is plain that one and the same thing, though intellectuallly divisible, may yet be really indiscernible. And indeed it is not only possible, but it seems necessary that this should be true: For though we should acknowledg that Matter were discernible *in infinitum*,

yet supposing a Cause of Infinite distinct perception and as Infinite power, (and God is such) this Cause can reduce this capacity of infinite discerpibleness of Matter into act, that is to say, actually and at once discerp it or disjoyn it into so many particles as it is discerpible into. From whence it will follow, that one of these particles reduced to this perfect Parvitude, is then utterly indiscerpible, and yet intellectually divisible, otherwise magnitude would consist of meer points, which would imply a contradiction. We have therefore plainly demonstrated by reason, that Matter consists of parts indiscerpible; and therefore there being no other Faculty to give suffrage against it, for neither sense nor any common notion can contradict it, it remains by *Axiome 5.* that the Conclusion is true.

6. What some would object from Reason, that these *perfect Parvitudes* being acknowledged still intellectually divisible, must still have parts into which they are divisible, and therefore be still discerpible, to this it is answered, That division into parts does not imply any discerpibility, because the parts conceived in one of these *Minima Corporalia* (as I may so call them) are rather *essentiall* or *formall* parts then *integrall*, and can no more actually be divided,

vered, then Sense and Reason from the Soul of a man. For it is of the very Essence of Matter to be divisible, but it is not at all included in the essence thereof to be discernible; and therefore where discernibility fails there is no necessity that divisibility should faile also. See the Preface, Sect. 3.

7. As for the trouble of spurious suggestions or representations from the Fancy, as if these *perfect Parvities* were round Bodyes, and that therefore there would be Triangular intervals betwixt, void of Matter, they are of no moment in this case, she alwayes representing a *Discernible* magnitude instead of an *Indiscernible* one. Wherefore she bringing in a false evidence, her testimony is to be rejected; nay if she could perplex the cause far worse, she was not to be heard, by Axiome the 4. Wherefore Fancy being unable to exhibite the object we consider, in its due advantages, for ought we know these *perfect Parvities* may lye so close together, that they have no intervals betwixt: nay it seems necessary to be so; For if there were any such intervalls, they were capable of particles less then these least of all, which is a contradiction in Reason, and a thing utterly impossible. But if we should gratify Fancy so far as to admit of these intervals, the greatest absurdity

would be, that we must admit an insensible *Vacuum*, which no Faculty will be able ever to confute. But it is most rationall to admit none, and more consonant to our determination concerning these *Minima Corporalia*, as I call them, whose largeness is to be limited to the least reall touch of either a Globe on a Plain, or a Cone on a Plain, or a Globe on a Globe; if you conceive any reall touch less then another, let that be the measure of these *Minute Realities* in Matter. From whence it will follow, they must touch a whole side at once, and therefore can never leave any empty intervals. Nor can we imagine any Angulosities or round protuberancies in a quantity infinitely little, more then we can in one infinitely great, as I have already declared in my Preface. I must confess, a mans Reason in this speculation is mounted far beyond his Imagination; but there being worse intricacies in Theories acknowledged constantly to be true, it can be no prejudice to the present Conclusion, by the 4. and 7. Axiomes.

8. Thus have we cleared up a full and distinct notion of a Spirit, with so unexceptionable accuracy, that no Reason can pretend to assert it impossible, nor unintelligible. But if the Theory thereof may seem more operose and tedious to impatient wits, and

and the punctuality of the description the more hazardous and incredible, as if it were beyond our Faculties to make so precise a Conclusion in a subject so obscure, they may ease their understanding, by contenting themselves with what we have set down Cap. 2. Sect. 11, 12. and remember that that Wisdome and Power that created all things, can make them of what nature He pleases, and that if God will that there shall be a Creature that is penetrable and indiscerpible, that it is as easy a thing for him to make one so of its own nature, as one impenetrable and discerpible, and indue it with what other properties he pleases, according to his own will and purpose: which induments being immediately united with the Subject they are in, Reason can make no further demand how they are there, by the 9. Axiome,

CHAP. VII.

1. *Of the Self-motion of a Spirit.* 2. *Of Self-penetration.* 3. *Of Self-contraction and dilatation.* 4. *The power of penetrating of Matter.* 5. *The power of moving,* 6. *And of altering the Matter.*

1. **WE** have proved the *Indiscerpibility* of a *Spirit* as well in Center as Circumference, as well in the *Primary* as *Secondary* Substance thereof, to be a very consistent and congruous Notion. The next property is *Self-motion*, which must of necessity be an Attribute of something or other; For by *Self-motion* I understand nothing else but *Self-activity*, which must appertain to a Subject active of it self. Now what is simply active of it self, can no more cease to be active then to Be; which is a sign that Matter is not active of it self, because it is reducible to Rest: Which is an Argument not only that *Self-activity* belongs to a Spirit, but that there is such a thing as a Spirit in the world, from which activity is communicated to Matter. And indeed if Matter as Matter had motion, nothing would hold together but Flints, Adamant, Bräis,

Brass, Iron; yea this whole Earth would suddenly melt into a thinner Substance then the subtil Aire, or rather it never had been condensated together to this consistency we finde it. But this is to anticipate my future purpose of proving That there are Spirits existing in the world: It had been sufficient here to have asserted, That *Self-motion* or *Self-activity* is as conceivable to appertain to *Spirit* as *Body*, which is plain at first sight to any man that appeales to his own Faculties. Nor is it at all to be scrupled at, that any thing should be allowed to move it self, because our adversaries that say there is nothing but Matter in the world, must of necessity (as I have intimated already) confess that this Matter moves it self, though it be very incongruous so to affirm.

2. The congruity and possibility of *Self-penetration* in a *created Spirit* is to be conceived, partly from the limitableness of the Subject, and partly from the foregoing attributes of *Indiscerpibility* and *Self-motion*. For *Self-penetration* cannot belong to God, because it is impossible any thing should belong to him that implyes imperfection, and *Self-penetration* cannot be without the lessening of the presence of that which does penetrate it self, or the implication that
some

some parts of that essence are not so well as they may be, which is a contradiction in a Being which is absolutely perfect. From the Attributes of *Indiscerpibility* and *Self-motion* (to which you may adde Penetrability from the generall notion of a Spirit) it is plain that such a Spirit as we define, having the power of Motion upon the whole extent of its essence, may also determine this Motion according to the Property of its own nature: and therefore if it determine the motion of the exterior parts inward, they will return inward towards the center of essentiall power; which they may easily doe without resistance, the whole Subject being penetrable, and without damage, it being also indiscerpible.


3. From this *Self-penetration* we doe not only easily, but necessarily, understand *Self-contraction* and *dilatation* to arise. For this *self-moving* Substance, which we call a Spirit, cannot penetrate it self, but it must needs therewith contract it self; nor restore it self again to it's former state, but it does thereby dilate it self; so that we need not at all insist upon these termes.

4. That power which a Spirit has to *penetrate Matter* we may easily understand if we consider a Spirit only as a Substance, whose immediate property is *Activity*. For
then

then it is not harder to imagine this Active Substance to pervade this or the other part of Matter, then it is to conceive the pervading or disspreading of motion it self therein.

5. The greatest difficulty is to fancy how this Spirit, being so incorporeall, can be able to move the matter, though it be in it. For it seems so subtil, that it will pass through, leaving no more footsteps of it's being there, then the Lightening does in the Scabbard, though it may haply melt the sword, because it there findes resistance. But a Spirit can find no resistance any where, the closest matter being easily penetrable and pervious to an Incorporeall substance. The ground of this difficulty is founded upon the unconceivableness of any *Union* that can be betwixt the matter, and a Substance that can so easily pass through it. For if we could but once imagine an *Union* betwixt Matter and a Spirit, the activity then of the Spirit would certainly have influence upon Matter, either for *begetting*, or *increasing*, or *directing* the motion thereof. But notwithstanding the Penetrability and easy passage of a Spirit through matter, there is yet for all that a capacity of a strong union betwixt them, and every whit as conceivable as betwixt the parts of Matter them-

themselves. For what glue or Cement holds the parts of hard matter in stones and metalls together, or, if you will, of what is absolutely hard, that has no pores or particles, but is one continued and perfectly homogeneous body, not only to sense, but according to the exact Idea of Reason? what Cement holds together the parts of such a body as this? Certainly nothing but *immediate Union and Rest*. Now for *Union*, there is no comparison betwixt that of Matter with Matter, and this of Spirit with Matter. For the first is only superficial; in this latter the very inward parts are united point to point throughout. Nor is there any feare it will not take hold, because it has a capacity of passing through. For in this absolutely solid hard Body, which let be A, in which let us conceive some inward superficies, suppose E. A. C, this superficies is so smooth as nothing can be conceived smoother: why does not therefore the upper E. D. C. slide upon the neather part E. F. C. upon the least motion imaginable, especially E. F. C. being supposed to be held fast whilst the other is thrust against? This facility therefore of one Body passing upon



upon another without any sticking, seeming as necessary to our fancy as a Spirits passing through all Bodies without taking hold of them, it is plain by Axiome 7. That a firm union of *Spirit* and *Matter* is very possible, though we cannot conceive the manner thereof. And as for *Rest*, it is competible also to this conjunction of Matter with Spirit, as well as of Matter with Matter. For suppose the whole body A. moved with like swiftness in every part, the parts of A. then are according to that sense of Rest, by which they would explain the adhesion of the parts of Matter one with another, truly quiescent. So say I that in the Union of Matter and Spirit, the parts of the Matter receiving from the Spirit just such a velocity of motion as the Spirit exerts, and no more, they both rest in firm Union one with another. That which comes to pass even then when there is far less immediate Union then we speak of. For if we doe but lay a Book on our hand, provided our hand be not moved with a swifter motion then it communicates to the Book, nor the Book be pushed on faster then the swiftness of our hand; the Book and our Hand will most certainly retain their Union and goe together. So naturall and easy is it to conceive how a Spirit may move a Body without any more perplexity

plexity or contradiction then is found in the Union and motion of the parts of Matter it self. See the Appendix to my Antidote, Cap. 3.

6. The last Terme I put in the Definition of a *Spirit*, is the *power of altering the Matter*; which will necessarily follow from it's *power of moving it* or directing its motion. For *Alteration* is nothing else but the varying of either the Figures, or postures, or the degrees of motion in the particles; all which are nothing else but the results of locall motion. Thus have we cleared the intelligibility and possibility of all the Termes that belong to the Notion of a created Spirit in generall, at least of such as may be rationally conceived to be the causes of any visible Phænomena in the world: We will now descend to the defining of the chief *Species* thereof.

CHAP. VIII.

1. *Four main Species of Spirits.* 2. *How they are to be defined.* 3. *The definition of a Seminall Forme;* 4. *Of the Soule of a Brute;* 5. *Of the Soule of a Man.* 6. *The difference betwixt the Soule of an Angel and an humane Soule.* 7. *The definition of an Angelical Soule.* 8. *Of the Platonicall Noes and 'Evades.* 9. *That Des-Cartes his Demonstration of the Existence of the Humane Soule does at least conclude the possibility of a Spirit.*

1. **W**E have enumerated four Kindes of Spirits, viz. The λογιστικαὶ ψυχαι or Seminall Formes, the Soules of Brutes, the Humane Soule, and that Soule or Spirit which actuates or informes the vehicles of Angels: For I look upon Angels to be as truly a compound Being, consisting of Soule and Body, as that of Men and Brutes. Their Existence we shall not now goe about to prove, for that belongs to another place. My present design is onely to expound or define the notion of these things, so far forth as is needful for the evincing that they are the Ideas or Notions of things which

E

imply

imply no contradiction or impossibility in their conception; which will be very easy for us to perform: the chief difficulty lying in that *more General notion* of a Spirit, which we have so fully explained in the foregoing chapters.

2. Now this *General notion* can be contracted into *Kindes*, by no other *Differences* then such as may be called peculiar powers or properties belonging to one Spirit and excluded from another, by the 8. Axiome. From whence it will follow, that if we describe these several kindes of Spirits by immediate and intrinsecall properties, we have given as good Definitions of them as any one can give of any thing in the world.

3. We will begin with what is most simple, the *Seminal Formes* of things which, for the present, deciding nothing of their existence, according to their *idæa possibilis*, we define thus; *A Seminal Forme is a created Spirit organizing duely prepared matter into life and vegetation proper to this or the other kind of plant.* It is beyond my imagination what can be excepted against this description, it containing nothing but what is very cohærent and intelligible. For in that it is a *Spirit*, it can *move Matter* intrinsecally, or at least *direct* the motion thereof. But in that it is not an *Omnipotent Spirit*, but

but *Finite* and Created, it's power may well be restrained to *duely prepared Matter* both for vital union and motion. He that has made these particular Spirits, varying their Faculties of Vital union according to the diversity of the preparation of Matter, and so limiting the whole comprehension of them all, that none of them may be able to be vitally joyned with any matter whatever, and the same first Cause of all things, that gives them a power of uniting with and moving of *matter duely prepared*; may also set such lawes to this motion, that when it lights on matter fit for it, it will produce such and such a Plant, that is to say, it will shape the matter into such Figure, Colour and other properties, as we discover in them by our Senses.

4. This is the first degree of Particular Life in the world, if there be any purely of this degree particular. But now, as *Aristotle* has somewhere noted, the Essences of things are like Numbers, whose *Species* are changed by adding or taking away an Unite; adde therefore another *Intrinsicall* power to this of *Vegetation*, viz. *Sensation*, and it becomes the *Soule* of a *Beast*. For in truth the bare Substance it self is not to be computed in explicite knowledg, it being utterly in it self unconceivable, and therefore

we will onely reckon upon the Powers. *A Subject therefore from whence is both Vegetation and Sensation is the general notion of the Soule of a Brute.* Which is distributed into a number of kindes, the effect of every *Intrinsical* power being discernible in the constant shape and properties of every distinct kind of Brute Creatures.

5. If we adde to *Vegetation and Sensation Reason* properly so called, we have then a settled notion of the Soule of Man; which we may more compleatly describe thus: *A created Spirit indued with Sense and Reason, and a power of organizing terrestrial matter into humane shape by vital union therewith.*

6. And herein alone, I conceive, does the Spirit or Soule of an Angel (for I take the boldness to call that Soule, what ever it is, that has a power of vitally actuating the Matter) differ from the Soule of a Man, in that the Soule of an Angel may vitally actuate an *aëreal* or *athereal* body, but cannot be born into this world in a *terrestrial* one.

7. To make an end therefore of our Definitions: an *Angelical Soule* is very intelligibly described thus; *A created Spirit indued with Reason, Sensation, and a power of being vitally united with and actuating of a Body of aire or ather onely.* Which power
over

over an *aëreal* or *athereal* Body is very easily to be understood out of that general notion of a Spirit in the foregoing Chapters. For it being there made good, that union with Matter is not incompatible to a Spirit, and consequently nor moving of it, nor that kind of motion in a Spirit which we call Contraction and Dilatation; these powers, if carefully considered, will necessarily infer the possibility of the Actuation and Union of an Angelical Soule with an *æthereal* or *airy* Body.

8. The *Platonists* write of other orders of Spirits or Immaterial Substances, as the *Nóes* and *Eva'des*. But there being more Subtilty then either usefulness or assurance in such like Speculations, I shall pass them over at this time; having already, I think, irrefutably made good, That there is no incongruity nor impossibility comprised in the Notion of Spirit or Incorporeal Substance.

9. But there is yet another way of inferring the same, and it is the Argument of *Des-Cartes*, whereby he would conclude that there is *de facto* a Substance in us distinct from Matter, viz. our own *Minde*. For every Real affection or Property being the Mode of some Substance or other, and reall Modes being unconceivable without their

Subject, he inferres that, seeing we can doubt whether there be any such thing as Body in the world (by which doubting we seclude *Cogitation* from *Body*) there must be some other Substance distinct from the Body, to which *Cogitation* belongs. But I must confess this Argument will not reach home to *Des-Cartes* his purpose, who would prove in Man a substance distinct from his body. For being there may be *modes* common to more Subjects then one, and this of *Cogitation* may be pretended to be such as is comperible as well to substance Corporeal as Incorporeal, it may be conceived apart from either, though not from both. And therefore his argument does not prove that That in us which does *think* or *perceive* is a Substance distinct from our Body, but onely That there may be such a Substance, which has the power of thinking or perceiving, which yet is not a Body. For it being impossible that there should be any real mode which is in no Subject, and we clearly conceiving *Cogitation* independent for existence on Corporeal Substance; it is necessary, That there may be some other Substance on which it may depend; which must needs be a Substance Incorporeal.

CHAP. IX.

1. That it is of no small consequence to have proved the Possibility of the Existence of a Spirit.
2. The necessity of examining of Mr. Hobbs his Reasons to the contrary.
3. The first Excerption out of Mr. Hobbs.
4. The second Excerption.
5. The third.
6. The fourth.
7. The fifth.
8. The sixth.
9. The seventh.
10. The eighth and last Excerption.

I Have been, I believe, to admiration curious and solicitous to make good, that the Existence of a *Spirit* or *Incorporeal Substance* is possible. But there is no reason any one should wonder that I have spent so much pains to make so small and inconsiderable a progresse, as to bring the thing only to a *bare possibility*. For though I may seem to have gained little to my self, yet I have thereby given a very signal overthrow to the adverse party, whose strongest hold seems to be an unshaken confidence, That the very notion of a *Spirit* or *Substance Immaterial* is a perfect Impossibility and pure Non-sense. From whence are insinuated no better Consequences then these:

That it is impossible that there should be any God, or Soule, or Angel, Good or Bad; or any Immortality or Life to come. That there is no Religion, no Piety nor Impiety, no Vertue nor Vice, Justice nor Injustice, but what it pleases him that has the longest Sword to call so. That there is no Freedom of Will, nor consequently any Rational remorse of Conscience in any Being whatsoever, but that all that is, is nothing but Matter and corporeal Motion; and that therefore every trace of mans life is as necessary as the tracts of Lightning, and the fallings of Thunder; the blind *impetus* of the Matter breaking through or being stoppt every where, with as certain and determinate necessity, as the course of a Torrent after mighty stormes and showers of Rain.

2. And verily considering of what exceeding great consequence it is to root out this sullen conceit that some have taken up concerning *Incorporeal Substance*, as if it bore a contradiction in the very termes, I think I shall be wanting to so weighty a Cause, if I shall content my self with a bare recitation of the Reasons whereby I prove it possible, and not produce their Arguments that seem most able to maintain the contrary. And truly I doe not remember that I ever met with any one yet that may justly be

be suspected to be more able to make good this Province then our Countreyman *Mr. Hobbs*, whose inexuperable confidence of the truth of the Conclusion, may well assure any man that dueily considers the excellency of his natural Wit and Parts, that he has made choice of the most Demonstrative Arguments that humane Invention can search out for the eviction thereof.

3. And that I may not incurre the suspicion of mistaking his Assertion, or of misrepresenting the force of his Reasons, I shall here punctually set them down in the same words I find them in his own Writings, that any man may judge if I doe him any wrong. The first place I shall take notice of is in his *Leviathan*, Chap. 34. *The word Body in the most general acceptation signifies that which filleth or occupieth some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the Imagination, but is a real part of that we call the Universe. For the Universe being the Aggregate of all Bodyes, there is no reall part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodyes) the Universe. The same also, because Bodyes are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of appearance to the sense of living Creaturcs, is called Substance, that is to say, subject to various Accidents,*

as

as sometimes to be moved, sometimes to stand still, and to seem to our senses sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold, sometimes of one Colour, Smell, Taste, or Sound, sometimes of another. And this diversity of seeming, (produced by the diversity of the operation of Bodies on the Organs of our Sense) we attribute to alterations of the Bodies that operate, and call them Accidents of those Bodies. And according to this acception of the word, Substance and Body signifie the same thing; and therefore Substance incorporeal are words which when they are joyned together destroy one another, as if a man should say an Incorporeal Body.

4. The second place is in his *Physicks*, Part 4. Chap. 25. Article 9. But it is here to be observed that certain Dreames, especially such as some men have when they are betwixt sleeping and waking, and such as happen to those that have no knowledg of the nature of Dreames, and are withall superstitious, were not heretofore nor are now accounted Dreames. For the Apparitions men thought they saw, and the voices they thought they heard in sleep, were not believed to be Phantasmes, but things subsisting of themselves, and Objects without those that Dreamed. For to some men, as well sleeping as waking, but especially to guilty men, and in the night, and in hallowed places, Fear alone, helped a little with
the

the storyes of such Apparitions, hath raised in their mindes terrible Phantasmes which have been and are still deceitfully received for things really true, under the names of Ghosts and Incorporeal Substances.

5. We will adde a third out of the same book, Part 1. Chap. 5. Art. 4. *For seeing Ghosts, sensible species, a shadow, light, colour, sound, space, &c. appear to us no less sleeping then waking, they cannot be things without us, but onely Phantasmes of the mind that imagines them.*

6. And a fourth out of his Humane Nature, Chap. 11. Art. 4. *But Spirits supernaturall commonly signifie some Substance without dimension, which two words doe flatly contradict one another. And Article 5. Nor I think is that word Incorporeal at all in the Bible, but is said of the Spirit, that it abideth in men, sometimes that it dwelleth in them, sometimes that it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth, and cometh, and that Spirits are Angels, that is to say, Messengers; all which words doe imply locality, and locality is Dimension, and whatsoever hath dimension is Body, be it never so subtile.*

7. The fifth Excerption shall be out of his Leviathan, Chap. 12. *And for the Matter or Substance of the Invisible agents so fancied, they could not by naturall cogitation fall*
upon

upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the Soule of Man, and that the Soule of Man was of the same Substance with that which appeareth in a Dream to one that sleepeth, or in a Looking-glass to one that is awake: Which, men not knowing that such Apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall and external Substances, and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latines called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aereal bodies; and those invisible Agents, which they feared, to be like them, save that they appeare and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeal or Immateriall, could never enter into the minde of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as Spirit and Incorporeal, yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them. We will help out this further from what he writes in his Humane Nature, Cap. 11. Art. 5. To know that a Spirit is, that is to say, to have natural evidence of the same, it is impossible. For all evidence is conception, and all conception is imagination, and proceedeth from Sense; and Spirits we suppose to be those Substances which work not upon the Sense, and therefore are not conceivable.

8. The sixth, out of Chap. 45. where he writes thus: *This nature of Sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to naturall knowledg, much less by those that consider not things so remote (as that knowledg is) from their present use, it was hard for men to conceive of those Images in the Fancy and in the Sense, otherwise then of things really without us. Which some (because they vanish away they know not whether nor how) will have to be absolutely incorporeal, that is to say, Immaterial, or Forms without Matter, Colour and Figure, without any coloured or figured body, and that they can put on airy bodyes, (as a garment) to make them visible when they will to our bodily eyes; and others say, are Bodyes and living Creatures, but made of Aire, or other more subtile and athereal matter, which is then, when they will be seen, condensed. But both of them agree on one general appellation of them, Demons. As if the dead of whom they dreamed were not the Inhabitants of their own Brain, but of the Aire or of Heaven or Hell, not Phantasmes but Ghosts; with just as much reason as if one should say he saw his own Ghost in a Looking-glass, or the Ghosts of the stars in a River, or call the ordinary Apparition of the Sun of the quantity of about a foot, the Damon or Ghost of that great Sun that enlightneth*

lightneth the whole visible world.

9. The seventh is out of the next Chapter of the same book. Where he again taking to task that Jargon, as he calls it, of *Abstract Essences* and *Substantial Formes*, he writes thus : *The world (I mean not the Earth onely, but the Universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are) is corporeal, that is to say, Body, and hath the Dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Breadth and Depth ; also every part of Body is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions ; and consequently every part of the Universe is Body, and that which is not Body is no part of the Universe : And because the Universe is all, that which is no part of it is nothing , and consequently no where.*

10. The eighth and last we have a little after in the same Chapter, which runs thus ; *Being once fallen into this errour of separated essences, they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these Formes to be real, they are obliged to assign them some place. But because they hold them incorporeal without all dimension of Quantity, and all men knew that Place is Dimension, and not to be filled but by that which is corporeall, they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed any where* Circum-

cumscriptivè, but Definitivè. Which termes, being meer words, and in this occasion insignificant, pass onely in Latine, that the vanity of them might be concealed. For the Circumscription of a thing is nothing else but the determination or defining of it's place, and so both the termes of distinction are the same. And in particular of the essence of man, which they say is his Soule, they affirm it to be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part (how small soever) of his Body, and yet no more Soule in the whole Body then in any one of these parts. Can any man think that God is served with such Absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe to those that will believe the existence of an incorporeal Soule separated from the Body.

CHAP. X.

1. *An Answer to the first Excerption.* 2. *To the second.* 3. *An Answer to the third.* 4. *To the fourth Excerption.* 5. *An Answer to the fifth.* 6. *To the sixth.* 7. *To the seventh.* 8. *An Answer to the eighth and last.* 9. *A brief Recapitulation of what has been said hitherto.*

1. **W**E have set down the chiefest passages in the Writings of Mr. Hobbs, that confident Exploder of *Immaterial Substances* out of the world. It remains now that we examine them, and see whether the force of his Arguments bears any proportion to the firmness of his belief, or rather mis-belief, concerning these things. To strip therefore the first Excerption of that long *Ambages* of words, and to reduce it to a more plain and compendious forme of reasoning, the force of his Argument lies thus: *That seeing every thing in the Universe is Body (the Universe being nothing else but an Aggregate of Bodies) Body and Substance are but names of one and the same thing; it being called Body as it fills a place, and Substance as it is the Subject of*
several

severall Alterations and Accidents. Wherefore Body and Substance being all one, Incorporeal Substance is no better sense than an Incorporeal Body, which is a contradiction in the very termes. But it is plain to all the world that this is not to prove, but to suppose what is to be proved, That the Universe is nothing else but an Aggregate of Bodies: When he has proved that, we will acknowledge the sequel; till then he has proved nothing, and therefore this first argumentation must pass for nought.

2. Let us examine the strength of the Second, which certainly must be this, if any at all; *That which has its originall meerly from Dreames, Feares and Superstitious Fancies, has no reall existence in the world.* But *Incorporeall Substances have no other Originall.* The Proposition is a Truth indubitable, but the Assumption is as weak as the other is strong; whether you understand it of the reall Originall of these Substances, or of the Principles of our knowledge That they are. And be their Originall what it will, it is nothing to us, but so far forth as it is cognoscible to us by Axiome first. And therefore when he sayes, they have no other Originall then that of our own Fancy, he must be understood to affirme that there is no other principle of

F

the

the knowledge of their Existence then that we vainly imagine them to be; which is grossly false. For it is not the Dreams and Feares of Melancholick and Superstitious persons; from which Philosophers and Christians have argued the Existence of Spirits and Immaterial Substances, but from the evidence of Externall Objects of Sense, that is, the ordinary *Phænomena* of Nature, in which there is discoverable so profound Wisdome and Counsell, that they could not but conclude that the order of things in the world was from a higher Principle then the blind motions and jumbings of Matter and meer Corporeall Beings. To which you may adde what usually they call *Apparitions*, which are so far from being meerly the Dreams and Fancies of the Superstitious, that they are acknowledged by such as cannot but be deemed by most men over Atheisticall, I mean *Pomponatius* and *Cardan*, nay by *Vaninus* himself, though so devoted to Atheisme, that out of a perfect mad zeale to that despicable cause he died for it. I omit to name the operations of the Soule, which ever appeared to the wisest of all Ages of such a transcendent condition, that they could not judge them to spring from so contemptible a Principle as bare Body or Matter. Wherefore to decline

cline all these, and to make representation onely of Dreames and Fancies to be the occasions of the world's concluding that there are *Incorporeall Substances*, is to fancy his Reader a meer foole, and publickly to profess that he has a minde to impose upon him.

3. The third argumentation is this: *That which appears to us as well sleeping as waking, is nothing without us: But Ghosts, that is Immateriall Substances, appeare to us as well sleeping as waking.* This is the weakest argument that has been yet produced: for both the Proposition and Assumption are false. For if the Proposition were true, the Sun, Moon, Stars, Clouds, Rivers, Meadows, Men, Women, and other living creatures were nothing without us: For all these appeare to us as well when we are sleeping as waking. But *Incorporeall Substances* doe not appeare to us as well sleeping as waking. For the notion of an *Incorporeall Substance* is so subtile and refined, that it leaving little or no impression on the Fancy, it's representation is meerly supported by the free power of Reason, which seldome exercises it self in sleep, unless upon easy intaginable Phantasmes.

4. The force of the fourth Argument is briefly this: *Every Substance has dimensions; but a Spirit has no dimensions.* Here I con-

fidently deny the Assumption. For it is not the Characteristicall of a Body to have *Dimensions*, but to be *Impenetrable*. All Substance has *Dimensions*, that is, Length, Breadth, and Depth: but all has not *Impenetrability*. See my Letters to Monsieur Des-Cartes, besides what I have here writ, Cap. 2, and 3.

5. In the Excerptions belonging to the fifth place these Arguments are comprised.
 1. That we have no principle of knowledge of any Immateriall Being, but such as a Dream or a Looking-Glasse furnisheth us withall. 2. That the word Spirit or Incorporeall implies a contradiction, and cannot be conceived to be sense by a naturall Understanding. 3. That nothing is conceived by the Understanding but what comes in at the Senses, and therefore Spirits not acting upon the Senses must remain unknown and unconceivable.

We have already answered to the first what we have returned to his second Argument in the second Excerption.

To the second I answer, That *Spirit* or *Incorporeall* implies no contradiction, there being nothing understood thereby but *Extended Substance* with *Activity* and *Indiscernibility*, leaving out *Impenetrability*: Which I have above demonstrated to be the notion of a thing possible, and need not repeat what I have already written.

To

To the third I answer, That Spirits do act really upon the Senses, by acting upon Matter that affects the Senses; and some of these operations being such, that they cannot be rationally attributed to the Matter alone, Reason by the information of the Senses concludes, that there is some other more noble Principle distinct from the Matter. And as for that part of the Argument that asserts that there is nothing in the Understanding but what comes in at the Senses, I shall in it's due place demonstrate it to be a very gross Errour. But in the mean time I conclude, that the Substance of every thing being utterly unconceivable by Axiome 8. and it being onely the *Immediate properties* by which a man conceives every thing, and the properties of *Penetrability* and *Indiscernibility* being as easy to conceive, as of *Discernibility* and *Impenetrability*, and the power of communicating of motion to Matter as easy as the Matters reception of it, and the Union of Matter with Spirit, as of Matter with Matter; it plainly followes, that the notion of a *Spirit* is as naturally conceivable as the notion of a *Body*.

6. In this sixth Excerpt he is very copious in jeering and making ridiculous the opinion of *Ghosts* and *Demons*, but the

Strength of his Argument, if it have any, is this, viz. *If there be any such things as Ghosts or Demons, then they are (according to them that hold this opinion) either those Images reflected from water or Looking-glasses, cloathing themselves in aiery garments, and so wandering up and down, or else they are living Creatures made of nothing but Aire or some more subtile and Æthereall Matter.* One might well be amazed to observe such flight and vain arguing come from so grave a Philosopher, were not a man well aware that his peculiar eminency, as himself somewhere professes, lies in *Politicks*, to which the humours and Bravadoes of Eloquence, especially amongst the simple, is a very effectuall and serviceable instrument. And certainly such Rhetorickations as this cannot be intended for any but such as are of the very weakest capacity. Those two groundless conceits that he would obtrude upon the sober Assertors of Spirits and Demons belong not to them, but are the genuine issue of his own Brain. For, for the former of them, it is most justly adjudged to him, as the first Author thereof; it being a Rarity, which neither my self nor (I dare say) any else ever met with out of *Mr. Hobbs* his Writings. And the latter he does not opely not goe about to confute here, but

but makes a shew of allowing it, for fear he should seem to deny Scripture, in Chap. 34. of his *Leviathan*. But those that assert the existence of Spirits, will not stand to *Mr. Hobbs* his choice for defining of them, but will make use of their own Reason and Judgment for the settling of so concerning a Notion.

7. In this seventh Excerption is contained the same Argument that was found in the first; but to deal fairly and candidly, I must confess it is better backt then before. For there he supposes, but does not prove, the chief ground of his Argument; but here he offers at a proof of it, couched, as I conceive, in these words [*and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Breadth and Depth*] for hence he would infer that the whole Universe is corporeall, that is to say, every thing in the Universe, because there is nothing but has Length, Breadth and Depth. This therefore is the very last ground his Argument is to be resolved into. But how weak it is I have already intimated, it being not *Trinall Dimension*, but *Impenetrability*, that constitutes a *Body*.

8. This last Excerption seems more considerable then any of the former, or all of them put together: but when the force of the Arguments therein contained is duely

weighed, they will be found of as little efficacy to make good the Conclusion as the rest. The first Argument runs thus; *Whatsoever is reall, must have some place: But Spirits can have no place.* But this is very easily answered. For if nothing else be understood by *Place*, but *Imaginary Space*, Spirits and Bodyes may be in the same imaginary Space, and so the Assumption is false. But if by *Place* be meant the *Concave Superficies of one Body immediately environing another Body*, so that it be conceived to be of the very Formality of a *Place*, immediately to environ the corporeall Superficies of that Substance which is said to be placed; then it is impossible that a *Spirit* should be properly said to be in a *Place*, and so the Proposition will be false. Wherefore there being these two acceptions of *Place*, that Distinction of being there *Circumscriptivè* and *Definitivè* is an allowable Distinction, and the terms may not signify one and the same thing. But if we will with *Mr. Hobbs* (and I know no great hurt if we should doe so) confine the notion of *Place* to *Imaginary Space*, this distinction of the Schools will be needles here, and we may, without any more adoe, assert, that *Spirits* are as truly in *Place* as *Bodyes*.

His second Argument is drawn from that
Scho:

Scholastick Riddle, which I must confess seems to verge too near to profound Nonsense, That the Soule of man is *tota in toto* and *tota in qualibet parte corporis*. This mad Jingle it seems has so frightened *Mr. Hobbs* sometime or other, that he never since could endure to come near the notion of a Spirit again, not so much as to consider whether it were a meer Bug-beare, or some reall Being. But if Passion had not surprised his better Faculties, he might have found a true settled meaning thereof, and yet secluded these wilde intricacies that the heedless Schools seem to have charged it with: For the *Immediate properties* of a Spirit are very well intelligible without these ænigmaticall flourishes, viz. That it is a *Substance Penetrable and Indiscernible*, as I have already shewn at large.

Nor is that Scholastick Ænigme necessary to be believed by all those that would believe the existence of an Incorporeal Soul; nor do I believe *Mr. Hobbs* his interpretation of this Riddle to be so necessary. And it had been but fair play to have been assured, that the Schools held such a perfect contradiction, before he pronounced the belief thereof necessary to all those that would hold the Soule of Man an *Immateriall Substance, separable from the Body*. I suppose they

they may mean nothing by it, but what *Plato* did by his making the Soule to consist *ἐκ μερίσσης καὶ ἀμερίστου ὁσίας* nor *Plato* any thing more by that *divisible* and *indivisible* Substance, then an Essence that is intellectually divisible, but really indiscerpible.

9. We have now firmly made good, that the notion of a Spirit implyes no contradiction nor impossibility in it; but is the notion or Idea of a thing that may possibly be. Which I have done so punctually and particularly, that I have cleared every *Species* of Substances Incorporeall from the imputation of either obscurity or inconsistency. And that I might not seem to take advantage in pleading their cause in the absence of the adverse party, I have brought in the most able Advocate and the most assured that I have hitherto ever met withall; and dare now appeal to any indifferent Judge, whether I have not demonstrated all his Allegations to be weak and inconclusive. Wherefore having so clearly evinced the possibility of the Existence of a Spirit, we shall now make a step further, and prove That it is not onely a thing possible, but that it is really and actually in Nature.

CHAP. XI.

1. *Three grounds to prove the Existence of an Immateriall Substance, whereof the first is fetcht from the Nature of God. 2. The second from the Phanomenon of Motion in the world. 3. That the Matter is not self-moveable. 4. An Objection that the Matter may be part self-moved, part not. 5. The first Answer to the Objection. 6. The second Answer. 7. Other Evasions answered. 8. The Conclusion, That no Matter is self-moved, but that a certain quantity of motion was impressed upon it at its first Creation by God.*

1. **T**Here be three main Grounds from whence a man may be assured of the Existence of Spirituall or Immateriall Substance. The one is the consideration of the transcendent excellency of the nature of God; who being, according to the true Idea of Him, *an Essence absolutely perfect*, cannot possibly be *Body*, and consequently must be something *Incorporeall*: and seeing that there is no contradiction in the notion of a Spirit in generall, nor in any of those kinds of Spirits which we have defined,

ned, (where the notion of God was set down amongst the rest) and that in the very notion of him there is contained the reason of his Existence, as you may see at large in my *Antidote*, Lib. 1. Cap. 7. 8; certainly if we find any thing at all to *be*, we may safely conclude that He is much more. For there is nothing besides Him of which one can give a reason why it is, unless we suppose him to be the Author of it. Wherefore though God be neither *Visible* nor *Tangible*, yet his very Idea representing to our Intellectuall Faculties the necessary reason of his Existence, we are by Axiome 5. (though we had no other Argument drawn from our Senses) confidently to conclude That He is.

2. The second ground is the ordinary *Phænomena* of Nature, the most generall whereof is *Motion*. Now it seems to me demonstrable from hence, that there is some Being in the world distinct from Matter. For Matter being of one simple homogeneous nature, & not distinguishable by specificall differences, as the Schools speak, it must have every where the very same Essentiall properties; and therefore of it self it must all of it be either without motion, or else be self-moving, and that in such or such a tenor, or measure of Motion; there being no
reason

reason imaginable, why one part of the Matter should move of it self lesse then another; and therefore if there be any such thing, it can onely arise from externall impediment.

3. Now I say, if Matter be utterly devoid of Motion in it self, it is plain it has it's motion from some other Substance, which is necessarily a Substance that is not Matter, that is to say, a *Substance Incorporeall*. But if it be moved of it self, in such or such a measure, the effect here being an *Emanative effect*, cannot possibly fail to be where-ever Matter is, by Axiome 17. especially if there be no externall impediment: And there is no impediment at all, but that the terrestriall parts might regain an activity very nigh equall to the æthereall, or rather never have lost it. For if the Planets had but a common *Dividend* of all the motion which themselves and the Sun and Stars, and all the Æthereall matter possess, (the matter of the Planets being so little in comparison of that of the Sun, Stars and Æther) the proportion of motion that will fall due to them would be exceeding much above what they have. For it would be as if four or five poor men in a very rich and populous city should, by giving up that estate they have, in a levelling way, get equall share

share with all the rest. Wherefore every Planet could not faile of melting it self into little less finer Substance then the purest *Aether*. But they not doing so, it is a signe they have not that Motion nor Agitation of themselves, and therefore rest content with what has extrinssecally accrued to them, be it less or more.

4. But the pugnacious, to evade the stroke of our Dilemma, will make any bold shift, and though they affront their own faculties in saying so, yet they will say, and must say, That part of the Matter is self-moving, part without motion of it self.

5. But to this I answer, That first this evasion of theirs is not so agreeable to experience; but, so far as either our Sense or Reason can reach, there is the same Matter every where. For consider the *subtilest parts of Matter* discoverable here below, those which for their Subtilty are invisible, and for their Activity wonderfull, I mean those particles that cause that vehement agitation we feel in *Windes*: They in time loose their motion, become of a visible vaporous consistency, and turn to Clouds, then to Snow or Rain, after haply to Ice it self; but then in process of time, first melted into Water, then exhaled into Vapours,

Vapours, after more fiercely agitated, do become Wind again. And that we may not think that this Reciprocation into *Motion* and *Rest* belongs onely to *Terrestriall* particles; that the *Heavens* themselves be of the same Matter, is apparent from the Ejections of *Comets* into our *Vortex*, and the perpetuall rising of those Spots and Scum upon the Face of the Sun.

6. But secondly, to return what is still more pungent. This *Matter* that is *Self-moved*, in the impressing of Motion upon other Matter, either looses of its own motion, or retains it still entire. If the first, it may be despoiled of all its motion: And so that whose immediate nature is to *move*, shall *rest*, the entire cause of its motion still remaining, viz. it self: which is a plain contradiction by Axiome 17. If the second, no meaner an inconvenience then this will follow, that the whole world had been turned into pure *Æther* by this time, if not into a perfect flame, or at least will be in the conclusion, to the utter destruction of all corporeall Consistencies. For, that these *Self-moving parts of Matter* are of a considerable copiousness, the event does testify, they having melted almost all the world already into *Suns*, *Stars* and *Æther*, nothing remaining but Planets and Comets to be dissolved:

dissolved: Which all put together scarce beare so great a proportion to the rest of the Matter of the Universe, as an ordinary apple to the ball of the Earth. Wherefore so potent a Principle of Motion still adding new motion to Matter, and no motion once communicated being lost, (for according to the laws of motion, no Body looses any more motion then it communicates to another) it plainly follows, that either the world had been utterly burnt up ere now, or will be at least in an infinite less time then it has existed, nay, I may say absolutely in a very little time, and will never return to any frame of things again, which though it possibly may be, yet none but a mad-man will assert, by Axiome 2. And that it has not yet been since the first *Epoches* of History, is a Demonstration this second Hypothesis is false.

7. There is yet another Evasion or two, which when they are answered there will be no scruple remaining touching this point. The first is, That the Matter is all of it homogeneall, of the like nature every where, and that it is the common property of it all to be of it self indifferent to *Motion* or *Rest*; and therefore, that it is no wonder that some of it moves and other some of it rests, or moves less then other some. To which I answer, That
this

this Indifferency of the *Matter* to *Motion* or *Rest* may be understood two wayes : Either *privatively*, that is to say, That it has not any reall or active propension to *Rest*, more then to *Motion*, or *vice versâ*, but is meerly passive and susceptible of what *Motion* or *Fixation* some other Agent confers upon it, and keeps that modification exactly and perpetually till again some other Agent change it ; (in which sense I allow the Assertion to be true, but it makes nothing against us, but for us, it plainly implying that there is an *Incorporeal Substance* distinct from the *Matter*, from whence the *Matter* both is and must be moved.) Or else, this Indifferency is to be understood *positively*, that is to say, That the *Matter* has a reall and active propension as well to *Motion* as to *Rest*, so that it moveth it self and fixeth it self from its own immediate nature : From whence there are but these two Absurdities that follow : the first, That two absolutely contrary properties are immediately seated in one simple Subject ; then which nothing can seem more harsh and unhandsome to our Logickall faculties ; unless the second, which is, That *Motion* and *Rest* being thus the emanative effects of this one simple Subject, the *Matter* will both move and rest at once ; or, if they doe not understand

by *Rest*, Fixation, but a meer absence of motion, That it will both move and not move at once. For what is immediate to any Subject, will not cease to be, the Subject not being destroyed, by Axiome 17. Nor will they much help themselves by fancying that Matter necessarily exerting both these immediate powers or properties at once of *Motion* and *Rest*, moves her self to such a measure and no swifter. For this position is but coincident with the second member of the Dilemma, Sect. 3. of this Chapter; and therefore the same Argument will serve for both places. The other Evasion is, by supposing part of the Matter to be *Self-moving*, and part of it *Self-resting*, in a positive sense, or *Self-fixing*: Which is particularly directed against what we have argued Sect. 6. But that this supposition is false is manifest from experience. For if there be any such *Self-fixing* parts of Matter, they are certainly in Gold and Lead and such like Metalls; but it is plain that they are not there. For what is *Self-fixing*, will immediately be reduced to *Rest*, so soon as externall violence is taken off, by Axiome 17. Whence it will follow that though these *Self-fixing parts of Matter* may be carried by other matter while they are made fast to it, yet left free they will suddainly rest.

rest, they having the immediate cause of Fixation in themselves. Nor can any one distrust that the change will be so suddain, if he consider how suddainly an externall force puts Matter upon motion. But a Bul-let of gold or lead put thus upon motion, swift or slow, does not suddainly reduce it self to rest. Whence it plainly appears that this last Evasion contradicts Experience, and therefore has no force against our former Arguments.

8. Wherefore it is most rationall to conclude, That Matter of its own Nature has no active Principle of Motion, though it be receptive thereof, but that when God created it, he superadded an impress of Motion upon it, such a measure and proportion to all of it, which remains still much-what the same for quantity in the whole, though the parts of Matter in their various occursion of one to another have not alwayes the same proportion of it. Nor is there any more necessity that God should reiterate this impress of Motion on the Matter created, then that he should perpetually create the Matter. Neither does his conservation of this quantity of Motion any thing more imply either a repetition or an augmentation of it, then the conservation of the Matter does the superaddition of new Matter thereunto.

Indeed he need but conserve the Matter, and the Matter thus conserved will faithfully retain, one part with another, the whole summe of Motion first communicated to it, some small moments excepted, which are not worth the mentioning in this place.

CHAP. XII.

1. *That the Order and Nature of things in the Universe argue an Essence Spirituall or Incorporeall.* 2. *The Evasion of this Argument.* 3. *A preparation out of Mr. Hobbs to answer the Evasion.* 4. *The first Answer.* 5. *The second Answer.* 6. *Mr. Hobbs his mistake, of making the Ignorance of Second Causes the onely Seed of Religion.*

1. **W**E have discovered out of the simple *Phænomenon of Motion*, the necessity of the Existence of some Incorporeall Essence distinct from the Matter: But there is a further assurance of this Truth, from the consideration of the Order and admirable Effect of this Motion in the world. Suppose Matter could move it self, would meere Matter, with Self-motion, amount to that admirable wise contrivance of things which

which we see in the world? Can a blind *impetus* produce such effects, with that accuracy and constancy, that, the more wise a man is, the more he will be assured *That no Wisdome can adde, take away, or alter any thing in the workes of Nature, whereby they may be bettered?* How can that. therefore that has not so much as *Sense*, arise to the effects of the highest pitch of *Reason* or *Intellect*? But of this I have spoke so fully and convincingly in the second Book of my *Antidote*, that it will be but a needless repetition to proceed any further on this Subject.

2. All the evasion that I can imagine our Adversaries may use here, will be this: That Matter is capable of *Sense*, and the finest and most subtil of the most refined *Sense*, and consequently of *Imagination* too, yea haply of *Reason* and *Understanding*. For *Sense* being nothing else, as some conceit, but *Motion*, or rather *Reaction* of a Body pressed upon by another Body, it will follow that all the Matter in the world has in some manner or other the power of Sensation.

3. Let us see now what this Position will amount to: Those that make *Motion* and *Sensation* thus really the same, they must of necessity acknowledg that no longer Motion no longer Sensation, as *Mr. Hobbs* has ingenuously confessed *Physic. Chap. 25.*

And that every *Motion* or *Reaction* must be a new Sensation, as well as every ceasing of Reaction a ceasing of Sensation.

4. Now let us give these busie active particles of the Matter that play up and down every where the advantage of Sense, and let us see if all their heads laid together can contrive the Anatomick fabrick of any Creature that lives. Assuredly when all is summ'd up that can be imagined, they will fall short of their account. For I demand, has every one of these particles that must have an hand in the framing of the Body of an Animal, the whole design of the work by the impress of some Phantasme upon it, or, as they have severall offices, so have they severall parts of the design? If the first, it being most certain, even according to their opinion whom we oppose, that there can be no knowledg nor perception in the Matter, but what arises out of the Reaction of one part against another, how is it conceivable that any one particle of Matter or many together (there not existing yet in Nature any Animal) can have the Idea impressed of that Creature they are to frame? Or if one or some few particles have the sense of one part of the Animal (they seeming more capable of this, the parts being far more simple then the whole

Compages

Compages and contrivement) and other some few of other parts; how can they confer notes? by what language or speech can they communicate their counsell one to another? Wherefore that they should mutually serve one another in such a design, is more impossible, then that so many men blind and dumb from their nativity should joyn their forces and wits together to build a Castle, or carve a Statue of such a Creature as none of them knew any more of in several, then some one of the smallest parts thereof, but not the relation it bore to the whole.

5. Besides this, *Sense* being really the same with Corporeal Motion, it must change upon new impresses of Motion, so that if a particle by *Sense* were carried in this line, it meeting with a counterbuffe in the way, must have quite another Imprefs and *Sense*, and so forget what it was going about, and divert its course another way. Nay though it scaped free, *Sense* being Reaction, when that which it beares against is removed, *Sense* must needs cease, and perfect Oblivion succeed. For it is not with these particles as with the Spring of a Watch, or a bent Cross-bow, that they should for a considerable time retain the same Reaction, and so consequently the same *Sense*. And lastly, if

they could, it is still nothing to the purpose, for let their Sense be what it will, their motion is necessary, it being meerly corporeall, and therefore the result of their motion cannot be from any kind of knowledg. For the corporeall motion is first, and is onely felt, not directed by feeling. And therefore whether the Matter have any Sense or no, what is made out of it is nothing but what results from the wild jumbings and knockings of one part thereof against another, without any purpose, counsell or direction. Wherefore the ordinary *Phænomena* of Nature being guided according to the most Exquisite Wisdome imaginable, it is plain that they are not the effects of the meer motion of *Matter*, but of some *Immaterial* Principle, by Axiome 10.

6. And therefore the Ignorance of Second Causes is not so rightly said to be the Seed of *Religion*, (as *Mr. Hobbs* would have it) as of *Irreligion* and *Atheisme*. For if we did more punctually and particularly search into their natures, we should clearly discern their insufficiency for such effects as we discover to be in the world. But when we have looked so closely and carefully into the nature of Corporeall Beings, and can finde no Causality in them proportionable to these Effects we speak of, still

to implead our selves rather of Ignorance, then the Matter and Corporeall motion of Insufficiency, is to hold an opinion upon humour, and to transgress against our first and second Axiomes.

CHAP. XIII.

1. *The last proof of Incorporeall Substances from Apparitions.* 2. *The first Evasion of the force of such Arguings.* 3. *An answer to that Evasion.* 4. *The second Evasion.* 5. *The first kind of the second Evasion.* 6. *A description out of Virgil of that Genius that suggests the dictates of the Epicurean Philosophy.* 7. *The more full and refined sense of that Philosophy now a dayes.* 8. *The great efficacy of the Stars (which they suppose to consist of nothing but Motion and Matter) for production of all manner of Creatures in the world.*

1. **T**HE Third and last ground which I would make use of, for evincing the Existence of Incorporeall Substances, is such extraordinary effects as we cannot well imagine any naturall, but must needs conceive some free or spontaneous Agent to be the Cause thereof, when as yet it is clear
that

that they are from neither Man nor Beast. Such are speakings, knockings, opening of doores when they were fast shut, sudden lights in the midst of a room floating in the aire, and then passing and vanishing; nay, shapes of Men and severall sorts of Brutes, that after speech and converse have suddainly disappeared. These and many such like extraordinary effects (which, if you please, you may call by one generall terme of *Apparitions*) seem to me to be an undeniable Argument, that there be such things as *Spirits* or *Incorporeall Substances* in the world; and I have demonstrated the sequel to be necessary in the last Chapter of the *Appendix to my Treatise against Atheisme*; and in the third Book of that Treatise have produced so many and so unexceptionable storyes concerning *Apparitions*, that I hold it superfluous to adde any thing here of that kind, taking far more pleasure in exercising of my Reason then in registering of History. Besides that I have made so carefull choice there already, that I cannot hope to cull out any that may prove more pertinent or convictive; I having pen'd down none but such as I had compared with those severe lawes I set my self in the first Chapter of that third Book, to prevent all tergiversations and evasions of gain-sayers.

2. But,

2. But, partly out of my own observation, and partly by information from others, I am well assured there are but two wayes whereby they escape the force of such evident narrations. The first is a firm perswasion that the very notion of a *Spirit* or *Immateriall* Substance is an Impossibility or Contradiction in the very termes. And therefore such stories implying that which they are confident is impossible, the Narration at the very first hearing must needs be judged to be false, and therefore they think it more reasonable to conclude all those that profess they have seen such or such things to be mad-men or cheats, then to give credit to what implyes a Contradiction.

3. But this Evasion I have quite taken away, by so clearly demonstrating that the notion of a Spirit implies no more contradiction then the notion of Matter; and that its Attributes are as conceivable as the Attributes of Matter: so that I hope this creep-hole is stopt for ever.

4. The second Evasion is not properly an evasion of the truth of these stories concerning *Apparitions*, but of our deduction therefrom. For they willingly admit of these *Apparitions* and *Prodigies* recorded in History, but they deny that they are any
Argu-

Arguments of a truly Spirituall and Incorporeall Substance distinct from the Matter thus changed into this or that shape, that can walk and speak, &c. but that they are speciall effects of the influence of the Heavenly Bodyes upon this region of Generation and Corruption.

5. And these that answer thus are of two sorts. The one have great Affinity with *Aristotle* and *Avenroes*, who look not upon the Heavenly Bodies as meer Corporeall Substances, but as actuated with Intelligencies, which are Essences separate and Immateriall. But this Supposition hurts not us at all in our present design; they granting that which I am arguing for, viz. a Substance Incorporeall. The use of this perverse Hypothesis is only to shuffle off all Arguments that are drawn from *Apparitions*, to prove that the Souls of men subsist after death, or that there are any such things as *Demons* or *Genii* of a nature permanent and immortall. But I look upon this Supposition as confutable enough, were it worth the while to encounter it. That of the *Sadduces* is far more firm, they supposing their ἀπορροιαὶ to be nothing else but the efficacy of the presence of God altering Matter into this or the other Apparition, or Manifestation; as if there were but

but one Soule in all things, and God were that Soule variously working in the Matter. But this I have already confuted in my Philosophicall Poems.

6. The other *Influenciaries* hold the same power of the Heavens as these; though they do not suppose so high a Principle in them, yet they think it sufficient for the salving of all Sublunary *Phænomena*, as well ordinary as extraordinary. Truly it is a very venerable *Secret*, and not to be uttered or communicated but by some old *Silenus* lying in his obscure Grot or Cave, nor that neither but upon due circumstances, and in a right humour, when one may find him with his veins swell'd out with wine, and his Garland falln off from his head through his heedless drowsiness: then if some young *Chromis* and *Mnasylus*, especially assisted by a fair and forward *Agle*, that by way of a love-frollick will leave the tracts of her fingers in the blood of Mulberries on the temples and forehead of this aged Satyre, while he sleeps dog-sleep, and will not seem to see for fear he forfeit the pleasure of his feeling; then, I say, if these young lads importune him enough, he will again sing that old song of the *Epicurean* Philosophy, in an higher strain than ever, which I profess I should abhor to recite,

cite, were it not to confute ; it is so monstrous and impious. But because no sore can be cured that is concealed, I must bring this *Hypothesis* into view also, which the Poet has briefly comprised in this summary.

*Namq; canebat, uti magnum per inane coacta
Semina terrarumq; animaq; marisq; fuissent,
Et liquidi simul ignis ; ut his exordia primis
Omnia, & ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis.*

7. The fuller and more refined sense whereof now a daies is this ; That *Matter* and *Motion* are the Principles of all things whatsoever ; and that by *Motion* some *Atomes* or particles are more subtil then others, and of more nimbleness and activity. That motion of one Body against another does every where necessarily produce Sense, Sense being nothing else but the *Reaction* of parts of the Matter. That the *subtiler* the Matter is, the Sense is more subtil. That the *subtilest* Matter of all is that which constitutes the *Sun* and *Stars*, from whence they must needs have the purest and *subtilest* Sense. That what has the most perfect Sense, has the most perfect *Imagination* and *Memory*, because *Memory* and *Imagination* are but the same with *Sense* in reality, the latter being but certain

Modes

Modes of the former. That what has the *perfectest Imagination*, has the *highest Reason* and *Providence*; *Providence* and *Reason* being nothing else but an exacter train of Phantasmes, Sensations or Imaginations. Wherefore the *Sun* and the *Stars* are the *most Intellectual Beings* in the world, and in them is that *Knowledge Counsell*, and *Wisdom* by which all Sublunary things are framed and governed.

8. These by their severall impresses and impregnations have filled the whole Earth with vital Motion, raising innumerable sorts of Flowers, Herbs and Trees out of the ground. These have also generated the severall Kindes of living Creatures. These have filled the Seas with Fishes, the Fields with Beasts, and the Aire with Fowles; the Terrestriall matter being as easily formed into the living shapes of these severall *Animals* by the powerfull impress of the Imagination of the Sun and Stars, as the *Embryo* in the womb is marked by the strong fancy of his Mother that bears him. And therefore these *Celestiall powers* being able to frame living shapes of earthly matter by the impress of their Imagination, it will be more easy for them to change the vaporous Aire into like transfigurations. So that admitting all these Stories of *Ap-*
paritions

paritions to be true that are recorded in Writers, it is no Argument of the Existence of any *Incorporeall* Principle in the world. For the piercing Fore-sight of these glorious Bodies, the *Sun* and *Stars*, is able to raise what *Apparitions* or *Prodigies* they please, to usher in the *Births* or fore-signify the *Deaths* of the most considerable persons that appear in the world; of which *Pomponatius* himself does acknowledg that there are many true examples both in *Greek* and *Latine* History. This is the *deepest Secret* that old *Silenus* could ever sing to ensnare the ears of deceivable Youth. And it is indeed *ἄριστον μυστήριον*, in the very worst sense, *Horrendum mysterium*, a very dreadfull and dangerous Mystery, saving that there is no small hope that it may not prove true, Let us therefore now examine it.

CHAP. XIV.

1. *That the Splendor of the Celestiall Bodies proves no Fore-sight nor Sovereignty that they have over us.*
2. *That the Stars can have no knowledg of us, Mathematically demonstrated.*
3. *The same Conclusion again demonstrated more familiarly.*
4. *That the Stars cannot communicate Thoughts, neither with the Sun nor with one another.*
5. *That the Sun has no knowledg of our affairs.*
6. *Principles laid down for the inferring that Conclusion.*
7. *A demonstration that he cannot see us.*
8. *That he can have no other kind of knowledg of us, nor of the frame of any Animall on Earth.*
9. *That though the Sun had the knowledg of the right frame of an Animal, he could not transmit it into Terrestriall matter.*
10. *An Answer to that Instance of the Signature of the Foetus.*
11. 12. *Further Answers thereto.*
13. *A short Increpation of the confident Exploders of Incorporeall Substance out of the world.*

1. **T**Hat the *Light* is a very glorious thing,
and the lustre of the *Stars* very lovely
to look upon, and that the *Body of the Sun*

H

is

is so full of splendour and Majesty, that without flattery we may profess our selves constrained to look aside, as not being able to bear the brightness of his aspect; all this must be acknowledged for Truth: but that these are as so many Eyes of Heaven to watch over the Earth, so many kinde and carefull Spectators and intermedlers also in humane affairs, as that phansifull Chymist *Paracelsus* conceits, who writeth that not onely Princes and Nobles, or men of great and singular worth, but even almost every one, near his death has some prognostick sign or other (as knockings in the house, the dances of dead men, and the like) from these compassionate Fore-seers of his approaching Fate; this I must confess I am not so paganly Superstitious as to believe one syllable of, but think it may be demonstrated to be a meer fancy, especially upon this present Hypothesis, That the Sun and Stars have no immaterial Being residing in them, but are meer Matter consisting of the subtilest Particles and most vehemently agitated. For then we cannot but be assured that there is nothing in them more Divine then what is seen in other things that shine in the dark, suppose rotten wood, glo-worms, or the flame of a rush-candle.

2. This at least we will demonstrate, That let the Sun and Stars have what knowledg they will of other things, they have just none at all of us, nor of our affairs; which will quite take away this last Evafion. That the Stars can have no knowledg of us is exceeding evident. For whenas the *Magnus Orbis* of the Earth is but as a Point compared with the distance thereof to a fixed Star, that is to say, when as that Angle which we may imagine to be drawn from a Star, and to be subtended by the Diameter of the *Magnus Orbis*, is to Sense no Angle at all, but as a meer Line; how little then is the Earth it self? and how utterly invisible to any Star, when as her Diameter is above 1100. times less then that of her *Magnus Orbis*? From whence it is clear that it is perfectly impossible that the Stars, though they were endued with sight, could so much as see the Earth it self, (much less the inhabitants thereof) to be *Spectators* and *Intermedlers* in their affaires for good or evil; and there being no higher Principle to inspire them with the knowledg of these things, it is evident that they remain utterly ignorant of them.

3. Or if this Demonstration (though undeniably true in it self) be not so intelligible to every one, we may adde what is

more easy and familiar, viz. That the Stars being lucid Bodies, and those of the first magnitude near an hundred times bigger then the Earth, and yet appearing so small things to us, hence any one may collect, that the opaque Earth will either be quite invisible to the Stars, or else at least appear so little, that it will be impossible that they should see any distinct Countries, much less Cities, Houses, or Inhabitants.

4. Wherefore we have plainly swept away this numerous Company of the celestiall Senators from having any thing to doe to consult about, or any way to oversee the affairs of Mankind; and therefore let them seem to wink and twinkle as cogitatively as they will, we may rest in assurance that they have no plot concerning us, either for good or evill, as having no knowledge of us. Nor if they had, could they communicate their thoughts to that great deemed Sovereign of the world, the Sun; they being ever as invisible to him, as they are to us in the day time. For it is nothing but his light that hinders us from seeing so feeble Objects, and this hindrance consisteth in nothing else but this, That that motion which by his Rayes is caused in the Organ is so fierce and violent, that the gentle vibration of the light of the Stars cannot

cannot master it, nor indeed bear any considerable proportion to it: What then can it do in reference to the very Body of the Sun himself, the matter whereof has the most furious motion of any thing in the world?

5. There is nothing now therefore left, but the Sun alone, that can possibly be conceived to have any knowledg of, or any superintendency over our terrestriall affairs. And how incapable he is also of this office, I hold it no difficult thing to demonstrate. Whence it will plainly appear, that those *Apparitions* that are seen, whether in the Aire or on Earth (which are rightly looked upon as an Argument of Providence and Existence of some Incorporeall Essence in the world) cannot be attributed to the power and prevision of the Sun, supposing him purely corporeall.

6. For it is a thing agreed upon by all sides, That meer *Matter* has no connate *Ideas* in it of such things as we see in the world; but that upon Reaction of one part moved by another arises a kind of Sense, or Perception. Which opinion as it is most rationall in it self to conceive (supposing *Matter* has any sense in it at all) so it is most consonant to experience, we seeing plainly that Sense is ever caused by some outward

corporeall motion upon our Organs, which are also corporeall. For that *Light* is from a corporeal motion, is plain from the reflexion of the rayes thereof, and no Sound is heard but from the motion of the Aire or some other intermediate Body; no Voice but there is first a moving of the tongue; no Musick but there must either be the blowing of wind, or the striking upon strings, or something Analogicall to these, and so in the other Senses. Wherefore if there be nothing but Body in the world, it is evident that Sense arises meerly from the motion of one part of Matter against another, and that Motion is ever first, and perception followes, and that therefore perception must necessarily follow the laws of Motion, and that no *Percipient* can have any thing more to conceive then what is conveighed by corporeall motion. Now from these Principles it will be easy to prove that, though we should acknowledg a power of perception in the Sun, yet it will not amount to any ability of his being either a Spectator, or Governor of our affairs here on Earth.

7. According to the Computation of *Astronomers*, even of those that speak more modestly, the *Sun* is bigger then the *Earth* above an hundred and fitty times. But how little he appears to us every eye is able to judge,

judge. How little then must the *Earth* appear to him? If he see her at all, he will be so far from being able to take notice of any Persons or Families, that he cannot have any distinct discerning of Streets, nor Cities, no not of Fields, nor Countries; but whole Regions, though of very great Extent, will vanish here, as *Alcibiades* his Patrimony, in that Map of the world *Socrates* shewed him, to repress the pride of the young Heire. The *Earth* must appear considerably less to him then the *Moon* does to us, because the *Sun* appears to us less then the *Moon*. It were easy to demonstrate that her *discus* would appear to the *Sun* near thirty, nay sixty times less then the *Moon* does to us, according to *Lansbergius* his computation. Now consider how little we can discern in that broader Object of sight, the *Moon*, when she is the nighest, notwithstanding we be placed in the dark, under the shadow of the *Earth*, whereby our sight is more passive and impressible. How little then must the fiery eye of that *Cyclops* the *Sun*, which is all Flame and Light, discern in this lesser Object the *Earth*, his vigour and motion being so vehemently strong and unyielding? What effect it will have upon him, we may in some sort judge by our selves; For though our Organ be

but moved or agitated with the reflection of his Rayes, we hardly see the Moon when she is above the Horizon by day: What impress then can our Earth, a less Object to him then the Moon is to us, make upon the Sun, whose Body is so furiously hot, that he is as boyling Fire, if a man may so speak, and the Spots about him are, as it were, the scum of this fuming Cauldron? Besides that our *Atmosphere* is so thick a covering over us at that distance, that there can be the appearance of nothing but a white mist enveloping all and shining like a bright cloud; in which the rayes of the Sun will be so lost, that they can never return any distinct representation of things unto him. Wherefore it is as evident to Reason that he cannot see us, as it is to Sense that we see him; and therefore he can be no *Overseer* nor *Intermedler* in our actions.

8. But perhaps you will reply That though the Sun cannot see the Earth, yet he may have a Sense and perception in himself (for he is a fine glittering thing, and some strange matter must be presumed of him) that may amount to a wonderfull large sphere of Understanding, Fore-knowledge, and Power. But this is a meer fancyfull surmise, and such as cannot be made good by any of our Faculties: Nay the quite

quite contrary is demonstrable by such Principles as are already agreed upon. For there are no *connate Ideas* in the *Matter*, and therefore out of the collision and agitation of these Solar particles, we cannot rationally expect any other effect in the Sun, then such as we experiment in the percussion of our own eyes, out of which ordinarily follows the sense of a confused light or flame. If the Sun therefore has any sense of himself, it must be only the perception of a very vigorous *Light* or *Fire*, which being still one and the same representation, it is a question whether he has a sense of it or no, any more then we have of our bones, which we perceive not, by reason of our accustomed and uninterrupted sense of them, as *Mr. Hobbs* ingeniously conjectures in a like supposition. But if you will say that there is a perception of the jogging or justling, or of what ever touch or rubbing of one Solar particle against another, the body of the Sun being so exceeding liquid, and consequently the particles thereof never resting, but playing and moving this way and that way; they hitting and fridging so fortuitously one against another, the perceptions that arise from hence must be so various and fortuitous, so quick and short, so inconsistent, flitting and unpermanant,

manent, that if any man were in such a condition as the Sun necessarily is, according to this Hypothesis, he would both be, and appear to all the world to be, stark mad; he would be so off and on, and so unsettled, and doe, and think, and speak all things with such ungovernable rashness and temerity. In brief, that the Sun by this tumultuous agitation of his *fiery Atoms*, should hit upon any rationall contrivance, or right Idea of any of these living Creatures we see here on Earth, is utterly as hard to conceive, as that the Terrestrial particles themselves should jumble together into such contrivances and formes, which is that which I have already sufficiently confuted.

9. And if the Sun could light on any such true frame or forme of any Animall, or the due rudiments or contrivance thereof, it is yet unconceivable how he should convey it into this Region of Generation here on Earth, partly by reason of the Earths Distance and Invisibleness, and partly because the deepest Principle of all being but meer Motion, without any superior power to govern it, this imagination of the Sun working on the Earth can be but a simple *Rectilinear* impress, which can never arise to such an inward solid organization
of

of parts in living Creatures, nor hold together these *Spectres* or *Apparitions* in the Aire, in any more certain form then the smoak of chymnies, or the fume of Tobacco.


10. Nor is that instance of the power of the Mothers fancy on the *Fetus* in the womb, any more then a meer flourish; for the disparity is so great, that the Argument proves just nothing: For whereas the Mother has an Explicite Idea of the *Fœtus* and every part thereof, the Sun and Stars have no distinct Idea at all of the parts of the Earth; nay I dare say that what we have already intimated will amount to a Demonstration, That though they had Sense, yet they do not so much as know whether this Earth we live on be *in verum Naturâ* or no.

11. Again, the mark that is impressed on the *Fetus*, the Mother has a clear and vivid conception of; but the curious contrivance in the Idea of Animals, I have shewn how incompetent it is to the fortuitous jostling of the fiery particles of either Sun or Stars.

12. Thirdly, the impress on the *Fetus* is very simple and slight, and seldome so curious as the ordinary impresses of Seals upon Wax, which are but the modifications of the surface thereof; but this supposed impress of the Imagination of the Sun and
Stars


Stars is more then a solid Statue, or the most curious *Automaton* that ever was invented by the wit of man ; and therefore impossible to proceed from a meer *Rectilinear* impress upon the *Aether* down to the Earth from the Imagination of the Sun, no not if he were supposed to be actuated with an Intelligent Soule, if the Earth and all the space betwixt her and him were devoid thereof. Nor do I conceive, though it be an infinitely more slight business, that the direction of the Signature of the *Fetus* upon such a part were to be performed by the Fancy of the Mother, notwithstanding the advantage of the organization of her body, were not both her self and the *Fetus* animated Creatures.

13. Wherefore we have demonstrated beyond all Evasion, from the *Phænomena* of the Universe, That of necessity there must be such a thing in the world as *Incorporeall Substance* ; let inconsiderable Philosophasters hoot at it, and deride it as much as their Follies please.



BOOK II. CHAP. I.

1. *An addition of more Axiomes for the demonstrating that there is a Spirit or Immateriall Substance in Man.* 2. *The Truth of the first of these Axiomes confirmed from the testimony of Mr. Hobbs.* 3. *The proof of the second Axiome.* 4. *The proof of the third.* 5. *The confirmation of the fourth from the testimony of Mr. Hobbs, as also from Reason.* 6. *An explication and proof of the fifth.* 7. *A further proof thereof.* 8. *A third Argument of the Truth thereof.* 9. *An Answer to an Evasion.* 10. *Another Evasion answered.* 11. *A further Answer thereto.* 12. *A third Answer.* 13. *A fourth Answer, wherein is mainly contained a confirmation of the first Answer to the second Evasion.* 14. *The plainness of the sixth Axiome.* 15. *The proof of the seventh.*

1.  Having cleared the way thus far as to prove that there is no Contradiction nor Inconsistency in the notion of a Spirit, but that it may Exist in Nature, nay that *de facto*

facto there are Incorporeall Substances really Existent in the world, we shall now drive more home to our main design, and demonstrate *That there is such an Immateriall Substance in Man*, which, from the power it is conceived to have in actuating and guiding the Body, is usually called *the Soule*. This Truth we shall make good first in a more generall way, but not a whit the lesse stringent, by evincing *That such Faculties or Operations* as we are conscious of in our selves, are utterly incompetible to *Matter* considered at large without any particular organization. And then afterwards we shall more punctually consider the *Body* of man, and every possible fitness in the structure thereof, that is worth taking notice of for the performance of *these Operations* we ordinarily find in our selves. And that this may be done more plainly and convincingly, we will here adde to the number of our Axiomes these that follow.

AXIOME XX.

Motion or Reaction of one part of the Matter against another, or at least a due continuance thereof, is really one and the same with Sense and Perception, if there be any Sense or Perception in Matter.

2. **T**HIS Axiome, as it is plain enough of it self (supposing there were nothing but Body in the world) so has it the suffrage of our most confident and potent adversary *Mr. Hobbs* in his *Elements of Philos.* Cap. 25. Art. 2. Whose judgment I make much of in such cases as these, being perswaded as well out of Reason as Charity, that he seeing so little into the nature of *Spirits*, that defect is compensated with an extraordinary Quickightedness in discerning of the best and most warrantable wayes of salving all *Phænomena* from the ordinary allowed properties of *Matter*. Wherefore I shall not hold it impertinent to bring in his Testimony in things of this nature, my Demonstrations becoming thereby more recommendable to men of his own Conclusions. But my design being not a particular victory over such a sort of Men, but an absolute establishing of the Truth, I shall lay down

down no Grounds that are meerly *Argumenta ad hominem*; but such as I am perswaded (upon this Hypothesis, That there is nothing but Body in the world) are evident to any one that can indifferently judge thereof. And the demonstration of this present Axiome I have prefixed in my Preface Sect. 5.

A X I O M E XXI.

So far as this continued Reaction reaches, so far reaches Sense or Perception, and no farther.

3. **T**HIS Axiome is to be understood as well of Duration of time, as Extension of the Subject, viz. That *Sense* and *Perception* spread no further in Matter than *Reaction* does, nor remain any longer then this *Reaction* remains. Which Truth is fully evident out of the foregoing Axiome.

A X I O M E XXII.

That diversity there is of Sense or Perception does necessarily arise from the diversity of the Magnitude, Figure, Position, Vigour and Direction of Motion in parts of the Matter.

4. **T**HE truth of this is also clear from the 20. Axiome. For *Perception* being really

really one and the same thing with *Reaction* of Matter one part against another, and there being a diversity of perception, it must imply also a diversity of modification of Reaction; and Reaction being nothing but Motion in Matter, it cannot be varied but by such *variations* as are competent to Matter, viz. such as are *Magnitude, Figure, Posture, Locall Motion*, wherein is contained any endeavour towards it, as also the Direction of that either full Motion or curb'd endeavour, and a Vigour thereof; which if you run to the lowest degrees, you will at last come to *Rest*, which therefore is some-way referrible to that head, as to *Magnitude* you are to refer *Littleness*. These are the first conceivables in Matter, and therefore diversity of perception must of necessity arise from these.

A X I O M E XXIII.

Matter in all the variety of those Perceptions it is sensible of, has none but such as are impressed by Corporeall Motions, that is to say, that are perceptions of some actions or modified Impressions of parts of Matter bearing one against another.

5. **T**O this Truth Mr. Hobbs sets his seale with all willingness imaginable, or
I rather

rather eagerness, as also his followers, they stoutly contending that we have not the perception of any thing but the Phantasmes of materiall Objects, and of sensible words or Markes, which we make to stand for such and such Objects. Which certainly would be most true if there were nothing but *Matter* in the world; so that they speak very consonantly to their own Principles: I say, this is not only true in that School, but also rationall in it self, supposing nothing but *Matter* in the world, and that *Perception* and *Reaction* is really one. For that Reaction being in Brutes as well as in Men, there must not be any difference by a perception of quite another kind, but by an externall way of communication of their perceptions. And therefore the distinction betwixt Men and Beasts must consist onely in this, that the one can agree in some common mark, whether *Voices* or *Characters*, or whatever else, to express their perceptions, but the other cannot; but the perceptions themselves must be of one kind in both, they neither of them perceiving any thing but corporeall impressions, such as they feel by the parts of the Matter bearing one against another.

AXIOME XXIV.

The distinct Impression of any considerable extent of variegated Matter cannot be received by a meer point of Matter.

6. **BY** a meer point of Matter I doe not mean a meer Mathematicall point, but a perfect Parvitude, or the least Reality of which Matter can consist, concerning which I have already spoke Lib. 1. Cap. 6. This being the least quantity that discerpible Matter can consist of, no particle of Matter can touch it less then it self. This Parvitude therefore that is so little that it has properly no integrall parts, really distinguishable, how can it possibly be a Subject distinctly receptive of the view, haply, of half an Horizon at once? which sight is caused by reall and distinct motion from reall distinct parts of the Object that is seen.

7. I acknowledg indeed that the Pupill of the Eye is but small in comparison of those vast Objects that are seen through it, as also that through a Hole exceedingly much less, made suppose in brass or lead, large Objects are transmitted very clearly; but I have observed with all that

you may lessen the hole so far, that an unclouded day at noon will look more obscure than an ordinary moon-shine night. Wherefore Nature has bounds, and reducing her to the least measure imaginable, the effect must prove insensible.

8. Again, this Object we speak of may be so variegated, I mean with such colours, that it may imply a contradiction, that one and the same particle of Matter (suppose some very small round one, that shall be the Cuspe of the visuall Pyramide or Cone) should receive them all at once; the opposite kindes of those colours being uncommunicable to this round particle, otherwise then by contrarietie of Motions, or by Rest and Motion, which are as contrary; as is manifest out of that excellent Theorem concerning Colours in *Des-Cartes* his *Metēors*, which if it were possible to be false, yet it is most certainly true, that seeing Motion is the cause of Sight, the contrariety of Objects for Colour must arise out of contrary modifications of Motion in this particle we speak of, that immediatly communicates the *Object* to the *Sentient*: which contrariety of Motions at the same time and within the same surface of the adequate place of a Body is utterly incompatible thereto,

9. Nor is that Evasion any thing available, That there is not any contrariety of reall Motion here, but that there is onely endeavour to Motion: For it is plain that Endeavour is as reall as Motion it self, and as contrary, because it does really affect the sight, and in a contrary manner. Besides, this Endeavour toward Motion is Motion it self, though of an exceeding small progress: But be it as little as it will, it is as great a contradiction, for example, that the Globe A. should upon the same centre, and within the same superficies (which is its adæquate place according to the meaning of that Notion in *Aristotles* Schoole) be turned never so little from C. to B. and from B. to C. at once, as to be turned quite about in that manner. To which you may adde that some Colours imply the ones Motion, and the others Rest; but a Globe if it rest in any one part from turning, rests in all. From whence it will follow, That it is impossible to see *Red* and *Black* at once.




10. This Subterfuge therefore being thus clearly taken away, they substitute another, viz. That the distinct parts of the Object doe not act upon this round particle, which is the Cuspe of the visuall Pyramide,

at once, but successively, and so swiftly, that the Object is represented at once; as when one swings about a fire-stick very fast, it seems one continued circle of fire. But we shall find this instance very little to the purpose, if we consider, that when one swings a fire-stick in a circle, it describes such a circle in the bottom of the Eye, not upon one point there, but in a considerable distance; and that the Optick Nerve, or the Spirits therein, are touched successively, but left free to a kind of *Tremor* or *Vibration* as it were, (so as it is in the playing of a Lute) till the motion has gone round, and then touches in the same place again, so quick, that it finds it still vigorously moved: But there being but one particle to touch upon here, some such like inconveniences will recur as we noted in the former case.

11. For, as I demonstrated before, that some Colours cannot be communicated at once to one and the same round particle of Matter; so from thence it will follow here, That, such Colours succeeding one another, the impress of the one will take off immediatly the impress of the other; from whence we shall not be able to see such various Colours as are discernible in a very large Object at once. For unless the impression

pression make some considerable stay upon that which receives it, there is no Sensation; insomuch that a man may wag his finger so fast that he can scarce see it: and if it doe make a due stay, suppose a large Object checkered with the most opposite Colours, it were impossible that we should see that checker-work at once in so large a compass as we doe, but we shall onely see it by parts, the parts vanishing and coming again in a competent swiftness, but very discernible.

12. Again; If we could possibly imagine the vicissitudes of the impresses, from the distinct parts of the Basis of the visuall Cone to the point of it, which we will suppose to be a very small *globulus*, such as *Des-Cartes* his second element consists of, it being thus successively thrust against, things must then be as I have represented them in the adjoining figure, where C. A. is the Object, G. H. the Sentient Matter, and I. the *Globulus*, which will be born from E. directly



toward F. where there will be received such a colour in the *least Reality* of the Sentient Matter in F. but from A. it will be borne towards B. and with a very short rowling touch in another *Reality*, or it may be more distantly from F. and impress such a colour from A. upon B. or thereabout, and so from C. upon D. so that hereby also it is manifest that no one *perfect Parvitude* receives the whole Object C. E. A.

13. Lastly, this quick vicissitude of impulse or impression would contaminate all the Colours, and make the whole Object as it were of one confounded colour, as a man may easily perceive in a painted Wheel; For what is it but a quick coming on of one colour upon the same part of the Optick nerve, upon which another was, immediately that makes the whole Wheel seem of one blended colour? But not to impose upon any one, this instance of the Wheel has a peculiar advantage above this present Supposition for making all seem one confounded colour, because the colours of the Wheel come not onely upon one and the same part of the Nerve, but in one and the same line from the Object; so that in this regard the instance is less accommodate. But it is shreudly probable, that fluid perceptive Matter will not fail to find the colours tinctured from

from one another in some measure in the whole Object here also, by reason of the instability of that particle that is plaied upon from all parts thereof. At least it is an unexceptionable confirmation of our first Demonstration of the weakness of the second Evasion, from the necessity of a considerable stay upon the percipient Matter, and that Sensation cannot be but with some leisurely continuance of this or that Motion before it be wiped out. We might adde also that there ought to be a due permanency of the Object that presses against the Organ, though no new impression suddenly succeeded to wipe out the former, as one may experiment in swiftly swinging about a painted Bullet in a string, which will still more fully confirme what we aime at. But this is more then enough for the making good of this 24. Axiome; whose evidence is so clear of it self, that I believe there are very few but will be convinced of it at the first sight.

AXI-

AXIOME XXV.

Whatever impression or parts of any impression are not received by this perfect Parvitude or Reall point of Matter, are not at all perceived by it.

14. **T**HIS is so exceeding plain of it self, that it wants neither explication nor proof.

AXIOME XXVI.

What ever Sense or Motion there is now in Matter, it is a necessary impression from some other part of Matter, and does necessarily continue till some part or other of Matter has justled it out.

15. **T**HAT what Motion there is in any part of Matter is necessarily there, and there continues, till some other part of Matter change or diminish its Motion, is plain from the lawes of Motion set down by *Des-Cartes* in his *Principia Philosophiæ*. And that there is the same Reason of Sense or Perception (supposing there is nothing but Matter in the world) is plain from Axiome 20. that makes Motion and Sense or Perception really the same.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

1. *That if Matter be capable of Sense, Inanimate things are so too : And of Mr. Hobbs his wavering in that point.*
2. *An Enumeration of severall Faculties in us that Matter is utterly incapable of.*
3. *That Matter in no kind of Temperature is capable of Sense.*
4. *That no one point of Matter can be the Common Sensorium.*
5. *Nor a multitude of such Points receiving singly the entire image of the Object.*
6. *Nor yet receiving part part, and the whole the whole.*
7. *That Memory is incompatible to Matter.*
8. *That the Matter is incapable of the notes of some circumstances of the Object which we remembred.*
9. *That Matter cannot be the seat of second Notions.*
10. *Mr. Hobbs his Evasion of the foregoing Demonstration clearly confuted.*
11. *That the freedom of our Will evinces that there is a Substance in us distinct from Matter.*
12. *That Mr. Hobbs therefore acknowledges all our actions necessary.*

1. **WE** have now made our addition of such Axiomes as are most usefull for our present purpose. Let us therefore, according to the order we propounded, before

fore we consider the fabrick and organization of the Body, see if *such Operations* as we find in our selves be competible to *Matter* looked upon in a more generall manner. That *Matter* from its own nature is incapable of *Sense*, plainly appears from Axiome 20. & 21. For *Motion* and *Sense* being really one and the same thing, it will necessarily follow, that where ever there is *Motion*, especially any considerable duration thereof, there must be *Sense* and *Perception*: Which is contrary to what we find in a *Catochus*, and experience daily in dead Carcasses; in both which, though there be *Reaction*, yet there is no *Sense*. In brief, if any Matter have *Sense*, it will follow that upon *Reaction* all shall have the like, and that a Bell while it is ringing, and a Bow while it is bent, and every Jack-in-a-box that School-boyes play with, while it is held in by the cover pressing against it, shall be living Animals, or Sensitive Creatures. A thing so foolish and frivolous, that the meer recitall of the opinion may well be thought confutation enough with the sober. And indeed *Mr. Hobbs* himself, though he resolve *Sense* meerly into *Reaction* of Matter, yet is ashamed of these odd consequences thereof, and is very loth to be reckoned in the company of those Philosophers,
(though,

(though, as he sayes, learned men) who have maintained that all Bodies are endued with Sense, and yet he can hardly abstain from saying that they are; onely he is more shie of allowing them *Memory*, which yet they will have whether he will or no, if he give them *Sense*. As for Example, in the ringing of a Bell, from every stroak there continues a *tremor* in the Bell, which decaying, must according to his Philosophie be *Imagination*, and referring to the stroak past must be *Memory*; and if a stroak overtake it within the compass of this Memory, what hinders but *Discrimination* or *Judgment* may follow? But the conclusion is consonant enough to this absurd Principle, That there is nothing but Matter in the Universe, and that it is capable of perception. See Mr. Hobbs his Elements of Philos. Chap. 25.

2. But we will not content our selves onely with the discovery of this one ugly inconvenience of this bold Assertion, but shall further endeavour to shew that the Hypothesis is false, and that *Matter* is utterly *uncapable* of such operations as we find in our selves, and that therefore there is *something in us Immateriall* or *Incorporeall*. For we finde in our selves, that one and the same thing both heares, and sees, and tastes, and, to be short, perceives all the variety of
Objects

Objects that Nature manifests unto us. Wherefore Sense being nothing but the impress of corporeall motion from Objects without, that part of Matter which must be the common *Sensorium*, must of necessity receive all that diversity of impulsions from Objects; it must likewise Imagine, Remember, Reason, and be the fountain of spontaneous Motion, as also the Seat of what the Greeks call the *τὸ αὐτεξέστικτον* or *liberty of Will*: Which supposition we shall finde involved in unextricable difficulties.

3. For first, we cannot conceive of any *Portion of Matter* but it is either *Hard* or *Soft*. As for that which is *Hard*, all men leave it out as utterly unlike to be endued with such Cognitive faculties as we are conscious to our selves of. That which is *Soft* will prove either *opaque*, *pellucid*, or *lucid*. If *opaque*, it cannot see, the exterior superficies being a bar to the inward parts. If *pellucid*, as *Aire* and *Water*, then indeed it will admit inwardly these *Particles* and that *Motion* which are the conveyers of the Sense, and distinction of *Colours*; and *Sound* also will penetrate. But this *Matter* being heterogeneall, that is to say consisting of parts of a different nature and office, the *Aire*, suppose, being proper for *Sound*, and those *Round particles* which *Cartesius* describes

scribes for *Colour* and *Light*; the perception of these Objects will be differently lodged; but there is some one thing in us that perceives both. Lastly, if *lucid*, there would be much-what the same inconvenience that there is in the *opaque*, for its own fieriness would fend off the gentle touch of externall impresses, or if it be so milde and thin that it is in some measure diaphanous, the inconveniences will again recurre that were found in the *pellucid*. And in brief, any *liquid Matter* has such variety of particles in it, that if the Whole, as it must, (being the common *Sensorium*) be affected with any impress from without, the parts thereof must be variously affected, so that no Object will seem homogeneous, as appears from Axiome 22. Which Truth I shall further illustrate by a homely but very significant representation. Suppose we should put Feathers, Bullets and Spur-rowels in a Box, where they shall lye intermixedly, but close, one with another: upon any jog this Box receives, supposing all the stuffage thereof has Sense, it is evident that the severall things therein must be differently affected, and therefore if the common *Sensorium* were such, there would seem no homogeneous Object in the world. Or at least these severall particles shall be the severall *Re-*
ceptives

ceptives of the severall motions of the same kinde from without, as the Aire of Sounds, the *Cartesian Globuli* of Light and Colours. But what receives all these, and so can judge of them all, we are again at a loss for, as before: unless we imagine it some very fine and *subtill* Matter, so *light* and *thinne*, that it feels not it self, but so *yielding* and *passive*, that it easily feels the several assaults and impresses of other Bodies upon it, or in it; which yet would imply, that this Matter alone were *Sensitive*, and the others not; and so it would be granted, that not all *Matter* (no not so much as in *Fluid* Bodies) has *Sense*. Such a tempered Matter as this is analogous to the *Animal Spirits* in Man, which, if Matter could be the Soule, were the very Soule of the Body, and *common percipient* of all Motions from within or without, by reason of the tenuity, passivity and neare homogeneity and imperceptibility of any change or alteration from the playing together of its own tenuious and light particles; and therefore very fit to receive all manner of impresses from others. Whence we may rationally conclude, That some such *subtile Matter* as this, is either the Soule, or her *immediate instrument* for all manner of perceptions. The latter whereof I shall prove to be true

in

in its due place. That the *former* part is false I shall now demonstrate, by proving more stringently, That no *Matter* whatsoever is capable of such *Sense* and *Perception* as we are conscious to our selves of.

4. For concerning that part of *Matter* which is the *Common Sensorium*, I demand whether some one point of it receive the whole image of the Object, or whether it is wholly received into every point of it, or finally whether the whole *Sensorium* receive the whole image by expanded parts, this part of the *Sensorium* this part of the image, and that part that. If the first, seeing That in us which perceives the externall Object moves also the Body, it will follow, That one little point of Matter will give locall motion to what is innumerable millions of times bigger then it self, of which there cannot be found nor imagined any example in Nature.

5. If the second, this difficulty presents it self, which also reflects upon the former Position, How so small a point as we speak of should receive the images of so vast, or so various Objects at once, without Obliteration or Confusion; a thing impossible; as is manifest from Axiome 24. And therefore not receiving them, cannot perceive them by Axiome 25. But if every point or particle of this Matter could receive the

K

whole

whole image; which of these innumerable particles, that receive the Image entirely, may be deemed *I myself* that perceive this Image? For if I be all those Points, it will come to pass, especially in a small Object, and very neare at hand, that the line of impulse coming to divers and distant Points, it will seem to come as from severall places, and so one Object will necessarily seem a Cluster of Objects. But if I be one of these Points, what becomes of the rest? or *who* are they?

6. There remains therefore onely the third way, which is that the parts of the image of the Object be received by the parts of this portion of Matter, which is supposed the common *Sensorium*. But this does perfectly contradict experience; for we finde our selves to perceive the whole Object, when in this case nothing could perceive the whole, every part onely perceiving its part; and therefore there would be nothing that can judge of the whole. No more then three men, if they were imagined to sing a song of three parts, and none of them should heare any part but his own, could judge of the Harmony of the whole.

7. As concerning the *Seat of Imagination* and *Memory*, especially *Memory*, what kinde of matter can be found fit for this function?

function? If it be *Fluid*, the images of Objects will be prone to vanish suddainly, as also to be perverted or turned contrary wayes. For example C. a particle of this fluid Matter receiving an impress from B. must feel it as coming from B: but it toying and tumbling up and down, as the particles of fluid Matter doe, turns the side E. F. which received that impress from B. to-




wards L. whence it will feel as if the impress had been from L. for it must feel it as from the place directly opposite to it self: and the same reason will be in other particles of this fluid Matter, which must needs force a great deal of preposterous confusion both upon the *Fancy* and *Memory*. If it be *Hard*, it will soon be composd to rest, as in a Bell whose tremor is gone in a little time; but we remember things some years together, though we never think of them till the end of that terme. If *Viscid*, there is the like inconvenience, nay it is the unfittest of all for either receiving of Motion, or continuing it, and therefore unlikely to be the *Seat* of either *Fancy* or *Memory*. For if *Motion* or *Reaction* and *Sense*, whether internall or externall, be all one, Motion ceasing Memory must needs cease, by Axi-

ome 21. Nor can it any more remember when it is again moved in the same manner, then a Stone or a piece of Lead that was flung up into the Aire, can become more light or more prone to flie upwards when they have once ceased from Motion; for they are both exquisitely as if they had never been moved.

8. Lastly, we remember some things, of which there can be no *Signatures* in Matter to represent them, as for example, *Wideness* and *Distance*. For as for both of them,

there is no note can be made in the Matter E. by lines from the two Objects A. B. and C.



D. whereby the

difference of remoteness of A. E. above C. E. or of the wideness of A. B. above C. D. can be discerned; for both the Objects make one and the same signature in the matter E.

9. Those that are commonly called by the name of *Secunda notiones*, and are not any sensible Objects themselves, nor the Phantasmes of any sensible Objects, but only our manner of conceiving them, or reasoning about them, in which number are

compre

comprehended all *Logicall* and *Mathematicall termes*; these, I say, never came in at the Senses, they being no impresses of corporeall motion, which excite in us, as in Doggs and other Brutes, the sense onely of Sounds, of Colours, of Hot, of Cold, and the like. Now *Matter* being affected by no perception but of corporeall impression, by the bearing of one Body against another; it is plain from Axiome 23. that these *second Notions*, or *Mathematicall* and *Logicall* conceptions, cannot be seated in *Matter*, and therefore must be in some other Substance distinct from it, by Axiome 10.

10. Here *Mr. Hobbs*, to avoid the force of this Demonstration, has found out a marvelous witty invention to befool his followers withall, making them believe that there is no such thing as these *Secunda Notiones*, distinct from the *Names* or *Words* whereby they are said to be signified; and that there is no perception in us, but of such *Phantasmes* as are impressed from externall Objects, such as are common to Us and Beasts: and as for the *Names* which we give to these, or the *Phantasmes* of them, that there is the same reason of them, as of other *Markes*, *Letters*, or *Characters*, all which coming in at the *Senses*, he would beare them in hand that it is a plain case,

that we have the perception of nothing but what is impressed from corporeall Objects. But how ridiculous an Evasion this is, may be easily discovered, if we consider, that if these *Mathematicall* and *Logicall Notions* we speak of be nothing but *Names*, *Logicall* and *Mathematicall Truths* will not be the same in all Nations, because they have not the same *names*. For Example, *Similitudo* and *ὁμοιότης*, *ἀναλογία* and *Proportio*, *λόγος* and *Ratio*, these *names* are utterly different, the *Greek* from the *Latine*; yet the *Greeks*, *Latines*, nor any Nation else, doe vary in their conceptions couched under these different names: Wherefore it is plain, that there is a settled Notion distinct from these *Words* and *Names*, as well as from those corporeall Phantasmes impressed from the Object; which was the thing to be demonstrated.

II. Lastly, we are conscious to our selves of that faculty which the Greekes call *ἐξουσία*, or a *Power in our selves*, notwithstanding any outward assaults or importunate temptations, to cleave to that which is *vertuous and honest*, or to yield to pleasures, or other vile advantages. That we have this *Liberty* and freedome in our selves, and that we refuse the good, and chuse the evil, when we might have done otherwise; that
 naturall

naturall Sense of *Remorse of Conscience* is an evident and undeniable witness of. For when a man has done amiss, the paine, grief, or indignation that he raises in himself, or at least feels raised in him, is of another kind from what we finde from misfortunes or affronts we could not avoid. And that which pinches us and vexes us so severely, is the sense that we have brought such an evill upon our selves, when it was in our power to have avoided it. Now if there be no sense nor perception in us, but what arises from the Reaction of Matter one part against another; whatever Representation of things, whatever Deliberation or Determination we fall upon, it will by Axiome 26. be *purely necessary*, there being upon this Hypothesis no more *Freedom* while we deliberate or conclude, then there is in a paire of scales, which rests as necessarily at last as it moved before. Wherefore it is manifest that this faculty we call *Free-will* is not found in *Matter*, but in some other Substance, by Axiome 10.

12. *Mr Hobbs* therefore, to give him his due, consonantly enough to his own principles, does very peremptorily affirm that all our actions are necessary. But I having proved the contrary by that Faculty which we may call *Internall Sense* or *Common Notion*,

found in all men that have not done violence to their own Nature ; unless by some other approved Faculty he can discover the contrary, my Conclusion must stand for an undoubted Truth by Axiome 5. He pretends therefore some Demonstration of Reason ; which he would oppose against the dictate of this *Inward Sense* ; which it will not be amiss to examine, that we may discover his Sophistry.

CHAP. III.

1. Mr. Hobbs *his Arguments whereby he would prove all our actions necessitated.* 2. *His first Argument.* 3. *His third Argument.* 4. *His fourth Argument.* 5. *What must be the meaning of these words, Nothing taketh beginning from it self, in the first Argument of Mr. Hobbs.* 6. *A fuller and more determinate explication of the foregoing words, whose sense is evidently convinced to be, That no Essence of it self can vary its modification.* 7. *That this is onely said by Mr. Hobbs, not proved, and a full confutation of his Assertion.* 8. *Mr. Hobbs imposed upon by his own Sophistry.* 9. *That*
one

one part of this first Argument of his is groundles, the other sophisticall. 10. The plain proposall of his Argument, whence appeares more fully the weaknes and sophistry thereof. 11. An Answer to his second Argument. 12. An Answer to the third. 13. An Answer to a difficulty concerning the Truth and Falsehood of future Propositions. 14. An Answer to Mr. Hobbs his fourth Argument, which, though slighted by himself, is the strongest of them all. 15. The difficulty of reconciling Free-will with Divine Prescience and Prophecies. 16. That the faculty of Free-will is seldome put in use. 17. That the use of it is properly in Morall conflict. 18. That the Soule is not invincible there neither. 19. That Divine decrees either finde fit Instruments or make them. 20. That the more exact we make Divine Prescience, even to the comprehension of any thing that implies no contradiction in it self to be comprehended, the more cleare it is that mans Will may be sometimes free. 21. Which is sufficient to make good my last Argument against Mr. Hobbs.

1. **HIS** first Argument runs thus (I will repeat it in his own words, as also the rest of them as they are to be found in his Treatise

Treatise of Liberty and Necessity) I conceive, (saith he) that nothing taketh beginning from it self, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it self; and that therefore, when first a man hath an appetite or Will to something, to which immediatly before he had no appetite nor Will, the cause of his Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in his own disposing: So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the Will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said the Will is also caused by other things, whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.

2. His second thus, I hold (saith he) that to be a sufficient cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needfull to the producing of the effect: The same also is a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was needfull for the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient; but if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause, for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily. For whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause

cause to produce it, or else it had not been. What followes is either the same, or so closely depending on this, that I need not adde it.

3. His third Argument therefore shall be that which he urges from *Future disjuncti-
ons*. For example, let the case be put of the Weather, 'Tis necessary that to morrow it shall rain, or not rain; *If therefore, saith he, it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the Proposition, It shall rain or not rain, should be true.*

4. His fourth is this, *That the denying of Necessity destroyeth both the Decrees and the Prescience of God Almighty. For whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man, as an Instrument, or foreseeeth shall come to pass, a man, if he have liberty from necessitation, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass; and God should either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he should foreknow such things shall be as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.*

5. The Entrance into his first Argument is something obscure and ambiguous, *No-
thing taketh beginning from it self*: But I shall be as candid and faithfull an Interpreter as I may. If he mean by *beginning*, beginning of *Existence*, it is undoubtedly true, That no Substance, nor Modification of Sub-
stance

stance taketh' beginning from it self; but this will not infer the Conclusion he drives at. But if he mean, that *Nothing* taketh beginning from it self, of being otherwise affected or modified then before; he must either understand by *nothing*, no Essence, neither *Spirit* nor *Body*, or no *Modification* of Essence. He cannot mean *Spirit*, as admitting no such thing in the whole comprehension of Nature. If *Body*, it will not infer what he aims at, unless there be nothing but *Body* in the Universe, which is a meer precarious Principle of his, which he beseeches his credulous followers to admit, but he proves it no where, as I have already noted. If by *Modification* he mean the *Modification* of *Matter* or *Body*, that runs still upon the former Principle, That there is nothing but *Body* in the world, and therefore he proves nothing but upon a begg'd Hypothesis, and that a false one; as I have elsewhere demonstrated. Wherefore the most favourable Interpretation I can make is, That he means by *no thing*, no Essence, nor *Modification* of Essence, being willing to hide that dearly-hug'd Hypothesis of his (That there is nothing but *Body* in the world) under so generall and uncertain termes.

6. The words therefore in the other senses

ses having no pretence to conclude any thing, let us see how far they will prevail in this, taking *no thing*, for *no Essence*, or *no Modification of Essence*, or what will come nearer to the Matter in hand, *no Faculty of an Essence*. And from this two-fold meaning, let us examine two Propositions, that will result from thence, viz. *That no Faculty of any Essence can vary its Operation from what it is, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it self*; or, *That no Essence can vary its Modification or Operation by it self, but by the action of some other immediate Agent without it*. Of which two Propositions the latter seemes the better sense by far, and most naturall. For it is very harsh, and, it truly looked into, as false, to say, *That the Mode or Faculty of any Essence changes it self*, for it is the Essence it self that exerts it self into these variations of Modes, if no externall Agent is the cause of these changes. And *Mr. Hobbs* opposing an *Externall Agent* to this *Thing* that he saies does not change it self, does naturally imply, That they are both not *Faculties* but *Substances* he speaks of.

7. Wherefore there remains onely the latter Proposition to be examined, *That no Essence of it self can vary its Modification*. That some Essence must have had a power

of

of moving is plain, in that there is Motion in the world, which must be the effect of some Substance or other. But that Motion in a large sense, taking it for mutation or change, may proceed from that very Essence in which it is found, seemes to me plain by Experience: For there is an Essence in us, whatever we will call it, which we find endued with this property ; as appears from hence, that it has variety of perceptions, *Mathematicall*, *Logicall*, and I may adde also *Morall*, that are not any impresses nor footsteps of Corporeall Motion, as I have already demonstrated ; and any man may observe in himself, and discover in the writings of others , how the Minde has passed from one of these perceptions to another, in very long deductions of Demonstration ; as also what stilness from bodily Motion is required in the excogitation of such series of Reasons, where the Spirits are to run into no other posture nor motion then what they are guided into by the Mind it self, where these immateriall and intellectuall Notions have the leading and rule. Besides in grossier Phantasmes, which are supposed to be somewhere impressed in the Brain, the composition of them, and disclusion and various disposall of them, is plainly an arbitrary act, and implies

an Essence that can, as it lists, excite in it self the variety of such Phantasmes as have been first exhibited to her from Externall Objects, and change them and transpose them at her own will. But what need I reason against this ground of *Mr. Hobbs* so solicitously? it being sufficient to discover, that he onely saies, that *No Essence can change the Modifications of it self*, but does not prove it; and therefore whatever he would infer hereupon is meerly upon a begg'd Principle.

8. But however, from this precarious ground he will infer, that *whenever we have a Will to a thing, the cause of this Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in our own disposing*; the meaning whereof must be, *That whenever we Will, some corporeall impress, which we cannot avoid, forces us thereto*. But the Illation is as weak as bold; it being built upon no foundation, as I have already shewn. I shall onely take notice how *Mr. Hobbs*, though he has rescued himself from the authority of the Schools, and would fain set up for himself, yet he has not freed himself from their fooleries in talking of *Faculties* and *Operations* (and the absurditie is alike in both) as separate and distinct from the *Essence* they belong to, wick causes a great deal of distraction and
obscurity

obscurity in the speculation of things. I speak this in reference to those expressions of his of the *Will being the cause of willing*; and of its being the necessary cause of voluntary actions, and of things not being in its disposing. Whenas, if a man would speak properly, and desired to be understood, he would say, *That the Subject in which is this power or act of willing, (call it Man or the Soul of Man) is the cause of this or that voluntary action.* But this would discover his Sophistry, wherewith haply he has entrapt himself, which is this, *Something out of the power of the Will necessarily causes the Will; the Will once caused is the necessary cause of voluntary actions; and therefore all voluntary actions are necessitated.*

9. Besides that the first part of this Argumentation is groundless (as I have already intimated) the second is sophisticall, that sayes *That the Will is the necessary cause of voluntary actions*: For by *necessary* may be understood either *necessitated*, forced and made to act, whether it will or no; or else it may signify that the Will is a requisite cause of voluntary actions, so that there can be no voluntary actions without it. The latter whereof may be in some sense true, but the former is utterly false. So the Conclusion being inferred from assertions whereof

whereof the one is groundless, the other Sophisticall, the Illation cannot but be ridiculously weak and despicable. But if he had spoke in the *Concrete* instead of the *Abstract*, the Sophistry had been more grossly discoverable, or rather the train of his reasoning languid and contemptible. Omitting therefore to speak of the *Will* separately, which of it self is but a blind Power or Operation, let us speak of that *Essence* which is endued with Will, Sense, Reason, and other Faculties, and see what face this argumentation of his will bear, which will then run thus;

10. *Some externall, irresistible Agent does ever necessarily cause that Essence (call it Soule or what you please) which is endued with the faculties of Will and Understanding, to Will. This Essence, endued with the power of exerting it self into the act of Willing, is the necessary cause of Voluntary actions. Therefore all voluntary actions are necessitated.* The first Assertion now at first sight appears a gross falshood, the Soule being endued with Understanding as well as Will, and therefore she is not necessarily determined to will by externall impresses, but by the displaying of certain notions and perceptions she raises in her self, that be purely intellectuall. And the second seems a

very slim and lank piece of Sophistrie. Both which my reasons already alledged doe so easily and so plainly reach, that I need add nothing more, but pass to his second Argument, the form whereof in brief is this;

II. *Every Cause is a sufficient cause, otherwise it could not produce its effect: Every sufficient cause is a necessary cause, that is to say, will be sure to produce the effect, otherwise something was wanting thereto, and it was no sufficient cause: And therefore every cause is a necessary cause, and consequently every Effect or Action, even those that are termed Voluntary, are necessitated.* This reasoning looks smartly at first view, but if we come closer to it, we shall find it a pittifull piece of Sophistry, which is easily detected by observing the ambiguity of that Proposition, *Every sufficient cause is a necessary cause*: For the force lyes not so much in that it is said to be *Sufficient*, as in that it is said to be a *Cause*; which if it be, it must of necessity have an *Effect*, whether it be *sufficient* or *insufficient*; which discovers the Sophisme. For these relative terms of *Cause* and *Effect* necessarily imply one another. But every Being that is *sufficient* to act this or that *if it will*, and so to become the *Cause* thereof, doth neither act, nor abstain from acting *necessarily*. And therefore

if it doe act, it addes *Will* to the *Sufficiency* of its power; and if it did not act, it is not because it had not sufficient power, but because it would not make use of it. So that we see that every *sufficient* Cause rightly understood without captiositie is not a *necessary* cause, nor will be sure to produce the Effect; and that though there be a sufficiency of power, yet there may be something wanting, to wit, the exertion of the Will; whereby it may come to pass, that what might have acted, if it would, did not: but if it did, Will being added to sufficient Power, that it cannot be said to be *necessary* in any other sense, then of that Axiome in Metaphysicks, *Quicquid est, quamdiu est, necesse est esse*: The reason whereof is, because it is impossible that a thing should be and not be at once. But before it acted, it might have chosen whether it would have acted or no; but it did determine it self. And in this sense is it to be said to be a *free Agent*, & not a *necessary* one. So that it is manifest, that though there be some prettie perverseness of wit in the contriving of this Argument, yet there is no solidity at all at the bottome.

12. And as little is there in his third. But in this, I must confess, I cannot so much accuse him of *Art* and *Sophistrie*, as of ignorance of the rules of *Logick*; for he does

plainly assert That the necessity of the truth of that Proposition there named depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts thereof, then which no grosser error can be committed in the Art of reasoning. For he might as well say that the necessity of the truth of a *Connex* Axiome depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts, as of a *Disjunct*. But in a *Connex*, when both the parts are not onely false, but impossible, yet the Axiome is necessarily true. As for example, *If Bucephalus be a man, he is endued with humane reason*; this Axiome is necessarily true, and yet the parts are impossible. For *Alexanders* horse can neither be a man, nor have the reason of a man, either radically or actually. The necessity therefore is only laid upon the connexion of the parts, not upon the parts themselves. So when I say, *To morrow it will rain, or it will not rain*, this *Disjunct* Proposition also is necessary, but the necessity lyes upon the *Disjunction* of the parts, not upon the parts themselves: For they being immediately disjoyned, there is a necessity that one of them must be, though there be no necessity that this must be determined rather than that. As when a man is kept under custody where he has the use of two rooms only, though there be a necessity that he be found

in

in one of the two, yet he is not confined to either one of them. And to be brief, and prevent those frivolous both answers and replies that follow in the pursuit of this Argument in *Mr. Hobbs*; As the necessity of this *Disjunct* Axiome lyes upon the *Disjunction* it self, so the truth, of which this necessity is a mode, must lye there too; for it is the *Disjunction* of the parts that is affirmed, and not the parts themselves, as any one that is but moderately in his wits must needs acknowledg.

13. There is a more dangerous way that *Mr. Hobbs* might have made use of, and with more credit, but yet scarce with better success, which is the consideration of an Axiome that pronounces of a future Contingent, such as this, *Cras Socrates disputabit*. For every Axiome pronouncing either true or false, as all doe agree upon; if this Axiome be now true, it is impossible but *Socrates* should dispute to morrow; or if it be now false, it is impossible he should: and so his Action of disputing or the omission thereof will be necessary, for the Proposition cannot be both true and false at once. Some are much troubled to extricate themselves out of this Nooze; but if we more precisely enquire into the sense of the Proposition, the difficultie will vanish. He therefore that

affirms that *Socrates* will dispute to morrow, affirms it (to use the distinction of *Futurities* that *Aristotle* somewhere suggests) either as a τὸ μᾶλλον, or τὸ ἰσόμενον, that is, either as a thing that is likely to be, but has a possibility of being otherwise, or else as a thing certainly to come to pass. If this latter, the Axiome is false; if the former, it is true: and so the liberty of *Socrates* his action, as also of all like contingent effects, are thus easily rescued from this sophistical entanglement. For every *Future* Axiome is as incapable of our judgment, unless we determine the sense of it by one of the forenamed modes, as an *Indefinite* Axiome is, before we in our minds adde the notes of *Universality* or *Particularity*: Neither can we say of either of them, that they are true or false, till we have compleated and determined their sense.

14. His fourth Argument he proposes with some diffidence and dislike, as if he thought it *not good Logick* (they are his own words) to make use of it, and adde it to the rest. And for my own part, I cannot but approve of the consistency of his judgment, and coherency with other parts of his Philosophie: For if there be nothing but *Body* or *Matter* in the whole comprehension of things, it will be very hard to find out any such

such *Deity* as has the knowledg or fore-knowledg of any thing: And therefore I suspect that this last is onely cast in as *argumentum ad hominem*, to puzzle such as have not dived to so profound a depth of naturall knowledg, as to fancy they have discovered there is no God in the world.

15. But let him vilifie it as he will, it is the only Argument he has brought, that has any tolerable sense or solidity in it; and it is a Subject that has exercised the wits of all Ages, to reconcile the *Liberty* of mans Will with the *Decrees* and *Prasceience* of God. But my *Freeness*, I hope, and *Moderation* shall make this matter more easy to me, then it ordinarily proves to them that venture upon it. My Answer therefore in brief shall be this;

16. That though there be such a Faculty in the Soule of man as *Liberty of Will*, yet she is not alwaies in a state of acting according to it. For she may either *degenerate so far*, that it may be as certainly known what she will doe upon this or that occasion, as what an hungry Dog will doe when a crust is offered him; which is the generall condition of almost all men in most occurrences of their lives: or else she may be so *Heroically good*, though that happen in very few, that it may be as certainly known

as before what she will doe or suffer upon such or such emergencies : and in these cases the use of *Liberty of Will* ceases.

17. That the use of the Facultie of *Free-will* is properly there, where we finde our selves so near to an *Equiponderancy*, being tought with the sense of Vertue on the one side, and the ease or pleasure of some vitious action on the other; that we are conscious to our selves that we ought, and that we may, if we will, abandon the one and cleave to the other.

18. That in this Conflict the Soule has no such absolute power to determine her self to the one or the other action, but Temptation or Supernaturall assistance may certainly carry her this way or that way; so that she may not be able to use that liberty of going indifferently either way.

19. That *Divine Decrees* either find men fit, or make them so, for the executing of whatever is absolutely purposed or prophesied concerning them.

20. That the *Prasfience* of God is so vast and exceeding the comprehension of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is this, That this knowledg is most perfect and exquisite, accurately representing the Natures, Powers and Properties of the thing it does foreknow. Whence it must follow,

follow, that if there be any Creature free and undeterminate, and that in such circumstances and at such a time he may either act thus or not act thus, this perfect Foreknowledge must discern from all eternity, that the said Creature in such circumstances may either act thus, or so, or not. And further to declare the perfection of this Foreknowledg and Omniscience of God; as His *Omnipotence* ought to extend so far, as to be able to doe whatsoever implies no contradiction to be done; so his *Præscience* and *Omniscience* ought to extend so far, as to know precisely and fully whatever implies no contradiction to be known. To conclude therefore briefly; *Free* or *Contingent* Effects doe either imply a contradiction to be foreknown, or they doe not imply it. If they imply a contradiction to be foreknown, they are no Object of the Omniscience of God, and therefore there can be no pretence that his Foreknowledg does determinate them, nor can they be argued to be determined thereby. If they imply no contradiction to be foreknown, that is to acknowledge that divine *Præscience* and they may very well consist together. And so either way, notwithstanding the divine Omniscience, the Actions of men may be free.

21. The sum therefore of all is this, That
mens

mens actions are sometimes free and sometimes not free ; but in that they are at any time free, is a Demonstration that there is a faculty in us that is incompatible to meer Matter : which is sufficient for my purpose.

CHAP. IV.

1. *An Enumeration of sundry Opinions concerning the Seat of Common Sense.* 2. *Upon supposition that we are nothing but meer Matter, That the whole Body cannot be the Common Sensorium ;* 3. *Nor the Orifice of the Stomack ;* 4. *Nor the Heart ;* 5. *Nor the Brain ;* 6. *Nor the Membranes ;* 7. *Nor the Septum lucidum ;* 8. *Nor Regius his small and perfectly solid Particle.* 9. *The probability of the Conarion being the common Seat of Sense.*

1. **I** Have plainly proved, that neither those more Pure and Intellectual faculties of *Will and Reason*, nor yet those less pure of *Memory and Imagination*, are compatible to meer *Bodies*. Of which we may be the more secure, I having so convincingly demonstrated, That not so much as that which we call *Externall Sense* is compatible to the same : all which Truths I have concluded concerning *Matter generally considered*. But
because

because there may be a suspicion in some, which are over credulous concerning the powers of *Body*, that *Organization* may doe strange feats (which Surmise notwithstanding is as fond as if they should imagine, that though neither Silver, nor Steel, nor Iron, nor Lute-strings, have any Sense apart, yet being put together in such a manner and forme, as will (suppose) make a compleat Watch, they may have Sense; that is to say, that a Watch may be a living creature, though the severall parts have neither Life nor Sense) I shall for their sakes goe more particularly to work, and recite every opinion that I could ever meet with by converse with either men or books concerning *the Seat of the Common Sense*, and after trie whether any of these Hypotheses can possibly be admitted for Truth, upon supposition that we consist of nothing but meer modified and organized Matter. I shall first recite the Opinions, and then examine the possibility of each in particular, which in brief are these. 1. That the whole Body is the Seat of Common Sense. 2. That the Orifice of the Stomack. 3. The Heart. 4. The Brain. 5. The Membranes. 6. The *Septum lucidum*. 7. Some very small and perfectly solid particle in the Body. 8. The *Conarion*. 9. The concurse of the Nerves about the
fourth

fourth ventricle of the Brain, 10. The Spirits in that fourth ventricle.

2. That the first Opinion is false is manifest from hence, That upon supposition we are nothing but *meer Matter*, if we grant the *whole Body* to be one common *Sensorium*, perceptive of all Objects, Motion which is impressed upon the Eye or Eare, must be transmitted into all the parts of the Body. For Sense is really the same with communication of Motion, by Axiome 20. And the variety of Sense arising from the modification of Motion, which must needs be variously modified by the different temper of the parts of the Body, by Axiome 22. it plainly followes that the Eye must be otherwise affected by the motion of Light, then the other parts to which this motion is transmitted. Wherefore if it be the *whole Body* that perceives, it will perceive the Object in every part thereof severall wayes modified at once; which is against all Experience. It will also appear in all likelihood in severall places at once, by reason of the many windings and turnings that must happen to the transmission of this Motion, which are likely to be as so many Refractions or Reflections.

3. That *the Orifice of the Stomack* cannot be *the seat of Common Sense*, is apparent from

from hence, That that which is the common *Sentient* does not only perceive all Objects, but has the power of moving the Body. Now besides that there is no organization in the mouth of the Stomack, that can elude the strength of our Arguments laid down in the foregoing Chapters, which took away all capacity from Matter of having any perception at all in it, there is no Mechanicall reason imaginable to be found in the Body, whereby it will appear possible, that supposing the mouth of the Stomack were the *common Percipient* of all Objects, it could be able to move the rest of the members of the Body, as we finde something in us does. This is so palpably plain, that it is needless to spend any more words upon it.

4. The same may be said concerning the *Heart*. For who can imagine, that if the *Heart* were that *common Percipient*, that there is any such Mechanical connexion betwixt it and all the parts of the Body, that it may, by such or such a perception, command the motion of the Foot or little Finger? Besides that it seems wholly employed in the performance of its *Systole* and *Diastole*, which causes such a great difference of the situation of the Heart by turns, that if it were that Seat in which the sense
of

of all Objects center, we should not be able to see things steddily resting in the same place.

5. How incapable the *Brain* is of being so active a Principle of Motion as we find in our selves, the *viscidty* thereof does plainly indicate. Besides that Physitians have discovered by experience, that the *Brain* is so far from being the *common Seat* of all senses, that it has in it none at all. And the *Arabians*, that say it has, have distinguished it into such severall offices of *Imagination*, *Memory*, *Common Sense*, &c. that we are still at a loss for some one part of Matter, that is to be the *Common Perceptient* of all these. But I have so clearly demonstrated the impossibility of the Brains being able to perform those functions that appertain truly to what ordinarily men call the *Soule*, in my *Antidote against Atheisme*, that it is enough to refer the Reader thither.

6. As for the *Membranes*, whether we would fancy them *all the Seat of Common Sense*, or *some one Membrane*, or *part* thereof; the like difficulties will accure as have been mentioned already. For if *all the Membranes*, the difference and situation of them will vary the aspect and sight of the Object, so that the same things will appear to us in severall hues and severall places at once,

as is easily demonstrated from Axiome 22. If *some one Membrane*, or *part* thereof, it will be impossible to excogitate any Mechanicall reason, how this *one* particular Membrane, or any *part* thereof, can be able so strongly and determinately to move upon occasion every part of the Body.

7. And therefore for this very cause cannot the *Septum lucidum* be the *Common Percipient* in us, because it is utterly unimaginable, how it should have the power of so stoutly and distinctly moving our exterior parts and limbs.

8. As for that new and marvelous Invention of *Henricus Regius*, that it may be a *certain perfectly solid, but very small particle of Matter in the Body*, that is the seat of common perception; besides that it is as boldly asserted, that such an *hard* particle should have sense in it, as that the filings of Iron and Steel should; it cannot be the spring of Motion: For how should so small an Atome move the whole Body, but by moving it self? But it being more subtile then the point of any needle, when it puts it self upon motion, especially such strong thrustings as we sometimes use, it must needs passe through the Body and leave it.

9. The most pure Mechanical Invention is that of the use of the *Conarion*, proposed by

by *Des-Cartes*; which, considered with some other organizations of the Body, bids the fairest of any thing I have met withall, or ever hope to meet withall, for the resolution of the Passions and Properties of living Creatures into meer corporeall motion. And therefore it is requisite to insist a little upon the explication thereof, that we may the more punctually confute them that would abuse his Mechanicall contrivances to the exclusion of all Principles but Corporeall, in either Man or Beast.

CHAP. V.

1. *How Perception of externall Objects, Spontaneous Motion, Memory and Imagination, are pretended to be performed by the Conarion, Spirits and Muscles, without a Soule.*
2. *That the Conarion, devoid of a Soule, cannot be the common Percipient, demonstrated out of Des-Cartes himself.*
3. *That the Conarion, with the Spirits and organization of the Parts of the Body, is not a sufficient Principle of Spontaneous motion, without a Soule.*
4. *A description of the use of the Valvulæ in the Nerves of the Muscles for spontaneous motion.*
5. *The*
insuf

insufficiency of this contrivance for that purpose. 6. A further demonstration of the insufficiency thereof, from whence is clearly evinced that Brutes have Soules. 7. That Memory cannot be salved the way above described; 8. Nor Imagination. 9. A Distribution out of *Dés-Cartes* of the Functions in us, some appertaining to the Body, and others to the Soule. 10. The Authors Observations thereupon.

1. THE sum of this Abuse must in brief be this; That the *Glandula Pinealis* is the common *Sentient* or *Percipient* of all Objects; and without a Soule, by vertue of the Spirits and Organization of the Body, may doe all those feats that we ordinarily conceive to be performed by Soule and Body joyned together. For it being one, whenas the rest of the Organs of Sense are double, and so handsomely seated as to communicate with the *Spirits* as well of the posteriour as antierour Cavities of the Brain; by their help all the motions of the *Nerves* (both those that transmit the sense of outward Objects, and of inward affections of the Body, such as Hunger, Thirst and the like) are easily conveyed unto it: and so being variously moved, it does variously determine the course of the *Spirits* into
M such

such and such *Muscles*, whereby it moves the Body. Moreover that the transmission of Motion from the Object, through the Nerves, into the inward concavities of the Brain, and so to the *Conarion*, opens such and such Pores of the Brain, in such and such order or manner, which remain as tracts or footsteps of the presence of these Objects after they are removed. Which tracts, or signatures, consist mainly in this, that the Spirits will have an easier passage through these Pores than other parts of the Brain. And hence arises *Memory*, when the Spirits be determined, by the inclining of the *Conarion*, to that part of the Brain where these tracts are found, they moving then the *Conarion* as when the Object was present, though not so strongly. From the hitting of the Spirits into such like tracts, is also the nature of *Imagination* to be explained; in which there is little difference from *Memory*, saving that the reflection upon time as past, when we saw or perceived such or such a thing, is quite left out. But these are not all the operations we are conscious to our selves of, and yet more then can be made out by this Hypothesis, That *Perception of Objects*, *Spontaneous Motion*, *Memory* and *Imagination*, may be all performed by vertue of this *Glandula*, the
Animal

Animal Spirits, and meer organization of the Body ; as we shall plainly find, though but upon an easy examination.


2. For that the *Conarion*, devoid of a Soule, has no perception of any one Object, is demonstrable from the very description *Cartesius* makes of the transmission of the image, suppose through the Eye to the Brain, and so to the *Conarion*. For it is apparent from what he sets down in the 35. Article of his *Treatise of the Passions of the Soule*, that the Image that is propagated from the Object to the *Conarion*, is impressed thereupon in some latitude of space. Whence it is manifest that the *Conarion* does not, nor can perceive the whole Object, though severall parts may be acknowledged to have the perception of the severall parts thereof. But something in us perceives the whole, which therefore cannot be the *Conarion*. And that we do not perceive the external Object double, is not so much because the Image is united in the Organ of Common Sense, as that the lines come so from the Object to both the Eyes, that it is felt in one place ; otherwise if the Object be very near, and the direction of our Eyes be not fitted to that nearness, it will seem double however. Which is a Demonstration that a man may see with both

eyes at once; and for my own part, I'me sure that I see better at distance, when I use both, then when one.

3. As for *Spontaneous Motion*, that the *Conarion* cannot be a sufficient Principle thereof, with the Spirits and organization of other parts of the Body, though we should admit it a fit seat of Common Sense, will easily appear, if we consider, that so weak and so small a thing as that *Glandula* is, seems utterly unable to determine the spirits with that force and violence we find they are determined in running, striking, thrusting and the like; and that it is evident, that sometimes scarce the thousandth part of the *Conarion* shall be director of this force; viz. when the Object of Sight, suppose, is as little as a pin's point, or when a man is prick'd with a needle, these receptions must be as little in the *Glandula* as in the exterior Sense. But suppose the *whole Conarion* alwaies did act in the determining the motion of the Spirits into this or that Muscle; it is impossible that such fluid Matter as these Spirits are, that upon the noddings of the *Conarion* forward may easily recede back, should ever determine their course with that force and strength they are determined. But haply it will be answered, That such subtile and fluid bodies as the
Animal

Animall Spirits, that are in a readines to be upon Motion any way, the least thing will determine their course, and that the Muscles themselves, being well replenisht with Spirits, and framed with such *Valvula* as will easily intromit them from the Brain, and also conveigh them out of one opposite Muscle into another upon the least redundancy of Spirits in the one above the other, and so shut them in; that that force we find in spontaneous Motion may very well be salved by this Mechanicall Artifice.

4. That the insufficiency of this answer may appear, let us more accurately consider the contrivance in the following Figure, which must be some such thing as *Regius* has, *Philosop. Natural. Lib. 4. cap. 16.* and which may serve for the more easy understanding of what *Des-Cartes* writes in his book of *Passions Artic. 11.* Here B. C. are two opposite Muscles, the known Instruments of spontaneous Motion; K. some part of the Body to be moved; D. E. and F. G. are the Nerves through which Spirits are transmitted from the Brain



into the foresaid Muscles, D. and F. two *Valvula* to let pass the Spirits from the Brain into the Muscles, but stop them if they would regurgitate; G. is a Valve that lets the Spirits out of the Muscle C. into B, and E. another Valve that lets the Spirits out of B. into C. Now in brief, the result of this Mechanicall contrivance is this, viz. That the Spirits being determined by the *Conarion* never so little more copiously into B. then into C, those in C. will pass through the Valve G. into B, and so B. swelling, and consequently shortning it self, it must needs bring up the member K.

5. We will not here alledge that this may be onely a meer fancy, these *Valvula* in the Nerves not being yet discovered by any Anatomist to be part of the Organization of the Body of any Animal; but rather shew, that they would not effect what is aimed at, though they were admitted. For first it does not appear that the Spirits will make more hast out of C. into B, then the pressure caused in B. by the determination of the Spirits from the *Conarion* forces them to. For all places being alike to them to play in, they will goe no further then they are driven or pressed, as Wind in a Bladder. And how the *Conarion* should drive or press the Spirits into B, so as to make
it

it press those in C, and force them out so quick and smart as we find in some Actions, is a thing utterly unconceivable.

6. Besides, admit that the *Conarion* could determine them with some considerable force so into B, that they would make those in C. come to them through the Valve G, there being the Valve E. to transmit them into C. again, it is impossible but that the Tenth part of that force which we ordinarily use to open a mans hand against his will, should whether he would or no easily open it. For a very ordinary strength moving K. from B. towards C. must needs so press the Spirits in B, that they will certainly pass by E. into C, if our Body be nothing but Matter Mechanically organized. And therefore it is the meer *Imperium* of our Soule that does determine the Spirits to this Muscle rather than the other, and holds them there in despite of externall force. From whence it is manifest that brute Beasts must have Soules also.

7. Concerning *Memory* and *Imagination*, that the meer Mechanical reasons of *Descartes* will not reach them, we shall clearly understand, if we consider that the easy aperture of the same Pores of the Brain, that were opened at the presence of such an Object, is not sufficient to represent the

Object, after the *Conarion* has by inclining it self thitherward determined the course of the Spirits into the same Pores. For this could onely represent the Figure of a thing, not the Colours thereof. Besides a man may bring an hundred Objects, and expose them to our view at the same distance, the Eye keeping exactly in the same posture, inso-much that it shall be necessary for these images to take up the very same place of the Brain, and yet there shall be a distinct remembrance of all these; which is impossible if there be no Soule in us, but all be meer Matter. The same may be said of so many Names or Words levell'd if you will out of a Trunk into the Eare kept accurately in the same posture, so that the Sound shall beat perpetually upon the same parts of the Organ, yet if there be five hundred of them, there may be a distinct memory for every one of them; which is a power perfectly beyond the bounds of meer Matter, for there would be a necessary confusion of all.

8. Lastly, for those imaginations or representations that are of no one Object that we ever see, but made up of severall that have taken their distinct places in the Brain, how can the *Conarion* joyn these together? Or rather in one and the same Object, sup-
pose

pose this Man or that House, which we see in a right posture, and has left such a signature or figure in the Brain as is fit to represent it so, how can the *Conarion* invert the posture of the image, and make it represent the House and Man with the heels upwards? Besides the difficulty of representing the Distance of an Object, or the Breadth thereof, concerning which we have spoken already. It is impossible the *Conarion*, if it be meer Matter, should perform any such operations as these. For it must raise motions in it self, such as are not necessarily conveyed by any corporeall impress of another Body, which is plainly against Axiome 26.

9. And therefore that sober and judicious Wit *Des-Cartes* dares not stretch the power of Mechanicall organization thus far, but doth plainly confess, that as there are *some Functions* that belong to the *Body* alone, so there are others that belong to the *Soule*, which he calls *Cogitations*; and are according to him of two sorts, the one *Actions*, the other *Passions*. The *Actions* are all the operations of our Will, as in some sense all *Perceptions* may be termed Actions. And these Actions of the Will are either such as are meer Intellectuall Operations, and end in the Soule her self, such as her stirring up
her

her self to love God, or contemplate any Immateriall Object; or they are such as have an influence on the Body, as when by vertue of our Will we put our selves upon going to this or that place.

He distinguishes again our *Perceptions* into two sorts, whereof the one has the Soule for their cause, the other the Body. Those that are caused by the Body are most-what such as depend on the Nerves. But besides these there is one kind of Imagination that is to be referred hither, and that properly has the Body for its cause, to wit, that Imagination that arises meerly from the hitting of the Animall Spirits against the tracts of those Images that externall Objects have left in the Brain, and so representing them to the *Conarion*; which may happen in the day-time when our Fancy roves, and we doe not set our selves on purpose to think on things, as well as it does in sleep by night. Those *Perceptions* that arrive to the Soule by the interposition of the Nerves, differ one from another in this, that some of them refer to *outward Objects* that strike our Sense, others to *our Body*, such as *Hunger, Thirst, Pain, &c.* and others to the *Soule* it self, as *Sorrow, Joy, Fear, &c.*

Those *Perceptions* that have the Soule
for

for their cause, are either the *Perceptions* of her own *Acts* of *Will*, or else of her *Speculation* of things purely intelligible, or else of *Imaginations* made at pleasure, or finally of *Reminiscency*, when she searches out something that she has let slip out of her Memory.

10. That which is observable in this Distribution is this, That all those *Cogitations* that he calls *Actions*, as also those kind of *Perceptions*, whose cause he assigns to the Soule, are in themselves (and are acknowledged by him) of that nature, that they cannot be imitated by any creature by the meer organization of its Body. But for the other, he holds they may, and would make us believe they are in Bodies of Brutes, which he would have meer *Machina's*, that is, That from the meer Mechanical frame of their Body, outward Objects of Sense may open Pores in their Brains so, as that they may determine the Animall Spirits into such and such Muscles for spontaneous Motion. That the course of the Spirits also falling into the Nerves in the Intestines and Stomack, Spleen, Heart, Liver, and other parts, may cause the very same effects of Passion, suppose of Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, in these brute *Machina's*, as we feel in our Bodies, though they, as being senseless,

less, feel them not; and so the vellication of certain Tunicles and Fibres in the Stomack and Throat, may affect their Body as ours is in the Sense of Hunger or Thirst; and finally that the hitting of the Spirits into the tracts of the Brain, that have been signed by Externall Objects, may act fo upon their Body as it does upon ours in Imagination and Memory.

Now adde to this *Machina* of *Des-Cartes*, the capacity in Matter of Sensation and Perception, (which yet I have demonstrated it to be incapable of) and it will be exquisitely as much as *Mr. Hobbs* himself can expect to arise from meer Body, that is, All the Motions thereof being purely Mechanicall, the perceptions and propensions will be fatall, necessary, and unavoidable, as he loves to have them.

But being all *Cogitations* that *Des-Cartes* terms *Actions*, as also all those kind of *Perceptions* that he acknowledges the Soule to be the cause of, are not to be resolved into any *Mechanicall* contrivance; we may take notice of them as a peculiar rank of Arguments, and such, as that if it could be granted, that the Soules of Brutes were nothing but sentient Matter, yet it would follow that a Substance of an higher nature, and truly *Immateriall*, must be the Principle

Principle of those more noble Operations we find in our selves, as appears from Axiome 20. and 26.

CHAP. VI.

1. *That no part of the Spinall Marrow can be the Common Sensorium without a Soule in the Body.*
2. *That the Animal Spirits are more likely to be that Common Percipient.*
3. *But yet it is demonstrable they are not:*
4. *As not being so much as capable of Sensation;*
5. *Nor of directing Motion into the Muscles;*
6. *Much less of Imagination and rationall Invention;*
7. *Nor of Memory.*
8. *An answer to an Evasion.*
9. *The Authors reason, why he has confuted so particularly all the suppositions of the Seat of Common Sense, when few of them have been asserted with the exclusion of a Soule.*

1. **T**Here remain now onely Two Opinions to be examined: the one, *That place of the Spinall Marrow where Anatomists conceive there is the nearest concourse of all the Nerves of the Body;* the other, *the Animall Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.* As for the former, viz. *That part of the Spinall*

Spinall Marrow, where the concurse of the *Nerves* are conceived to be, as I have answered in like case, so I say again, that besides that I have already demonstrated, that Matter is incapable of Sense, and that there is no modification thereof in the *Spinall Marrow*, that will make it more likely to be indued with that Faculty then the pith of Elder or a mess of Curds; we are also to take notice, that it is utterly inept for Motion, nor is it conceivable how that part of it, or any other that is assigned to this office of being the *Common Percipient* in us of all Thoughts and Objects, (which must also have the power of moving our members) can, having so little agitation in it self, (as appearing nothing but a kind of soft Pap or Pulp) so nimbly and strongly move the parts of our Body.

2. In this regard the *Animal Spirits* seem much more likely to perform that office; and those, the importunity of whose gross fancies constrains them to make the Soule Corporeall, doe nevertheless usually pitch upon some *subtile thin Matter* to constitute her nature or Essence: And therefore they imagine her to be either Aire, Fire, Light, or some such like Body; with which the *Animall Spirits* have no small affinity.

3. But this opinion, though it may seem plausible

plausible at first sight, yet the difficulties it is involved in are insuperable. For it is manifest, that all the Arguments that are brought Chap. 2. Sect. 3. will recur with full force in this place. For there is no Matter that is so perfectly *liquid* as the *Animal Spirits*, but consists of particles onely contiguous one to another, and actually upon Motion playing and turning one by another, as busy as Atomes in the Sun. Now therefore, let us consider whether that Treasury of pure Animall Spirits contained in the *Fourth Ventricle* be able to Sustain so noble an office as to be the *common Percipient* in our Body, which, as I have often repeated, is so complex a Function, that it does not onely contain the perception of externall Objects, but Motion, Imagination, Reason and Memory.

4. Now at the very first dash, the transmission of the image of the Object into this crowd of particles cannot but hit variously upon them, and therefore they will have severall Perceptions amongst them, some haply perceiving part of the Object, others all, others more then all, others also perceiving of it in one place, and others in another. But the *Percipient in us* representing no such confusion or disorder in our beholding of Objects, it is plain that

it is not the *Animall Spirits* that is it.

5. Again, that which is so confounded a *Percipient*, how can it be a right Principle of directing Motion into the Muscles? For besides what disorder may happen in this function upon the distracted representation of present Objects, the power of thinking, excogitating, and deliberating, being in these *Animal Spirits* also, (and they having no means of communicating one with another, but jostling one against another; which is as much to the purpose, as if men should knock heads to communicate to each other their conceits of Wit) it must needs follow that they will have their perceptions, inventions, and deliberations apart; which when they put in Execution, must cause a marvelous confusion in the Body, some of them commanding the parts this way, others driving them another way: or if their factions have many divisions and subdivisions, every one will be so weak, that none of them will be able to command in any way. But we find no such struggling or countermands of any thing in us, that would act our Body one way when we would another; as if when one was a going to write

Μὴνιν ἀνδρὸς θεοῦ——

something stronger in him, whose conceits
he

he is not privy to, should get the use of his hand, and, in stead of that, write down

Arma virumque cano.

And the like may be said of any other *Spontaneous Motion*, which being so constantly within our command as it is, it is a sufficient Argument to prove that it is not such a lubricous Substance as the *Animal Spirits*, nor so disunited; but something more perfectly *One* and *Indivisible*.

6. We need not instance any further concerning the power of *Invention* and *Reason*, how every particle of these *Animal Spirits* has a liberty to *think* by it self, and *consult* with it self, as well as to *play* by it self, and how there is no possible means of communicating their Thoughts one to another, unless it should be, as I have said, by hitting one against another: but that can onely communicate *Motion*, not their determinate *Thought*; unless that these particles were conceived to figure themselves into the shape of those things they think of, which is impossible by *Axiome 26*. And suppose it were possible one particle should shape it self, for example, into a *George on Horse-back* with a *Lance* in his hand, and another into an *Inchanted Castle*; this *George on Horse-back* must run against the *Castle*, to make the *Castle* receive his impress and similitude.

N

But

But what then? Truly the encounter will be very unfortunate. For *St. George* indeed may easily break his Lance, but it is impossible that he should by justling against the Particle in the form of a *Castle* convey the entire shape of himself and his Horse thereby, such as we find our selves able to imagine of a man on horse-back. Which is a Truth as demonstrable as any Theorem in Mathematicks, but so plain at first sight, that I need not use the curiosity of a longer Demonstration to make it more firm. Nor is there any colourable evasion by venturing upon a new way, as if this particle having transformed it self into a Castle, and that into an Horse-man, all the others then would see them both. For by *what light*, and *how little* would they appear, and in *what different places*, according to the different posture of the particles of the *Animal Spirits*, and with what *different faces*, some seeing one side, others another? But besides this, there is a further difficulty, that if such *Sensible representations* as these could be convey'd from one particle to another by corporeall encounters and justlings, or by that other way after alledged; *Logicall* and *Mathematicall notions* can not. So that some of the *Animal Spirits* may think of one Demonstration in *Mathematicks*, or of part of that

that Demonstration, and others of another: insomuch that if a *Mathematician* be to write, while he would write one thing upon the determination of these *Animal Spirits*, others may get his hand to make use of for the writing something else, to whose Thoughts and Counsell he was not at all privy; nor can tell any thing, till those other *Animal Spirits* have writ it down. Which Absurdities are so mad and extravagant, that a man would scarce defile his pen by recording them, were it not to awaken those that dote so much on the power of *Matter* (as to think it of it self sufficient for all *Phænomena* in the world) into due shame and abhorrence of their foolish Principle.

7. The last Faculty I will consider is *Memory*, which is also necessarily joyned with the rest in the *Common Percipient*; of which not onely the *fluidity* of parts, but also their *dissipability*, makes the *Animal Spirits* utterly incapable. For certainly, the Spirits by reason of their *Subtilty* and *Activity* are very *dissipable*, and in all likelihood remain not the same for the space of a week together; and yet things that one has not thought of for many years, will come as freshly into a mans minde, as if they were transacted but yesterday.

8. The onely Evasion they can excogi-

rate here is this, That as there is a continuall supply of Spirits by degrees, so, as they come in, they are *seasoned, fermented, and tinctured* with the same notions, perceptions and propensions that the Spirits they find there have. These are fine words, but signifie nothing but this, that the Spirits there present in the Brain communicate the Notions and Perceptions they have to these new-comers; which is that which I have already proved impossible in the foregoing Sections. And therefore it is impossible that the *Animal Spirits* should be that *Common Percipient*, that *hears, sees, moves, remembers, understands*, and does other functions of life that we perceive performed in us or by us.

9. We have now particularly evinced, that neither the *whole Body*, nor any of those *parts* that have been pitched upon, if we exclude the presence of a *Soul* or *Immaterial Substance*, can be the *Seat of Common Sense*. In which I would not be so understood, as if it implied that there are none of these parts, but some or other have affirmed might be the *common Sensorium*, though we had no Soule; but because they have been stood upon, all of them, by some or other to be the *Seat of Common Sense*, supposing a Soule in the Body, that there might no
imaginable

imaginable doubt or scruple be left behind, I have taken the pains thus punctually and particularly to prove, that none of them can be the place of CommonSense without one. And thus I have perfectly finished my main design, which was to demonstrate *That there is a Soule or Incorporeall Substance residing in us, distinct from the Body.* But I shall not content my self here, but for a more full discovery of her *Nature and Faculties*, I shall advance further, and search out her *chief Seat in the Body*, where and from whence she exercises her most noble Functions, and after enquire whether she be confined to that part thereof alone, or whether she be spread through all our members; and lastly consider after what manner she sees, feels, hears, imagines, remembers, reasons, and moves the Body. For beside that I shall make some good use of these discoveries for further purpose, it is also in it self very pleasant to have in readiness a rationall and cohærent account, and a determinate apprehension of things of this nature.

CHAP. VII.

1. His enquiry after the Seat of Common Sense, upon supposition there is a Soule in the Body.
2. That there is some particular part in the Body that is the Seat of Common Sense.
3. A generall division of their Opinions concerning the place of Common Sense.
4. That of those that place it out of the Head there are two sorts.
5. The Invalidity of Helmont's reasons whereby he would prove the Orifice of the Stomack to be the principall Seat of the Soule.
6. An Answer to Helmont's storyes for that purpose.
7. A further confutation out of his own concessions.
8. Mr. Hobbs his Opinion confuted, that makes the Heart the Seat of Common Sense.
9. A further confutation thereof from Experience.
10. That the Common Sense is seated somewhere in the Head.
11. A caution for the choice of the particular place thereof.
12. That the whole Brain is not it;
13. Nor Regius his small solid Particle;
14. Nor any external Membrane of the Brain, nor the Septum Lucidum.
15. The three most likely places.
16. Objections against Cartesius his Opinion concerning the Conarion answered.
17. That the Conarion is not the Seat of

Common

Common Sense ; 18. Nor that part of the *Spinall Marrow* where the *Nerves* are conceived to concurte, but the *Spirits* in the *fourth Ventricle* of the *Brain*.

1. IT will therefore be requisite for us to resume the former Opinions, altering the Hypothesis ; and to examine which of them is most reasonable, supposing there be a *Substance immateriall* or *Soule* in man.

2. That there is *some particular* or restrained *Seat of the Common Sense*, is an Opinion that even all Philosophers and Physitians are agreed upon. And it is an ordinary Comparison amongst them, that the *Externall Senses* and the *Common Sense* considered together are like a Circle with five lines drawn from the Circumference to the Centre. Wherefore as it has been obvious for them to finde out particular Organs for the externall Senses , so they have also attempted to assign some distinct part of the Body for to be an Organ of the Common Sense; that is to say, as they discovered Sight to be seated in the Eye, Hearing in the Eare, Smelling in the Nose, &c. so they conceived that there is some part of the Body wherein Seeing, Hearing and all other Perceptions meet together, as the lines of a circle in the centre: and that there the

Soule does also judge and discern of the difference of the Objects of the outward Senses. They have justly therefore excluded all the Externall parts of the Body from the lightest suspicion of any capacity of undergoing such a function as is thus generall, they being all employed in a more particular task, which is to be the Organ of some one of these five outward Senses; and to be affected no otherwise, then by what is impressed upon themselves, and chiefly from their proper Objects, amongst which five, *Touch* properly so called has the greatest share, it being as large as the Skin that covers us, and reaching as deep as any Membrane and Nerve in the limbs and trunk of the Body, besides all the Exterior parts of the Head. All which can no more see, then the Eye can hear, or the Eare can smell.

3. Besides this, all those Arguments that doe so clearly evince that the place of Common Sense is somewhere in the Head, is a plain demonstration that the whole Body cannot be the Seat thereof, and what those Arguments are you shall hear anon. For all those Opinions that have pitched on any one Part for the Seat of Common Sense, being to be divided into two Ranks, to wit, either such as assign some particular place in

II. the
ard
ded
om
un-
all,
cu-
me
d to
it is
efly
rich
eat-
that
any
and
eri-
a no
the
that
om-
is a
ody
nose
r all
any
nse,
avit,
lace
in

in the *Body*, or else in the *Head*, we will proceed in this order; as first to confute those that have made choice of any part for the Seat of Common Sense out of the Head; and then in the second place we will ingenerall shew, that the common *Sensorium* must be in some part of the Head; and lastly, of those many opinions concerning what part of the Head this common *Sensorium* should be, those which seem less reasonable being rejected, we shall pitch upon what we conceive the most unexceptionable.

4. Those that place the Common *Sensorium* out of the Head, have seated it either in the *upper Orifice* of the *Stomack*, or in the *Heart*. The former is *Van-Helmont's* Opinion, the other *Mr. Hobbs* his.

5. As for *Van-Helmont*, there is nothing he alledges for his Opinion but may be easily answered. That which mainly imposed upon him was the *exceeding Sensibility* of that part, which Nature made so, that, as a faithfull & sagacious Porter, it might admit nothing into the Stomack that might prove mischievous or troublesome to the Body. From this *tender Sensibility*, great offences to it may very well cause Swoonings, and Apoplexies, and cessations of Sense. But Fear and Joy and Grief have dispatched some

some very suddainly, when yet the first entrance of that deadly stroak has been at the Eare or the Eye, from some unsupportable ill newes or horrid spectacle. And the harsh handling of an angry Sore, or the treading on a Corn on the Toe, may easily cast some into a swoon, and yet no man will ever imagine the Seat of the Common Sense to be placed in the Foot. In fine, there is no more reason to think the Common *Sensorium* is in the mouth of the Stomack, because of the *Sensible Commotions* we feel there, then that it is seated in the Stars, because we so clearly perceive their Light, as *Des-Cartes* has well answered upon like occasion. Nor can *Phrensies* and *Madnesses*, though they may sometimes be observed to take their rise from thence, any more prove that it is the Seat of the Common Sense, then the *Furor uterinus*, Apoplexies, Epilepsies, and Syncopees proceeding from the Wombe, doe argue that the common *Sensorium* of Women lyes in that part.

6. And if we consider the great *Sympathy* betwixt the *Orifice* of the Stomack and the Heart, whose *Pathemata* are so alike and conjoynd, that the Ancients have given one name to both parts, calling them promiscuously *καρδία*, and the pains of the Stomack *καρδιαλγίαι*, and *καρδι-
ωγμῶι*,

ὥγμοι, as also that the *Heart* is that part from which manifestly are the supplies of life, whence the *Pulse* ceasing life cannot long continue for want of warmth and Spirits; here is an evident reason, how it may happen that a Wound about the mouth of the Stomack may dispatch a man more suddainly then a wound in the Head, they being both supposed mortal, though the seat of the Sensitive Soule be not chiefly in the aforesaid Orifice. For partly the naturall Sympathy betwixt the Orifice of the *Stomack* and the *Heart*, and partly the horror and pain perceived by the Soule in the common *Sensorium*, which we will suppose in the *Head*, does so dead the *Heart*, that, as in the suddain Passions above named, it ceases to perform the ordinary functions of Life, and so Pulse and Sense and all is gone in short time; when as the *Head* being wounded mortally, Perception is thereby so diminished, that the *Heart* escapes the more free from the force of that lethiferous passion; and so though Sense be gone, can continue the Pulse a longer time: which is a perfect answer to *Helmont's* stories he recites in his *Sedes Anima*.

7. To all which I may adde, That himself does acknowledg in the end of that Treatise, that the power of Motion, of Will,

Will, Memory and Imagination, is in the Brain; and therefore unless a man will say and deny any thing, he must say that the Common Sense is there also.

8. The Opinion of *Mr. Hobbs* bears more credit and countenance with it, as having been asserted heretofore by Philosophers of great fame, *Epicurus*, *Aristotle*, and the School of the *Stoicks*: but if we look closer to it, it will prove as little true as the other; especially in his way, that holds there is no *Soule* in a Man, but that all is but *organized Matter*. For let him declare any Mechanicall reason whereby his *Heart* will be able to move his Finger. But upon this Hypothesis I have confuted this Opinion already. It is more maintainable, if there be granted a *Soule* in the Body, that the *Heart* is the chief Seat thereof, and place of *Common Sense*, as *Aristotle* and others would have it, as also the spring of Spontaneous Motion. But it is very unlikely, that that part that is so continually employed in that naturall Motion of *contracting and dilating* it self, should be the Seat of that Principle which commands Free and Spontaneous progressions: *Perceptions* also would be horribly disturbed by its squeezing of it self, and then flagging again by vicissitudes. Neither would Objects appear in the same place when

when the *Heart* is drawn up and when it is let down again, as I have above intimated: the extream heat also of it could not admit that it be affected with the gentle motions of the Objects of Sense, the Blood being there in a manner scalding hot. And it is in this sense that that Aphorisme in *Aristotle* is to be understood, τὸ μέσον κρῖνον, *That which must receive the variety of externall impresses, must not be it self in any high temper or agitation.*

9. Wherefore it is a very rash thing to assert, that the *Heart* is the Seat of *Common Sense*, unless by some plain experience it could be evinced to be so, whenas indeed Experiments are recorded to the contrary. As, that if we bind a Nerve, Sense and Motion will be betwixt the Ligature and the Brain, but not betwixt the Heart and the Ligature. And that the *Crocodile*, his Heart being cut out, will live for a considerable time, and fight, and defend himself. The like is observed of the *Sea-Tortoise*, and the *wild Goat*, as *Calcidius* writes. To which you may adde what *Galen* relates of sacrificed Beasts, that their Hearts being taken out and laid upon the Altar, they have been seen in the mean time not onely to breath, and roar aloud, but also to run away, till the expence of Blood has made them fall down.

Which

Which Narrations to me are more credible, I having seen with mine own eyes a *Frog* quite exenterated, heart, stomach, guts and all taken out by an ingenious friend of mine, and dexterous Anatomist, after which the *Frog* could see, and would avoid any object in its way, and skipped as freely and nimbly up and down, as when it was entire, and that for a great while. But a very little wound in the *Head* deprives them immediately of Life and Motion. Whence it is plain that the derivation of Sense and spontaneous Motion is not from the *Heart*. For if the Motion be intercepted betwixt the *Brain* and the *Heart*, by *Mr. Hobbs* his own concession, there will be no perception of the Object. And there is the same reason of the *Orifice of the Stomack*: so that this one Experiment does clearly evince these two Opinions to be erroneous.

10. And that no man hereafter may make any other unhappy choice in the parts of the Body, we shall now propose such Reasons as we hope will plainly prove, That the common *Sensorium* must needs be in the *Head*; or indeed rather repeat them: For some of those whereby we proved that the *Heart* is not the Seat of Common Sense, will plainly evince that the *Head* is. As that out of *Laurentius*, that a Nerve being
tied,

ried, Sense and Motion will be preserved from the ligature up towards the *Head*, but downwards they will be lost. As also that experiment of a Frog, whose brain if you pierce will presently be devoid of Sense and Motion, though all the Entrals being taken out it will skip up and down, and exercise its senses as before. Which is a plain evidence that Motion and Sense is derived from the *Head*; and there is now no pretence to trace any Motion into a farther fountain, the *Heart* (from whence the *Nerves* were conceived to branch by *Aristotle*, and from whence certainly the *Veins and Arteries* doe, as appears by every Anatomie) being so justly discharged from that office. To which it may suffice to adde the consideration of those diseases that seize upon all the Animal functions at once, such as are the Lethargie, Apoplexie, Epilepsie, and the like, the causes of which Physicians find in the *Head*, and accordingly apply remedies. Which is a plain detection that the Seat of the Soule, as much as concerns the Animal Faculties, is chiefly in the *Head*. The same may be said of Phrensy and Melancholy, and such like distempers, that deprave a mans Imagination and Judgment; Physitians alwaies conclude something amiss within the *Cranium*. Lastly, if it were nothing but the

the near attendance of the outward Senses on the *Soule*; or her *discerning Faculty*, being so fitly placed about her in the *Head*; this, unless there were some considerable Argument to the contrary, should be sufficient to determine any one that is unprejudiced, to conclude that the Seat of Common Sense, Understanding, and command of Motion, is there also.

11. But now the greatest difficulty will be to define *In what part thereof it is to be placed*. In which, unless we will goe overboldly and carelessly to work, we are to have a regard to Mechanicall congruities, and not pitch upon any thing that, by the advantage of this Supposall, *That there is a Soule in man*, may goe for possible; but to chuse what is most handsome and convenient.

12. That the *whole Brain* is not the Seat of Common Sense, appears from the wounds and cuts it may receive without the destruction of that Faculty; for they will not take away *Sense* and *Motion*, unless they pierce so deep as to reach the *Ventricles of the Brain*, as *Galen* has observed.

13. Nor is it in *Regius* his *small solid particle*. For besides that it is not likely the *Centre of Perception* is so minute, it is very incongruous to place it in a Body so perfectly

fectly solid, more hard then Marble, or Iron. But this Invention being but a late freak of his petulant fancy, that has an ambition to make a blunder and confusion of all *Descartes* his Metaphysicall Speculations, (and therefore found out this rare quirk of wit to shew, how though the Soule were nothing but Matter, yet it might be incorruptible and immortal) it was not worth the while to take notice of it here in this Hypothesis, which we have demonstrated to be true, viz. *That there is a Soule in the Body, whose nature is immateriall or incorporeall.*

14. Nor are the *Membranes in the Head* the common *Sensorium*; neither those that envelop the Brain, (for they would be able then to see the light through the hole the *Trepan* makes, though the party *Trepan'd* winked with his eyes; to say nothing of the conveyance of the Nerves, the Organs of externall Sense, that carry beyond these exterior Membranes, and therefore point to a place more inward, that must be the *Recipient* of all their impresses) nor any *Internall membrane*, as that which bids fairest for it, the *Septum Lucidum*, as being in the midst of the upper Ventricle. But yet if the levell of Motion through the externall Senses be accurately considered, some

will shoot under, and some in a distant parallel, so that this Membrane will not be struck with all the Objects of our Senses, Besides that it seems odd and ridiculous that the centre of Perception should be either driven out so into plates, or spread into hollow convexities, as it must be supposed, if we make either the externall or internall Membranes of the Brain the Seat of Common Sense.

15. The most likely place is some one of those that the three last Opinions point at, viz. either the *Conarion*, or the *Concourse of the Nerves in the fourth Ventricle*, or the *Animal Spirits there*.

16. The first is *Des-Cartes* Opinion, and not rashly to be refused, neither doe I find any Arguments hitherto that are valid enough to deface it. Those that are recited out of *Bartholine*, and subscribed to by the learned Author of *Adenographia*, in my apprehension have not the force to ruin it: we will first repeat them, and then examine them.

The first is, that this *Glandula* is too little to be able to represent the Images of all that the Soule has represented to her.

The second, that the externall Nerves doe not reach to the *Glandula*, and that therefore it cannot receive the impress of sensible Objects.

The

The third, that it is placed in a place of excrements which would soile the species of things.

The fourth, that the species of things are perceived there where they are carried by the Nerves. But the Nerves meet about the beginning or head of the *Spinall Marrow*, a more noble and ample place then the *Glandula pinealis*.

To the first I answer, That the amplitude of that place where the Nerves meet in the *Spinall Marrow*, is not large enough to receive the distinct impresses of all the Objects the mind retains in Memory. Besides, that the other parts of the Brain may serve for that purpose, as much as any of it can. For it is the Soule it self alone that is capable of retaining so distinct and perfect representations, though it may make an occasionall use of some private marks it impresses in the Brain; which haply may be nothing at all like the things it would remember, nor of any considerable magnitude nor proportion to them, such as we observe in the words *Arx* and *Atomus*, where there is no correspondency of either likeness or bigness, betwixt the words and the things represented by them.

To the second, That though there be no continuation of *Nerves* to the *Conarion*, yet
O 2 there

there is of *Spirits*; which are as able to convey the impresses of Motion from external Sense to the *Conarion*, as the Aire and *Aether* the impress of the Stars unto the Eye.

To the third, That the *Glandula* is conveniently enough placed, so long as the Body is sound, for no excrementitious humours will then overflow it or besmeare it. But in such distempers wherein they doe, Apoplexies, Catalepsies, or such like diseases will arise; which we see doe fall out, let the seat of *Common Sense* be where it will.

To the last I answer, that the *Nerves*, when they are once got any thing far into the Brain, are devoid of Tunicles, and be so soft and spongy, that the motion of the *Spirits* can play through them, and that therefore they may ray through the sides, and so continue their motion to the *Conarion*, wherever their extremities may seem to tend.

17. But though these Arguments doe not sufficiently confute the Opinion, yet I am not so wedded to it, but I can think something more unexceptionable may be found out, especially it being so much to be suspected, that all Animals have not this *Conarion*; and then, that what pleased

Des-

Des-Cartes so much in this Invention, was that he conceited it such a marvelous fine instrument to beat the Animal Spirits into such and such Pores of the Brain, a thing that I cannot at all close with for reasons above alledged. Besides that Stones have been found in this *Glandula*, and that it is apparent that it is environ'd with a net of veines and arteries, which are indications that it is a part assigned for some more inferiour office. But yet I would not dismiss it without fair play.

18. Wherefore that opinion of the fore-cited Author, who places the Seat of Common Sense in that part of the *Spinall Marrow* where the Nerves are suspected to meet, as it is more plain and simple, so it is more irrefutable, supposing that the Soul's *Centre of perception* (whereby she does not onely apprehend all the Objects of the externall Senses, but does imagine; reason, and freely command and determine the Spirits into what part of the Body she pleases) could be conveniently seated in such dull pasty Matter as the Pith of the Brain is; a thing, I must needs profess, that pleases not my Palate at all, and therefore I will also take leave of this opinion too, and adventure to pronounce, *That the chief Seat of the Soule, where she perceives all Objects, where she*

imagines, reasons, and invents, and from whence she commands all the parts of the Body, is those purer Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.

CHAP. VIII.

1. *The first reason of his Opinion, the convenient Situation of these Spirits.*
2. *The second, that the Spirits are the immediate instrument of the Soule in all her functions.*
3. *The proof of the second Reason from the generall Authority of Philosophers, and particularly of Hippocrates;*
4. *From our Sympathizing with the changes of the Aire;*
5. *From the celerity of Motion and Cogitation;*
6. *From what is observed generally in the Generation of things;*
7. *From Regius his experiment of a Snaile in a glass;*
8. *From the running round of Images in a Vertigo;*
9. *From the constitution of the Eye, and motion of the Spirits there;*
10. *From the dependency of the actions of the Soule upon the Body, whether in Meditation or corporeall Motion;*
11. *From the recovery of Motion and Sense into a stupified part;*
12. *And lastly from what is observed in swooning fits, of paleness and sharp-*

sharpness of visage, &c. 13. The inference from all this, That the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle are the seat of Common Sense, and that the main use of the Brain and Nerves is to preserve the Spirits.

1. **T**Hat which makes me embrace this Opinion rather than any other is this, That first, this situation of the common *Sensorium* betwixt the Head and the trunk of the Body, is the most exactly convenient to receive the impresses of Objects from both, as also to impart Motion to the Muscles in both the Head and in the Body. In which I look upon it as equall with the last Opinion, and superiour to all them that went before. For whatever may be objected is already answered in what I have said to the last Objection against *Descartes*.

2. But now in the second place, (wherein this opinion of mine has a notorious advantage above all else that I know) It is most reasonable that that Matter, which is the immediate instrument of all the Animal functions of the Soule, should be the chiefest Seat from whence and where she exercises these functions, and if there be any place where there is a freer plenty of the purest sort of this Matter, that her *peculiar resi-*

dence should be there. Now the immediate instrument of the functions of the Soule is that *thinner Matter* which they ordinarily call Animal Spirits, which are to be found in their greatest purity and plenty in the *fourth Ventricle of the Brain*. From whence it must follow that that precious and choice part of the Soule which we call *the Centre of perception* is to be placed in that Ventricle, not in any pith of the Brain thereabout, but in the midst of these Spirits themselves; for that is the most naturall situation for the commanding them into the parts of the Head and Body, besides a more delicate and subtile use of them at home, in pursuing various imaginations and inventions.

3. That this *thin and Spirituous Matter* is the immediate engine of the Soule in all her operations, is in a manner the generall opinion of all Philosophers. And even those that have placed the *Common Sensorium* in the *Heart*, have been secure of the truth of this their conceit, because they took it for granted, that the left Ventricle thereof was the fountain of these pure and subtile Spirits, and please themselves very much, in that they fancied that Oracle of Physitians, the grave and wise *Hippocrates*, to speak their own sense so fully and significantly,

nificantly, Γνώμη ὅτι τὸ ἀνθρώπου πέφυκεν ἐν τῇ λαίῃ κοιλίῃ τρέφεσθαι ὃ ἐπὶ σίλοις ἐν ποταμοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ καθαρῇ καὶ φωτιστῇ περιούσια ἡγεμονίᾳ ἐκ τῆς διακρίσεως τοῦ αἵματος: that is to say, *That the mind of man is in the left Ventricle of his Heart, and that it is not nourished from meats and drinks from the belly, but by a clear and luminous Substance that redounds by separation from the blood: which is that which happens exactly in the Brain. For the Spirits there are nothing else but more pure and subtile parts of the blood, whose tenuity and agitation makes them separate from the rest of the mass thereof, and so replenish the Ventricles of the Brain.*

4. Moreover our *sympathizing* so sensibly with the *changes* of the *Aire*, which *Hippocrates* also takes notice of, that in clear *Aire* our thoughts are more clear, and in cloudy more obscure and dull, is no slight indication that that which conveys Sense, Thoughts and Passions immediately to the Soule, is very tenuous and delicate, and of a nature very congenerous to the *Aire* with which it changes so easily.

5. The strange *Agility* also of *Motions* and *Cogitations* that we find in our selves, has forced the most sluggish witts, even such as have been so gross as to deem the Soule
Corporal,

Corporeall, yet to chuse the freeſt, ſubtileſt and moſt active Matter to compound her of, that their imaginations could excogitate. And *Lucretius*, the moſt confident of the *Epicurean* Sect, thinks he has hit the naile on the head in his choice, *De rerum Nat. lib.* 3. where he concludes thus,

*Nunc igitur quoniam eſt animi natura reperta
Mobilis egregie, per quam conſtare neceſſe eſt
Corporibus parvis & levibus atque rotundis :*

whoſe testimony I account the better in this caſe, by how much the more craſs Philoſopher he is, the neceſſity of the tenuity of particles that are to pervade the Body of a Man being convinced hence to be ſo plain, that the dimmeſt eyes can eaſily diſcover it.

6. But we will advance higher to more forcible Arguments, amongſt which this, I think, may find ſome place, That we cannot diſcover any immediate operation of any kind of Soule in the world, but what it firſt works upon that Matter which participates in a very great meaſure of this fineneſs and tenuity of parts, which will eaſily yield and be guided ; as may be univerſally obſerved in all *Generations*, where the Body is alwaies organized out of thin fluid liquor, that will eaſily yield to the plaſtick power of the Soule, In which I doe not doubt
but

but it takes the advantage of moving the most subtile parts of all first, such as *Descartes* his first and second element, which are never excluded from any such humid and tenuious substance: which elements of his are that true *Heavenly* or *Aethereal matter* which is every where, as *Ficinus* somewhere saith Heaven is; and is that fire which *Trismegist* affirms is the most inward vehicle of the minde, and the instrument that God used in the forming of the world, and which the Soul of the world, wherever she acts, does most certainly still use.

7. And to make yet a step further, That ocular demonstration that *Henricus Regius* brings *Philos. Natur. lib. 4. cap. 16.* seems to me both ingenious and solid. It is in a Snail, such as have no shells, moving in a glass: so soon as she begins to creep, certain Bubbles are discovered to move from her tail to her head; but so soon as she ceases moving, those Bubbles cease. Whence he concludes, That a gale of spirits that circuit from her head along her back to her tail, and thence along her belly to her head again, is the cause of her progressive motion.

8. That such thin Spirits are the immediate instruments of Sense, is also discovered by what is observed in a *Vertigo*. For the Brain it self is not of such a fluid substance

as to turn round, and to make external Objects seem to doe so. Wherefore it is a sign that the immediate corporeal instrument of conveying the images of things is the Spirits in the Brain.

9. And that they are the chief Organ of Sight is plain in the exterior parts of the Eye; for we may easily discern how full they are of that *καθαρή καὶ φωτεινὴ οὐσία*, *pure and lucid substance* which Hippocrates speaks of, though he seat it in a wrong place; and how upon the passions of the minde these Spirits ebbe or flow in the Eye, and are otherwise wonderful-significantly modified, insomuch that the Soul even seems to speak through them, in that silent voice of Angels, which some fancy to be by nothing but by dumb shews, but I doe not at all believe it. It is also plain enough, that dimness of sight comes from deficiency of these Spirits, though the parts of the Eye otherwise be entire enough. The wider opening also of the pupill of one Eye upon the shutting of the other does indicate the flux and more copious presence of Spirits there, as *Galen* has ingeniously collected.

10. To which we may adde that in those more noble operations of the Minde, when she meditates and excogitates various Theorems, that either she uses some part of the

the Body as an Instrument then, or acts freely and independently of the Body. That the latter is false is manifest from hence, that then the change of Air, or Distemper and Diseasedness, could not prejudice her in her Inventive and purely Intellectual Operations; but it is manifest that they doe, and that a mans Minde is much more cloudy one time then another, and in one Country then another, whence is that proverbiall Verse,

Bæotum crasso jurares aere natum.

If she uses any part of the Body, it must be either these animal Spirits, or the Brain. That it is not the Brain, the very consistency thereof so clammy and sluggish is an evident demonstration, which will still have the more force, if we consider what is most certainly true, That the Soul has not any power, or else exceeding little, of moving Matter; but her peculiar priviledge is of determining Matter in motion; which the more subtile and agitated it is, the more easily by reason of its own mobility is it determined by her. For if it were an immediate faculty of the Soul to contribute motion to any matter, I doe not understand how that faculty never failing nor diminishing no more then the Soul it self can fail or diminish, that we should ever be weary of motion.

tion. In so much that those nimble-footed *Manades* or she-Priests of *Bacchus*, with other agile Virgins of the Country, which *Dionysius* describes dancing in the flowry meadows of *Meander* and *Cayster*, might, if life and limbs would last, be found dancing there to this very day, as free and frolick as wanton Kids (as he pleases to set out their activity) and that without any lassitude at all. For that immediate *motive* faculty of the Soul can still as fresh as ever impart motion to all the Body, and sooner consume it into air or ashes by heating and agitating it, then make her self weary or the Body seem so. Wherefore it is plain that that motion or heat that the Soul voluntarily confers upon the Body is by vertue of the Spirits, which she, when they are playing onely and gently toying amongst themselves, sends forth into the-exteriour members, and so agitates and moves them: but they being so subtile and dissipable, the Soul spends them in using of them; and they being much spent, she can hardly move the Body any longer, the sense whereof we call *Lassitude*. These are the $\tau\alpha\ \sigma\phi\mu\omega\acute{\nu}\tau\alpha$ or $\epsilon\nu\sigma\phi\mu\omega\acute{\nu}\tau\alpha$ of *Hippocrates*, and the Souls immediate engine of *motion* through all the parts of the Body.

II. As they are also of *Sense* in the more remote

remote parts, as well as in the Head, as *Spigelius* handsomely insinuates by that ordinary example of a mans legge being stupified or asleep, as some call it, by compresion or whatever hinderance may be of the propagation of the Spirits into that part. For as sense and motion is restored, a man may plainly feel something creep into it tingling and stinging like Pismires, as he compares it; which can be nothing but the Spirits forcing their passage into the part. Wherein what they suffer is made sensible to the Soul, they being her immediate Vehicle of life and sense.

12. Lastly, in *swooning fits*, when *motion* and *sense* fails, the exterior parts are *pale* and *fallen*, the Face looking more *lean* and *sharp*; of which there can be no other meaning, then that that benign gale of vital air, that fill'd up the parts before, is now absent and retreated from them; that is, that the *fluid Spirits* are retired, without which no *sense* nor *motion* can be performed: whence it is apparent that they are the immediate instrument of both.

13. I have proved that the *Animal Spirits* are the Souls immediate organ for *sense* and *motion*. If therefore there be any place where these Spirits are in the fittest plenty and purity, and in the most convenient situation

tuation for Animal functions; that in all reason must be concluded the chief seat and *Acropolis* of the Soul. Now the *Spirits* in the *middle ventricle of the brain* are not so indifferently situated for both the *Body* and the *Head*, as those in the *fourth* are; nor so pure. The upper Ventricles, being two, are not so fit for this office, that is so very much one and singular. Besides that the sensiferous impresses of motion through the eyes play under them; to say nothing how the *Spirits* here are less defæcate also then in the *fourth Ventricle*. Wherefore there being *sufficient plenty*, and *greatest purity*, and *fittest situation* of the *Spirits* in this *fourth Ventricle*, it is manifest that in these is placed the *Centre of Perception*, & that they are the *common Sensorium* of the Soul. And that as the *Heart* pumps out *Blood* perpetually to supply the whole *Body* with nourishment, and to keep up the bulk of this edifice for the Soul to dwell in, as also from the more subtile and agile parts thereof, to replenish the *Brain* and *Nerves* with *Spirits*, which are the immediate instrument of the Soul for Sense and Motion; so it is plain likewise that the main use of the *Brain* and *Nerves* is to keep these *subtile Spirits* from over speedy dissipation, and that the *Brain* with its *Caverns* is but one great round Nerve;

Nerve; as the Nerves with their invisible porosities are but so many smaller productions or slenderer prolongations of the Brain.

CHAP. IX.

1. *Several Objections against Animal Spirits.*
2. *An Answer to the first Objection touching the Porosity of the Nerves.*
3. *To the second and third from the Extravasation of the Spirits and pituitous Excrements found in the Brain.*
4. *To the fourth fetcht from the incredible swiftness of motion in the Spirits.*
5. *To the last from Ligation.*
6. *Undeniable Demonstrations that there are Animall Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain.*

1. **B**Efore we proceed to our other two Enquiries, we are forced to make a stop a while, and listen to some few Objections made by some late Authours, who against the common stream of all other Philosophers, Physitians and Anatomists, are not ashamed to deny that there are any such things as *Spirits* in the Body; or at least that there are any in the Ventricles of the Brain. For as for the Nerves, say they,

P

they

they have no Pores or Cavities to receive them; and besides, it is plain that what is fluid in them is nothing but a milky white juice, as is observed in the pricking of a Nerve. And as for the Ventricles of the Brain, those Cavities are too big, and the Spirits if they issue into them, will be as extravasated Blood, whence they must needs be spoiled and corrupt. Besides that they will evaporate at those passages through which the mucous or pituitous excrements pass from the Brain. Whose appearance there is, say they, another great argument that these Ventricles were intended onely for receptacles and conveyances of such excrementitious Humours which the Brain discharges it self of. Lastly, if Spontaneous Motion be made by means of these Spirits, it could not be so extremely sudden as it is, for we can wagge our finger as quick as thought, but corporeal Motion cannot be so swift. And if the Spirits be continued from the Head to the Finger, suppose, in the ligation of the Nerve there would be sense from the Ligature to the Fingers end; which is, say they, against Experience. These are the main Objections I have met withall in *Hofman* and others; but are such as I think are very easily answered: and indeed they doe in some sort clash some of them one with another.

2. For how can the Nerves derive juice if they have no Pores, or are not so much as passable to these thin active Spirits we speak of? or from whence can we better conceive that juice to arise, then from these Spirits themselves, as they loose their agitation, and flag into a more gross consistency?

3. Neither can the Spirits be looked upon as extravasated in the Ventricles of the Brain, more then the Blood in the Auricles or Ventricles of the Heart. Nor is there any fear of their sliding away through the *Infundibulum*, the pituitous excrements having no passage there but what they make by their weight, as well as their insinuating moistness, which always besmearing these parts makes them more impervious to the light Spirits, whose agility also and componderancy with the outward Aire renders them incapable of leaving the Caverns in which they are. That arguing from the pituitous excrements found there, that they were made onely for a Receptacle of such useless redundancy, is as ineptly inferred, as if a man should argue from what is found in the *Intestinum rectum*, that the Stomack and all the Intestines were made for a Receptacle of Stercoreous excrement. The Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain, playing about and hitting against the sides

of the Caverns they are in, will in process of time abate of their agitation, the grosser parts especially; and so necessarily come to a more coarse consistency, and settle into some such like moist Sediment as is found at the bottome of the Ventricles, which nature dischargeth through fit passages, whereby the Spirits are left more pure. But because this necessary fæculency is found in these Cavities, to conclude that that is the onely use of them, is as ridiculous as to inferre That because I spit at my Mouth, and blow my Nose, that that was the chief end and use of these two parts of my Body, or that my Eyes were not made for seeing, but weeping.

4. The nature of the swiftness of Motion in these Spirits is much like that of Light, which is a Body as well as they. But that Lucid Matter in the Sun does not, so soon as he appears upon the Horizon, fly so many thousand miles in a moment to salute our eyes; but Motion is propagated as it were at once from the Sun to our Eye through the æthereal Matter betwixt. Or suppose a long Tube, as long as you will, and one to blow in it; in a moment, so soon as he blows at one end, the Motion will be felt at the other, and that downwards as well as upwards, and as easily; to satisfie
that

that other frivolous Objection I find in *Hofman*, as if it were so hard a business that these Spirits should be commanded downwards into the Nerves. But the Opposers of this ancient and solid Opinion are very simple and careless.

5. That of the *Ligature* proves nothing. For though the Nerve betwixt the Ligature and the Finger be well enough stored with Spirits, yet the *Centre of Perception* being not there, and there being an interruption and division betwixt the Spirits that are continued to their Common *Sensorium*, and these on the other side of the Ligature; 'tis no more wonder, that we feel nothing on this side of the Ligature, then that we see nothing in our neighbours garden, when a wall is betwixt, though the Sun shine clearly on both sides of the wall.

6. We see how invalid their Arguments are against this received Opinion of almost all both Physitians and Philosophers: It is needless to produce any for the confirmation of it, those which we have made use of for proving that the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soule, being of equall force most of them to conclude their existence in the Body. And yet for an overplus I will not much care to cast in a brief suggestion of the use of the *Lungs*,
P 3 which

which the best Physicians and Anatomists adjudge to be chiefly for conveyeing prepared aire to the Heart ; as also of the *Retē mirabile* and *Plexus Choroides*, whose bare situation discover their use, that they may more plentifully evaporate the thinner and more agile particles of the Blood into the Ventricles of the Brain. The *Diastole* also of the Brain keeping time with the Pulse of the Heart, is a manifest indication, what a vehement steam of Spirits, by the direct and short passage of the *Arteria Carotides*, are carried thither. For if one part of the Blood be more fiery and subtil then another, it will be sure to reach the Head. From whence considering the sponginess & laxness of the Brain, and thinness of the Tunicles in the little Arteries that are there ; it will follow by Mechanical necessity that the Ventricles thereof will be filled with that *καθαρὴ καὶ φωτὸς δὲ περιούσια ἐκ διακρίσεως τοῦ αἵματος*, which *Hippocrates* so fitly describes, though he fancy the Seat of it in an unfitting place. But the purest of these Spirits being in the fourth Ventricle, as *Bartholine* and others have judiciously concluded, it follows plainly from what has been alledged, That the Common Sensorium is to be placed in the midst of these purer Spirits of the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.

CHAP. X.

1. *That the Soule is not confined to the Common Sensorium.* 2. *The first Argument from the Plastick power of the Soule.* 3. *Which is confirmed from the graduall dignity of the Soules Faculties, of which this Plastick is the lowest;* 4. *Externall Sensation the next;* 5. *After that Imagination, and then Reason.* 6. *The second Argument from Passions and Sympathies in Animals.* 7. *An illustration of the manner of naturall Magick.* 8. *The third Argument from the Perception of Pain in the exterior parts of the Body.* 9. *The fourth and last from the nature of Sight.*

1. **W**E are now at leisure to resume the two remaining Enquiries; the former whereof is, whether the Soule be so in this fourth Ventricle, that it is essentially no where else in the Body, or whether it be spread out into all the Members. *Regius* would coup it up in the *Conarion*, which he believes to be the *Common Sensorium*, and so by consequence it should be confined to the fourth Ventricle, and not expatiate at all thence, supposing that the Seat of Common Sense. The reason of this conceit of

his is this, That whatever is in the rest of the Body, may come to pass by powers meerly Mechanical; wherein he does very superstitiously tread in the footsteps of his Master *Des-Cartes*. But for my own part, I cannot but dissent, I finding in neither any sufficient grounds of so novell an Opinion, but rather apparent reasons to the contrary.

2. As first the *Frame of the Body*, of which I think most reasonable to conclude the *Soule* her self to be the more particular *Architect* (for I will not wholly reject *Platinus* his opinion;) and that the *Plastick power* resides in her, as also in the *Soules* of Brute animals, as very learned and worthy Writers have determined. That the *Fabrick* of the Body is out of the concurse of *Atomes*, is a meer precarious Opinion, without any ground or reason. For Sense does not discover any such thing, the first rudiments of life being out of some liquid homogeneous Matter; and it is against reason, that the tumbling of *Atomes* or corporeall particles should produce such exquisite frames of creatures, wherein the acutest wit is not able to find any thing inept, but all done exquisitely wel every where, where the foulness and coarseness of Matter has not been in fault. That God is not the immediate Maker of these Bodies, the particular

mis-

miscarriages demonstrate. For there is no Matter so perverse and stubborn but his Omnipotency could tame; whence there would be no Defects nor Monstrosities in the generation of Animals. Nor is it so congruous to admit, that the *Plastick* faculty of the *Soule of the World* is the sole contriver of these Fabricks of particular creatures (though I will not deny but she may give some rude preparative stroaks towards Efformation:) but that in every particular world, such as Man is especially, his own Soule is the peculiar and most perfective Architect thereof, as the Soule of the World is of it. For this vitall Fabrication is not as in artificiall Architecture, when an external person acts upon Matter, but implies a more particular and near union with that Matter it thus intrinsically shapes out and organizes. And what ought to have a more particular and close union with our Bodies then our Souls themselves? My opinion is therefore, That the Soule, which is a Spirit, and therefore contractible and dilatable, begins within less compass at first in Organizing the fitly-prepared Matter, and so bears it self on in the same tenour of work till the Body has attained its full growth; and that the Soule dilates it self in the dilating of the Body, and so possesses it through

through all the members thereof.

3. The congruity of this Truth will further discover it self, if we consider the nature of the faculties of the Soule (of which you may read more fully in *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus* Artic. 3, 4, 5.) in what a natural graduality they arise till they come to the most free of all. The *deepest* or *lowest* is this *Plastick power* we have already spoke of, in virtue whereof is continued that perpetuall *Systole* and *Diaſtole* of the Heart, as I am more prone to think then that it is meerly Mechanical, as also that *Respiration* that is performed without the command of our Will: For the *Libration* or *Reciprocation* of the *Spirits* in the *Tensility* of the *Muscles* would not be so perpetuall, but cease in a small time, did not some more mysticall Principle then what is meerly Mechanical give Assistance, as any one may understand by observing the insufficiency of those devices that *Henricus Regius* propounds for adæquate causes of such motions in the Body. These I look upon as the *First Faculties* of the Soule, which may be bounded by this generall character, That the exercise of them does not at all imply so much as our Perception.

4. Next to these is the *Sensation* of any externall Object, such as *Hearing*, *Seeing*,
Feeling,

Feeling, &c. All which include *Perception* in an irresistible necessity thereof, the Object being present before us, and no external Obstacle interposing.

5. *Imagination* is more free, we being able to avoid its representations for the most part, without any external help; but it is a degree on this side *Will* and *Reason*, by which we correct and silence unallowable fancies. Thus we see how the *Faculties* of the Soule rise by *Degrees*; which makes it still the more easy and credible, that the *lowest* of all is competent to her as well as the *highest*.

6. Moreover, *Passions* and *Sympathies*, in my judgment, are more easily to be resolved into this Hypothesis of the Souls pervading the whole Body, then in restraining its essential presence to one part thereof. For to believe that such an horrible Object as, suppose, a Bear or Tiger, by transmission of Motion from it through the eyes of an Animal to the *Conarion*, shall so reflect thence, as to determine the Spirits into such Nerves as will streighten the Orifice of the Heart, and lessen the Pulse, and cause all other symptoms of Fear; seems to me little better then a meer piece of *Mechanical Credulity*. Those Motions that represent the Species of things, being turned this way or
the

the other way, without any such *impetus* of Matter as should doe such feats as *Descartes* speaks of in his Book of Passions. And that which he would give us as a pledge of this Truth is so false, that it does the more animate me to dis-believe the Theorem, Artic. 13. For the waisting of one's hand neare the Eye of a mans friend, is no sufficient proof That externall Objects will necessarily and Mechanically determine the Spirits into the Muscles, no Faculty of the Soule intermedling. For if one be fully assured, or rather can keep himself from the fear of any hurt, by the waisting of his friends Hand before his Eye, he may easily abstain from winking: But if fear surprise him, the Soule is to be entituled to the action, and not the meer *Mechanisme* of the Body. Wherefore this is no proof that the *Phænomena* of Passions, with their consequences, may be salved in brute Beasts by pure Mechanicks; and therefore neither in Men: but it is evident that they arise in us against both our *Will* and *Appetite*. For who would bear the tortures of *Fears* and *Jealousies*, if he could avoid it? And therefore the Soule sends not nor determines the Spirits thus to her own Torture, as she resides in the Head. Whence it is plain that it is the effect of her as she resides in the *Heart* and *Stomack*,

Stomack, which sympathize with the horrid representation in the Common *Sensorium*, by reason of the exquisite unity of the Soul with her self, & of the continuity of Spirits in the Body, the necessary instrument of all her Functions. And there is good reason the *Heart & Stomack* should be so much affected, they being the chief Seats of those Faculties that maintain the life of the Body; the danger whereof is the most eminent Object of Fear in any Animal.

7. From this Principle, I conceive that not onely the *Sympathy of parts* in one particular Subject, but of *different and distant Subjects*, may be understood: such as is betwixt the party wounded, and the Knife or Sword that wounded him, besmeared with the Weapon-salve, and kept in a due temper: Which certainly is not purely Mechanical, but Magical, though not in an unlawful sense; that is to say, it is not to be resolved into meer Matter, of what thinness or subtilty soever you please, but into the *Unity of the Soul of the Universe*, and *Continuity of the subtile Matter*, which answers to our *Animal Spirits*. And in this sense it is that *Plotinus* sayes, that the World is *ὁ πᾶς πᾶν*, the grand Magus or *Enchanter*. And I doe not question, but that upon this score meerly, without the association of any
Fami-

Familiar Spirit, several odde things may be done, for evil as well as good. For this *Spirit of the World* has Faculties that work not by Election, but fatally or naturally, as several Gamaitus we meet withall in Nature seem somewhat obscurely to subindicate. Of this Principle we shall speak more fully in its due place.


8. But we have yet a more clear discovery, that our Soul is not confined to any one part of the Head, but possesses the whole Body, from the Perception of *Pain* in the parts thereof: For it is plainly impossible, that so high a torture as is felt but in the pricking of a Pin, can be communicated to the *Centre of Perception* upon a meer Mechanical account. For whether the *immediate Instrument of Sense* be the *Pith of the Nerves*, as *Des-Cartes* would have it, or whether it be the *Spirits*, as is most true; it is ridiculous to think, that by the forcible parting of what was joyned together at ease (when this case is not communicated to either the *Spirits*, or *Pith of the Nerves*, from the place of the Puncture, to the very seat of Common Sense) that the Soul there seated should feel so smart a torment, unless that her very Essence did reach to the part where the pain is felt to be. For then the reason of this is plain, that it is the *Unity of*
Soul

Soul possessing the whole Body, and the *Continuity of Spirits* that is the cause thereof. And it is no wonder, if the continuation and natural composure of the Spirits be Rest and Ease to the Soul, that a violent disjoyning and bruising of them, and baring the Soul of them, as I may so speak, should cause a very harsh and torturous sense in the *Centre of Perception*. This Argument bears undeniable Evidence with it, if we doe but consider the fuzziness of the *Pith of the Nerves*, and the fluidity of the *Spirits*, and what little stress or crouding so small a thing as a Pin or Needle can make in such soft and liquid Matter.

9. Lastly, unless the very Essence of the Soul reach from the Common *Sensorium* to the *Eye*, there will be very great difficulties how there should be so distinct a representation of any visible Object: for it is very hard to conceive that the *Colours* will not be confounded, and the bigness of the Object diminished, and indeed that the image will not be quite lost before it can come to the Soul, if it be onely in the Common *Sensorium*; For it is plain, and experience will demonstrate that there is a very perfect Image of the Object in the bottome of the *Eye*, which is made by the decussation of the lines of Motion from it, thus:

The

The Line A. B. from the Object A. C. bears against that point in the bottome of



the Eye in B, and the line C. D. against the point D ; whereby C. and A. are felt in their place, and in such a distance as they are in the Object C. A : and so of all the lines which come from the Object C. A. into the bottome of the Eye B. D. From whence the Object is felt in such a length and bredth as it is capable of being perceived in at such a distance from the Eye. And as the Motion that is conveyed from A. to B, and from C. to D, is felt there, so the modification of it, whereby the Object in those parts may seem red, yellow, green, or any other colour, is felt there also. Whence it is plain that there will be an exquisite impression, according to all circumstances of the Object, in the bottome of the Eye : so that if the Soul receive it there, and convey it thence to her *Centre of Perception* intirely

II.
C.
of
C
Q
A
the
t in
hey
the
A.
rom
gth
ved
d as
o B,
odi-
nose
any
ce it
im-
s of
: so
vey
in-
rely

tirely in the same circumstances, the representation will be compleat. But if the Soul be not there, but the conveyance thereof must be left to the bare laws of Matter, the Image will be much depraved, or lost, before it can come to the Common *Sensorium*. For this Motion must be propagated from B and D, till it come to the hole E, and so pass into the Optick Nerve, to be carried into the Brain, and so to the seat of Common Sense: but betwixt B and E, or D and E, there may be the depainture of sundry colours, whence it will be necessary that F be tinged with the colour D, and G with the colour of both D and F; and so of the rest of the Lines drawn from the Object to the Eye: so that all their colours would be blended before they came to E. Now at that harsh flexure at E, where the visual Line is as crooked as B E R, according to the experiments of Reflection and Refraction, the breadth or length of the Object C A. would be lost. For we must needs expect, that as it is in Reflections and Refractions, where the Object will appear in that Line that immediately conveys the sense of it, so here it must be also, and therefore the point C and A must appear about Q, whence the Object will shrivel up in a manner into nothing. And suppose

Q

it

it might appear in some tolerable latitude, for all this, the Brain being an opaque substance, so soon as the Motion comes thither, it would be so either changed or lost, that the Image could not pass the opacity of it, in any splendour or entireness. Wherefore I do not doubt but that the Image which the Soul perceives is that in the Eye, and not any other corporeally produced to the inside of the Brain (where *Colour* and *Figure* would be so strangely depraved, if not quite obliterated) I mean it is the concurrence of the *lucid Spirits* in the bottome of the Eye, with the outward Light conveyed through the Humours thereof (which is the best sense of the Platonick *συναίγεια* that *Plutarch* speaks of) wherein the great Mystery of *Sight* consists.

CHAP. XI.

1. That neither the Soul without the Spirits, nor the Spirits without the presence of the Soul in the Organ, are sufficient causes of Sensation.
2. A brief declaration how Sensation is made.
3. How Imagination.
4. Of Reason and Memory, and whether there be any Marks in the Brain.
5. That the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of

of the Soul in Memory also; and how Memory arises; 6. As also Forgetfulness. 7. How spontaneous Motion is performed. 8. How we walk, sing, and play, though thinking of something else. 9. That though the Spirits be not alike fine every where, yet the Sensiferous Impression will pass to the Common Sensorium. 10. That there is an Heterogeneity in the very Soul herself; and what it is in her we call the Root, the Centre, and the Eye; and what the Rayes and Branches. 11. That the sober and allowable Distribution of her into Parts, is into Perceptive and Plastick.

1. **A**fter our evincing that the Soul is not confined to the Common Sensorium, but does essentially reach all the Organs of the Body; it will be more easy to determine the Nature of Sensation and other Operations we mentioned. For we have already demonstrated these two things of main consequence; That the Spirits are not sufficient of themselves for these Functions; nor the Soul of her self, without the assistance of the Spirits: as is plain in the interception or disjunction of the Spirits by Ligature or Obstruction; whence it is, that Blindness sometimes happens meerly for that the Optick Nerve is obstructed.

Q 2

2. Where-

2. Wherefore briefly to dispatch our third Querie; I say in general, That *Sensation* is made by the arrival of motion from the Object to the Organ; where it is received in all the circumstances we perceive it in, and conveyed by vertue of the Souls presence there, assisted by her immediate Instrument the *Spirits*, by vertue of whose continuity to those in the Common *Sensorium*, the Image or Impress of every Object is faithfully transmitted thither.

3. As for *Imagination*, there is no question but that Function is mainly exercised in the chief seat of the Soul, those purer Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain. I speak especially of that Imagination which is most free, such as we use in *Romantick Inventions*, or such as accompany the more severe Meditations and Disquisitions in Philosophy, or any other Intellectual entertainments. For Fasting, fresh Aire, moderate Wine, and all things that tend to an handsome supply and depuration of the Spirits, make our thoughts more free, subtile, and clear.

4. *Reason* is so involved together with *Imagination*, that we need say nothing of it apart by it self. *Memory* is a Faculty of a more peculiar consideration; and if the Pith of the Brain contribute to the Function

ons of any power of the mind, (more then by conserving the Animal Spirits) it is to this. But that the *Brain* should be stored with *distinct images* (whether they consist of the Flexures of the supposed *Fibrilla*, or the orderly puncture of Pores, or in a continued modified Motion of the parts thereof, some in this manner, and others in that) is a thing, as I have already proved, utterly impossible. If there be any *Marks* in it, it must be a kind of *Brachygraphie*, some small dots here and there standing for the recovering to Memory a series of things that would fill, it may be, many sheets of paper to write them at large. As if a man should tie a string about a friends finger to remember a business, that a whole daies discourse, it may be, was but little enough to give him full instructions in. From whence it is plain that the *Memory* is in the Soule, and not in the *Brain*. And if she doe make any such Marks as we speak of, she having no perception of them distinct from the representation of those things which they are to remind her of, she must not make them by any *Cognitive power*, but by some such as is Analogous to her *Plastick Faculty* of organizing the Body, where she acts and perceives it not.

5. But whether the Soule act thus or no

Q 3

upon

upon the Brain, is a Matter of uncertain determination ; nor can it be demonstrated by any experiment that I know. And therefore if we will contain our selves within the capacities of the *Spirits*, which I have so often affirmed to be the immediate instrument of the Soule in all her operations, that Position will be more unexceptionable. And truly I doe not understand but that they and the Soule together will perform all the Functions of Memory that we are conscious to our selves of. And therefore I shall conclude that Memory consists in this, That the Soule has acquired a greater *Promptitude* to think of this, or that Phantasm, with the circumstances thereof, which were raised in her upon some occasion, Which *Promptitude* is acquired by either the often representation of the same Phantasm to her ; or else by a more vivid impress of it from its novelty, excellency, mischievousness, or some such like condition that at once will pierce the Soule with an extraordinary resentment ; or finally by voluntary attention, when she very carefully and on set purpose imprints the Idea as deeply as she can into her inward Sense. This *Promptitude* to think on such an Idea will lessen in time, and be so quite spent, that when the same Idea is represented again to
the

the Soule, she cannot tell that ever she saw it before. But before this inclination thereto be quite gone, upon this proneness to return into the same conception, with the circumstances, the *Relative Sense* of having seen it before (which we call *Memory*) does necessarily emerge upon a fresh representation of the Object.

6. But *Forgetfulness* arises either out of meer *Desuetude* of thinking on such an Object, or on others that are linked in with it, in such a Series as would represent it as past, and so make it a proper Object of Memory. Or else for that the *Spirits*, which the Soule uses in all her Functions, be not in a due temper; which may arise from overmuch *Coolness*, or *Waterishness* in the Head, to which alone *Sennertus* ascribes *Obliviousness*.

7. The last thing we are to consider is *Spontaneous Motion*. Which that it is performed by the continuation of the *Spirits* from the Seat of Common Sense to the *Muscles*, which is the gross Engine of Motion, is out of doubt. The manner how it is, we partly feel and see; that is to say, we find in our selves a power, at our own pleasure to move this or the other member with very great force, and that the *Muscle* swells that moves the part; which is a plain indication of influx of *Spirits*, thither directed or there

guided by our meer Will : a thing admirable to consider , and worth our most serious meditation. That this direction of the impresse of Motion is made by our meer Will, and Imagination of doing so, we know and feel it so intimately, that we can be of nothing more sure. That there is some fluid and subtile Matter, which we ordinarily call *Spirits*, directed into the *Muscle* that moves the Member, its swelling does evidence to our sight ; as also the experience, that moderate use of wine which supplyes *Spirits* apace , will make this motion the more strong. As for the manner, whether there be any such *Valvula* or no in the Nerve, common to the opposite *Muscles*, as also in those that are proper to each, it is not materiall. This great *priviledge* of our Soules *directing the motion of Matter thus*, is wonderfull enough in either Hypothesis. But I look upon the *Fibrous* parts of the *Muscle* as the main engine of motion ; which the Soule moistning with that subtil liquor of the Animal *Spirits*, makes them swell and shrink, like Lute-strings in rainy weather : And in this chiefly consists that notable strength of our Limbs in spontaneous motion. But for those conceived *Valvula* that Experience has not found out yet, nor sufficient Reason, they are to wait for admission till they bring better

better evidence. For the presence of the Animal Spirits in this Fibrous flesh, and the command of the Soule to move, is sufficient to salve all *Phænomena* of this kind. For upon the Will conceived in the *Common Sensorium*, that part of the Soule that resides in the *Muscles*, by a power near a-kin to that by which she made the Body and the Organs thereof, guides the Spirits into such Pores and parts, as is most requisite for the shewing the use of this excellent Fabrick.

8. And in virtue of some such power as this, doe we so easily *walk*, though we think not of it, as also *breath*, and *sing*, and *play* on the Lute, though our Mindes be taken up with something else. For Custome is another Nature: and though the Animal Spirits, as being meerly corporeall, cannot be capable of any habits; yet the Soule, even in that part thereof that is not *Cognitive*, may, and therefore may move the Body, though *Cogitation* cease; provided the members be well replenished with Spirits, whose assistance in naturall motions of Animals is so great, that their Heads being taken off, their Body for a long time will move as before: as *Chalcidius* relates of *Wasps* and *Hornets*, who will fly about, and use their wings, a good part of an houre after they have lost their Heads: which is to be im-
puted

puted to the residence of their Soule in them still, and the intireness of the Animal Spirits, not easily evaporating through their crustaceous Bodies. For it is but a vulgar conceit to think, that the Head being taken off, the Soule must presently fly out, like a Bird out of a Basket, when the Lid is lifted up. For the whole World is as much throng'd with Body, as where she is; and that *Tye* of the *Spirits* as yet not being lost, it is a greater engagement to her to be there then any where else. This motion therefore in the *Wasp*, that is so perfect and durable, I hold to be *vitall*; but that in the parts of dismembred creatures, that are less perfect, may be usually *Mechanicall*.

9. We have now, so far forth as it is requisite for our design, considered the *Nature and Functions of the Soule*; and have plainly demonstrated, that she is a Substance distinct from the Body, and that her very Essence is spread throughout all the Organs thereof: as also that the generall instrument of all her Operations is the subtle *Spirits*; which though they be not in like quantity and sincerity every where, yet they make all the Body so pervious to the impresses of Objects upon the externall Organs, that like Lightning they pass to the Common *Sensorium*. For it is not necessary

cessary that the Medium be so fine and tenuous as the Matter where the most subtil motion begins. Whence Light passes both Aire and Water, though Aire alone is not sufficient for such a motion as Light, and Water almost incapable of being the Seat of the fountain thereof. This may serve to illustrate the passage of Sense from the Membranes (or in what other seat soever the Spirits are most subtil and lucid) through thicker places of the Body to the very *Centre of Perception*.

10. Lastly, we have discovered a kind of *Heterogeneity* in the Soule; and that she is not of the same power every where. For her *Centre of Perception* is confined to the *Fourth Ventricle* of the Brain; and if the *Sensiferous Motions* we speak of be not faithfully conducted thither, we have no knowledge of the Object. That part therefore of the Soule is to be looked upon as most precious; and she not being an independent Mass, as *Matter* is, but one part resulting from another, that which is the noblest is in all reason to be deemed the cause of the rest. For which reason (as *Synefius* calls God, on whom all things depend, $\rho\iota\zeta\omega\nu\ \rho\iota\zeta\alpha\nu$) so, I think *this Part* may be called the *Root of the Soule*. Which apprehension of ours will seem the less strange, if

if we consider that from the highest *Life*, viz. the *Deity*, there does result that which has no *Life* nor *Sense* at all, to wit the *stupid Matter*. Wherefore in very good Analogie we may admit, that that pretious part of the Soule in which resides *Perception*, *Sense*, and *Understanding*, may send forth such an *Essential Emanation from it self*, as is utterly devoid of all *Sense* and *Perception*; which you may call, if you will, the *Exteriour branches* of the Soule, or the *Rayes of the Soule*, if you call that nobler and diviner part the *Centre*; which may very well merit also the appellation of the *Eye of the Soule*, all the rest of its parts being but meer darkness without it. In which, like another *Cyclops*, it will resemble the World we live in, whose one Eye is conspicuous to all that behold the light.

11. But to leave such lusurious Considerations, that rather gratifie our fancy then satisfy our severer faculties; we shall content our selves hereafter, from those two notorious Powers, and so perfectly different, which Philosophers acknowledg in the Soule, to wit, *Perception* and *Organization*, onely to term that more noble part of her in the Common *Sensorium*, the *Perceptive*, and all the rest the *Plastick* part of the Soule,

CHAP,

CHAP. XII.

1. *An Answer to an Objection, That our Arguments will as well prove the Immortality of the Souls of Brutes, as of Men.*
2. *Another Objection inferring the Praeexistence of Brutes Souls, and consequently of ours.*
3. *The first Answer to the Objection.*
4. *The second Answer consisting of four parts.*
5. *First, That the Hypothesis of Praeexistence is more agreeable to Reason than any other Hypothesis.*
6. *And not onely so, but that it is very solid in it self.*
7. *That the Wisdome and Goodness of God argue the truth thereof.*
8. *As also the face of Providence in the World.*
9. *The second part of the second Answer, That the Praeexistence of the Soul has the suffrage of all Philosophers in all Ages, that held it Incorporeal.*
10. *That the Gymnosophists of Ægypt, the Indian Brachmans, the Persian Magi, and all the learned of the Jews were of this Opinion.*
11. *A Catalogue of particular famous persons that held the same.*
12. *That Aristotle was also of the same minde.*
13. *Another more clear place in Aristotle to this purpose, with Sennertus his Interpretation.*
14. *An Answer to an*

Eva-

evasion of that Interpretation. 15. The last and clearest place of all out of Aristotles Writings.

1. **H**AVING thus discovered the Nature of the Soul, and that she is a *Substance distinct from the Body*; I should be in readiness to treat of her *Separation from it*, did I not think my self obliged first, to answer an envious Objection cast in our way, whereby they would make us believe, that the Arguments which we have used, though they be no less then Demonstrations, are meer Sophisms, because some of them, and those of not the least validity, prove what is very absurd and false, *viç.* That the *Souls of Brutes* also are *Substances Incorporeal*, distinct from the Body: from whence it will follow, that they are *Immortal*. But to this I have answered already in the *Appendix to my Antidote, &c. Cap. 10.* and in brief concluded, That they are properly *no more Immortal* then the *stupid Matter*, which *never perishes*, and that out of a terrestrial Body they may have no more sense then it. For all these things are as it pleases the first Creatour of them.

2. To this they perversly reply, That if the Souls of Brutes subsist after death, and are then senseless and unactive, it will necessarily

asily follow that they must come into Bodies again. For it is very ridiculous to think that these Souls, having a Being yet in the world, and wanting nothing but fitly-prepared Matter to put them in a capacity of living again, should be always neglected, and never brought into play, but that new ones should be daily created in their stead: for those innumerable Myriads of Souls would lie useless in the Universe, the number still increasing even to infinity. But if they come into Bodies again, it is evident that they *præexist*: and if the Souls of Brutes *præexist*, then certainly the Souls of Men doe so too. Which is an Opinion so wilde and extravagant, that a wry mouth and a loud laughter (*the Argument that every Fool is able to use*) is sufficient to silence it and dash it out of countenance. No *wise man* can ever harbour such a conceit as this, which every *Idiot* is able to confute by consulting but with his own Memory. For he is sure, if he had been before, he could remember something of that life past. Besides the unconceivableness of the Approach and Entrance of these *præexistent* Souls into the Matter that they are to actuate.

3. To this may be answered two things. The first, That though indeed it cannot be well denied, but that the concession of the

Præ-

Præexistence of the Souls of Brutes is a very fair introduction to the belief of the *Præexistence* of the Souls of Men also ; yet the sequel is not at all *necessary*, but one may be without the other.

4. The second is this, That if the sequel were granted, that no Absurdity can be detected from thence in Reason, if the prejudices of Education, and the blinde suggestion of unconcerned Faculties, that have no right to vote here, be laid aside. To speak more explicitly, I say, This consequence of our Souls *Præexistence* is more agreeable to Reason then any other Hypothesis whatever ; has been received by the most learned Philosophers of all Ages, there being scarce any of them that held the Soul of man *immortal* upon the meer light of Nature and Reason, but asserted also her *Præexistence*; That *Memory* is no fit Judge to appeal to in this Controversy, and lastly, That *Traduction* and *Creation* are as intricate and unconceivable as this opposed Opinion.

5. I shall make all these four parts of my Answer good in order. The truth of the first we shall understand, if we compare it with those Opinions that stand in competition with it, which are but two that are considerable. The one is of those that say, the Soule is *ex traduce* ; the other of those that

that say it is *created*, upon occasion. The first Opinion is a plain contradiction to the *notion* of a Soul, which is a *Spirit*, and therefore of an *Indivisible*, that is of an *Indiscernible*, Essence. The second Opinion implies both an Indignity to the Majesty of God, (in making Him the chief assistant and actour in the highest, freest, and most particular way that the Divinity can be conceived to act, in those abominable crimes of Whoredome, Adultery, Incest, nay Buggery it self, by supplying those foul coitions with new created Souls for the purpose :) and also an injury to the Souls themselves ; that they being ever thus created by the immediate hand of God, and therefore pure, innocent and immaculate, should be imprisoned in unclean, diseased and disordered Bodies, where very many of them seem to be so fatally over-mastered, and in such an utter incapacity of closing with what is good and vertuous, that they must needs be adjudged to that extreme calamity which attends all those that forget God. Wherefore these two opinions being so incongruous, what is there left that can seem probable, but the *Præxistency* of the Soul ?

6. But I shall not press the Reasonableness of this Opinion onely from comparing it with others, but also from the concin-

R

nity

nity that is to be found in it self. For as it is no greater wonder that every particular mans Soul that lives now upon Earth should be *à mundo condito*, then the particular Matter of their Bodies should (which has haply undergone many Millions of Alterations and Modifications, before it lighted into such a contexture as to prove the entire Body of any one person in the world, has been in places unimaginably distant, has filed, it may be, through the triangular passages of as many Vortices as we see Stars in a clear frosty night, and has shone once as bright as the Sun (as the *Cartesian* Hypothesis would have all the Earth to have done) in so much that we eat, and drink, and cloath our selves with that which was once pure Light and Flame;) so that *de factis* they do bear the same date with the Creation of the World, that unavoidable certainty of the Præexistence of the Souls of Brutes does, according to the very confession of our Adversaries, fairly insinuate,

7. But this is not all. Both the *Attributes* of God, and Face of things in the world, out of which his *Providence* is not to be excluded, are very strong Demonstrations thereof to Reason unprejudiced. For first, if it be good for the Souls of men to be at all, the *sooner* they are the *better*. But

we are most certain that the *Wisdom* and *Goodness* of God will doe that which is the *best*; and therefore if they can enjoy themselves before they come into these terrestrial Bodies (it being better for them to enjoy themselves then not) they must be before they come into these Bodies; that is, they must be in a capacity of enjoying themselves without them for long periods of time, before they appeared here in this Age of the World. For nothing hinders but that they may live before they come into the Body, as well as they may after their going out of it: the latter whereof is acknowledged even by them that deny the *Praeexistence*. Wherefore the *Praeexistence* of Souls is a necessary result of the *Wisdom* and *Goodness* of God, who can no more fail to doe that which is *best*, then he can to *understand* it: for otherwise his *Wisdom* would exceed his *Benignity*; nay there would be less hold to be taken of his *Goodness*, then of the *Bounty* of a very benign and good man, who, we may be well assured, will slip no opportunity of doing good that lies in his power, especially if it be neither *damage* nor *trouble* to him; both which hindrances are incompatible to the Deity.

8. Again, the face of *Providence* in the World seems very much to suit with this

Opinion; there being not any so naturall and easy account to be given of those things that seem the most harsh in the affairs of men; as from this Hypothesis, *That their Soules did once subsist in some other state; where; in severall manners and degrees, they forfeited the favour of their Creatour. And so according to that just Nemesis that He has interwoven in the constitution of the Universe, and of their own natures, they undergo severall calamities and asperities of fortune, and sad drudgeries of Fate, as a punishment inflicted, or a disease contracted from the severall Obliquities of their Apostasie.* Which key is not onely able to unlock that recondite mystery of some particular Mens almost fatal aversness from all Religion and Vertue, their stupidity and dulness and even invincible slowness to these things from their very child-hood, and their incorrigible propension to all manner of Vice; but also of that squalid forlorneness and brutish Barbarity, that whole Nations for many Ages have layen under, and many doe still lye under at this very day. Which sad Scene of things must needs exceedingly cloud and obscure the wayes of Divine providence, and make them utterly unintelligible; unless some light be let in from the present Hypothesis we speak of. It is plain

plain therefore that there are very weighty Reasons may be found out, to conclude the *Praexistence of Soules*. And therefore this Opinion being so demonstrable from this Faculty, and there being no other that can contradict it, (for that the verdict of *Memory* in this case is invalid I shall prove anon) we are according to the Light of Nature undoubtedly to conclude, that the Soules of Men doe præexist, by Axiome 5.

9. And as this Hypothesis is Rationall in it self, so has it also gained the suffrage of all Philosophers of all Ages, of any note, that have held the Soule of Man *Incorporeal* and *Immortall*. And therefore I am not at all solicitous what either the *Epicureans*, or *Stoicks* held concerning this Matter; this contest being betwixt those onely that agree on this Truth, *That the Soule is a Substance Immateriall*. And such amongst the Philosophers as held it so, did unanimously agree *that it does Praexist*. This is so plain, that it is enough onely to make this challenge; every one in the search will satisfie himself of the Truth thereof. I shall onely adde, for the better countenance of the business, some few instances herein, as a pledge of the Truth of my generall Conclusion. Let us cast our Eye therefore into what corner of the World we will, that

has been famous for Wisdome and Literature, and the-wisest of those Nations you shall find the Assertours of this Opinion.

10. In *Egypt*, that ancient Nurse of all hidden Sciences, that this Opinion was in vogue amongst the wise men there, those fragments of *Trismegist* doe sufficiently witness. For though there may be suspected some fraud and corruption in severall passages in that Book, in reference to the interest of Christianity; yet this Opinion of the *Praeexistency of the Soule*, in which Christianity did not interest it self, cannot but be judged, from the Testimony of those Writings, to have been a Branch of the Wisdome of that Nation: of which Opinion not onely the *Gymnosophists* and other wise men of *Egypt* were, but also the *Brachmans* of *India*, and the *Magi* of *Babylon* and *Persia*; as you may plainly see by those *Oracles* that are called either *Magicall* or *Chaldaicall*, which *Pletho* and *Psellus* have commented upon. To these you may adde the abstruse Philosophy of the *Jewes*, which they call their *Cabbala*, of which the *Soules Praeexistence* makes a considerable part; as all the learned of the *Jewes* doe confess. And how naturally applicable this Theory is to those three first mysterious chapters of *Genesis*,
I

I have, I hope, with no contemptible success, endeavoured to shew in my *Conjectura Cabalistica*.

11. And if I should particularize in persons of this Opinion, truly they are such, of so great fame for depth of Understanding and abstrusest Science, that their testimony alone might seem sufficient to bear down any ordinary modest man into an assent to their doctrine. And in the first place, if we can believe the *Cabbala* of the *Jewes*, we must assign it to *Moses*, the greatest Philosopher certainly that ever was in the world; to whom you may adde *Zoroaster*, *Pythagoras*, *Epicharmus*, *Empedocles*, *Cebes*, *Euripides*, *Plato*, *Euclide*, *Philo*, *Virgil*, *Marcus Cicero*, *Plotinus*, *Iamblicus*, *Proclus*, *Boethius*, *Pfellus*, and severall others which it would be too long to recite. And if it were fit to adde *Fathers* to *Philosophers*, we might enter into the same list *Synesius* and *Origen*: the latter of whom was surely the greatest Light and Bulwark that ancient Christianity had; who unless there had been some very great Matter in it, was far from that *levity* and *vanity*, as to entertain an Opinion so vulgarly slighted and neglected by other men: and the same may be said of others that were Christians, as *Boethius*, *Pfellus*, and the late learned *Marsilius*

Ficinus. But I have not yet ended my Catalogue: that admirable Physitian *Johannes Fernelius* is also of this perswasion, and is not content to be so himself onely, but discovers those two grand Masters of Medicine, *Hippocrates* and *Galen*, to be so too; as you may see in his *De abditis rerum causis*. *Cardan* also, that famous Philosopher of his Age, expressly concludes, that the *Rationall Soule* is both a distinct Being from the *Soule of the World*, and that it does *præexist* before it comes into the Body: and lastly *Pomponatius*, no friend to the Soules Immortality, yet cannot but confess, that the safest way to hold it, is also therewith to acknowledg her *Præexistence*.

12. And that nothing may be wanting to shew the frivolousness of this part of the Objection, we shall also evince that *Aristotle*, that has the luck to be believed more then most Authors, was of the same opinion, in his Treatise *De Anima* Lib. 1. Cap. 3. Where he speaks of the necessity of the qualification of the Body that the Soule is to actuate; and blaming those that omit that consideration, sayes, that they are as careless of that Matter, as if it were possible that, according to the *Pythagorick fables*, any Soule might enter into any Body. Whenas every Animall, as it has its proper species, so it is to have its peculiar

culiar form. But those that define otherwise, Παραπλήσιον λέγουσι, saith he, ὥσπερ εἴ τις φαίη ἢ τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλὴς ἐνδύεσθαι· δὲ ἢ τήχην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι, i. e. *They speak as if one should affirm that the skil of a Carpenter did enter into a Flute or Pipe; for every Art must use its proper Instruments, and every Soule its proper Body.* Where (as Cardan also has observed) Aristotle does not find fault with the opinion of the Soules going out of one Body into another, (which implies their Præexistence:) but that the Soule of a Beast should goe into the Body of a Man, and the Soule of a Man into a Beasts Body; this is the Absurdity that Aristotle justly rejects, the other Opinion he seems tacitely to allow of.

13. He speaks something more plainly in his *De Generat. Animal.* Lib. 3. Cap. 11. *There are generated, saith he, in the Earth, and in the moisture thereof, Plants and living Creatures; because in the Earth is the moisture, and in the moisture Spirit, and in the whole Universe an Animal warmth or heat; insomuch that in a manner all places are full of Soules, ὡς τε τρόπον τινα πάντα ψυχῆς εἶναι πλήρη, Adeo ut modo quodam omnia sint Animarum plena,* as Sennertus interprets the place: Aristotle understanding by ψυχῆ, the samethat he does afterwards by ψυχικὴ ἀρχή,

ἀρχή, that Principle we call *Soule*, according to the nobility whereof he asserts, that Animals are more or less noble; which assertion therefore reaches Humane Soules as well as these of Beasts.

14. Nor can this Text be eluded by being so injurious to *Aristotle*, as to make him to assert that there is but one Soule in the world, because he sayes ψυχῆς, not ψυχῶν. For the text admitting of *Sennertus* his exposition as well as this other; that which is most reasonable is to be attributed to him. Now if his meaning was, that there is but One Soule in the World that goes through all things, and makes the Universe one great Animal, as the *Stoicks* would have it, he need not say that all places are in a manner full of this Soule, but absolutely full of it, as our Body is wholly actuated by the Soule in it. And therefore the Sense must be, that all places indeed are in a manner full of Soules: not that they have opportunity to actuate the Matter, and shew their presence there by vitall operation; but are there dormant as to any visible energie, till prepared Matter engage them to more sensible actions.

15. We will adde a third place still more clear, Lib. 2. Chap. 3. where he starts this very question of the *Præxistency of Soules*, of the Sensitive and Rationall especially;

καὶ αἰδιονικῆς ψυχῆς καὶ καὶ νοητικῆς, whe-
 ther both kindes doe προῦπαρχειν, that is
praexist, before they come into the Body,
 or whether the Rationall onely; and he
 concludes thus, Λέπειται ὅτι τὸν νοῦν μόνον
 διαφέρει ἐκείναι καὶ δεῖον εἶναι μόνον· ὡς ἐν γὰρ
 αὐτῇ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ.
 i. e. *It remains that the rationall or intel-*
lectual Soule onely enter from without, as be-
ing onely of a nature purely divine, with whose
actions the actions of this gross Body have no
communication. Concerning which point he
 concludes like an Orthodox Scholar of his
 excellent Master *Plato*; to whose footsteps
 the closer he keeps, the less he ever wan-
 ders from the truth. For in this very place
 he does plainly profess, what many would
 not have him so apertly guilty of, that the
 Soule of man is immortall, and can perform
 her proper Functions without the help of
 this terrestriall Body. And thus I think I
 have made good the two first parts of my
 answer to the proposed Objection; and
 have clearly proved, that the *Praexistence*
of the Soule is an opinion both in it self
 the most rationall that can be maintained,
 and has had the suffrage of the renownedst
 Philosophers in all Ages of the World;
 and that therefore this sequel from our
 arguments for the Immortality of the
 Soule

Soule is no discovery of any fallacy in them.

CHAP. XIII.

1. *The third part of the second Answer, That the forgetting of the former state is no good argument against the Soules Præexistence.*
2. *What are the chief causes of Forgetfulness.*
3. *That they all conspire, and that in the highest degree, to destroy the memory of the other state.*
4. *That mischances and Diseases have quite taken away the Memory of things here in this life.*
5. *That it is impossible for the Soule to remember her former condition without a Miracle.*
6. *The fourth part of the second Answer, That the entrance of a Præexistent Soule into a Body is as intelligible as either Creation or Traduction.*

1. **A**S for the two last Difficulties, concerning the Soules Memory of her former state, and the manner of her coming into the Body; I hope I shall with as much ease extricate my self here also, especially in the former. For if we consider what things they are that either quite take away, or exceedingly diminish our Memory in this life;

life; we shall find the concurse of them all, and that in a higher degree, or from stronger causes, contained in our descent into this earthly Body, then we can meet with here: they none of them being so violent as to dislodge us out of it.

2. Now the things that *take away our Memory here*, are chiefly these; either *the want of opportunity of being reminded of a thing*, as it happens with many, who rise confident they slept without dreaming such a night, and yet before they goe to bed again, recover a whole Series of representations they had in their last sleep, by something that fell out in the day, without which it had been impossible for them to recall to minde their Dream. Or else, in the second place, *Desuetude of thinking of a Matter*; whereby it comes to pass, that what we have earnestly meditated, laboured for, and pen'd down with our own hands when we were at Schoole, were it not that we saw our names written under the Exercise, we could not acknowledg for ours when we are grown men. Or lastly, *some considerable change in the frame and temper of our Body*, whether from some externall mischance, or from some violent Disease, or else from old age, which is disease enough of it self: which often doe *exceedingly impair*,

paire, if not quite take away, the *Memory*, though the Soule be still in the *same Body*.

3. Now all these Principles of Forgetfulness, namely *the want of something to reminde us, Desuetude of thinking, and an Extraordinary change in the Body*, are more eminently to be found in the *Descent* of the Soule into these Earthly prisons, then can happen to her for any time of her *abode* therein. For there is a greater *difference*, in all probability, betwixt that Scene of things the Soule sees out of the Body and in it, then betwixt what shee sees sleeping and waking: and the perpetuall occurrences of this present life continue a long *Desuetude* of thinking on the former. Besides that their descent hither in all likelihood scarce befalls them but in their state of *Silence* and *Inactivity*, in which myriads of Soules may haply be for many Ages, as the maintainers of this Opinion may pretend, by reason of the innumerable expirations of the *aëreal periods of life*, and the more narrow Lawes of *preparing terrestrial Matter*. And lastly, her coming into this Earthly Body is a greater and more disadvantageous change, for the utter spoiling of the memory of things she was acquainted with before, then any Mischance or Disease can be for the bringing upon her a forgetfulness

getfulness of what she has known in this life.

4. And yet that *Diseases and Casualties* have even utterly taken away all memory, is amply recorded in History. As that *Messala Corvinus* forgot his own name; that one, by a blow with a stone, forgot all his learning; another, by a fall from an Horse, the name of his Mother and kinsfolks. A young Student of *Montpelier*, by a wound, lost his Memory so, that he was fain to be taught the letters of the Alphabet again. The like befell a *Franciscan* after a Feaver. And Thucydides writes of some, who after their recovery from that great Pestilence at *Athens*, did not onely forget the names and persons of their friends, but themselves too, not knowing who themselves were, nor by what name they were called:

*Atque etiam quosdam cepisse obliviarerum
Cunctarum, neq; se possent cognoscere ut ipsi;*

as the Poet *Lucretius* sadly sets down in his description of that devouring Plague, out of the fore-named Historian.

5. Wherefore without a miracle it is impossible the Soule should remember any particular circumstance of her former condition, though she did really *præexist*, and
was

was in a capacity of acting before she came into this Body, (as *Aristotle* plainly acknowledges she was) her change being far greater by coming into the Body then can ever be made while she staies in it. Which we haply shall be yet more assured of, after we have considered *the manner of her descent*, which is the last Difficulty objected.

6. I might easily decline this Controversie, by pleading onely, that the entrance of the Soule into the Body, supposing her *Praexistence*, is as intelligible as in those other two wayes, of *Creation* and *Traduction*. For how this *newly-created* Soule is *infused* by God, no man knowes; nor how, if it be *traducted* from the Parents, both their Soules contribute to the making up a new one. For if there be decision of part of the Soule of the Male, in the injection of his seed into the matrix of the Female, and part of the Female Soule to joyn with that of the Males; besides that the decision of these parts of their Soules makes the Soule a *Discerpible essence*, it is unconceivable how these *two parts* should make up *one Soule* for the Infant: a thing ridiculous at first view. But if there be no decision of any parts of the Soule, and yet the Soule of the Parent be the cause of the Soule of the Childe, it is perfectly an act of *Creation*;

athing that all sober men conclude incomperible to any particular Creature. It is therefore plainly unintelligible, how any Soul should pass from the Parents into the Body of the seed of the *Fetus*, to actuate and inform it: which might be sufficient to stop the mouth of the Opposer, that pretends such great obscurities concerning the entrance of *Præexistent Souls* into their *Bodies*.

CHAP. XIV.

1. The knowledge of the difference of Vehicles, and the Soules Union with them, necessary for the understanding how she enters into this Earthly Body.
2. That though the name of Vehicle be not in Aristotle, yet the thing is there.
3. A clearing of Aristotles notion of the Vehicle, out of the Philosophy of Des-Cartes.
4. A full interpretation of his Text.
5. That Aristotle makes onely two Vehicles, Terrestriall and Æthereall; which is more then sufficient to prove the Soul's Oblivion of her former state.
6. That the ordinary Vehicle of the Soule after death is Aire.
7. The duration of the Soule in her severall Vehicles.
8. That the Union of the Soule with her Vehicle

S

does

does not consist in Mechanicall Congruity, but Vitall. 9. In what Vitall congruity of the Matter consists. 10. In what Vital congruity of the Soule consists, and how it changing, the Soule may be free from her airy Vehicle, without violent precipitation out of it. 11. Of the manner of the descent of Soules into Earthly Bodies. 12. That there is so little Absurdity in the Præexistence of Soules, that the concession thereof can be but a very small prejudice to our Demonstrations of her Immortality.

1. **B**UT I shall spend my time better in clearing the Opinion I here defend, then in perplexing that other that is so gross of it self, that none that thoroughly understand the nature of the Soule, can so much as allow the possibility thereof: wherefore for the better conceiving, how a *Præ-existent Soule* may enter this *Terrestrial Body*, there are two things to be enquired into; *the difference of the Vehicles of Soules*, and *the cause of their union with them*. The *Platonists* doe chiefly take notice of *Three kindes of Vehicles*, *Aethereal*, *Aereal*, and *Terrestrial*, in every one whereof there may be several degrees of purity and impurity, which yet need not amount to a new Species.

2. This notion of *Vehicles*, though it be

be discoursed of most in the School of *Plato*, yet is not altogether neglected by *Aristotle*, as appears in his *De Generat. Animal. Lib. 2. Cap. 3.* where, though he does not use the Name, yet he does expressly acknowledge the Thing it self: For he does plainly affirm, that every Soule partakes of a Body distinct from this organized terrestriall Body, and of a more divine nature then the Elements so called; and that as one Soule is more noble then another, so is the difference of this diviner Body; which yet is nothing else with him then that warmth or heat in the seed, τὸ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ἐνυπάρχον τὸ καλούμενον θερμὸν, which is not fire, but a Spirit contained in the spumeous seed; and in this Spirit a nature analogous to the element of the Stars.

3. Of which neither *Aristotle* himself had, nor any one else can have, so explicite an apprehension as those that understand the first and second Element of *Des-Cartes*; which is the most subtile and active Body that is in the World, & is of the very same nature that the Heaven and Stars are, that is to say, is the very Body of Light, (which is to be understood chiefly of the first Element) though so mingled with other Matter here below that it does not shine, but is the Basis of all that naturall warmth in all generations,

rations, and the immediate instrument of the Soule, when it organizeth any Matter into the figure or shape of an Animall; as I have also intimated elsewhere, when I proved, *that the Spirits are the immediate instrument of the Soule in all Vital and Animal functions.* In which Spirits of necessity is contained this *Cælestiall* Substance, which keeps them from congealing, as it does also all other liquid bodies, and must needs be in the Pores of them; there being no *Vacuum* in the whole comprehension of Nature.

4. The full and expresse meaning therefore of *Aristotles* text must be this, that in the spumeous and watry or terrene moisture of the seed is contained a Body of a more spirituous or aëreal consistency, and in this aëreal or spirituous consistency is comprehended *φύσις ἀνάλογον ὅτι τῶν ἀστέρων στοιχείῳ*, a nature that is analogous or like to the Element of the stars, namely that is of it self *athereal* and *lucid*.

5. And it is this *Vehicle* that *Aristotle* seems to assert that the Soule does act in, separate from the Body; as if she were ever either in this *terrestrial* Body, or in her *athereal* one: which if it were true, so vast a change must needs obliterate all *Memory* of her former condition, when she is once plunged

plunged into this earthly prison. But it seems not so probable to me, that Nature admits of so great a Chasme; nor is it necessary to suppose it, for this purpose: the descent of the Soule out of her *aiery* Vehicle into this terrestrial Body, and besmearing moisture of the first rudiments of life, being sufficient to lull her into an eternall oblivion of whatever hapned to her in that other condition; to say nothing of her long state of *Silence* and Inactivity before her turn come to revive in an earthly body.

6. Wherefore not letting go that more orderly conceit of the *Platonists*; I shall make bold to assert, that the Soule may live and act in an *aëreal* Vehicle as well as in the *athereal*; and that there are very few that arrive to that high happiness, as to acquire a *Cælestial* Vehicle immediatly upon their quitting the *terrestrial* one: that *heavenly Chariot* necessarily carrying us in triumph to the greatest happiness the Soule of man is capable of: which would arrive to all men indifferently, good and bad, if the parting with this earthly Body would suddenly mount us into the heavenly. Wherefore by a just *Nemesis*, the Soules of Men that are not very Heroically vertuous, will finde themselves restrained within the compass of this caliginous Aire, as both Reason

it self will suggest, and the *Platonists* have unanimously determined.

7. We have competently described the difference of those *three kinds* of *Vehicles*, for their *purity* and *consistency*. The *Platonists* adde to this the difference of *duration*, making some of them of that nature as to entertain the Soule a longer time in them, others a shorter. The shortest of all is that of the *Terrestrial Vehicle*. In the *Aëreal* the Soule may inhabit, as they define, many *Ages*, and in the *Æthereal* for ever.

8. But this makes little to the clearing of the *manner of their descent eis γένεω*, which cannot be better understood, then by considering their Union with the Body generated, or indeed with any kinde of Body whatever, where the Soul is held captive, and cannot quit her self thereof by the free *imperium* of her own Imagination and Will. For what can be the cause of this cohesion, the very essence of the Soul being so easily penetrative of Matter, and the dimensions of all Matter being alike penetrable every where? For there being no more *Body* or *Matter* in a Vessel filled with *Lead* then when it is full of *Water*, nor when full with *Water* then when with *Aire*, or what other subtiler Body soever that can be imagined in the Universe; it is manifest that the *Craftsmen*

sities of Matter is every where alike, and alike penetrable and passable to the Soul. And therefore it is unconceivable how her Union should be so with any of it, as that she should not be able at any time to glide freely from one part thereof to another as she pleases. It is plain therefore, that this Union of the Soul with Matter does not arise from any such gross Mechanical way, as when two Bodies stick one in another by reason of any toughness and viscosity, or straight commissure of parts; but from a *congruity* of another nature, which I know not better how to term then *Vital*: which *Vital Congruity* is chiefly in the Soul it self, it being the noblest Principle of Life, but is also in the Matter, and is there nothing but such modification thereof as fits the *Plastick* part of the Soul, and tempts out that Faculty into act.

9. Not that there is any *Life* in the *Matter* with which this in the Soul should sympathize and unite; but it is termed *Vital* because it makes the *Matter* a congruous Subject for the Soul to reside in, and exercise the functions of life. For that which has no life it self, may tie to it that which has. As some men are said to be tied by the teeth, or tied by the ear, when they are detained by the pleasure they are struck with

from good Musick or delicious Viands. But neither is that which they eat alive, nor that which makes the Musick, neither the Instrument, nor the Air that conveys the sound. For there is nothing in all this but meer Matter and corporeal motion, and yet our vital functions are affected thereby. Now as we see that the *Perceptive* part of the Soul is thus vitally affected with that which has no life in it, so it is reasonable that the *Plastick* part thereof may be so too. That there may be an Harmony betwixt Matter thus and thus modified, and that Power that we call *Plastick*, that is utterly devoid of all Perception. And in this alone consists that which we call *Vital Congruity* in the prepared Matter, either to be organized, or already shaped into the perfect form of an Animal.

10. And that *Vital Congruity* which is in the Soul, I mean in the *Plastick* part thereof, is analogous to that Pleasure that is perceived by the Sense, or rather to the capacity of receiving it, when the Sense is by agreeable motions from without or in the Body it self very much gratified, and that whether the Minde will or no. For there are some Touches that will in their Perception seem pleasant, whether our Judgment would have them so or not. What
this

this is to the *Perceptive* part of the Soul, that other Congruity of Matter is to the *Plastick*. And therefore that which ties the Soul and this or that Matter together, is an unresistible and unperceptible pleasure, if I may so call it, arising from the congruity of Matter to the *Plastick* faculty of the Soul: which Congruity in the Matter not failing, nor that in the Soul, the Union is at least as necessary as the continuation of eating and drinking, so long as Hunger and Thirst continues, and the Meat and Drink proves good. But either satiety in the Stomack, or some ill tast in the Meat may break the congruity on either side, and then the action will cease with the pleasure thereof. And upon this very account may a Soul be conceived to quit her *airy* Vehicle within a certain period of Ages, as the *Platonists* hold she does, without any violent precipitation of her self out of it.

II. What are the strings or cords that tie the Soul to the Body, or to what Vehicle else soever, I have declared as clearly as I can. From which it will be easy to understand the manner of her descent. For assuredly, the same cords or strings that tie her there, may draw her thither: Where the carcass is, there will the Eagles be gathered. Not that she need use her *Perceptive* faculty

culty in her descent, as Hawks and Kites by their sight or smelling fly directly to the lure or the prey: but she being within the *Atmosphere* (as I may so call it) of Generation, and so her *Plastick* power being reached and toucht by such an invisible reek, (as Birds of prey are, that smell out their food at a distance;) she may be fatally carried, all Perceptions ceasing in her, to that Matter that is so fit a receptacle for her to exercise her efformative power upon. For this *Magick-sphere*, as I may so term it, that has this power of conjuring down Souls into earthly Bodies, the nearer the Centre, the vertue is the stronger; and therefore the Soul will never cease till she has slided into the very Matter that sent out those rays or subtile reek to allure her. From whence it is easy to conceive that the Souls of Brutes also, though they be not able to exercise their *Perceptive* faculty out of a terrestrial body, yet they may infallibly finde the way again into the world, as often as Matter is fitly prepared for generation. And this is one Hypothesis, and most intelligible to those that are pleased so much with the opinion of those large Sphears they conceive of *emissary Atomes*. There is also another, which is the Power and Activity of the *Spirit of Nature* or *Inferiour Soul of the World*,
who

who is as fit an Agent to transmit particular Souls, as she is to move the parts of Matter. But of this hereafter.

12. What has been said is enough for the present to illustrate the pretended obscurity and unconceivableness of this Mystery. So that I have fully made good all the four parts of my Answer to that Objection that would have supplanted the force of my strongest Arguments for the Souls Immortality, and have clearly proved, that though this sequel did necessarily result from them, *That the Souls both of Men and Beasts did Pre-exist*, yet to unprejudiced reason there is no Absurdity nor Inconvenience at all in the Opinion. And therefore this Obstacle being removed, I shall the more chearfully proceed to the demonstrating of the Souls *actual Separation* from the Body.

CHAP. XV.

1. *What is meant by the Separation of the Soul, with a confutation of Regius, who would stop her in the dead Corps.*
2. *An Answer to those that profess themselves puzzled how the Soul can get out of the Body.*
3. *That there is a threefold Vital Congruity to be found in three several Subjects.*
4. *That*

4. That this triple Congruity is also compatible to one Subject, viz. the Soul of Man.
5. That upon this Hypothesis it is very intelligible how the Soul may leave the Body.
6. That her Union with the aerial Vehicle may be very suddain, and as it were in a moment.
7. That the Soul is actually separate from the Body is to be proved either by History or Reason. Examples of the former kinde out of Pliny, Herodotus, Ficinus.
8. Whether the Exstasie of Witches prove an actual separation of the Soul from the Body.
9. That this real separation of the Soul in Exstasie is very possible.
10. How the Soul may be loosned and leave the Body, and yet return thither again.
11. That though Reason and Will cannot in this life release the Soul from the Body, yet Passion may; and yet so that she may return again.
12. The peculiar power of Desire for this purpose.
13. Of Cardans Exstasies, and the Ointment of Witches, and what truth there may be in their confessions.

I, **C**ONCERNING the actual and local Separation of the Soul from the Body, it is manifest that it is to be understood of this Terrestrial Body. For to be in such a separate state, as to be where no Body or Matter is,

is to be out of the World: the whole Universe being so thick set with Matter, or Body, that there is not to be found the least vacuity therein. The question therefore is onely, whether upon death the Soul can pass from the Corps into some other place. *Henricus Regius* seems to arrest her there by that *general law of Nature*, termed the *law of Immutability*; whereby every thing is to continue in the same condition it once is in, till something else change it. But the application of this law is very grossly unjust in this case. For as I have above intimated, the Union of the Soul with the Body is upon certain terms; neither is every peece of Matter fit for every Soul to unite with, as *Aristotle* of old has very solidly concluded. Wherefore that condition of the Matter being not kept, the Soul is no longer engaged to the Body. What he here says for the justifying of himself, is so arbitrary, so childish and ridiculous, that, according to the merit thereof, I shall utterly neglect it, and pass it by, not vouchsafing of it any Answer.

2. Others are much puzzled in their imagination, how the Soul can get out of the Body, being imprisoned and lockt up in so close a Castle. But these seem to forget both the nature of the Soul, with the tenuity of her Vehicle, and also the Anatomy of the
the

the Body. For considering the nature of the Soul her self, and of Matter which is alike penetrable every where, the Soul can pass through solid Iron and Marble as well as through the soft Air and Æther; so that the thickness of the Body is no impediment to her. Besides, her Astral Vehicle is of that tenuity, that it self can as easily pass the smallest pores of the Body, as the Light does Glass, or the Lightning the Scabbard of a Sword without tearing or scorching of it. And lastly, whether we look upon that principal seat of the *Plastick* power, the *Heart*, or that of *Perception*, the *Brain*; when a man dies, the Soul may collect her self and the small residue of Spirits (that may haply serve her in the inchoation of her new Vehicle) either into the Heart, whence is an easy passage into the Lungs, and so out at the Mouth; or else into the Head, out of which there are more doors open then I will stand to number. These things are very easily imaginable, though as invisible as the Air, in whose element they are transacted.

3. But that they may still be more perfectly understood, I shall resume again the consideration of that Faculty in the *Plastick* part of the Soul, which we call *Vital Congruity*. Which according to the number of Vehicles,

Vehicles, we will define to be threefold, *Terrestrial*, *Aereal*, and *Æthereal* or *Cælestial*. That these *Vital Congruities* are found, some in some kinde of Spirits, and others in other some, is very plain. For that the *Terrestrial* is in the Soul of Brutes and in our own is without controversie; as also that the *Aereal* in that kinde of Beings which the Ancients called *Δαιμόνες* and lastly, that the *Heavenly* and *Æthereal* in those Spirits that Antiquity more properly called *Θεοί*, as being Inhabitants of the Heavens. For that there are such *Aereal* and *Æthereal Beings* that are analogous to *Terrestrial Animals*; if we compare the nature of God with the *Phænomena* of the world, it cannot prove less then a Demonstration. For this Earth that is replenisht with living Creatures, nay put in all the Planets too that are in the world, and fancy them inhabited, they all joyned together bear not so great a proportion to the rest of the liquid Matter of the Universe (that is in a nearer capacity of being the Vehicle of Life) as a single Cumin-seed to the Globe of the Earth. But how ridiculous a thing would it be, that all the Earth beside being neglected, onely one peece thereof no better then the rest, nor bigger then the smallest seed, should be inhabited? The same may be said also of the
com-

compass of the Aire; and therefore it is necessary to enlarge their Territories, and confidently to pronounce there are *Aethereal Animals*, as well as *Terrestrial* and *Aereal*.

4. It is plain therefore that these three *Congruities* are to be found in severall Subjects; but that which makes most to our purpose, is to finde them in one, and that in the Soule of Man. And there will be an easy intimation thereof, if we consider the vast difference of those Faculties that we are sure are in her *Perceptive* part, and how they occasionally emerge, and how upon the laying asleep of one, others will spring up. Neither can there be any greater difference betwixt the highest and lowest of these *Vitall congruities* in the *Plastick* part, then there is betwixt the highest and lowest of those Faculties that result from the *Perceptive*. For some Perceptions are the very same with those of *Beasts*; others little inferiour to those that belong to *Angels*, as we ordinarily call them; some perfectly brutish, others purely divine: why therefore may there not reside so great a Latitude of capacities in the *Plastick* part of the Soule, as that she may have in her all those three *Vitall Congruities*, whereby she may be able livingly to unite as well with

with the *Cælestial* and *Aereal* Body, as with this *Terrestrial* one? Nay, our nature being so free and multifarious as it is, it would seem a reproach to Providence, to deny this capacity of living in these several Vehicles; because that *Divine Nemesis* which is supposed to rule in the world, would seem defective without this contrivance. But without controversy, Eternall Wisdom and Justice has forecast that which is the best: and, unless we will say nothing at all, we having nothing to judge by but our own Faculties, we must say that the Forecast is according to what we, upon our most accurate search, doe conceive to be the best. For there being no Envy in the Deity, as *Plato* somewhere has noted, it is not to be thought but that He has framed our Faculties so, that when we have rightly prepared our selves for the use of them, they will have a right correspondency with those things that are offered to them to contemplate in the world. And truly if we had heretime to consider, I doe not doubt but it might be made to appear a very rationall thing, that there should be such an *Amphibian* as the Soule of man, that had a capacity (as some Creatures have to live either in the Water or on the Earth) to change her Element, and after her abode here in

T

this

this *Terrestrial Vehicle* amongst Men and Beasts, to ascend into the company of the *Aereal Genii*, in a Vehicle answerable to their nature.

5. Supposing then this triple capacity of *Vital Congruity* in the Soule of Man, the manner how she may leave this Body is very intelligible. For the Bodies fitness of temper to retain the Soule being lost in Death, the lower *Vitall Congruity* in the Soule looseth its Object, and consequently its Operation. And therefore as the letting goe one thought in the *Perceptive part* of the Soule is the bringing up another; so the ceasing of one *Vitall Congruity* is the wakening of another, if there be an Object, or Subject, ready to entertain it; as certainly there is, partly in the Body, but mainly without it. For there is a vitall Aire that pervades all this lower world, which is continued with the life of all things, and is the chiefeft Principle thereof. Whence *Them* in his *Scholia* upon *Aratus* interprets that Hemistich

—Τὸ γὰρ αἶν' ἐστὶν,

in a secondary meaning as spoken of the Aire, which he calls τὸν Δία or τὸν Ζῆνα τοῦ φυσικόν, the naturall *Jupiter*, in whom, in an inferiour sense, we may be said to live, and move, and have our Being: for without Aire,

Aire, neither Fishes, Fowls, nor Beasts can subsist, it administering the most immediate matter of life unto them, by feeding & refreshing their Animal Spirits. Wherefore upon the cessation of the lowest *Vitall Congruity*, that Aereal capacity awakening into Act, and finding so fit Matter every where to employ her self upon, the Soule will not faile to leave the Body; either upon choice, by the power of her own Imagination & Will; or else (supposing the very worst that can happen) by a naturall kinde of Attraction, or Transvection, she being her self, in that stound and confusion that accompanies Death, utterly unsensible of all things. For the Aire without being more *wholesome* and *vitall* then in the corrupt caverns of the dead Body, and yet there being a continuation thereof with that without; it is as easy to understand, how (that Principle of joyning therewith in the *Plastick* part of the Soule being once excited) she will naturally glide out of the Body into the free Aire, as how the Fire will ascend upwards, or a Stone fall downwards: for neither are the motions of these meerly Mechanicall, but vitall or Magicall, that cannot be resolved into meer Matter, as I shall demonstrate in my Third Book.

6. And being once recovered into this

vast Ocean of *Life*, and *sensible Spirit of the world*, so full of enlivening Balsame; it will be no wonder if the Soule suddainly regain the use of her *Perceptive* faculty, being, as it were in a moment, regenerate into a naturall power of Life and Motion, by so happy a concurse of rightly-prepared Matter for her *Plastick* part vitally to unite withall. For grosser generations are performed in almost as inconsiderable a space of time; if those Histories be true, of extemporary Sallads, sowne and gathered not many hours before the meale they are eaten at: and of the suddain ingendring of Frogs upon the fall of rain, whole swarms whereof that had no Being before, have appeared with perfect shape and liveliness in the space of half an houre, after some more unctuous droppings upon the dry ground; as I find not onely recited out of *Fallopins*, *Scaliger*, and others, but have been certainly my self informed of it by them that have been eye-witnesses thereof; as *Vaninus* also professes himself to have been by his friend *Johannes Ginchius*, who told him for a certain, that in the month of *July* he saw with his own eyes a drop of rain suddenly turned into a Frog. By such examples as these it is evident, that the reason why Life is so long a compleating in Terrestrial generations, is onely the Sluggishness

gishness of the Matter the Plastick power works upon. Wherefore a Soule, once united with Aire, cannot miss of being able, in a manner in the twinckling of an eye, to exercise all *Perceptive functions* again, if there was ever any intercession of them in the astonishments of Death.

7. How the Soule *may* live and act separate from the Body, may be easily understood out of what has been spoken. But that she does so *de facto*, there are but two wayes to prove it; the one by the testimony of *History*, the other by *Reason*. That of *History*, is either of persons *perfectly dead*, or of those that have been subject to *Ecstasies*, or rather to that height thereof which is more properly called *ἀπαίρεσις*, when the Soule does really leave the Body, and yet return again. Of this latter sort is that example that *Pliny* recites of *Hermotimus Clazomenius*, whose Soule would often quit her Body, and wander up and down; and after her return tell many true stories of what she had seen during the time of her disjunction. The same, *Maximus Tyrius* and *Herodotus* report of *Aristaeus Proconnesius*. *Marsilius Ficinus* adjoyns to this rank that narration in *Aulus Gellius*, concerning one *Cornelius*, a Priest, who in an *Ecstasie* saw the Battel fought betwixt *Cæsar*

and *Pompey* in *Thessalie*, his Body being then at *Padua*; and yet could, after his return to himself, punctually declare the Time, Order and Success of the Fight. That in *Wierus* of the *Weasell* coming out of the Souldiers mouth when he was asleep, is a more plain example: which, if it were true, would make *Aristaus* his *Pigeon* not so much suspected of fabulosity as *Pliny* would have it. Severall Relations there are in the world to this effect, that cannot but be loudly laughed at by them that think the Soule inseparable from the Body; and ordinarily they seem very ridiculous also to those that think it is separable, but as firmly believe that it is never, nor ever can be, separate but in Death.

8. *Bodinus* has a very great desire, notwithstanding it is so incredible to others, that the thing should be true; it being so evincing an argument for the Soules Immortality. And he thinks this Truth is evident from innumerable examples of the *Ecstasies* of Witches: which we must confess with him not to be natural; but that they amount to a perfect ἀπαρpesία or carrying away the Soule out of the Body, the lively sense of their meeting, and dancing, and adoring the Devill, and the mutuall remembrance of the persons that meet one another there

at such a time, will be no infallible *Demonstration* that they were there indeed; while their Bodies lay at home in Bed. Conformity of their Confessions concerning the same Conventicle is onely a shrewd probability, if it once could be made good, that this leaving their Bodies were a thing possible. For when they are out of them, they are much-what in the same condition that other *Spirits* are, and can imitate what shape they please; so that many of these Transformations into Wolves and Cats, may be as likely of the Soule having left thus the Body, as by the Devils possessing the Body and transfiguring it himself. And what these airy Cats or Wolves suffer, whether cuttings of their limbs, or breaking the Back, or any such like mischief, that the Witch in her Bed suffers the like, may very well arise from that *Magick Sympathy* that is seated in the Unity of the Spirit of the World, and the continuity of the subtile Matter dispersed throughout. The Universe in some sense being, as the *Stoicks* and *Platonists* define it, one vast entire *Animal*.

9. Now that this reall Separation of the Soule may happen in some *Ecstasies*, will be easily admitted, if we consider that the Soule in her own Nature is separable from the Body, as being a Substance really distinct

distinct therefrom; and that all Bodies are alike penetrable and passable to her, she being devoid of that corporeall property which they ordinarily call *αἰσθησιμότητα*, and therefore can freely slide through any Matter whatsoever, without any *knocking* or *resistance*; and lastly, that she does not so properly impart Heat and Motion to the Body, as Organization: and therefore when the Body is well organized, and there be that due temper of the Blood, the Heart and Pulse will in some measure beat, and the Brain will be replenish't with Spirits, and therewith the whole Body; though the Soule were out of it. In which case (saving that the *Spirit of Nature* cannot be excluded thence) it would be perfectly *Cartesius* his *Machina* without Sense; though seemingly as much alive as any animate Creature in a deep sleep. Whence it appears, that if the Soule could leave the Body, that she might doe it for a certain time without any detriment thereto, that is, so long as she might well live without Repast. Which fully answers their fears, who conceit that if the Soule was but once out of the Body, perfect Death must necessarily ensue, and all possible return thither be precluded.

10. But all the difficulty is to understand how the Soul may be loosned from the Body,

Body, while the Body is in a fit condition to retain her. That is a very great Difficulty indeed, and in a manner impossible for any power but what is supernatural. But it is not hard to conceive that this vital fitness in the Body may be changed, either by way of *natural Disease*, or by *Art*. For why may not some certain Fermentation in the Body so alter the Blood and Spirits, that the powers of the *Plastick* part of the Soul may cease to operate, as well as sometimes the *Perceptive* faculties doe, as in *Catalepsies*, *Apoplexies*, and the like? Wherefore this passing of the Soul out of the Body in Sleep, or Ecstasie, may be sometime a certain Disease, as well as that of the *νυκτοβαῖται*, *those that walk in their sleep*. Now if it should happen that some such distemper should arise in the Body, as would very much change the *Vital Congruity* thereof for a time, and in this Paroxysm that other Disease of the *Noctambuli* should surprise the party; his Imagination driving him to walk to this or that place, his Soul may very easily be conceived in this loosned condition it lies in, to be able to leave the Body, and pass in the Aire, as other Inhabitants of that Element doe, and act the part of separate Spirits, and exercise such Functions of the *Perceptive* faculty, as they do that are quite relea-

released from Terrestrial Matter. Onely here is the difference, That that damp in the Body that loosned the Union of the Soul being spent; the Soul, by that natural *Magick* I have more then once intimated, will certainly return to the Body, and unite with it again as firm as ever. But no man can when he pleases pass out of his Body thus, by the *Imperium* of his Will, no more then he can walk in his Sleep: For this capacity is pressed down more deep into the lower life of the Soul, whither neither the *Liberty of Will*, nor *free Imagination* can reach.

II. *Passion* is more likely to take effect in this case then either of the other two Powers, the seat of Passions being originally in the Heart, which is the chief Fort of these lower Faculties; and therefore by their propinquity can more easily act upon the first Principles of Vital Union. The effect of these has been so great, that they have quite carried the Soul out of the Body, as appears in sundry Histories of that kinde. For both *Sophocles* and *Dionysius* the *Sicilian* Tyrant died suddainly upon the news of a Tragick Victory; as *Polycrita* also a Noble Woman of the Isle of *Naxus*, the Poet *Philiippides*, and *Diagoras* of *Rhodes*, upon the like excess of Joy. We might adde examples of sudden *Fear* and *Grief*, but it is need-

needless. It is a known and granted Truth, that *Passion* has so much power over the vital temper of the Body, as to make it an unfit mansion for the Soul; from whence will necessarily follow her disunion from it. Now if *Passion* will so utterly change the Harmony of the Blood and Spirits, as quite to release the Soul from the Body by a perfect Death; why may it not sometime act on this side that degree, and onely bring a present *intemperies*, out of which the Body may recover, and consequently regain the Soul back again, by virtue of that *Mundane Sympathy* I have so often spoke of?

12. Now of all *Passions* whatever, excess of *Desire* is fittest for this more harmless and momentary ablegation of the Soul from the Body; because the great strength thereof is so closely assisted with the imagination of departing to the place where the party would be, that upon disunion not amounting to perfect Death, the power of Fancy may carry the Soul to the place intended; and being satisfied and returned, may rekindle life in the Body to the same degree it had before it was infested by this excess of *Desire*. This is that, if any thing, that has made dying men visit their friends before their departure, at many miles distance, their Bodies still keeping their sick bed;

bed ; and those that have been well, give a visit to their sick friends, of whose health they have been over-desirous and solicitous. For this *Ecstasie* is really of the *Soul*, and not of the *Blood* or *Animal Spirits* ; neither of which have any Sense or Perception in them at all. And therefore into this Principle is to be resolved that Story which *Martinus Del-Rio* reports of a Lad who, through the strength of Imagination and Desire of seeing his Father, fell into an *Ecstasie* ; and after he came to himself, confidently affirmed he had seen him, and told infallible circumstances of his being present with him.

13. That *Cardan* and others could fall into an *Ecstasie* when they pleased, by force of *Imagination* and *Desire* to fall into it, is recorded and believed by very grave and sober Writers : but whether they could ever doe it to a compleat *ἀφαισπεσία*, or local disjunction of the Soul from the Body, I know none that dare affirm ; such events being rather the chances of Nature and Complexion, as in the *Noctambuli*, then the effects of our Will. But we cannot assuredly conclude but that *Art* may bring into our own power and ordering that which natural causes put upon us sometimes without our leaves. But whether those *Oyntments* of Witches

Witches have any such effect, or whether those unclean Spirits they deal with, by their immediate presence in their Bodies, cannot for a time so suppress or alter their *Vital sensess* to such a degree as will loosen the Soul, I leave to more curious Inquisitors to search after. It is sufficient that I have demonstrated a very intelligible possibility of this actual separation without Death properly so called. From whence the peremptory Confessions of Witches, and the agreement of the story which they tell in several, as well those that are there bodily, as they that leave their Bodies behind them, especially when at their return they bring something home with them, as a permanent sign of their being at the place, is (though it may be all the delusion of their *Familiars*) no contemptible probability of their being there indeed where they declare they have been. For these are the greatest evidences that can be had in humane affairs: And nothing, so much as the supposed Impossibility thereof, has deterred men from believing the thing to be true.

CHAP. XVI.

1. *That Souls departed communicate Dreams.*
2. *Examples of Apparitions of Souls deceased.*
3. *Of Apparitions in fields where pitcht Battels have been fought; as also of those in Churchyards, and other vaporous places.*
4. *That the Spissitude of the Air may well contribute to the easiness of the appearing of Ghosts and Spectres.*
5. *A further proof thereof from sundry examples.*
6. *Of Marsilius Ficinus his appearing after death.*
7. *With what sort of people such examples as these avail little.*
8. *Reasons to perswade the unprejudiced that ordinarily those Apparitions that bear the shape and person of the deceased, are indeed the Souls of them.*

1. **T**HE Examples of the other sort, *viz.* of the appearing of the Ghosts of men after death, are so numerous and frequent in all mens mouths, that it may seem superfluous to particularize in any. This appearing is either by *Dreams*, or *open Vision*. In *Dreams*, as that which hapned to *Avenzoar Albumaron* an *Arabian* Physitian, to whom his lately-deceased friend suggested in his sleep a very soverain Medicine for his

his sore Eyes. Like to this is that in *Diodorus* concerning *Isis* Queen of *Egypt*, whom he reports to have communicated remedies to the *Egyptians* in their sleep after her death, as well as she did when she was alive. Of this kinde is also that memorable story of *Posidonius* the *Stoick*, concerning two young men of *Arcadia*, who being come to *Megara*, and lying the one at a Victuallers, the other in an Inne; he in the Inne while he was asleep dream'd that his Fellow-traveller earnestly desired him to come and help him, as being assaulted by the Victualler, and in danger to be killed by him: But he, after he was perfectly awake, finding it but a Dream, neglected it. But faine asleep again, his murdered friend appeared to him the second time, beseeching him, that though he did not help him alive, yet he would see his Death revenged; telling him how the Victualler had cast his Body into a Dung-cart, and that if he would get up timely in the morning, and watch at the Town-gate, he might thereby discover the murder: which he did accordingly, and so saw Justice done on the Murderer. Nor does the first Dream make the second impertinent to our purpose: For as that might be from the strength of Imagination, and desire of help in the distressed *Arcadian*,
impressed

impressed on the *Spirit of the World*, and so transmitted to his friend asleep (a condition fittest for such communications;) so it is plain that this after his Death must fail, if his Soul did either cease to be or to act. And therefore it is manifest that she both was and did act, and suggested this Dream in revenge of the Murder. Of which kinde there be infinite examples, I mean of Murders discovered by Dreams, the Soul of the person murdered seeming to appear to some or other asleep, and to make his complaint to them. But I will content my self onely to adde an Example of *Gratitude* to this of *Revenge*. As that of *Simonides*, who lighting by chance on a dead Body by the Sea side, and out of the sense of Humanity bestowing Burial upon it, was requited with a Dream that saved his life. For he was admonisht to desist from his Voyage he intended by Sea, which the Soul of the deceased told him would be so perillous, that it would hazard the lives of the Passengers. He believed the Vision, and abstaining was safe: those others that went suffered Shipwrack.

2. We will adjoyn onely an Example or two of that other kind of *Visions*, which are ordinarily called the Apparitions of the dead. And such is that which *Pliny* relates at large

in his Epistle to *Sura*, of an house haunted at *Athens*, and freed by *Athenodorus* the Philosopher, after the Body of that person that appeared to him was digged up, and interred with due solemnity. It is not a thing unlikely, that most houses that are haunted, are so chiefly from the Soules of the deceased; who have either been murdered, or some way injured, or have some hid treasure to discover, or the like. And persons are haunted for the like causes, as well as houses; as *Nero* was after the murdering of his Mother; *Otho* pull'd out of his bed in the night by the Ghost of *Galba*. Such instances are infinite: as also those wherein the Soule of ones friend, suppose Father, Mother, or Husband, have appeared to give them good counsell, and to instruct them of the event of the greatest affairs of their life. The Ghosts also of deceased Lovers have been reported to adhere to their Paramours, after they had left their Bodies; taking all opportunities to meet them in Solitude, whether by day or by night.

3. There be also other more fortuitous occurrsions of these deceased Spirits; of which one can give no account, unless it be, because they find themselves in a more easy capacity to appear. As haply it may be

in Fields after great slaughters of Armies, and in publick Buriall-places. Though some would ridiculously put off these Apparitions, by making them nothing but the reek or vapour of the Bodies of the dead, which they fancy will fall into the like stature and shape with the man it comes from: Which yet *Cardan* playes the fool in as well as *Vanninus* and others; as he does also in his account of those *Spectra* that appear so ordinarily in *Iseland*, where the Inhabitants meet their deceased friends in so lively an Image, that they salute them and embrace them for the same persons; not knowing of their death, unless by their suddain disappearing, or by after-information that they were then dead. This he imputes partly to the *Thicknes* of the Aire, and partly to the foule food and gross spirits of the *Islanders*; and yet implies, that their fancies are so strong, as to convert the thick vaporous aire into the compleat shape of their absent and deceased acquaintance, and so perswade themselves that they see them, and talk with them, whenas it is nothing else but an airy Image made by the power of their own Fancy. But certainly it had been better flatly to have denied the Narration, then to give so slight and unprobable reason of the *Phanomenon*.

4 That the *Spissitude* of the Aire in that place may contribute something to the frequency of these *Spectra*, is rationally enough. For it being more thick, it is the more easily reduced to a visible consistency: but must be shaped, not by the fancy of the Spectatour, (for that were a monstrous power) but by the Imagination of the Spirit that actuates its own Vehicle of that gross Aire. For the same reason also in other places these Apparitions haply appear oftner in the Night then in the Day, the Aire being more clammy and thick after the Sun has been some while down then before. To which also that custome of the *Lappians*, a people of *Scandia*, seems something to agree; who, as *Casspar Peucerus* relates, are very much haunted with Apparitions of their deceased friends. For which trouble they have no remedy but burying them under their Hearth. Which Ceremony can have no naturall influence upon these *Lemures*, unless they should hereby be engaged to keep in a warmer aire, & consequently more rarified, then if they were interred elsewhere. Or rather because their Bodies will sooner putrify by the warmth of the hearth, whenas otherwise the coldness of that Clime would permit them to be sound a longer time, and consequently be fit for the Souls of the de-

ceased to have recourse to and replenish their Vehicle with such a *Cambium* or glutinous moisture, as will make it far easier to be commanded into a *visible consistence*.

5. That this facilitates their condition of *appearing*, is evident from that known recourse these infestant Spirits have to their dead Bodies. As is notorious in the History of *Cuntius*, which I have set down at large in my *Antidote*, Lib. 3. Cap. 9. and of the *Silesian* Shoemaker and his Maid in the foregoing Chapter. To which you may add what *Agrippa* writes out of the *Cretian Annals*, How there the *Catechanes*, that is the *Spirits* of the deceased Husbands, would be very troublesome to their Wives, & endeavour to lye with them, while they could have any recourse to their dead Bodies. Which mischief therefore was prevented by a Law, that if any Woman was thus infested, the Body of her Husband should be burnt, and his Heart struck through with a stake. Which also put a speedy end to those stirs and tragedies the Ghost of *Cuntius* and those others caused at *Pentsch* and *Breslau* in *Silesia*. The like disquietnesses are reported to have hapned in the year 1567. at *Trawtenaw* a city of *Bohemia*, by one *Stephanus Hubener*, who was to admiration grown rich, as *Cuntius* of *Pentsch*, and when he

he died, did as much mischief to his fellow-Citizens. For he would ordinarily appear in the very shape he was when he was alive, and such as he met, would salute them with so close embraces, that he caused many to fall sick and several to die by the unkinde huggs he gave them. But burning his Body rid the Town of the perilous occurrences of this malicious Goblin. All which instances doe prove not onely the *appearing* of Souls after they have left this life, but also that some thickning Matter, such as may be got either from Bodies alive, or lately dead, or as fresh as those that are but newly dead (as the Body of this *Hubener* was, though it had lyen 20 weeks in the Grave,) or lastly from thick vaporous Air, may facilitate much their appearing, and so invite them to play tricks, when they can doe it at so cheap a rate; though they have little or no end in doing them, but the pleasing of their own, either ludicrous, or boisterous and domineering, humour.

6. But of any private person that ever appeared upon design after his death, there is none did upon a more noble one then that eximious Platonist *Marfilus Ficinus*; who having, as *Baronius* relates, made a solemn vow with his fellow-Platonist *Michael Mercatus* (after they had been pretty warmly

disputing of the Immortality of the Soul, out of the Principles of their Master *Plato* that whether of them two died first should appear to his friend, and give him certain information of that Truth; (it being *Fici-nus* his fate to die first, and indeed not long after this mutual resolution) he was mindful of his promise when he had left the Body. For *Michael Mercatus* being very intent at his Studies betimes on a morning, heard an horse riding by with all speed, and observed that he stopped at his window, and therewith heard the voice of his friend *Fici-nus* crying out aloud, *O Michael, Michael, vera, vera sunt illa*. Whereupon he suddenly opened the window, and espying *Marsilius* on a white Steed, called after him; but he vanish in his sight. He sent therefore presently to *Florence* to know how *Marsilius* did; and understood that he died about that hour he called at his window, to assure him of his own and other mens Immortalities.

7. The Examples I have produced of the appearing of the Souls of men after death, considering how clearly I have demonstrated the separability of them from the Body, and their capacity of Vital Union with an airy Vehicle, cannot but have their due weight of Argument with them that are unprejudiced. But as for those that have their
minds

minds enveloped in the dark mist of Atheism, that lazy and Melancholy saying which has dropt from the careless pen of that uncertain Writer *Cardan*, *Orbis magnus est, & ævum longum, & error ac timor multum in hominibus possunt*, will prevail more with them then all the Stories the same Authour writes of *Apparitions*, or whatever any one else can adde unto them. And others that doe admit of these things, præconceptions from Education, That the Soul when she departs this life, is suddenly either twitched up into the *Cælum Empyreum*, or hurried down headlong towards the Centre of the Earth, makes the Apparitions of the Ghosts of men altogether incredible to them; they always substituting in their place some Angel or Devil which must represent their persons, themselves being not at leisure to act any such part.

8. But *Misconceit* and *Prejudice*, though it may hinder the force of an Argument with those that are in that manner *entangled*, yet *Reason* cannot but take place with them that are *free*. To whom I dare appeal whether (considering the aerial Vehicles of Souls which are common to them with other *Genii*, so that whatever they are fancied to doe in their stead, they may perform themselves; as also how congruous

it is, that those persons that are most concerned, when it is in their power, should act in their own affairs, as in detecting the Murderer, in disposing their estate, in rebuking injurious Executors, in visiting and counselling their Wives and Children, in forewarning them of such and such courses, with other matters of like sort; to which you may adde the profession of the Spirit thus appearing, of being the Soul of such an one, as also the similitude of person; and that all this adoe is in things very just and serious, unfit for a Devil with that care and kindness to promote, and as unfit for a good *Genius*, it being below so noble a nature to tell a Lie, especially when the affair may be as effectually transacted without it;) I say, I dare appeal to any one, whether all these things put together and rightly weighed, the violence of prejudice not pulling down the ballance, it will not be certainly carried for the present cause; and whether any indifferent Judge ought not to conclude, if these Stories that are so frequent every where and in all Ages concerning the Ghosts of men appearing be but true, that it is true also that it is their Ghosts, and that therefore the Souls of men subsist and act after they have left these earthly Bodies.

CHAP. XVII.

1. *The preeminence of Arguments drawn from Reason above those from Story.* 2. *The first step toward a Demonstration of Reason that the Soul acts out of her Body, for that she is an immaterial Substance separable therefrom.* 3. *The second, That the immediate instruments for Sense, Motion, and Organization of the Body, are certain subtile and tenuious Spirits.* 4. *A comparison betwixt the Soul in the Body and the Aereal Genii.* 5. *Of the nature of Dæmons from the account of Marcus the Eremite, and how the Soul is presently such, having once left this Body.* 6. *An Objection concerning the Souls of Brutes : to which is answered, First by way of concession ;* 7. *Secondly, by confuting the Arguments for the former concession.* 8. *That there is no rational doubt at all of the Humane Soul acting after death.* 9. *A further Argument of her activity out of this Body, from her conflicts with it while she is in it.* 10. *As also from the general hope and belief of all Nations, that they shall live after death.*

1. **B**UT we proceed now to what is less subject to the evasions and misinterpretations of either the *Profane* or *Superstitious*.

stitutions. For none but such as will profess themselves meer Brutes can cast off the Decrees and Conclusions of Philosophy and Reason; though they think that in things of this nature they may, with a great deal of applause and credit, refuse the testimony of other mens senses if not of their own: all *Apparitions* being with them nothing but the strong surprisals of *Melancholy* and *Imagination*. But they cannot with that ease nor credit silence the Deductions of Reason, by saying it is but a *Fallacy*, unless they can shew the Sophisme: which they cannot doe, where it is not.

2. To carry on therefore our present Argument in a rational way, and by degrees; we are first to consider, That (according as already has been clearly demonstrated) there is a Substance in us which is ordinarily called *the Soul*, really distinct from the Body, (for otherwise how can it be a Substance?) And therefore it is really and locally separable from the Body. Which is a very considerable step towards what we aim at.

3. In the next place we are to take notice, That the immediate Instrument of the Soul are those tenuious and aerial particles which they ordinarily call the *Spirits*; that these are they by which the Soul hears, sees, feels, imagines, remembers, reasons,
and

and by moving which, or at least directing their motion, she moves likewise the Body; and by using them, or some subtile Matter like them, she either compleats, or at least contributes to the Bodies Organization. For that the Soul should be the *Vital Architect* of her own house, that close connexion and sure possession she is to have of it, distinct and secure from the invasion of any other particular Soul, seems no slight Argument. And yet that while she is exercising that Faculty, she may have a more then ordinary Union or Implication with the Spirit of Nature, or the Soul of the World, so far forth as it is *Plastick*, seems not unreasonable: and therefore is asserted by *Plotinus*; and may justly be suspected to be true, if we attend to the prodigious effects of the Mothers Imagination derived upon the Infant, which sometimes are so very great, that, unless she raised the *Spirit of Nature* into consent, they might well seem to exceed the power of any Cause. I shall abstain from producing any Examples till the proper place: in the mean time I hope I may be excused from any rashness in this assignation of the cause of those many and various Signatures found in Nature, so plainly pointing at such a Principle in the World as I have intimated before.

4. But to return, and cast our eye upon the Subject in hand. It appears from the two precedent Conclusions, that the Soul considered as invested immediately with this tenuious Matter we speak of, which is her inward Vehicle, has very little more difference from the *aereal Genii*, then a man in a Prison from one that is free. The one can only see, and suck air through the Grates of the Prison, and must be annoyed with all the stench and unwholsome fumes of that sad habitation; whereas the other may walk and take the fresh air, where he finds it most commodious and agreeable. This difference there is betwixt the *Genii* and an *incorporated Soul*. The Soul, as a man fallen into a deep pit, (who can have no better Water, nor Air, nor no longer enjoyment of the Sun, and his chearful light and warmth, then the measure and quality of the pit will permit him) so she once immured in the Body cannot enjoy any better Spirits (in which all her life and comfort consists) then the constitution of the Body after such circuits of concoction can administer to her. But those *Genii* of the Aire, who possess their Vehicles upon no such hard terms, if themselves be not in fault, may by the power of their minds accommodate themselves with more pure and impolluted Matter, and
such

such as will more easily conspire with the noblest and divinest functions of their Spirit. In brief therefore, if we consider things aright, we cannot abstain from strongly surmising, that there is no more difference betwixt a Soule and an æreal *Genius*, then there is betwixt a Sword in the scabbard and one out of it: and that a Soule is but a *Genius* in the Body, and a *Genius* a Soule out of the Body; as the Antients also have defined, giving the same name, as well as nature, promiscuously to them both, by calling them both *Δαίμονες*, as I have elsewhere noted.

5. This is very consonant to what *Michael Psellus* sets down, from the singular knowledge and experience of *Marcus* the Eremite, in these matters; who describes the nature of these *Δαίμονες*, as being throughout Spirit and Aire; whence they heare and see and feel in every part of their Body. Which he makes good by this reason, and wonders at the ignorance of men that doe not take notice of it, viz. τὸ μὴ ὅτι πῶς ὁσούν ἢ νεῦρον ἢ τὸ αἰδανόμερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τέτοις ἐνυπάρχον πνεῦμα, that it is neither Bones, nor Nerves, nor any gross or visible part of the Body, or of any Organ thereof, whereby the Soule immediately exercises the functions of Sense, but that it is the Spirits that are her nearest and inmost instrument
of

of these operations : Of which when the Body is deprived, there is found no Sense in it, though the gross Organs and parts are in their usuall consistency, as we see in *Syn-copes* and *Apoplexies*. Which plainly shewes, that the immediate Vehicle of Life are the Spirits; and that the Soules connexion with the Body is by these; as the most learned Physicians doe conclude with one consent. Whence it will follow, that this *Vinculum* being broke, the Soule will be free from the Body, and will as naturally be carried out of the corrupt carkass that now has no harmony with the Soule, into that Element that is more congenerous to her, the vital Aire, as the Fire will mount upwards; as I have already noted. And so Principles of Life being fully kindled in this thinner Vehicle, she becomes as compleat for Sense and Action as any other Inhabitants of these airy regions.

6. There is onely one perverse Objection against this so easy and naturall Conclusion, which is this; That by this manner of reasoning, the Soules of Brutes, especially those of the perfecter sort, will also not onely subsist, (for that difficulty is concocted pretty well already) but also live and enjoy themselves after death. To which I dare boldly answer, That it is a thousand

times

times more reasonable that they doe, then that the Soules of Men doe not. Yet I will not confidently assert, that they doe, or doe not; but will lightly examine each Hypothesis. And first, by way of feigned concession, we will say, They doe; and take notice of the Reasons that may induce one to think so. Amongst which two prime ones are those involved in the Objection, That they doe subsist after death; and, That the immediate instrument of their Vitall Functions is their Spirits, as well as in Man. To which we may adde, That for the present we are fellow-inhabitants of one and the same Element, the Earth, subject to the same fate of Fire, Deluges and Earthquakes. That it is improbable, that the vast space of Aire and Æther, that must be inhabited by living creatures, should have none but of one sort, that is the Angels or *Genii*, good or bad. For it would seem as great a solitude, as if Men alone were the Inhabitants of the Earth, or Mermaids of the Sea. That the periods of vitall congruity, wound up in the Nature of their Soules, by that eternall Wisdome that is the Creatress of all things, may be shorter or longer, according as the property of their essence and relation to the Universe requires; and that so their Descents and Returns may be accordingly swifter or slower.

flower. That it is more conformable to the Divine goodness to be so then otherwise, if their natures will permit it: And that their existence would be in vain, while they were deprived of vital operation when they may conveniently have it. That they would be no more capable of Salvation in the other state, then they are here of Conversion. That the intellectual Inhabitants of the Aire having also externall and corporeall Sense, variety of Objects would doe as well there, as here amongst us on Earth. Besides that Historyes seem to imply, as if there were such kind of aerial Animals amongst them, as Dogs, Horses, and the like. And therefore to be short, that the Soules of Brutes cease to be alive after they are separate from this Body, can have no other reason, than *Immortality* the Mother of *Ignorance*, (that is, nothing but narrowness of spirit, out of over-much self-love, and contempt of other Creatures) to embolden us so confidently to adhere to so groundless a Conclusion.

7. This Position makes indeed a plausible shew, infomuch that if the Objection drove one to acknowledge it for Truth, he might seem to have very little reason to be ashamed of it. But this Controversy is not so easily decided. For though it be plain that the Soules of Beasts be Substances really

really separable from their Bodies; yet if they have but one Vital congruity, namely the *Terrestriall* one, they cannot recover life in the Aire. But their having one or two, or more Vital congruities, wholly depends upon his wisdom & counsel that has made all things. Besides, the Souls of Brutes seem to have a more passive nature, then to be able to manage or enjoy this escape of Death, that free and commanding Imagination belonging onely to us, as also Reminiscency. But Brutes have onely a passive Imagination, and bare Memory; which failing them in all likelyhood in the shipwrack of their Body, if they could live in the Aire, they would begin the World perfectly on a new score, which is little better then Death: so that they might in this sense be rightly deemed mortall. Our being Co-inhabitants of the same element, the Earth, proves nothing: for by the same reason, Worms and Fleas should live out of their Bodies, and Fishes should not, who notwithstanding, their shape, it may be, a little changed (for there is no necessity that these creatures in their airy Vehicles should be exactly like themselves in their terrestriall ones) might act and live in the more moist tracts of the Aire. As for the supposed solitude that would be in the Aire, it reaches

not this Matter. For in the lower Regions thereof, the various Objects of the Earth and Sea will serve the turn. The winding up of those severall circuits of vitall congruity may indeed pass for an ingenious invention, as of a thing possible in the Soules of Brutes: but, as the Schools say well, *A posse ad esse non valet consequentia*. As for that Argument from *Divine Goodness*, it not excluding his Wisdom which attempers it self to the natures of things, & we not knowing the nature of the Soules of Brutes so perfectly as we doe our own, we cannot so easily be assured from thence what will be in this case. A Musitian strikes not all strings at once; neither is it to be expected that every thing in Nature at every time should act: but when it is its turn, then touched upon it will give its sound; in the interim it lies silent. And so it may be with the Soules of Brutes for a time, especially when the vitall temper of Earth and Aire and Sea shall fail; yea and at other times too, if none but Intellectual Spirits be fit to manage *Aerial Vehicles*. I confess indeed, that Salvation can no more belong to the Soules of Brutes then Conversion; but that is as true of the Soules of Plants, (if they have any distinct from the *Universall Spirit of Nature*) but yet it does not prove that the Soules of Vegetables

Vegetables shall live and act in Aiery Vehicles, after an Herbe or Tree is dead and rotten here. To that of conveniency of variety of Objects for the aiery Inhabitants I have answered already. And for the Apparitions of Horses, Doggs and the like, they may be the transformation of the aerial *Genii* into these shapes: Which though it be a sign that they would not abhor from the use and society of such aeriall Animals, if they had them; yet they may the better want them, they being able so well themselves to supply their places. We will briefly therefore conclude, that from the meer light of Reason it cannot be infallibly demonstrated, that the Soules of Brutes doe not live after death, nor that it is any Incongruity in Nature to say they do. Which is sufficient to enervate the present Objection.

8. But for the life and activity of the Soules of Men out of this Body, all things goe on hand-smooth for it, without any check or stop. For we finding the aerial *Genii* so exceeding near-a-kin to us in their Faculties, we being both *intellectuall Creatures*, and both using the same immediate instrument of Sense and Perception, to wit, *aeriall Spirits*, insomuch that we can scarce discover any other difference betwixt us

then there is betwixt a man that is naked and one clad in gross thick cloathing; it is the most easy and naturall inference that can be, to conclude, that when we are separate from the Body, and are invested onely in Aire, that we shall be just like them, and have the same life and activity they have. For though a Brute fall short of this Priviledge, it ought to be no disheartning to us, because there is a greater cognation betwixt the *Intellectual* Faculties and the *aery* or *athereal* Vehicle, then there is betwixt such Vehicles and those more low and sensuall powers common to us with Beasts. And we finde, in taking the fresh aire, that the more fine and pure our Spirits are, our thoughts become the more noble & divine, and the more purely intellectuall. Nor is the step greater upwards then downwards: For seeing that what in us is so Divine and Angelicall may be united with the body of a Brute, (for such is this Earthly cloathing) why may not the Soule, notwithstanding her terrestriall Congruity of life, (which upon new occasions may be easily conceived to surcease from acting) be united with the Vehicle of an Angel? So that there is no puzzle at all concerning the Soul of Man, but that immediately upon Death she may associate her self with those aeriall Inhabitants, the *Genii* or *Angels*.

9. Which we may still be the better assured of, if we consider how we have such *Faculties* in us, as the *Soul* finds hopped and fettered, clouded and obscured by her fatal residence in this prison of the *Body*. In so much that, so far as it is lawful, she falls out with it for those incommodations that the most confirmed brutish health brings usually upon her. How her Will tugs against the impurity of the *Spirits* that stir up bestial Passions, (that are notwithstanding the height and flower of other *Creatures* enjoyments) and how many times her whole life upon *Earth* is nothing else but a perpetual warfare against the results of her union with this lump of *Earth* that is so much like to other terrestrial *Animals*. Whence it is plain she finds her self in a wrong condition, and that she was created for a better and purer state; which she could not attain to, unless she lived out of the *Body*: which she does in some sort in divine *Ecstasies* and *Dreams*; in which case she making no use of the *Bodies* *Organs*, but of the purer *Spirits* in the fourth *Ventricle* of the *Brain*, she acts as it were by her self, and performs some preludious Exercises, conformable to those in her airy *Vehicle*.

10. Adde unto all this, that the *Immortality* of the *Soul* is the common, and there-

fore naturall, hope and expectation of all Nations; there being very few so barbarous as not to hold it for a Truth: though, it may be, as in other things, they may be something ridiculous in the manner of expressing themselves about it; as that they shall retire after Death to such a Grove or Wood, or beyond such a Hill, or unto such an Island, such as was $\Delta\epsilon\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ Aximius , the Island where *Achilles* Ghost was conceived to wander, or the *Insula Fortunata*, the noted *Elysium* of the Ancients. And yet, it may be, if we should tell these of the *Caelum Empyreum*, and compute the height of it, and distance from the Earth, and how many solid Orbs must be glided through before a Soul can come thither; these simple Barbarians would think as oddly of the *Scholastic* Opinion as we do of theirs: and it may be some more judicious and sagacious Wit will laugh at us both alike. It is sufficient, that in the main all Nations in a manner are agreed that there is an *Immortality* to be expected, as well as that there is a *Deity* to be worshipped; though ignorance of circumstances makes Religion vary, even to Monstrosity, in many parts of the world. But both Religion, and the belief of the Reward of it, which is a blessed state after Death, being so generally acknowledged by all the Inhabitants

bitants of the Earth; it is a plain Argument that it is true according to the Light of Nature. And not onely because they believe so, but because they do so seriously either desire it, or are so horribly afraid of it, if they offend much against their Consciences: which properties would not be in men so universally, if there were no Objects in Nature answering to these Faculties, as I have elswhere argued in the like case.

CHAP. XVIII.

1. That the Faculties of our Souls, and the nature of the immediate instrument of them, the Spirits, doe so nearly symbolize with those of Demons, that it seems reasonable, if God did not on purpose hinder it, that they would not fail to act out of this earthly Body. 2. Or if they would, his power and wisdom could easily implant in their essence a double or triple Vital Congruity, to make all sure. 3. A farther demonstration of the present Truth from the Veracity of God. 4. An Answer to an Objection against the foregoing Argument. 5. Another Demonstration from His Justice. 6. An Answer to an Objection. 7. An

Answer to another Objection. 8. *Another Argument from the Justice of God.* 9. *An Objection answered.* 10. *An invincible Demonstration of the Souls Immortality from the Divine Goodness.* 11. *A more particular enforcement of that Argument, and who they are upon whom it will work least.* 12. *That the noblest and most vertuous Spirit is the most assurable of the Souls Immortality.*

1. **B**UT finally, to make all sure, let us contemplate the Nature of God, who is the Author and Maker of all things, according to whose Goodness, Wisdome and Power all things were created, and are ever ordered; and let us take special notice how many steps towards this Immortality we now treat of, are impressed upon the very nature of the Soule already, and then seriously consider, if it be possible that the *Sovereign Deity* should stop there, and goe no further, when there are so great reasons, if we understand any thing, that He perfect our expectations. For we have already clearly demonstrated, That the Soul of man is a Substance actually separable from the Body, and that all her Operations & Functions are immediately performed, not by those parts of the Body that are of an earthly and gross

confi-

consistency, but by what is more aeriall or
 ethereall, the *Vitall* and *Animall Spirits*;
 which are very congenerous to the Vehi-
 cles of the Angels or *Genii*. Insomuch that
 if the Divine power did but leave Nature
 to work of it self, it might seem very strange,
 considering those Divine and Intellectuall
 Faculties in us, (as conformable to the essen-
 ces or Soules of Angels as our Animal Spi-
 rits are to their Vehicles) if it would not
 be an immediate sequel of this Priviledge,
 that our Soules, once separate from the Bo-
 dy, should act and inform the Aire they are
 in with like facility that other *Genii* doe;
 there being so very little difference betwixt
 both their natures.

2. Or if one single *Plastick* power, in a
 Subject so near a-kin to these aeriall people,
 will not necessarily suffice for both states,
 certainly it must be a very little addition
 that will help out: and how easy is it for
 that Eternall Wisdome to contrive a double
 or triple Vitall Congruity, to wit, *aeriall*
 and *athereal*, as well as *terrestrial*, in such
 an Essence, whose Faculties and properties
 doe so plainly symbolize with those purer
 Inhabitants of both the *Aether* and *Aire*?

3. But this is not all we have to say. For
 if there be one thing more precious in
 the Deity then another, we shall have it all

as

as a sure and infallible pledge of this present Truth, *That our Souls will not fail to prove Immortal.* And for my own part, I know nothing more precious in the Godhead than his *Veracity, Justice and Goodness*; and all these three will assure us and secure us, that we shall sustain no loss or damage by our departure out of these Earthly Bodies, in either Life or Essence. For it were a very high reproach to that Attribute of God which we call his *Veracity*, he so plainly and universally promising to all the Nations of the World, where there is any Religion at all, a happy state after this life; if there should in reality be no such thing to be expected. For he does not onely connive at the Error, if it be one, by not declaring himself against it, (as any upright person would, if another should take upon him, in his presence or hearing, to tell others that he intended to bestow such and such gifts and revenues upon them, when there was no such matter:) but he has, as a man may say, on set purpose indued men with extraordinary parts and powers, to set this Opinion on foot in the Earth; all *Prophets and Workers of Miracles* that have appeared in the world, having one way or other assured to Man-kind this so weighty Truth. And the most Noble & Vertuous Spirits in all Ages have

have been the most prone to believe it, And this not onely out of a sense of their own Interest; but any one that ever had the happiness to experience these things, may observe, That that Clearness & Purity of temper that most consists with the Love and admiration of God and Vertue, and all those divine Accomplishments that even those that never could attain to them give their highest approbation of, I say, that this more refined temper of Minde does, of it self beget a wonderful proneness, if not a necessity, of presuming of the Truth of this Opinion we plead for. And therefore if it be not true, God has laid a train in Nature, that the most vertuous and pious men shall be the most sure to be deceived: Which is a contradiction to his Attribute of *Veracity*.

4 Nor can the strength of this Argument be evaded by replying, that God may deceive men for their good, as Parents doe their Children; and therefore His *Wisdom* may contrive such a naturall Error as this, to be serviceable for States and Politicks, to keep the people in awe, and so render them more faithfull and governable. I must confess that there does result from this divine Truth such an usefulness, by the by, for the better holding together of Common-weals; but to think that this is the main use thereof,

of; and that there is nothing more in it then so, is as Idioticall and Childish, as to conclude, that because the Stars, those vast lights, doe some small offices for us by Night, that therefore that is all the meaning of them, and that they serve for nothing else. Besides, there is no Father would tell a Lye to his Child, if he were furnisht with truth as effectual for his purpose; and if he told any thing really good, as well as desirable, to his Childe, to induce him to Obedience, if it lay in his power, he would be sure to perform his promise. But it is in the power of God to make good whatever he has propounded for reward; nor need he make use of any falshood in this matter. Wherefore if he doe, he has less *Veracity* then an ordinary honest man; which is *blasphemous*, and *contradictious* to the nature of the Deity.

5. Again upon point of *Justice*, God was engaged to contrive the Nature and Order of things so, that the Soules of Men may live after death, and that they may fare according to their behaviour here upon earth. For the Godhead, as the Philosopher calls him, is *Νόμος ἰσοκλινης*, and does immutably and inevitably distribute Justice, both Reward and Punishment, in the world. But how difficult a thing

It is to be good and to live according to Vertue, the common practise and complaint of all men doe confesse with one consent; and that it is exceeding hard to perswade any one to doe that violence to their own natures, as to endeavour after a due degree and right sense of Vertue (for Craft and Policy are easy enough, and other things there are that, set against the contrary Vices, look like Vertues, but are not:) But to perswade to those that truly are, is, I say, exceeding hard, if not impossible, without the inculcation of this grand concernment, the State of the Soule after Death, and the Reward that will then follow a Vertuous life. Of which hopes if we be frustrated by the Soules Mortality, we are defrauded of our Reward, and God of the honour of *Justice*.

6. Nor can the force of this Argument be enervated by either that high pretension of *Stoicisme*, That Vertue to it self is a sufficient reward; or that the very hopes of this Immortality, it being accompanied with so much joy, tranquillity and contentment, will countervail all the pain and trouble of either acquiring, or keeping close to Vertue once acquired. For as for the first, It is one thing to talk high, and another thing to practise. And for my own part, I think
in

in the main, that *Epicurus*, who placed the chiefest good in Pleasure, Philosophized more solidly then the paradoxical *Stoicks*. For questionless that is that which all men ought to drive at, if they had the true notion of it, and knew wherein to place it, or could arrive to the purest and most warrantable sense of it. But there can be no *Pleasure*, (without a perfect Miracle) while our Spirits are disturbed and vitiated by sordid and contemptible Poverty, by Imprisonments, Sickneses, Tortures, ill Diet, and a number of such Adversities, that those that are the most exactly vertuous have been in all Ages most lyable to. Besides the care and sollicitude of perpetually standing upon their guard, the stings of Calumny and Defamation, and a continuall vexation to see the baseness and vileness of mens tempers, and ugly oblique transactions of affairs in the world. Which inquietudes cannot be avoided by any other remedy but what is as ill as the disease, or worse, it being altogether incompetible to a true *Heroicall* tenour of minde; I mean their *Stoical Apathy*; of which the best that can be said is, that it is a kind of constant and safe piece of fullness, stating us onely in the condition of those that are said to have neither wone nor lost: So poor a reward is persecuted

ted and distressed Vertue of it self, without the hope of future Happines.

7. But to say, the Hope thereof without Enjoyment is a sufficient compensation, is like that mockery *Plutarch* records of *Dionysius* towards a Fidler, whom he caused to play before him, promising him a reward; but when he demanded it of him for his pains, denied it him, or rather said it was paid already, putting him off with this jest, *Οὐκ ἔχοντες εὐφραίνεσθαι ἄδων, ποῦτον ἔχαipes ἰσχυρῶν*, i. e. *So long as you pleased me with playing, so long you rejoyced your self with hoping after the reward; so that you are sufficiently paid already.* Which piece of injurious mirth may be passable in a ludicrous matter, and from a Tyrant, where height of Fortune makes proud and forgetful Mortality contemn their inferiours: But in a thing of this nature, that concerns not onely this transient life, but the sempiternal duration of the Soul, Injustice there is unspeakably grievous; and so much the more harsh and uncomely, if we consider that it is supposed to be committed, not by a frail earthly Potentate, (the height of whose Honours may make him regardless of smaller affairs and meaner persons,) but by the God of Heaven, who can with the like ease attend all things as he can any one thing; and who

is

is perfectly and immutably just, not doing nor omitting any thing by changeable humours, as it happens in vain Men, but ever acting according to the transcendent Excellency and Holiness of his own Nature.

8. Neither is *Divine Justice* engaged only to reward, but also to punish; which cannot be, unless the Souls of men subsist after Death. For there are questionless many thousands that have committed most enormous Villanies, persecuted the Good, taking away their possessions, liberties, or lives; adding sometimes most barbarous tortures and reproachful abuses; and in all this highly gratified their covetousness, ambition and revenge; nay, it may be the bestial ferocity of their own spirits, that have pleased themselves exceedingly to bring the truly religious into disgrace, and have laughed at all vertuous actions as the fruits of Ignorance and Folly; and yet for all this have died in peace on their beds, after their lives have been as thick set with all sensual enjoyments of Honour, Riches and Pleasure, as their Story is with Frauds, Rapines, Murders, Sacriledges, and whatever crimes the impious boldness of lawless persons will venture on.

9. Such things as these happen proportionably through all the ranks and orders

of

of men. Nor is it sufficient to reply that their own Consciences, as so many Furies, do lash them and scorch them in this life: For we speak of inveterate and successful wickedness, where that Principle is utterly laid asleep; or if it at any time wake and cry, the noise of the affairs of the world, and hurry of business, and continual visits of friends and flatterers, false instructions of covetous Priests or mercenary Philosophers (who for gain will impudently corrupt and pervert both the Light of Nature and Sense of Religion) the sound and clatter of these, I say, will so possess the ear of the prosperously wicked, that the voice of conscience can be no more heard in this continual tumult, then the vagient cries of the Infant *Jupiter* amidst the rude shuffles and dancings of the *Cretick Corybantes*, and the tinkling and clashing of their brazen Targers. And therefore if there be no Life hereafter, the worst of men have the greatest share of happiness, their passions and affections being so continually gratified, and that to the height, in those things that are so agreeable, and, rightly circumstantiated, allowable to humane Nature: such as are the sweet reflection on the success of our political management of the affairs of the World; the general tribute of Honour and

respect for our Policy and Wit, and that ample testimony thereof, our acquisitions of Power or Riches; that great satisfaction of foiling and bearing down our Enemies, and obliging and making sure our more serviceable Friends; to which finally you may adde all the variety of Mirth and Pastime that flesh and blood 'can entertain it self with, from either *Musick, Wine, or Women*.

10. Thirdly and lastly, the Mortality of the Soul is not onely inconsistent with the *Veracity* and *Justice* of God, but also with his *Goodness*, the most soveraign and sacred Attribute in the Deity, and which alone is enough to demonstrate, That the Soul of man cannot perish in Death. For suppose that God had made no promise to us, either by any extraordinary Prophet, or by the suggestion of our own natural Faculties, that we shall be Immortal, and that there was neither Merit nor Demerit in this life, so that all plea from either the Divine *Veracity* or *Justice* were quite cut off; his *Goodness* alone (especially if we consider how capable the Soul is of after-subsistence) is a sufficient assurance that we shall not fail to live after Death. For how can that soveraign *Goodness*, assisted by an omnipotent Knowledge, fail to contrive it so; it being so infinitely more conformable to his Transcendent Bounty,


to ordain thus then otherwise? that is to say, so soon as he created the World, to make it so compleat, as at once to bring in- to Being not onely all Corporeal Substance (according as all men confess he did) but also all Substances *Immaterial* or *Incorporeal*, and as many of them as can partake of Life, and of enjoyment of themselves and the Universe, to set them upon living and working in all places and Elements that their Nature is able to operate in; and therefore amongst other Beings of the Intellectual Order, that the Souls of men also, whereever they were, or ever should be, especially if it were not long of themselves, should have a power of Life and Motion, and that no other *Nemesis* should follow them then what they themselves lay the trains of; nor this to utter annihilation, but by way of chastisement or punishment; and that they being of so multifarious a nature, as to have such Faculties as are nearly a-kin to Brutes, as well as such as have so close an affinity with those of the aerial *Genii* and celestial Angels, that their *Vital Congruity* should be as multifarious, and themselves made capable of a living Union with either *Celestial*, *Aerial*, or *Terrestrial* Vehicles; and that the leaving of one should be but the taking up of another,

so long as the Elements continue in their natural temper, and as soon as the Laws of Generation will permit.

11. These, and a long series of other things consonant to these, represent themselves to their view that have the favour of beholding the more hidden treasures of the *Divine Benignity*. But they being more than the present occasion requires, I shall content my self with what precisely touches the matter in hand, which is, That the Soul of Man being capable to act after this life in an *Aerial Vehicle*, as well as here in an *Earthly*; and it being better that she do live and act, then that she be idle and silent in death; and it depending meerly upon the Will of God whether she shall or no; He ordering the natures of things infallibly according to what is best, must of necessity ordain that the Souls of men live and act after death. This is an unavoidable Deduction of Reason to those that acknowledge the Being of God, and rightly relish that transcendent Attribute in the Divine Nature. For those that have a true sense thereof, can as hardly deny this Conclusion as the Existence of the Deity. Nor can they ever be persuaded, that He who is so perfectly good in himself, and to whom they have so long adhered in faithful obedience and amorous devotion,

devotion, has made them of such a nature, that when they hope most to enjoy him, they shall not be able to enjoy him at all, nor any thing else; as not being in a capacity to act but in an earthly Body. But to those that be of a meer animal temper, that relish no love but that of themselves and their own interest, nor care for any but those that are serviceable to them, and make for their profit, these being prone to judge of God according to the vile-ness of their own Spirit, will easily conceit, that Gods care of us and tenderness over us is onely proportionable to the fruit he reaps by us; which is just none at all.

12. And therefore this Argument especially, and also the two former, though they be undeniable Demonstrations in themselves, yet they requiring a due resentment of Morality, that is of *Veracity*, *Justice* and *Goodness*, in him that is to be perswaded by them; it will follow, that those whose minds are most blinded and debased by Vice, will feel least the force of them; and the *Noblest* and most *generous Spirit* will be the *most firmly assured* of the *Immortality* of the Soule.



BOOK III. CHAP. I.

1. *Why the Authour treats of the state of the Soul after Death, and in what Method.*
2. *Arguments to prove that the Soule is ever united vitally with some Matter or other.*
3. *Further Reasons to evince the same.*
4. *That the Soule is capable of an aiery and æthereal Body, as well as a terrestrial.*
5. *That she ordinarily passes out of an earthly into an aereal Vehicle first.*
6. *That in her aiery Vehicle she is capable of Sense, Pleasure, and Pain.*
7. *That the main power of the Soule over her aereal Vehicle is the direction of Motion in the particles thereof.*
8. *That she may also add or diminish Motion in her æthereal.*
9. *How the purity of the Vehicle confers to the quickness of Sense and Knowledge.*
10. *Of the Soules power of changing the temper of her aereal Vehicle.*
11. *As also the shape thereof.*
12. *The plainness of the last Axiome.*

1. **WE** have, I hope, with undeniable evidence demonstrated the Immortality of the Soule to such as neither by
 their

their slowness of parts, nor any prejudice of Immorality, are made incompetent Judges of the truth of Demonstrations of this kind: so that I have already perfected my main Design. But my own curiosity, and the desire of gratifying others who love to entertain themselves with speculations of this nature, doe call me out something further; if the very Dignity of the present Matter I am upon doth not justly require me, as will be best seen after the finishing thereof: Which is *concerning the State of the Soule after Death*. Wherein though I may not haply be able to fix my foot so firmly as in the foregoing part of this Treatise, yet I will assert nothing but what shall be reasonable, though not demonstrable, and far preponderating to whatever shall be alledged to the contrary, and in such clear order and Method, that if what I write be not worthy to convince, it shall not be able to deceive or entangle by perplexedness and obscurity; and therefore I shall offer to view at once the main Principles upon which I shall build the residue of my Discourse.

AXIOME XXVII.

The Soule separate from this Terrestrial Body is not released from all Vital Union with Matter.

2. **T**HIS is the general Opinion of the *Platonists*. *Plotinus* indeed dissents, especially concerning the most divine Souls, as if they at last were perfectly unbared of all Matter, and had no union with any thing but God himself: which I look upon as a fancy proceeding from the same inequality of temper, that made him surmise that the most degenerate Soules did at last sleep in the bodies of Trees, and grew up meerly into *Plantal* life. Such fictions as these of fancyfull men have much depraved the ancient *Cabbala* and sacred Doctrine which the *Platonists* themselves doe profess to be *θεοπαράδοτον*, a holy Tradition received from the mouth of God or Angels. But however *Plotinus* himself does not deny but till the Soule arrive to such an exceeding height of purification, that she acts in either an *airy* or *celestial* Body. But that she is never released so perfectly from all Matter, how pure soever and tenuious, her condition of operating here in this life is a greater

pre-

presumption then can be fetcht from any thing else, that she ever is. For we finde plainly that her most subtil and most intellectual operations depend upon the fitness of temper in the Spirits; and that it is the fineness and purity of them that invites her and enables her to love and look after *divine* and *intellectual* Objects: Which kind of Motions if she could exert immediately by her own proper power and essence, what should hinder her but that, having a will, she should bring it to effect, which yet we finde she cannot if the Spirits be indisposed. Nor can the Soule well be hindred by the undue temper of the Spirits in these Acts, if they be of that nature that they belong to the bare essence of the Soule quite præscinded from all Union with Matter. For then as to these Acts it is all one where the Soule is, that is, in what Matter she is (and she must be in some, because the Universe is every where thick-set with Matter) whether she be raised into the purest regions of the Aire, or plunged down into the foulest Receptacles of Earth or Water; for her *intellectual* actings would be alike in both. What then is there imaginable in the *Body* that can hinder her in these Operations? Wherefore it is plain that the nature of the Soule is such, as that she cannot act but in dependence

on

on Matter, and that her Operations are some way or other alwaies modified thereby. And therefore if the Soule act at all after death, (which we have demonstrated she does) it is evident that she is not released from all vitall union with all kind of Matter whatsoever: Which is not onely the Opinion of the *Platonists*, but of *Aristotle* also, as may be easily gathered out of what we have above cited out of him, Lib. 2. Cap. 14.

3. Besides, it seems a very wilde leap in nature, that the Soul of Man, from being so deeply and muddily immerfed into Matter, as to keep company with Beasts, by vitall union with gross flesh and bones, should so on a suddain be changed, that she should not adhere to any Matter whatsoever, but ascend into an *ἀνότῃς* competible haply to none but God himself; unless there be such Creatures as the *Platonists* call *Nóes* or *pure Intelleets*. This must seem to any indifferent man very harsh and incongruous, especially if we consider what noble Beings there are on this side the *Nóoi* or *Nóes*, that all the Philosophers that ever treated of them acknowledge to be vitally united with either *aerial* or *athereal* Vehicles. For of this condition are all the *Genii* or Angels. It is sufficient therefore that the Soule never
exceed

exceed the immateriality of those orders of Beings ; the lower sort whereof that they are vitally united to Vehicles of Aire, their ignorance in Nature seems manifestly to bewray. For it had been an easy thing, and more for their credit, to have informed their followers better in the Mysteries of Nature ; but that themselves were ignorant of these things, which they could not but know, if they were not thus bound to their *airy* bodies. For then they were not engaged to move with the whole course of the Aire, but keeping themselves steddly, as being disunited from all Matter, they might in a moment have perceived both the *diurnal* and *annual motion* of the *Earth*, and so have saved the Credit of their followers, by communicating this Theory to them; the want of the knowledge whereof spoiles their repute with them that understand the Systeme of the world better then themselves, for all they boast of their Philosophy, so as if it were the Dictate of the highest Angels.

AXIOME XXVIII.

There is a Triple Vitall Congruity in the Soule, namely Æthereall, Aeriall, and Terrestriall.

4. **T**HAT this is the common Opinion of the *Platonists*, I have above intimated. That this Opinion is also true in it self, appears from the foregoing Axiome. Of the *Terrestrial Congruity* there can be no doubt; and as little can there be but that at least one of the other two is to be granted, else the Soule would be released from all vital union with Matter after Death. Wherefore she has a *vital aptitude* at least to unite with Aire: But Aire is a common Receptacle of bad and good Spirits (as the Earth is of all sorts of men and beasts) nay indeed rather of those that are in some sort or other bad, then of good, as it is upon Earth. But the Soule of Man is capable of very high refinements, even to a condition purely Angelicall. Whence Reason will judge it fit, and all Antiquity has voted it, That the Souls of men arrived to such a due pitch of purification must at last obtain *celestial Vehicles*.

AXI.

AXIOME XXIX.

According to the usual custome of Nature, the Soul awakes orderly into these Vital Congruities, not passing from one Extreme to another without any stay in the middle.

5. **T**HIS Truth, besides that at first sight it cannot but seem very reasonable, according to that known Aphorism, *Natura non facit saltum*; so if it be further examined, the solidity thereof will more fully appear. For considering how small degrees of purification the Souls of almost all men get in this life, even theirs who pass vulgarly for honest and good men, it will plainly follow that very few arrive to their *Æthereal* Vehicle immediately upon quitting their *Terrestrial* Body; that being a privilege that has appertained to none but very Noble and *Heroical* Spirits indeed, of which History records but very few. But that there may be degrees of purity and excellency in the *Aerial* Bodies, is a thing that is not to be denied, so that a just *Nemesis* will find out every one after death.

AXIOME XXX.

The Soul in her Aerial Vehicle is capable of Sense properly so called, and consequently of Pleasure and Pain.

6. **T**HIS plainly appears from the 27. and 28. Axiomes. For there is a necessity of the resulting of Sense from Vital Union of the Soul with any Body whatsoever: and we may remember that the immediate instrument of Sense, even in this earthly Body, are the Spirits: so that there can be no doubt of this Truth. And *Pleasure* and *Pain* being the proper modifications of Sense, and there being no Body but what is passible, it is evident that these Vehicles of Air are subject to Pain as well as Pleasure, in this Region where ill things are to be met with as well as good.

AXIOME XXXI.

The Soul can neither impart to nor take away from the Matter of her Vehicle of Air any considerable degree of Motion, but yet can direct the particles moved which way she pleases by the Imperium of her Will.

7. **T**HE reasonableness of this Axiome may be evinced, partly out of the former;

mer; for considering the brushiness and angulosity of the parts of the Air, a more then ordinary Motion or compressive Rest may very well prove painful to the Soul, and dis-harmonious to her touch; and partly from what we may observe in our own Spirits in this Body, which we can only direct, not give Motion to, nor diminish their Motion by our Imagination or Will, (for no man can imagine himself into Heat or Cold, the sure consequences of extraordinary Motion and Rest, by willing his Spirits to move faster or slower; but he may direct them into the Organs of spontaneous Motion, and so by moving the grosser parts of the Body, by this direction he may spend them, and heat these parts in the expence of them; and this is all we can doe) and partly from that Divine Providence that made all things, and measures out the Powers and Faculties of his Creatures according to his own Wisdome and Counsel, and therefore has bound that state of the Soul to straighter conditions, that is competible to the bad as well as to the good.

AXIOME XXXII.

Though the Soul can neither confer nor take away any considerable degree of Motion from the Matter of her Aairy Vehicle, yet nothing hinders but that she may doe both in her Æthereal.

8. **T**HE reason hereof is, because the particles of her *Æthereal Vehicle* consist partly of smooth sphæricall-Figures, and partly of tenuious Matter, so exceeding liquid that it will without any violence comply to any thing: whenas the *Aire*, as may be observed in Winde-Guns, has parts so stubborn and so stiff, that after they have been compressed to such a certain degree that the barrel of the Piece grows hot again, they have not lost their shapes nor virtue; but like a spring of Steel, liberty being given, they return to their natural posture with that violence, that they discharge a Bullet with equal force that Gun-powder does. Besides that the Goodness of that Deity on whom all Beings depend, may be justly thought to have priviledged the *Æthereal Congruity of Life* (which awakes onely in perfectly-obedient Souls, such as may be trusted as throughly faithful to his Empire) with

with a larger power then the other, there being no incompetibleness in the Subject. For it is as easy a thing to conceive that God may endow a Soul with a power of moving or resting Matter, as of determining the motions thereof.

AXIOME XXXIII.

The purer the Vehicle is, the more quick and perfect are the Perceptive Faculties of the Soul.

9. **T**HE truth of this we may in a manner experience in this life, where we finde that the quickness of Hearing, Seeing, Tasting, Smelling, the nimbleness of Reminiscency, Reason, and all other *Perceptive Faculties*, are advanced or abated by the cleanness, or foulness and dulness of the Spirits of our Body, and that Oblivion and Sottishness arise from their thickness and earthiness, or waterishness, or whatsoever other gross consistency of them: which distemper removed, and the Body being replenished with good Spirits in sufficient plenty and purity, the Minde recovers her activity again, remembers what she had forgot, and understands what she was before incapable

Z

of,

of, sees and hears at a greater distance; and so of the rest.

AXIOME XXXIV.

The Soul has a marvellous power of not only changing the temper of her Aairy Vehicle, but also of the external shape thereof.

10. **T**HE truth of the first part of this Axiome appears from daily experience; for we may frequently observe how strangely the *Passions* of the Mind will work upon our Spirits in this state, how Wrath, and Grief, and Envy will alter the Body, to say nothing of other Affections. And assuredly the finer the Body is, the more mutable it is upon this account: so that the *Passions* of the Minde must needs have a very great influence upon the Souls *Aerial Vehicle*; which though they cannot change into any thing but Air, yet they may change this Air into qualifications as vastly different as *Vertue* is from *Vice*, *Sickness* from *Health*, *Pain* from *Pleasure*, *Light* from *Darkness*, and the *stink* of a *Gaol* from the *Aromatick odours* of a flourishing *Paradise*.

11. The truth of the latter part is demonstrable from the latter part of the 31. Axiome. For supposing a power in the Soul

Soul of directing the motions of the particles of her fluid Vehicle, it must needs follow that she will also have a power of shaping it in some measure according to her own Will and Fancy. To which you may adde, as no contemptible pledge of this Truth, what is done in that kinde by our Will and Fancy in this life: as, onely because I will and fancy the moving of my Mouth, Foot, or Fingers, I can move them, provided I have but Spirits to direct into this motion; and the whole Vehicle of the Soul is in a manner nothing else but Spirits. The Signatures also of the *Fetus* in the Womb by the Desire and Imagination of the Mother, is very serviceable for the evincing of this Truth: but I shall speak of it more fully in its place.

A X I O M E XXXV.

It is rational to think, that as some Faculties are laid asleep in Death or after Death, so others may awake that are more sutable for that state.

13. **T**HE truth of this Axiome appears from hence, That our Souls come not by chance, but are made by an All-wise God, who foreseeing all their states, has

fitted the *Excitation* or *Consopition* of Powers and Faculties, sutable to the present condition they are to be in.

AXIOME XXXVI.

Whether the Vital Congruity of the Soule expire, as whose period being quite unwound, or that of the Matter be defaced by any essential Dis-harmony, Vital Union immediately ceases.

13. **T**HIS last Axiome is plain enough of it self at first sight, and the usefulness thereof may be glanced at in his due place.

These are the main Truths I shall recurre to, or at least suppose, in my following Disquisitions: others will be more seasonably delivered in the continuation of our Discourse.

CHAP. II.

1. *Of the Dimensions of the Soul considered barely in her self.*
2. *Of the Figure of the Souls Dimensions.*
3. *Of the Heterogeneity of her Essence.*
4. *That there is an Heterogeneity in her Plastick part*
distinct

distinct from the Perceptive. 5. Of the acting of this Plastick part in her framing of the Vehicle. 6. The excellency of Descartes his Philosophy. 7. That the Vehicles of Ghosts have as much of solid corporeal Substance in them as the Bodies of Men. 8. The folly of the contrary Opinion evinced. 9. The advantage of the Soul, for matter of Body, in the other state, above this.

1. **T**HAT we may now have a more clear and determinate apprehension of the nature and condition of the Soul out of the Body, let us first consider her a while, what she is in her own Essence, without any reference to any Body at all, and we shall finde her *a Substance extended and indiscerpible*, as may be easily gathered out of what we have written, *Lib. 1. Cap. 3, 5, 8.* as also *Lib. 2. Cap. 1, 2.* And it is a seasonable contemplation here (where we consider the Soul as having left this *Terrestrial Body*) that she hath as ample, if not more ample, Dimensions of her own, then are visible in the Body she has left. Which I think worth taking notice of, that it may stop the mouths of them that, not without reason, laugh at those unconceivable and ridiculous fancies of the Schools; that first rashly take

away all *Extension* from Spirits, whether Soules or Angels, and then dispute how many of them booted and spur'd may dance on a needles point at once. Fooleries much derogatory to the Truth, and that pinch our perception into such an intolerable streightness and evanidness, that we cannot imagine any thing of our own Being; and if we doe, are prone to fall into despair, or contempt of our selves, by fancying our selves such unconsiderable Motes of the Sun,

2. But as it is very manifest that the Soule has Dimensions, and yet not infinite, and therefore that she is necessarily bounded in some Figure or other; so it is very uncertain whether there be any peculiar Figure naturall to her, answerable to *animal shape*, or whether she be of her self of either a Round or Oval figure, but does change her shape according as occasion requires. It is not material to define any thing in this Question more then thus, That when the Soule acts in *Terrestrial Matter*, her *Plastick* part is determined to the Organization of the Body into humane forme; and in the *Aereal* or *Aethereal*, that she is neither more nor less determined to any shape then the *Genii* or Angels, and that if their Vehicles are more naturally guided into one shape then

then another, that hers is in the same condition; so that in her visible Vehicle she will bear the ordinary form of Angels, such a countenance, and so cloathed, as they.

3. That which is more material, I think is more easy to be defined, and that is, whether the Soule be one *Homogeneous* Substance, or whether it be in some manner *Heterogeneous*. That the latter is in some measure true, is manifest from what we have written *Lib. 2. Cap. 11.* viz. That the *Perceptive* faculty reaches not throughout the whole Soule, but is confined to a certain part, which we called the *Centre* or *Eye of the Soule*, as also her *Perceptive part*; but all the rest *Plastick*. But here arises a further Scruple, whether there be not an *Heterogeneity* in the very *Plastick* part also of the Soule. The *Aristotelians* seem to be confident there is not, and doe affirm that if there were an Eye in the Toe, the Toe would see as well as the Head. Of which I very much doubt: For hence it would follow that some Creatures would have a glimmering of Light all over, they being in a manner all over transparent; and some thin and clear Complexions might haply have the perception of Light betwixt the lower parts of their Fingers, which are in

some good measure pellucid; and therefore Life and Spirits being continued from thence to the *Canarion*, as they are, or to the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, it would follow that the Soule would have a perception of some glimmerings of Light from thence, which were to *see* there as well as to *feel*.

4. Wherefore it seems more rationall to admit an *Heterogeneity* in the *Plastick* part of the Soule also, and to acknowledge that every removall from the Seat of Common Sense, that is to say, every Circle that surrounds the Centre of the Soule, has not the same bounds of power, neither for number nor extent. But that as concerning the former, there is a gradual falling off from the first excellency, which is the *Perceptive* part of the Soule; the closest Circle to which is that part of the *Plastick* that is able to convey Objects of Sight as well as of Touch and Hearing, and what other Senses else there may be in the Soule. The next Circle is *Hearing* without *Seeing*, though not without *Touch*; for *Touch* spreads through all, but in its exterior region, which is excessively the greatest, it transmits the circumstantiated Perceptions of no Objects but those that are *Tactile*; but to others it is onely as a dead Medium, as the Circle

of Hearing is but as a dead Medium to the Objects of Sight. So that if we would please our Imagination with *Ficinus*, in fancying the Soule as a Star, we shall doe it more perfectly, if we look upon her in her Circles, as having an *Halo* about her: For the Soule to our *Reason* is no more *homogeneous*, then that Spectacle is to our Sight.

5. But if we look upon the Soule as ever propending to some personall shape, the direction of the *Plastick* rayes must then tend to a kind of Organization, so far as is conducent to the state the Soule is in, whether in an *Aiery* or *Ethereal* Vehicle. For that the *Plastick* power omits or changes as she is drawn forth by the nature of the Matter she acts upon, is discoverable in her Organization of our Bodies here. For in all likelihood the Soule in her self is as much of one sex as another; which makes her sometimes signe the Matter with both, but that very seldome: and therefore it is manifest that she omits one part of her *Plastick* power, and makes use of the other, in almost all efformations of the *Fetus*. Whence it is easy to conclude, that supposing her *Plastick* power naturally work the *Ethereal* or *Aereal* Vehicle into any *animal shape*, it may put forth onely such stroaks of the efformative
vertue

virtue as are convenient and becoming the Angelical Nature. But according to this Hypothesis haply all Objects of Sense will not arrive to the Centre of the Soule from every part of the Horizon; no not though this Organization were not naturall but meerly arbitrary. But be the Soule conceived either bound up thus into *animal forme*, or spread loose into any careless round shape, according as her rayes shall display themselves in her *Vehicle of Aire or Ether*, yet the seat of sight will be duely restrained, which is a consideration of no contemptible consequence.

6. This in generall may suffice concerning the very Nature of the Soule it self, her *Extension* and *Heterogeneity*. I shall onely adde to this one Observable concerning her *Aiery* and *Aethereal Vehicle*, and then I shall descend to more particular disquisitions. Rash fancies and false deductions from misunderstood Experiments have made some very confident that there is a *Vacuum* in Nature, and that every Body by how much more light it is, so much less substance it has in it self. A thing very fond and irrational, at the first sight, to such as are but indifferently well versed in the incomparable Philosophy of *Renatus Des-Cartes*, whose dexterous wit and through insight into the nature

nature and lawes of Matter, has so perfected the reasons of those *Phænomena*, that *Democritus*, *Epicurus*, *Lucretius* and others have puzzled themselves about, that there seems nothing now wanting as concerning that way of Philosophizing, but patience and an unprejudiced judgment to peruse what he has writ.

7. According therefore to his Philosophy and the Truth, there is ever as much Matter or Body in one consistency as another; as for example, there is as much Matter in a Cup of Aire as in the same Cup filled with Water, and as much in this Cup of Water as if it were filled with Lead or Quicksilver. Which I take notice of here, that I may free the imagination of men from that ordinary and idiotick misapprehension which they entertain of Spirits that appear, as if they were as evanid and devoid of Substance as the very shadowes of our Bodies cast against a Wall, or our Images reflected from a River or Looking-glass: and therefore from this errour have given them names accordingly, calling the Ghosts of men that present themselves to them, *Εἰδωλα* and *Umbra*, *Images* and *Shades*. The which, the more visible they are, they think them the more substantial; fancying that the Aire is so condensed, that there is not onely more
of

of it, but also that simply there is more Matter or Substance, when it appears thus visible, then there was in the same space before. And therefore they must needs conceit that Death reduces us to a pittifull thin pittance of Being, that our Substance is in a manner lost, and nothing but a tenuious reek remains, no more in proportion to us, then what a sweating horse leaves behind him as he gallops by in a frosty morning. Which certainly must be a very lamentable consideration to such as love this thick and plump Body they beare about with them, and are pleased to consider how many pounds they outweighed their Neighbour the last time they were put in the ballance together.

8. But if a kinde of dubious Transparency will demonstrate the *deficiency* of Corporeal Substance, a Pillar of *Crystall* will have less thereof then one of *Tobacco-smoke*; which though it may be so doubtful and evanid an Object to the Eye, if we try it by the Hand, it will prove exceeding solid: as also these Ghosts that are said to appear in this manner have proved to them that have touched them, or have been touched by them. For it is a thing ridiculous and unworthy of a Philosopher, to judge the measure of corporeal Matter by what it seems

seems to our *sight*; for so Air would be nothing at all: or what it is to our *handling* or weighing of it; for so indeed a Cup of Quick-silver would seem to have infinitely more Matter in it then one fill'd with Air onely, and a vessel of Water less when it is plung'd under the water in the River, then when it is carried in the Air. But we are to remember, that let Matter be of what consistency it will, as thin and pure as the flame of a candle, there is not less of corporeal Substance therein then there is in the same dimensions of Silver, Lead, or Gold.

9. So that we need not bemoan the shrivell'd condition of the deceased, as if they were stript almost of all Substance corporeal, and were too thinly clad to enjoy themselves as to any Object of Sense. For they have no less Body then we our selves have, onely this Body is far more active then ours, being more *spiritualized*, that is to say, having greater degrees of Motion communicated unto it; which the whole Matter of the world receives from some *spiritual* Being or other, and therefore in this regard may be said the more to symbolize with that immaterial Being, the more Motion is communicated to it: As it does also in that which is the effect of Motion, to wit the *tenuity* and *subtily* of its particles, where-

whereby it is enabled to imitate, in some sort, the proper privilege of Spirits that pass through all Bodies whatsoever. And these Vehicles of the Soul, by reason of the tenuity of their parts, may well pass through such Matter as seems to us impervious, though it be not really so to them. For Matter reduced to such fluid subtilty of particles as are invisible, may well have entrance through Pores unperceptible. Whence it is manifest that the Soul, speaking in a natural sense, loseth nothing by Death, but is a very considerable gainer thereby. For she does not onely possess as much Body as before, with as full and solid dimensions, but has that accession cast in, of having this Body more invigorated with Life and Motion then it was formerly. Which consideration I could not but take notice of, that I might thereby expunge that false conceit that adheres to most mens fancies, of that *evanid* and *starved* condition of the other state.

CHAP. III.

1. *That the natural abode of the Soul after death is the Air.*
2. *That she cannot quit the Aerial Regions till the Æthereal Congruity*

gruity of life be awakened in her. 3. That all Souls are not in the same Region of the Aire. 4. Cardans conceit of placing all Dæmons in the upper Region. 5. The use of this conceit for the shewing the reason of their seldome appearing. 6. That this Phænomenon is salved by a more rational Hypothesis. 7. A further confutation of Cardans Opinion. 8. More tending to the same scope. 9. The Original of Cardans error concerning the remote operations of Dæmons. 10. An Objection how Dæmons and Souls separate can be in this lower Region, where Winds and Tempests are so frequent. 11. A preparation to an Answer from the consideration of the nature of the Winds. 12. Particular Answers to the Objection. 13. A further Answer from the nature of the Statick Faculty of the Soul. 14. Another from the suddain power of actuating her Vehicle. 15. What incommodations she suffers from haile, rain, &c.

1. **T**Hose more particular Enquiries we intend to fall upon, may be reduced to these few Heads: viz. *The place of the Souls abode, Her employment, and Her moral condition after Death.* That the place of Her abode is the Aire, is the constant opinion of the

the ancient Philosophers and natural Theologers, who doe unanimously make that *Element* the Receptacle of Souls departed: which therefore they called *αἰδης*, that is, *αἰδης*, because men deceased are in a state of invisibility, as the place they are confined to is an Element utterly invisible of its own nature, and is accloy'd also with caliginous mists, and enveloped by vicissitudes with the dark shadow of the Earth. The truth of this opinion of theirs is plainly demonstrable from the 29. and 31. Axiomes. For Nature making no enormous jumps, it must needs follow, that separate Souls must take their first station in the Aire, because that *Vital Congruity* that fits an *Aerial Vehicle* does of order awaken immediately upon the quitting of the *Earthly Body*.

2. Wherefore the Soul being thus vitally united with a *Body* or *Vehicle* of Aire, it is impossible that she should drive out of those Regions: because her motions are onely according to the capacity of her Vehicle, she being not able to alter the consistency thereof into any more subtile or purer temper then the Aire will admit of, keeping still its own Species. Onely she may conspissate the Aire by directing the motion thereof towards her, and so squeezing out a considerable part of the first and se-

cond

cond Element may retain more Aire then ordinary: But she cannot command the Air from her so entirely, as to actuate these two Elements alone, or any considerable part of them, because the *Aethereal Congruity* of life is as yet wholly asleep; nor is it in the power of the Soul to awake it as she pleases: and therefore it would be Pain and Death to her to attempt the removal of the aerial Matter quite from her. Besides that it would require such a force as would imply a contribution of motion to it, as well as direction of it, to make it able to bear against other parts of the Aire that love not to be streightened nor crouded: which though it may haply be done in some measure, yet that she may by this force of direction recover a whole Vehicle of *Aether*, seems excessively improbable, as is plain from the 31. Axiome.

3. Wherefore it is necessary that the Soul departed this life should be somewhere in the Aire, though it be not at all necessary that they should inhabit all of them the same Region thereof. For as some Souls are more purified then others when they leave the Body, so a more pure degree of *Final Congruity* will awake in them: whence by that Divine *Nemesis* that runs through all things, they will be naturally conveyed

to such places, and be associated to such company as is most congruous to their Nature; and will be as distinctly sorted by that eternal Justice that God has so deeply ingrafted in the very essential contexture of the Universe, as humane Laws dispose of persons with us, sending some to Prisons, some to Pest-houses, and others to the *Prytaneeum*.

4. It will therefore, in all likelihood, fall to some of their shares to be fatally fettered to this lower Region of the Aire, as I doubt not but many other Spirits are; though *Cardan* much pleases himself with a peculiar conceit of his own, as if the supreme Region of the Aire was the onely habitation of all *Demons* or Spirits whatever, and that their descent to us is as rare as the diving of Men into the bottome of the Sea, and almost as difficult, this thick Aire we breathe in being in a manner as unsutable to their tenuious consistencies as the Water is to us; in which we are fain to hold our breath, and consequently to make a very short stay in that Element. Besides that he fancies the passage of the Middle Region tedious to them, by reason of its Coldness; which therefore he saith is as it were a fence betwixt us and them, as the Sea is betwixt the Fishes and us; whom though we exceed much in Wit and Industry, and have a great

desire

desire to catch them and kill them, yet we get very few into our hands in comparison of those that scape us: And so these *Dæmons*, though they bear us no good will, by bodily conflict they can hurt none of us (as being so difficult a thing to come at us) and very few of us by their Art and Industry. For this fancyfull Philosopher will have them onely attempt us as we do the Fishes, by Baits, and Nets, and Eel-spears, or such like Engines which we cast into the bottom of the Water: So these aerial *Genii*, keeping their station above in the third Region of the Aire (as we doe on the bank of the River, or in a Boat on the Sea, when we fish) by sending down Dreams and Apparitions, may entangle some men so, that by affrightments and disturbances of minde at last, though at this distance, they may work their ruine and destruction.

5. This Hypothesis, I suppose, he has framed to give an account why the appearing of the *Genii* is so seldome, and why so little hurt is done by them as there is. For an Answer would be ready, that this lower there is no Element for them to abide in: and that it is as foolishly argued by those that say there are no Spirits, because they are so seldome seen, as if the Fishes, upon a concession of Speech and Reason to their

mute Tribe, should generally conclude, that there are no such Creatures as Men or Horses, because it happens so very seldome that they can see them; and should contemn and laugh at those Fishes that, having had the hap to meet with them, should say they have seen such Creatures, as if they were fan-tick and lunatick, and not well in their wits, or else too much in them, and that they contrived such fictions for some political design.

6. Which Parable may hold good, though not upon the same grounds, onely by substituting *difference of condition* for *distance of place*; and the similitude will prove as sound as before. For, for a Spirit to condensate his Vehicle to almost a Terrestrial grossness and Visibilty, is as rare and uncouth as for Terrestrial animals to dive to the bottom of the Sea, and its likely every jot as difficult: and so the reason as obvious why so few are seen, & the confident denial of their existence as rash and foolish, by them that have not seen them themselves. For it is as if the Fishes should contest amongst themselves about the existence of Men, and their diving into the Water, and whether there were any places haunted in the Sea, as those would be the most famous where they fish for Pearls, or that cause the most frequent Shipwracks, or are most pleasant

B. J. L.
e, the
r Her
ne the
nn and
ad the
y have
e fana
r wits,
y con
defign
bough
y sub
istanc
ove in
o con
estrial
nd no
ive to
every
vious
denial
then
For i
ough
and
ether
Ser
where
not
sion
to

to swim in. And some notable occasion, mischance, or weighty design, such as occur more rarely, must be reasonably conceived the onely invitations to the *Genii* to expose themselves to our view.

7. That there is so little hurt done by them, need not be resolved into the distance of their habitation, but into the *Law of the Universe*, whose force penetrates through all orders of Beings. Besides, it is too trivial and idiotick a conceit, & far below the pitch of a Philosopher, to think that *all* Aerial Spirits are Haters of Mankind, so as to take delight meerly in destroying them. For Men do not hate Fishes because they live in another Element different from theirs, but catch them meerly in love to themselves, for gain and food; which the airy *Genii* cannot aim at in destroying of us. But to doe Mischief meerly for Mischiefs sake, is so excessive an Enormity, that some doubt whether it be competible to any *Intellectual Being*. And therefore *Cardan* ought to have proved that first: as also, if there be any so extremely degenerate, that there be many of them, or rather so many that they cannot be awed by the number of those that are less depraved. For we may observe that men amongst our selves that are sufficiently wicked, yet they abhor very much from

those things that are grossly & causlessly destructive to either Man or Beast, & themselves would help to destroy, punish, or at least hinder the attempters of such wild & exorbitant outrages that have no pretence of Reason, but are a meer exercise of Cruelty and Vexation to other Creatures. He also ought to have demonstrated, that all Mankind are not the *Peculium* of some Spirits or other, and that there are not invisible Governours of Nations, Cities, Families, and sometime of particular Men; and that at least a *Political Goodness*, such as serves for the safety of Persons and what belongs to them, is not exceedingly more prevalent even in these Kingdomes of the Aire, then *gross Injustice*. For all this may be on this side of the *Divine Life*: so that there is no feare of making these aerial Inhabitants over-perfect by this Supposition. In a word, he should have proved that *Political Order*, in the full exercise thereof, did not reach from *Heaven* to *Earth*, and pierce into the *Subterraneous Regions* also, if there be any *Intellectual Creatures* there. For this will suffice to give a reason that so little hurt is done, though all places be full of *Aerial Spirits*.

8. Adde unto all this, that though they may not be permitted to doe any gross evil them-

themselves, and to kill men at pleasure without their consents, yet they may abet them in such wayes, or invite them to such courses, as will prove destructive to them: but, it may be, with no greater plot then we have when we set Doggs together by the eares, fight Cocks, bait Beares and Bulls, run Horses, and the like; where often, by our occasion, as being excited and animated by us, they pursue their own inclinations, to the loss of their lives. But though we doe not care to kill a Dog or a Cock in this way; yet there is none so barbarous as to knock these Creatures on the head meerly because they will doe so. So these worser kind of *Genii*, according as their tempers are, may haply follow some men prone to such or such vices, in which they may drive them in way of contest, or to please their own fancies, to the utmost they can doe in it; and, taking their parts, sport themselves in making one man overcome another in duelling, in drinking, in craft and undermining, in wenching, in getting riches, in clambering to honours; and so of the rest. Where it may be their pastime to try the Victory of that Person they have taken to; and if he perish by the hurry of their temptations and animations, it is a thing they intended no more, it may be,

then he that sets his Cock into the pit desires his neck should be broke: but if it happen so, the sorrow is much alike in both cases. And therefore these Spirits may doe mischief enough in the world, in abetting men that act it, though haply they neither take pleasure in doing of it upon any other termes, nor if they did, are able to doe it, there being so many watchfull eyes over them. For these *Aerial Legions* are as capable of *Political Honesty*, and may as deeply resent it, as the Nations of the Earth doe, and it may be more deeply.

9. But if these Creatures were removed so far off as *Cardan* would have them, I doe not see how they could have any communion at all with us, to doe us either good or hurt. For that they are able to send Apparitions or Dreames at this distance, is itself but a Dream, occasioned from that first error in the *Aristotelian* Philosophy, that makes God and the Intelligences act from the heavenly spheara, and so to produce all these effects of Nature below; such as can never be done but by a present *Numen* and *Spirit of Life* that pervades all things.

10. This conceit therefore of his shall be no hindrance to our concluding, That this lower Region of the Aire is also replenish'd with *Demons*. Which if it be, it is not unlikely

likely but that the impurer Souls wander there also; though I have taken all this pains to bring still greater trouble upon my self. For it is obvious to object that which *Lucretius* has started of old, that this Region being so obnoxious to Windes and tempests, the Souls will not be able to keep their Vehicles of Aire about them, but that they will be blown in pieces by the roughness of these storms. But we may be easily delivered of this solicitude, if we consider the nature of the *Windes*, the nature of these *Vehicles*, & the *Statick* power of the Soule. For to say they wil make as good shift as the *Genii* here, is not fully satisfactory, because a man would also willingly understand how the *Genii* themselves are not liable to this inconvenience. My Answer therefore shall reach both.

II. That *Windes* are nothing else but Watery particles at their greatest agitation, *Cartesius* has very handsomely demonstrated in his *Meteors*: Which particles doe not so much drive the Aire before them, as pass through it, as a flight of arrowes and showers of haile or rain. One part of the Aire therefore is not driven from another; but it is as if one should conceive so many little pieces of haire twirling on their middle point as at quarter-staffe, and so passing through the Aire, which motion would pass free,

free, without carrying the Aire along with it. This therefore being the nature of Winde, the Aire is not torn apieces thereby, though we finde the *impetus* of it moving against us, because it cannot penetrate our Bodies with that facility that it does the Aire.

12. But the *Vehicles* of the *Genii* and Souls deceased are much-what of the very nature of the Aire; whence it is plainly impossible that the Winde should have any other force on them, then what it has on the rest of that Element; and therefore the least thing imaginable will hold all the parts together. Which is true also if the Winde did carry along the Aire with it: for then the *Vehicles* of the *Genii* would move along with the stream, suffering little or no violence at all, unless they would force themselves against it. Which they are not necessitated to doe, as indeed not so much as to come into it, or not at least to continue in it, but may take shelter, as other living Creatures doe, in houses, behind walls, in woods, dales, caverns, rocks and other obvious places; and that maturely enough, the change of Aire and prognostick of storms being more perceptible to them then to any terrestrial animal.

13. And yet they need not be so cauti-

ous

ous to keep out of danger, they having a power to grapple with the greatest of it, which is their *Statick* faculty; which arises from the power of directing the motion of the particles of their Vehicle. For they having this power of directing the motion of these particles which way they please, by Axiome 31. it necessarily followes, that they can determinate their course inwards, or toward the Centre; by which direction they will be all kept close together, firm and tight: which ability I call the *Statick* power of the Soule. Which if it can direct the whole agitation of the particles of the Vehicle, as well those of the first and second Element as those of the Aire, and that partly towards the Centre, and partly in a countertendency against the storme, this force and firmness will be far above the strongest windes that she can possibly meet with.

14. Wherefore the Soules Vehicle is in no danger from the boisterousness of the Winds, and if it were, yet there is no fear of cessation of Life. For as the Wind blowes off one part of Aire, it brings on another which may be immediately actuated by the presence of the Soule; though there be no need to take refuge in so large an Hypothesis. And it is more probable that she is more peculiarly

peculiarly united to one part of the Aire then another, and that she dismisses her Vehicle but by degrees, as our Spirits leasurly pass away by insensible Perspiration.

15. We see how little the Souls Vehicle can be incommodated by storms of Winde, And yet Rain, Haile, Snow and Thunder will incommodate her still less. For they pass as they doe through other parts of the Aire, which close again immediately, and leave neither wound nor scarre behinde them. Wherefore all these Meteors in their Mediocrity may be a pleasure to her and refreshment; and in their excess no long pain, nor in their highest rage any destruction of life at all. From whence we may safely conclude, that not onely the Upper Region, but this Lower also, may be inhabited both by the *deceased Souls of Men* and by *Demons*.

CHAP. IV.

1. *That the Soule once having quitted this earthly Body becomes a Dæmon.* 2. *Of the Externall Senses of the Soule separate, their number and limits in the Vehicle.* 3. *Of Sight in a Vehicle organized and unorganized.* 4. *How Dæmons*
and

and separate Souls hear and see at a vast Distance: and whence it is that though they may so easily hear or see us, we may neither see nor hear them. 5. That they have Hearing as well as Sight. 6. Of the Touch, Smell, Taste, and Nourishment of Dæmons. 7. The external employment that the Genii and Souls deceased may have out of the Body. 8. That the actions of Separate Souls, in reference to us, are most-what conformable to their life here on Earth. 9. What their entertainments are in reference to themselves. 10. The distinction of orders of Dæmons from the places they most frequent.

1. **T**HE next thing we are to enquire into is the Employment of the Soul after Death; how she can entertain her self; and pass away the time, and that either in Solitude, in Company, or as she is a Political member of some Kingdome or Empire. Concerning all which in the general we may conclude, that it is with her as with the rest of the Aerial Genii, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀποδομαίνετα ὅταντα δαίμονιόν ἐστι, for the Soul having once put off this terrestrial Body becomes a Genius her self; as Maximus Tyrius, Xenocrates, Philo and others expressly affirm. But we shall consider these things more particularly.

2. As for those *employments* wherewith she may entertain her self *in solitude*, they are either *Objects* of the *External Senses*, or of the *Inward Minde*. Concerning the *former* whereof it is more easie to move *Questions* then satisfy them; as Whether she have the same number of *Senses* she had in this life. That she is endued with *Hearing*, *Sight* and *Touch*, I think there can be no scruple, because these will fall to her share necessarily, whether her *Vehicle* be organized or not; and that of *Seeing* and *Touch* is the most uncontrovertible of all. For the sense of visible *Objects* being discovered to us by transmission of Motion through those Spherical particles that are continued along from the *Object* through the *Aire* to our very *Organ* of *Sight* (which sees meerly by reason of these particles vitally united with the *Soul*) the same particles pervading all the *Souls Vehicle*, it is impossible but that she should see. But the *Question* is, whether she sees in every part thereof. To which I must answer, No: partly from what I have already declared concerning the *Heterogeneity* of her *Plastick part*; and partly from a gross inconvenience that would follow this Supposition. For if we should grant that the *Soul* saw in every part of her *Vehicle*, every *Object* that is near would not
only

only seem double, but centuple, or mille-
uple; which would be a very ugly enormity
and defacement of Sight. Wherefore we
have, with very good reason, restrained the
Visive faculty of the Soule in this state of Se-
paration, as well as it was in the *Terrestrial*
Body.

3. But this hinders nothing but that the
Soule, when she lies in one *Homogeneal* orb of
Aire, devoid of organization, may see round
about her, behinde, before, above, beneath,
and every way. But if she organize her Ve-
hicle, Sight may haply be restrain'd, as in us
who cannot see behinde us. Which Consi-
deration we toucht upon before.

4. It is plain therefore that these Aerial
Spirits, though we cannot see them, cannot
miss of seeing us; and that, it may be, from
a mighty distance, if they can transform
their Vehicle, or the Organ of Sight, into
some such advantageous Figure as is
wrought in Dioptrick Glasses. Which
power will infinitely exceed the contracting
and dilating of the pupil of our Eye, which
yet is a weaker and more defectuous at-
tempt towards so high a Priviledge as we
speak of: which notwithstanding may seem
very possible in Spirits from 31. and 34.
Axiomes. The same also may be said of
their *Hearing*. For the same principle may
enable

enable them to shape themselves Organs for the receiving of *Sounds*, of greater art and excellency then the most accurate *Acoustick* we read of, or can excogitate. Wherefore it is a very childish mistake to think, that because we neither *see* the shape nor *hear* the discourse of *Spirits*, that they neither *hear* nor *see* us. For soft Bodies are impenetrable by hard ones, but not on the contrary, as melted Wax will receive the Signature of the Seal, but the Seal is not at all impressed upon by the Wax. And so a solid Body will stop the course of the Aire, but the Aire will not stop the course of a solid Body, and every inconsiderable terrestrial consistency will reflect Light, but Light scarce moves any terrestrial Body out of its place, but is rebounded back by it. That therefore that is most tenuous and thin, is most passive, and therefore if it be once the Vehicle of Sense, is most sensible. Whence it will follow, that the reflexion of Light from Objects being able to move our Organs, that are not so fine, they will more necessarily move those of the *Genii*, and at a greater distance. But their Bodies being of *diaphanous Aire*, it is impossible for us to *see* them, unless they will give themselves the trouble of reducing them to a more *terrestrial consistency*, whereby they may reflect light. Nor can

we easily *hear* their ordinary speech, partly because a very gentle motion of the *Aire* will act upon their Vehicles, and partly because they may haply use the finer and purer part of that Element in this exercise, which is not so fit to move our Sense. And therefore unless they will be heard *datâ operâ*, naturally that impress of the *Aire* in their usual discourse can never strike *our* Organ.

5. And that we may not seem to say all this for nought; that they will have *Hearing* as well as *Seeing*, appears from what I have intimated above, that this Faculty is ranged near the *Common Sensorium* in the Vehicle, as well as that of Sight, and therefore the Vehicle being all *Aire*, such percussions of it as cause the sense of Sound in us will necessarily doe the like in them; but more accurately, haply, if they organize their Vehicle for the purpose, which will answer to the arrection of the Ears of Animals, for the better taking in the Sound.

6. That they have the sense of *Touch* is inevitably true, else how could they feel resistance, which is necessary in the bearing of one Body against another, because they are impenetrable? And to speak freely my mind, it will be a very hard thing to disprove that they have not something analogical to *Smell* and *Tast*, which are very near a-kin

to *Touch* properly so called. For Fumes and Odours passing so easily through the Aire, will very naturally insinuate into their Vehicles also: which Fumes, if they be grosser and humectant, may raise that diversification of *Touch* which we Mortals call *Tasting*; if more subtile and dry, that which we call *Smelling*. Which if we should admit, we are within modest bounds as yet in comparison of others; as *Cardan*, who affirms downright that the Aerial *Genii* are nourished, and that some of them get into the Bodies of Animals to batten themselves there in their Blood and Spirits. Which is also averred by *Marcus the Mesopotamian* *Eremit* in *Psellus*, who tells us that the purer sort of the *Genii* are nourished by drawing in the Aire, as our Spirits are in the Nerves and Arteries; and that other *Genii*, of a courser kinde, suck in moisture, not with the Mouth as we doe, but as a Sponge does water. And *Moses Egyptian* writes concerning the *Zabii*, that they eat of the blood of their Sacrifice, because they thought it was the food of the *Demons* they worshipped, and that by eating thereof they were in a better capacity to communicate with them. Which things if they could be believed, that would be no such hard Probleme concerning the Familiars of Witches,

ches, why they suck them. But such curiosities, being not much to our purpose, I willingly omit.

7. The conclusion of what has been said is this, That it is certain that the *Genii*, and consequently the Souls of men departed, who *ipso facto* are of the same rank with them, have the sense of *Seeing, Hearing, and Touching*, and not improbably of *Smelling and Tasting*. Which Faculties being granted, they need not be much at a loss how to spend their time, though it were but upon external Objects; all the furniture of Heaven and Earth being fairly exposed to their view. They see the same Sun and Moon that we doe, behold the persons and converse of all men, and, if no special Law inhibit them, may pass from Town to Town, and from City to City, as *Hesiod* also intimates,

Ἥρα ἰογάμενοι πάντων φοιτῶσιν ἐπ' αἶαν.

There is nothing that we enjoy but they may have their fees out of it; fair Fields, large and invious Woods, pleasant Gardens, high and healthful Mountains, where the purest gusts of Aire are to be met with, Cryстал Rivers, mossy Springs, solemnity of Entertainments, Theatrick Pumps and Shews, publick and private Discourses, the

exercifes of Religion, whether in Temples, Families, or hidden Cells. They may be alfo (and haply not unintereffed) Spectators of the glorious and mischievous hazards of War, whether Sea-fights or Land-fights; befides thofe foft and filent, though fometimes no lefs dangerous, Combats in the Camps of *Cupid*; and a thoufand more particularities that it would be too long to reckon up, where they haply are not men Spectators but Abettors, as *Plutarch* writes: Like old men that are paft Wreftling, Pitching the Barre, or playing at Cudgels themfelves, yet will affift and abet the young men of the Parifh at thofe Exercifes. So the Souls of men departed, though they have put off with the Body the capacity of the ordinary functions of humane Life, yet they may affift and abet them, as purfuing fome design in them; and that either for evil or good, according as they were affected themfelves when they were in the Body.

8. In brief, whatever is the cuftome and defire of the Soul in this life, that fticks and adheres to her in that which is to come; and ſhe will be ſure, fo farre as ſhe is capable, either to act it, or to be at leaſt a Spectator and Abettor of ſuch kinde of actions.

— *Qua gratia currum
 Armorumque fuit vivis, qua cura nudentes
 Pascere equos, eadē sequitur tellure repostos.*

Which rightly understood is no poetical fiction, but a professed Truth in *Plato's* Philosophy. And *Maximus Tyrius* speaks expressly even of the better sort of Soules, who having left the Body, and so becoming *τῷ αὐτῷ ἡρώδῃ καὶ νόμῳ δαίμονες αὐτῷ ἀρβανί-
 τῳ*, i. e. being made ipso facto Genii in stead of men, that, beside the peculiar happiness they reap thereby to themselves, they are appointed by God, and have a mission from him, to be Overseers of humane affairs: but that every *Genius* does not perform every office, but as their naturall Inclinations and Customes were in this life, they exercise the like in some manner in the other. And therefore he will have *Æsculapius* to practise Physick still, and *Hercules* to exercise his strength, *Amphilochus* to prophesy, *Castor* and *Pollux* to navigate, *Minos* to hear causes, and *Achilles* to war. Which opinion is as likely to hold true in Bad Soules as in Good; and then it will follow, that the Soules of the wicked make it their business to assist and abet the exercise of such Vices as themselves were most addicted to in this life, and

to animate and tempt men to them. From whence it would follow, that they being thus by their separate state *Demons*, as has been said already, if they be also tempters to evil, they will very little differ from meer *Devils*.

9. But besides this employment in reference to us, they may entertain themselves with Intellectuall Contemplations, whether Naturall, Mathematical, or Metaphysical. For assuredly *Knowledge* is not so easy and cheap in this state of Separation, but that they may advance and improve themselves by exercise and Meditations. And they being in a capacity to forget by reason of desuetude, it will be a new pleasure to them to recall to minde their almost obliterate speculations. And for those that take more pleasure in outward Sense then in the operations of their Understanding; there being so much change in Nature, and so various qualifications of the Aire and these inferiour Elements, which must needs act upon their aerial Bodies to more or less gratification or dislike, this also will excuse them from being idle, and put them upon quest after such refreshments and delights as Nature will afford the multifarious presages and desires of their fitting Vehicles.

10. Not but that they keep constant to
some

some generall inclination, which has divided these aerial wanderers into so many Orders or Tribes; the ancient Philosophers and Poets (which are Philosophers of the antientest standing of all) having assigned places proper to each Order: the Sea, Rivers and Springs to one, Mountains and Groves to others, and so of the rest. Whence they imposed also those names of the *Nereides*, *Naiades*, *Oreades*, *Dryades*, and the like: to which you may adde the *Dii Tutelares* of Cities and Countries, and those that love the warmth of Families and homely converse of Men, such as they styled *Lares familiares*. All which, and hundreds more, which there is no need to recite, though they be engaged ever in one natural propension, yet there being so great variety of occasions to gratify it more or less, their thoughts may be employed in purchasing and improving those delights that are most agreeable to their own nature. Which particularities to run over would be as infinite as useless. These short intimations are sufficient to make us understand that the *Genii* and *separate Souls* need want no *Employment*, no not in *Solitude*: for such must their stay also amongst us be esteemed, when they doe not sensibly and personally converse with us,

CHAP. V.

1. *That the Separate Soule spends not all her time in Solitude.*
2. *That her converse with us seems more intelligible then that with the Genii.*
3. *How the Genii may be visible one to another, though they be to us invisible.*
4. *Of their approaches, and of the limits of their swiftness of motion.*
5. *And how they far exceed us in celerity.*
6. *Of the figure or shape of their Vehicles, and of their privacy, when they would be invisible.*
7. *That they cannot well converse in a meer simple Orbicular forme.*
8. *That they converse in humane shape, at least the better sort of them.*
9. *Whether the shape they be in proceed meerly from the Imperium of their Will and Fancy, or is regulated by a natural Character of the Plastick part of the Soule.*
10. *That the personal shape of a Soule or Genius is partly from the Will, and partly from the Plastick power.*
11. *That considering how the Soul organizes the Fœtus in the Womb, and moves our limbs at pleasure; it were a wonder if Spirits should not have such command over their Vehicles as is believed.*
12. *A further Argument from an excessive vertue some have given to Imagination.*

1. **B**UT the separate state of the Soule does not condemn her to this Solitude, but being admitted into the order of the *Genii*, she is possessed of their Priviledges, which is to converse personally with this *Aerial people*, and also upon occasion with the Inhabitants of the Earth; though the latter with far more difficulty.

2. As for her converse with the *Aerial Genii* and other Souls separate, it must be in all reason concluded to be exceeding much more frequent then that with men, and yet this latter is in some sort more intelligible; because it is certain she can see us, light being reflected from our opaque Bodies unto her Sense, and by conspissating her Vehicle she may make her self visible to us. But the Vehicles of the *Genii* and of Souls being in their natural consistence purely Aerial, and Air being a transparent Body, it will transmit the light wholly; and so no reflexion being made from these airy Bodies, they can have no perception of one anothers presence, and therefore no society nor communion one with another.

3. This seems a shrewd Difficulty at the first view. But it is easily taken off, if we consider that Aire will admit of many degrees of Rarefaction and Condensation, and yet

yet still appear unto us alike invifible, as one may obferve in the Weather-glaſs. But it were more proper to propoſe in this caſe the experiment of the Wind-gun, wherein the Aire is compressed to a great number of degrees of condenſatiõ beyond its natural ſtate; within the compaſs of many whereof there is no doubt, if not in the utmoſt, that the Aire does remaine invifible to us. But there is no ſcruple to be made but that in the progreſs of theſe degrees of Condensation the Aire, if it were in a Glaſs-barrel, might become viſible to the *Genii*, by reaſon of the tenderness and delicacy of their Senses, before it would be ſo to us. Whence it followes, that the Vehicles of the *Genii* may have a conſiſtency different from the Aire, and perceptible to them, that is to ſay, to one anothers ſight, though it be as unperceptible to us as the reſt of the Aire is. As, it may be, a man that has but bad eyes would not be able to diſtinguiſh Ice immerſed in the Water from the Water it ſelf by his Sight, though he might by his Touch. Or if their Vehicles could be ſuppoſed purer and finer then the reſt of the Aire, their preſence might be perceptible by that means too. For this vaporous Aire having without queſtion a confuſed reflection of light in it, every way in ſome proportion like that

in

in a Mist, or when the Sun shines waterishly and prognosticks rain; these repercussions of light being far more sensible to the *Genii* then to us, the lessening of them would be more sensible, and therefore the diminution of reflection from their Vehicles would be sufficient to discover their presence one to another: and for the illustrating of this Hypothesis, the experiment of the Weather-glass is more proper. But the other supposition I look upon as the more likely to be true; and that as the *aquatil Animals* that live in the Sea have a consistency grosser then the Element they move in, so it is with these that live in the Aire, though there be nothing near so great a difference here as in that other Element.

4. It is plain therefore, that the Persons of the *Genii* and separate Souls are visible one to another. But yet not at any distance, and therefore there is necessity of approaching to one another for mutual converse: which enforces us to say something of their *Local Motion*. Which is neither by Fins nor Wings, as in Fishes or Birds, who are fain to sustain themselves by these instruments from sinking to the bottome of either Element: but it is meerly by the direction of the agitation of the particles of their Vehicle toward the place they aime

at;

at; and in such a swiftness or leasureliness as best pleases themselves, and is competitive to their natures. For they can goe no swifter then the whole summe of agitation of the particles of their Vehicle will carry so much Matter, nor indeed so swift; for it implies that their Vehicles would be turned into an absolutely hard Body, such as Brasse or Iron, or whatever we find harder; so that necessarily they would fall down to the Earth as dead as a Stone. Those therefore are but phantastick conceits that give such agility to Spirits, as if they could be here and there and every where at once, skip from one Pole of the World to another, & be on the Earth again in a moment: whereas in truth they can pass with no greater swiftness then the direction of such a part of the agitation of the particles of their Vehicles will permit, as may be spared from what is employed in keeping them within a tolerable compass of a due aerial fluidity.

5. And this alone will suffice to make them exceed us in activity and swiftness by many degrees. For their whole Vehicle is haply at least as thin and moveable as our animal Spirits, which are very few in comparison of this luggage of an earthly Body that they are to drive along with them. But
the

the Spiritual Bodies of the *Genii* have nothing to drive along with them but themselves; and therefore are more free and light, compared to us, then a mett'l'd Steed that has cast his Rider, compared with a Pack-horse loaden with a sack of Salt.

6. The next thing to be considered, touching the *mutual conversation* of these aerial *Genii*, is the *shape* they appear in one to another, of what *Figure* it is, and whether the Figure be *Natural*, or *Arbitrariouſ*, or *Mixt*. For that they must appear in some Figure or other is plain, in that their Vehicles are not of an infinite extension. It is the more general Opinion, that there is no particular Figure that belongs unto them naturally, unless it be that which of all Figures is most simple, and most easy to conform to, even by external helps, which is the equal compression of the Aire on every side of the Vehicle, by which means drops of Dew, and Rain and pellets of Hail come so ordinarily into that shape. Which also will more handsomely accord with the nature of the Soul, supposing she consist of *Central* and *Radial* essence, as I have above described, and the Common *Sensorium* be placed in the midst. In this Figure may the Soul reside in the Aire, and haply melt her self, I mean her Vehicle, into near so equal a liquidity

quidity with that part of that Element adjacent to her, that it may be in some measure like our retiring into secrecy from the sight of men, when we desire to be private by our selves.

7. But she may, if she will, and likely with farre more ease, change this consistency of her Aerial Body into such a degree of thickness, that there may be a dubious discovery of her, as in the glimpse of a Fish under the water, and may still make her self more visible to her fellow-*Genii*, though keeping yet this simple Orbicular form. But what converse there can be betwixt two such heaps of living Aire, I know not. They may indeed communicate their affections one to another in such a way as is discovered in the Eye, wherein the motions of the Spirits doe plainly indicate the Passions of the Minde: so that it may seem possible, in this simple Figure, to make known their joy or grief, peaceableness or wrath, love or dislike, by the modification of the motion of the Spirits of their Vehicle. But how there can well be entertained any Intellectual or Rational Conference, without any further organization of their Aiery Bodies, I profess my self at a loss to understand.

8. Wherefore the *Genii* and *separate Souls*, whatever their shape be in private, appear

appear in a more operose and articulate form when they are to converse with one another. For they can change their Figure in a manner as they please, by Axiome 34. Which power, I conceive, will be made use of not onely for service, but ornament and pulchritude. And the most unexceptionable Beauty, questionless, is that of Man in the best patterns (chuse what Sex you will) and far above the rest of Creatures; which is not our judgement onely, but His that made us. For certainly he would give to the Principal of *terrestrial Animals* the noblest form and shape; which though it be much obscured by our unfortunate Fall, yet questionless the defacement is not so great, but that we may have a near guess what it has been heretofore. It is most rational therefore to conclude, that the Aerial *Genii* converse with one another in *Humane shape*, at least the better sort of them.

9. But the difficulty now is, whether that Humane shape that the Soul transforms her Vehicle into, be simply the effect of the *Imperium* of her Will over the Matter she actuates, or that her Will may be in some measure limited or circumscribed in its effect by a concomitant exertion of the *Plastic* power; so that what proceeds from the Will may be onely more general, that is,

is, That the Souls Will may onely command the Vehicle into an Animal form; but that it is the form or shape of a Man may arise in a more natural way from the concomitant exertion of the *Plastick* vertue. I say, in a more easy and natural way: For vehemency of desire to alter the Figure into another representation may make the appearance resemble some other creature: But no forced thing can last long. The more easy and natural shape therefore that, at least, the better *Genii* appear in, is *Humane*: which if it be granted, it may be as likely that such a determinate Humane shape may be more easy and natural then another, and that the Soul, when she wills to appear in personal Figure, will transform her Vehicle into one constant likeness, unless she disguise her self on set purpose. That is, the *Plastick* power of every Soul, whether of Men, or of the other *Genii*, does naturally display it self into a different modification of the Humane shape, which is the proper Signature of every particular or individual person: which though it may be a little changed in Generation by vertue of the Imagination of the Parents, or quality of their seed, yet the Soul set free from that Body she got here, may exquisitely recover her ancient form again.

10. Not that the *Plastick* virtue, awakened by the *Imperium* of her Will, shall renew all the lineaments it did in this *Earthly* Body (for abundance of them are useless and to no purpose, which therefore, Providence so ordaining, will be silent in this *airy* figure, and onely such operate as are fit for this separate state; and such are those as are requisite to perfect the visible feature of a Person, giving him all parts of either ornament or use for the pleasure of rational converse,) nor that this *Efformative* power does determine the whole appearance alone (for these aerial Spirits appear variously clad, some like beautiful Virgins, others like valiant Warriours with their Helmets and Plumes of feathers, as *Philostratus* would make us believe *Achilles* did to *Apollonius*;) But there is a mixt action and effect, resulting partly from the freeness of the Will and Imagination, and partly from the natural propension of the *Plastick* virtue, to cast the Vehicle into such a personal shape.

11. Which Prerogative of the Soul, in having this power thus to shape her Vehicle at will, though it may seem very strange, because we doe not see it done before our eyes, nor often think of such things; yet it is not much more wonderful then that she organizes the *Fetus* in the womb, or that we

can move the parts of our Body meerly by our Will and Imagination. And that the aerial Spirits can doe these things, that they can thus shape their Vehicles, and transform themselves into several Appearances, I need bring no new instances thereof. Those Narrations I have recited in my *Third Book against Atheism* doe sufficiently evince this Truth. And verily, considering the great power acknowledged in Imagination by all Philosophers, nothing would seem more strange, then that these Aiery Spirits should not have this command over their own Vehicles, to transform them as they please.

12. For there are some, and they of no small note, that attribute so wonderful effects to that Faculty armed with confidence and belief (to which Passion *Fear* may in some manner be referred, as being a strong belief of an imminent evil, and that it will surely take effect, as also vehement *Desire*, as being accompanied with no small measure of perswasion that we may obtain the thing desired, else Desire would not be so very active) I say, they attribute so wonderful force to Imagination, that they affirm that it will not onely alter a mans own Body, but act upon anothers, and that at a distance; that it will inflict diseases on the
sound,

Sound, and heal the sick ; that it will cause Hail, Snows and Winds ; that it will strike down an Horse or Camel, and cast their Riders into a ditch ; that it will doe all the feats of Witchcraft, even to the making of Ghosts and Spirits appear, by transforming the adjacent Aire into the shape of a person that cannot onely be felt and seen, but heard to discourse, and that not onely by them whose Imagination created this airy *Spectrum*, but by other by-standers, whose Fancy contributed nothing to its existence. To such an extent as this have *Avicenna*, *Alcazel*, *Paracelsus*, *Pomponatius*, *Vaninus* and others, exalted the power of humane Imagination : which if it were true, this transfiguration of the Vehicles of the separate Souls and *Genii* were but a trifle in comparison thereof.

CHAP. VI.

1. *More credible Instances of the effects of Imagination.*
2. *A special and peculiar Instance in Signatures of the Fœtus.*
3. *That what Fienus grants, who has so cautiously bounded the power of Fancy, is sufficient for the present purpose.*
4. *Examples approved of by Fienus.*
5. *Certain*

tain Examples rejected by him, and yet approved of by Fernelius and Sennertus.

6. Three notorious Stories of the power of the Mothers Imagination on the Foetus, out of Helmont. 7. A conjectural inference from those Stories, what influence the Spirit of Nature has in all Plastick operations. 8. A further confirmation of the Conjecture from Signatures on the Foetus. 9. An application thereof to the transfiguration of the Vehicles of Dæmons.

1. **B**UT I shall contain my belief within more moderate bounds, that which the most sober Authors assent to being sufficient for our turn; and that is the power of *Imagination* on our own Bodies, or what is comprehended within our own, viz. the *Fœtus* in the Womb of the Mother. For that *Imagination* will bring real and sensible effects to pass is plain, in that some have raised diseases in their own Bodies by too strongly imagining of them; by fancying bitter or soure things, have brought those real sapours into their mouths, at the remembering of some filthy Object, have saln a vomiting; at the imagining of a Potion, have saln a purging; and many such things of the like nature. Amongst which, that of prefixing to ones self what time in the morning

ning we will wake, is no less admirable then any. Which alterations upon the Spirits for the production of such qualities, is every not as hard as the ranging them into new figures or postures. But the hardest of all is, to make them so determinately active, as to change the shape of the Body, by sending out knobs like horns, as it hapned to *Cypus*, of which *Agrippa* speaks in his *Occult. Philosoph.* Which I should not have repeated here, had I not been credibly informed of a later example of the like effect of Imagination, though upon more fancyful grounds. That *feare* has killed some, and turned others gray, is to be referred to Imagination also: the latter of which examples is a signe that the *Plastick* power of the Soule has some influence also upon the very haire: which will make it less marvellous that the Soules Vehicle may be turned into the live effigies of a Man, not a haire, that is necessary to the perfecting of his representation, being excluded, free Imagination succeeding or assisting the *Plastick* power in the other state.

2. But of all Examples, those of the *Signatures* of the *Fetus* by the Imagination of the Mother come the nearest to our purpose. For we may easily conceive, that as the *Plastick* power in the *Fetus* is directed

or seduced by the force of the Mothers Fancy; so the Efformative virtue in Souls separate and the *Genii* may be governed and directed or perverted by the force of their Imagination. And so much the more surely by how much the union is more betwixt the Imagination of the Soule and her own Plastick faculty, then betwixt her and the Plastick power of another Soule; and the capacity of being changed, greater in the yielding aerial Vehicle, then in the grosser rudiments of the *Fetus* in the Womb.

3. And yet the effects of the force of the Mothers Imagination in the signing of the *Fetus* is very wonderful, and almost beyond belief, to those that have not examined these things. But the more learned sort both of Physitians and Philosophers are agreed on the truth thereof, as *Empedocles*, *Aristotle*, *Pliny*, *Hippocrates*, *Galen*, and all the modern Physitians, being born down into assent by daily experience. For these Signatures of less extravagance and enormity are frequent enough, as the similitude of Cherries, Mulberries, the colour of Claret-wine spilt on the woman with child, with many such like instances. And if we stand but to what *Fienus* has defined in this matter, who has, I think, behaved himself as cautiously and modestly as may be, there

will

will be enough granted to assure us of what we aime at. For he does acknowledge that the Imagination of the Mother may change the figure of the *Fetus* so as to make it beare a resemblance, though not absolutely perfect, of an Ape, Pig, or Dog, or any such like Animal. The like he affirms of colours, haire, and excrescencies of several sorts: that it may produce also what is very like or analogous to horns and hoofs, and that it may encrease the bigness and number of the parts of the Body.

4. And though he does reject several of the examples he has produced out of Authors, yet those which he admits for true are Indications plain enough, what we may expect in the Vehicle of a *departed Soule* or *Damon*. As that of the Hairy girle out of *Marcus Damascenus*; that other out of *Gnilielmus Paradinus*, of a Child whose skin and nails resembled those of a Bear; and a third out of *Balduinus Ronsaus*, of one born with many excrescencies coloured and figured like those in a Turkey-cock; and a fourth out of *Pareus*, of one who was born with an head like a Frog; as lastly that out of *Avicenna*, of chickens with hawks heads. All which deviations of the *Plastick* power hapned from the force of Imagination in the Females, either in the time of Concep-

tion, or gestation of their young.

5. But he scruples of giving assent to others, which yet are assented to by very learned writers. As that of Black-moores being born of white Parents, and white Children of black, by the exposal of pictures representing an Æthiopian or European: which those two excellent Physitians, *Fernelius* and *Sennertus*, both agree to. He rejects also that out of *Cornelius Gemma*, of a Child that was born with his Forehead wounded and running with blood, from the husbands threatning his wife, when she was big, with a drawn sword which he directed towards her Forehead. Which will not seem so incredible, if we consider what *Sennertus* records of his own knowledg, viz. That a Woman with child seeing a Butcher divide a Swines head with his Cleaver, brought forth her Child with its face cloyen in the upper jaw, the palate, and upper lip to the very nose.

6. But the most notorious instances of this sort are those of *Helmont De injectis materialibus*. The one of a Taylors wife at *Mechlin*, who standing at her doore, and seeing a souldiers hand cut off in a quarrel, presently fell into labour, being struck with horror at the spectacle, and brought forth a child with one hand, the other arm bleed-

ing

ing without one, of which wound the infant died by the great expense of blood. Another woman, the wife of one *Marcus De Vogeler* Merchant of *Antwerp*, in the year 1602. seeing a souldier begging who had lost his right arme in *Ostend-siege*, which he shewed to the people still bloody, fell presently into labour, and brought forth a Daughter with one arme struck off, nothing left but a bloody stump to employ the Chirurgions skill: this woman married afterwards to one *Hoochcamer* Merchant of *Amsterdam*, and was yet alive in the year 1638. as *Helmont* writes. He adds a third example, of another Merchants wife which he knew, who hearing that on a morning there were thirteen men to be beheaded (this hapned at *Antwerp* in Duke *D' Alva* his time) she had the curiosity to see the execution. She getting therefore a place in the Chamber of a certain widow-woman, a friend of hers that dwelt in the market-place, beheld this Tragick spectacle; upon which she suddainly fell into labour, and brought forth a perfectly-formed infant, onely the head was wanting, but the neck bloody as their bodies she beheld that had their heads cut off. And that which does still advance the wonder is, that the hand, arme, and head of these infants, were none of them

to be found. From whence *Van-Helmont* would infer a penetration of corporeal dimensions; but how groundlessly I will not dispute here.

7. If these Stories he recites be true, as I must confess I do not well know how to deny them, he reporting them with so honest and credible circumstances; they are notable examples of the power of Imagination, and such as do not onely win belief to themselves, but also to others that *Firinus* would reject, not of this nature onely we are upon, of wounding the body of the Infant, but also of more exorbitant conformation of parts, of which we shall bring an instance or two anon. In the mean time, while I more carefully contemplate this strange virtue and power of the Soule of the Mother, in which there is no such measure of purification or exaltedness, that it should be able to act such miracles, as I may call them, rather then natural effects; I cannot but be more then usually inclinable to think that the *Plastick* faculty of the Soule of the Infant, or whatever accessions there may be from the Imagination of the Mother, is not the adæquate cause of the formation of the *Fætus*: a thing which *Plotinus* somewhere intimates by the by, as I have already noted, viz. That the Soule of
the

the World, or *the Spirit of Nature*, assists in this performance. Which if it be true, we have discovered a Cause proportionable to so prodigious an Effect. For we may easily conceive that the deeply-impassioned fancy of the Mother snatches away *the Spirit of Nature* into consent: which Spirit may rationally be acknowledged to have a hand in the efformation of all vital Beings in the World, and haply be the onely Agent in forming of all manner of Plants. In which kinde whether she exert her power in any other Elements then Earth and Water, I will conclude no further, then that there may be a possibility thereof in the calmer Regions of *Aire* and *Aether*. To the right understanding of which conjecture, some light will offer it self from what we have said concerning the Visibility and Consistency of the aerial *Demons* in their occurrences one with another.

8. But this is not the onely Argument that would move one to think that this *Spirit of Nature* intermeddles with the Efformation of the *Fetus*. For those Signatures that are derived on the Infant from the Mothers fancy in the act of Conception, cannot well be understood without this Hypothesis. For what can be the Subject of that Signature? Not the *Plastick* part of
the

the Soul of the Mother ; for that it is not the Mothers Soul that efforms the *Embryo*, as *Sennertus* ingeniously conjectures from the manner of the efformation of Birds, which is in their Egges, distinct from the Hen, and they may as well be hatched without any Hen at all, a thing ordinarily practised in *Egypt* ; nor the Body of the *Embryo*, for it has yet no Body ; nor its Soul, for the Soul, if we believe *Aristotle*, is not yet present there. But the *Spirit of Nature* is present every where, which snatcht into consent by the force of the Imagination of the Mother, retains the Note, and will be sure to seal it on the Body of the Infant. For what rude inchoations the Soul of the World has begun in the Matter of the *Fœtus*, this Signature is comprehended in the whole design, and after compleated by the presence and operation of the particular Soul of the Infant, which cooperates conformably to the pattern of the Soul of the World, and insists in her footsteps ; who having once begun any hint to an entire design, she is alike able to pursue it in any place, she being every where like or rather the same to her self. For as our Soul being one, yet, upon the various temper of the Spirits, exerts her self into various imaginations and conceptions ; so the Soul of
the

the World, being the same perfectly every where, is engaged to exert her efformative power every where alike, where the Matter is exactly the same. Whence it had been no wonder, if those Chickens above-mentioned with Hawks heads had been hatched an hundred miles distant from the Hen, whose Imagination was disturbed in the act of Conception: because the Soul of the World had begun a rude draught, which it self would as necessarily pursue every where, as a *Geometrician* certainly knows how to draw a Circle that will fit three Points given.

9. This Opinion therefore of *Plotinus* is neither irrational nor unintelligible, That the *Soul of the World* interposes and insinuates into all generations of things, while the Matter is fluid and yielding. Which would induce a man to believe, that she may not stand idle in the transfiguration of the Vehicles of the *Demons*, but assist their fancies and desires, and so help to cloath them and attire them according to their own pleasures: or it may be sometimes against their wills, as the unwieldiness of the Mothers Fancy forces upon her a Monstrous birth.

CHAP. VII.

1. *Three notable Examples of Signatures, rejected by Fienus :* 2. *And yet so farre allowed for possible, as will fit our design.* 3. *That Helmonts Cherry and Licetus his Crab-fish are shrewd arguments that the Soul of the World has to do with all Efformations of both Animals and Plants.* 4. *An Example of a most exact and lively Signature out of Kircher :* 5. *With his judgement thereupon.* 6. *Another Example out of him of a Child with gray hairs.* 7. *An application of what has been said hitherto, concerning the Signatures of the Foetus, to the transfiguration of the airy Vehicles of separate Souls and Demons.* 8. *Of their personal transformation visible to us.*

1. **T**Hose other Examples of the Signation of the *Fœtus* from the Mothers Fancy, which *Fienus* rejecteth, the one of them is out of *Wierus*, of a man that threatened his wife when she was bigge with child, saying, she bore the Devil in her womb, and that he would kill him: whereupon, not long after, she brought forth a Child well shaped from the middle downwards, but

up.

upwards spotted with black and red spots, with eyes in its forehead, a mouth like a *Satyre*, ears like a Dog, and bended horns on its head like a Goat. The other out of *Ludovicus Vives*, of one who returning home in the disguise of a Devil, whose part he had acted on the Stage, and having to doe with his wife in that habit, saying he would beget a Devil on her, impregnated her with a Monster of a shape plainly diabolical. The third and most remarkable is out of *Peramatus*, of a Monster born at *S. Lawrence* in the *West-Indies*, in the year 1573. the narration whereof was brought to the Duke of *Medina Sidonia* from very faithful hands. How there was a Child born there at that time, that besides the horrible deformity of its mouth, ears and nose, had two horns on the head, like those of young Goats, long hair on the body, a fleshy girdle about his middle, double, from whence hung a peece of flesh like a purse, and a bell of flesh in his left hand, like those the *Indians* use when they dance, white boots of flesh on his legges, doubled down: In brief, the whole shape was horrid and diabolical, and conceived to proceed from some fright the Mother had taken from the antick dances of the *Indians*, amongst whom the Devil himself does not fail to appear sometimes.

2. These

2. These Narrations *Ficinus* rejects, not as false, but as not being done by any natural power, or if they be, that the descriptions are something more lively than the truth. But in the mean time he does freely admit, that by the meer power of Imagination there might be such excrescencies as might represent those things that are there mentioned; though those diabolical shapes could not have true horns, hoofs, tail, or any other part, specifically distinct from the nature of Man. But so farre as he acknowledges is enough for our turn.

3. But *Fortunius Licetus* is more liberal in his grants, allowing not onely that the Births of women may be very exquisitely distorted in some of their parts into the likeness of those of Brutes, but that Chimerical imaginations in Dreams may also effect it, as well as Fancies or external Objects when they are awake. Of the latter sort whereof he produces an Example that will more then match our purpose, of a *Sicilian* matron, who by chance beholding a Crab in a Fishermans hand new caught, and of a more then ordinary largeness, when she was brought to bed, brought forth a Crab (as well as a Child) perfectly like those that are ordinarily caught in the Sea. This was

told

told him by a person of credit, who both knew the Woman, and saw the Crab she brought forth. *Helmonts* Cherry he so often mentions, and how it was green, pale, yellow, and red; at the times of year other Cherries are, is something of this nature; that is to say, comes near to the perfect species of a *Cherry*, as this did of a *Crab*, the plantal life of a *Cherry* being in some measure in the one, as the life of an Animal was perfectly in the other. Which confirms what we said before, that strength of our Desire and Imagination may snatch into consent the *Spirit of Nature*, and make it act: which once having begun, leaves not off, if Matter will but serve for to work upon; and being the same in all places, acts the same upon the same Matter, in the same circumstances. For the *Root* and *Soul* of every Vegetable is the *Spirit of Nature*; in virtue whereof this Cherry flourisht and ripened, according to the seasons of the Country where the party was that bore that live Signature. These two instances are very shrewd arguments that the *Soul of the World* has to doe with all Efformations of either *Plants* or *Animals*. For neither the Childs Soul nor the Mothers, in any likelihood, could frame that *Crab*, though the Mother might, by that strange power of Desire and

Imagination, excite the *Spirit of the World* that attempts upon any Matter that is fitted for generation, some way or other, to make something of it; and being determined by the fancy of the Woman, might sign the humid materials in her Womb with the image of her Minde.

4. Wherefore if *Ficinus* had considered from what potent causes *Signatures* may arise, he would not have been so scrupulous in believing that degree of exactness that some of them are reported to have: or if he had had the good hap to have met with so notable an example thereof, as *Kircher* professes himself to have met with. For he tells a story of a man that came to him for this very cause, to have his opinion what a certain strange Signature, which he had on his Arm from his birth, might portend, concerning which he had consulted both *Astrologers* and *Cabbalists*, who had promised great preferments, the one imputing it to the Influence of the Stars, the other to the favour of the sealing Order of Angels. But *Kircher* would not spend his judgement upon a meer verbal description thereof; though he had plainly enough told him, it was the *Pope sitting on his Throne, with a Dragon under his feet, and an Angel putting a Crown on his head.* Wherefore the man

desi-

desirous to hear a further confirmation of these hopes (he had conceived from the favourable conjectures of others) by the suffrage of so learned a man, was willing in private to put off his doublet, and shew his Arm to *Kircher*: who having viewed it with all possible care, does profess that the Signature was so perfect, that it seemed rather the work of Art than of exorbitating Nature, & yet by certain observations he made, that he was well assured it was the work of Nature, and not of Art, though it was an artificial piece that Nature imitated, *viz.* the picture of Pope *Gregory* the thirteenth, who is sometimes drawn according as this Signature did lively represent, namely on a Throne, with a Dragon under his feet, leaning with one hand on his Seat, and bearing the other in that posture in which they give the Benediction, and an Angel removing a Curtain, and reaching a Crown towards his head.

5. *Kircher* therefore leaving the superstitions and fooleries of the spurious *Cabbalists* and *Astrologers*, told him the truth, though nothing so pleasant as their lies and flatteries, *viz.* That this Signature was not impressed by any either influence of the Stars, or Seals of Angels, but that it was the effect of the Imagination of his Mother

that bore him, who in some more then ordinary fit of affection towards this Pope, whose picture she beheld in some Chappel or other place of her devotion, and having some occasion to touch her Arm, printed that image on the Arm of her Child, as it ordinarily happens in such cases. Which doubtless was the true solution of the mystery.

6. The same Author writes, how he was invited by a friend to contemplate another strange miracle (as he thought that did invite him to behold it) that he might spend his judgement upon it. Which was nothing else but an exposed Infant of some fourteen days old, that was gray-hair'd, both head and eye-brows. Which his friend, an Apothecary, look't upon as a grand Prodigy, till he was informed of the cause thereof. That the Mother that brought it forth, being married to an old man whose head was all white, the fear of being surprized in the act of Adultery by her snowy-headed husband, made her imprint that colour on the Child she bore. Which Story I could not omit to recite, it witnessing to what an exact curiosity the power of Fancy will work, for the fashioning and modifying the Matter, not missing so much as the very colours of the hair, as I have already

ready noted something to that purpose.

7. To conclude therefore at length, and leave this luxuriant Theme. Whether it be the Power of Imagination carrying captive the *Spirit of Nature* into consent, or the *Soule of the Infant*, or both; it is evident that the effects are notable, and sometimes very accurately answering the Idea of the Impregnate, derived upon the moist and ductil matter in the Womb : Which yet, not being any thing so yielding as the soft aire, nor the Soule of the Mother so much one with that of the Infant as the separate Soule is one with it self, nor so peculiarly united to the Body of the Infant as the Soule separate with her own Vehicle, nor having any nearer or more mysterious commerce with the *Spirit of Nature*, then she has when her *Plastick* part, by the *Imperium* of her Will and Imagination, is to organize her Vehicle into a certain shape and form, which is a kind of a momentaneous birth of the distinct Personality, of either a *Soule separate*, or any *other Damon* ; it followes, that we may be very secure, that there is such a power in the *Genii* and *Separate Souls*, that they can with ease and accuracy transfigure themselves into shapes and forms agreeable to their own temper and nature.

8. All which I have meant hitherto in reference to their visible congresses one with another. But they are sometimes visible to us also, under some Animal shape, which questionless is much more difficult to them than that other Visibility is. But this is also possible, though more unusual by far, as being more unnatural. For it is possible by Art to compress Aire so, as to reduce it to visible opacity, and has been done by some, and particularly by a friend of *Des-Cartes*, whom he mentions in his Letters as having made this Experiment; the Aire getting this opacity by squeezing the *Globuli* out of it. Which though the separate Souls and Spirits may doe by that directive faculty, Axiome 31. yet surely it would be very painful. For the first Element lying bare, if the Aire be not drawn exceeding close, it will cause an ungratefull heat; and if it be, as unnatural a cold; and so small a moment will make the first Element too much or too little, that it may, haply, be very hard, at least for these interior Spirits, to keep steddily in a due mean. And therefore, when they appear, it is not unlikely but that they soak their Vehicles in some vaporous or glutinous moisture or other, that they may become visible to us at a more easy rate.

C H A P. VIII.

1. *That the Better sort of Genii converse in Humane shape, the Baser sometimes in Bestial.* 2. *How they are disposed to turn themselves into several Bestial forms.* 3. *Of Psellus his αὐγαὶ πυρώδεις, or Igneous splendours of Dæmons, how they are made.* 4. *That the external beauty of the Genii is according to the degree of the inward virtue of their minds.* 5. *That their aerial forme need not be purely transparent, but more finely opaque, and coloured.* 6. *That there is a distinction of Masculine and Feminine beauty in their personal figurations.*

1. **A**fter this Digression, of shewing the facility of the figuring of the Vehicles of the *Genii* into personal shape, I shall return again where we left; which was concerning the Society of these *Genii* and *Souls* separate, and under what shape they converse one with another; which I have already designed to be *Humane*, especially in the better sort of Spirits. And as for the worst kind, I should think that they are likewise for the most part in *Humane* form, though disguised with ugly circumstances; but that they figure themselves also in *Bestial* appearan-

ces; it being so easy for them to transform their Vehicle into what shape they please, and to imitate the figures as dexterously as some *men* will the voices of brute beasts, whom we may hear sing like a Cuckow, crow like a Cock, bellow like a Cow and Calfe, bark like a Dog, grunt and squeak like a Pig, and indeed imitate the cry of almost any Bird or Beast whatsoever. And as easy a matter is it for these lower *Genii* to resemble the shapes of all these Creatures, in which they also appear visibly oftentimes to them that entertain them, and sometimes to them that would willingly shun them.

2. Nor is it improbable, but the variety of their impurities may dispose them to turn themselves into one brutish shape rather than another; as envying, or admiring, or in some sort approving and liking the condition and properties of such and such Beasts: as *Theocritus* merrily sets out the Venerousness of the Goatheard he describes,

Ὁ πόλος ὄκκ' ἐσορῇ τὰ μνησθῆναι οἷα βαλεῖνται,
τάχεται ὀφθαλμῶς, ὅτι ἢ τράγῳ αὐτὸς ἐγένε.

As if he envied the happiness of the Goats, and wisht himself in their stead, in their acts of carnal Copulation. So according to the several bestial properties that symbolize with uncleanness and vitiousness

of the tempers of these *Demons*, they may have a propension to imitate their shape rather than others, and appear ugly, according to the manner and measure of their internal turpitudes.

3. As it is likely also that those *θεοπλάται* or *ἀνυαὶ πυρώδεις*, those *Igneous Splendours* *Psellus* makes mention of, (as the end and scope of the nefarious ceremonies those wicked wretches, he describes, often used) were coloured according to the more or less feculency of the Vehicle of the *Demon* that did appear in this manner, viz. in no personal shape, but by exhibiting a light to the eyes of his abominable Spectatours and Adorers: which, I suppose, he stirred up within the limits of his own Vehicle; the power of his Will and Imagination, by Axiome 31, commanding the grosser particles of the Aire and terrestrial vapours, together with the *Globuli*, to give back every way, from one point to a certain compass, not great, and therefore the more easy to be done. Whence the first Element lyes bare in some considerable measure, whose activity cannot but lick into it some particles of the Vehicle that borders next thereto, and thereby exhibit, not a pure star-like light (which would be, if the first Element thus unbared, and in the midst of pure

pure aire, were it self unmixt with other Matter) but the feculency of those parts that it abrades and converts into fewel, and the foulness of the ambient Vehicle through which it shines, makes it look red and fiery like the Horizontal Sun seen through a thick throng of vapours. Which *fiery splendour* may either onely slide downamongst them, and so pass by with the Motion of the *Demons* Vehicle, which *Pfellus* seems mainly to aime at; or else it may make some stay and discourse with them it approaches, according as I have heard some Narrations. The reason of which lucid appearances being so intelligible out of the Principles of *Cartesius* his Philosophy, we need not conceit that they are nothing but the prestigious delusions of Fancy, and no real Objects, as *Pfellus* would have them; it being no more uncompetible to a *Damon* to raise such a light in his Vehicle, and a purer then I have described, then to a wicked man to light a candle at a tinderbox.

4. But what we have said concerning the purity and impurity of this light, reminds me of what is of more sutable consequence to discourse of here, which is the Splendour and Beauty of personal shape in the better sort of the *Genii*. Which assuredly is greater or lesser, according to the degrees of

Virtue

Vertue and *moral Affections* in them. For even in this Body, that is not so yielding to the powers of the Mind, a man may observe, that according as persons are better or worse inclined, the aire of their visage will alter much, and that vicious courses, defacing the inward pulcritude of the Soul, doe even change the outward countenance to an abhorred hue. Which must therefore necessarily take place, in a far greater measure, in the other state; where our outward form is wholly framed from the inward *Imperium* of our Minde: which by how much more pure it self is, it will exhibit the more irreprehensible pulcritude in the outward feature and fashion of the Body, both for proportion of parts, the spirit and aire of the Countenance, and the ornament of cloaths and attirings: there being an indissoluble connexion in the Soule of the Sense of these three things together, *Vertue*, *Love*, and *Beauty*; of all which she her self is the first Roor, and especially in the separate state, even of outward Beauty it self: whence the converse of the most vertuous there must needs afford the highest pleasure and satisfaction; not onely in point of rational communication, but in reference to external and personal complacency also. For if *Vertue* and *Vice* can be ever seen with outward eyes,

eyes, it must be in these aerial Vehicles, which yield so to the Will and Idea of good and pure affections, that the Soule in a manner becomes perfectly transparent through them, discovering her lovely beauty in all the efflorescencies thereof, to the ineffable enravishment of the beholder.

5. Not that I mean, that there is any necessity that their Vehicle should be as a Statue of fluid *Crystal*; but that those impresses of beauty and ornament will be so faithfully and lively represented, according to the dictates of her inward Sense and Imagination, that if we could see the Soule her self, we could know no more by her then she thus exhibits to our eye: which personal figuration in the extimate parts thereof, that represent the Body, Face and Vestments, may be attempered to so fine an opacity, that it may reflect the light in more perfect colours then it is from any earthly body, and yet the whole Vehicle be so devoid of weight, as it will necessarily keep its station in the Aire. Which we cannot wonder at, while we consider the hanging of the Clouds there, less aerial by far then this consistency we speak of: to say nothing of aerial Apparitions as high as the clouds, and in the same colours and figures as are seen here below, and yet no
reflexi-

reflexions of terrestrial Objects, as I have proved in my Third Book against Atheism.

6. The exact Beauty of the personal shapes and becoming habits of these airy Beings, the briefest and safest account thereof that Philosophy can give, is to referre to the description of such things in Poets: and then, when we have perused what the height and elegancy of their fancy has penn'd down, to write under it, *An obscure Subindication of the transcendent pulcritude of the Aerial Genii, whether Nymphs or Heroes.* For though there be neither Lust, nor difference of Sex amongst them (whence the kindest commotions of minde will never be any thing else but an exercise of *Intellectual love*, whose Object is *Virtue and Beauty*;) yet it is not improbable but that there are some general strictures of discrimination of this Beauty into *Masculine* and *Feminine*: partly because the temper of their Vehicles may incline to this kinde of pulcritude rather than that; and partly because several of these *airial Spirits* have sustained the difference of Sex in this life, some of them here having been Males, others Females: and therefore their History being to be continued from their departure hence, they ought to retain some character, especially so general a one, of what they were here. And it is
very

very harsh to conceit that *Aeneas* should meet with *Dido* in the other World in any other form then that of a Woman: whence a necessity of some slighter distinction of habits, and manner of wearing their hair, will follow. Which dress, as that of the *Masculine* mode, is easily fitted to them by the power of their Will and Imagination: as appears from that Story out of *Peramatus*, of the *Indian* Monster that was born with fleshy boots, girdle, purse, and other things that are no parts of a man, but his cloathing or utensils; and this meetly by the Fancy of his Mother, disturb'd and frighted, either in sleep or awake, with some such ugly appearance as that *Monster* resembled.

CHAP. IX.

1. *A general account of the mutual entertainings of the Genii in the other World.*
2. *Of their Philosophical and Political Conferences.*
3. *Of their Religious Exercises.*
4. *Of the innocent Pastimes and Recreations of the better sort of them.*
5. *A confirmation thereof from the Conventicles of Witches.*
6. *Whether the purer Dæmons have their times of repast or no.*
7. *Whence the bad Genii have their food.*
8. *Of the*

the food and feasting of the better sort of Genii.

1. **WE** have now accurately enough defined in what form or garb the aerial *Genii* converse with one another. It remains we consider how they *mutually entertain* one another in passing away the time. Which is obvious enough to conceive, to those that are not led aside into that blind Labyrinth which the generality of men are kept in, of suspecting *that no representation of the state of these Beings is true, that is not so confounded and unintelligible that a man cannot think it sense, unless he wink with the inward eyes of his Minde, and command silence to all his Rational Faculties.* But if he will but bethink himself, that the immediate instrument of the Soul in this life is the Spirits, which are very congenerous to the body of Angels; and that all our passions and conceptions are either suggested from them, or imprest upon them; he cannot much doubt but that all his Faculties of Reason, Imagination and Affection, for the general, will be in him in the other state as they were here in this: namely, that he will be capable of Love, of Joy, of Grief, of Anger; that he will be able to imagine, to discourse, to remember, and the rest of such

such operations as were not proper to the Fabrick of this earthly Body, which is the Officine of Death and Generation.

2. Hence it will follow, that the Souls of men deceased, and the rest of the aerial *Demons*, may administer much content to one another in mutual Conferences concerning the nature of things, whether *Moral*, *Natural*, or *Metaphysical*. For to think that the quitting the earthly Body entitles us to an Omniscieny, is a Fable never enough to be laught at. And *Socrates*, somewhere in *Plato*, presages, that he shall continue his old Trade when he comes into the other World; convincing and confounding the idle and vain-glorious *Sophists* wherever he went. And by the same reason *Platonists*, *Aristotelians*, *Stoicks*, *Epicureans*, and whatever other sects and humors are on the Earth, may in likelihood be met with there, so far as that estate will permit; though they cannot doubt of all things we doubt of here. For these aerial Spirits know that themselves *are*, and that the Souls of men *subsist* and *act* after death, unless such as are too deeply tinctured with *Avenroism*. But they may doubt whether they will hold out for ever, or whether they will perish at the conflagration of the World, as the *Stoicks* would have them. It may be also a great contro-

controversie amongst them, whether *Pythagoras's* or *Ptolemies* Hypothesis be true concerning the Motion of the Earth; and whether the Stars be so bigge as some define them. For these lower *Demons* have no better means then we to assure themselves of the truth or falshood of these Opinions. Besides the discourse of News, of the affairs as well of the *Earth* as *Aire*. For the *aerial Inhabitants* cannot be less active then the *terrestrial*, nor less busie, either in the performance of some solemn exercises, or in carrying on designs party against party; and that either more Private or more Publick; the events of which will fill the *aerial Regions* with a quick spreading fame of their Actions. To say nothing of prudential conjectures concerning future successes beforehand, and innumerable other entertains of Conference, which would be too long to reckon up, but bear a very near analogy to such as men pass away their time in here.

3. But of all Pleasures, there are none that are comparable to those that proceed from their joynt exercise of Religion and Devotion. For their Bodies surpassing ours so much in tenuity and purity, they must needs be a fitter soil for the Divinest thoughts to spring up in, and the most delicate and most enravishing affections to-

wards their Maker. Which being heightened by sacred Hymns and Songs, sung with voices perfectly imitating the sweet passionate relishes of the sense of their devout minds, must even melt their Souls into Divine Love, and make them swim with joy in God. But these kinds of exercises being so highly rapturous and ecstatical, transporting them beyond the ordinary limits of their Nature, cannot in Reason be thought to be exceeding frequent; but as a solemn Repast, after which they shall enjoy themselves better for a good space of time after.

4. Wherefore there be other entertainments, which though they be of an inferiour nature to these, yet they farre exceed the greatest pleasure and contentments of this present state. For the *Animal life* being as essential to the Soul as union with a Body, which she is never free from; it will follow that there be some fitting gratifications of it in the other World. And none greater can be imagined then *Sociableness* and *Personal complacency*, not onely in rational discourses, which is so agreeable to the Philosophical Ingeny, but innocent Pastimes, in which the Musical and Amorous propension may be also recreated. For these three dispositions are the flower of all the rest, as *Plat-*

tinus

has somewhere noted: And his reception into the other World is set out by Apollo's Oracle, from some such like circumstances as these.

Μετ' ὁμῶν γὰρ ἔρχεται ἦδ' αὖ
 Δαμνίλῳ ἐρατοῖσιν ἀναπνεύσαν ἀπταῖς.
 Ἐστ' ἐνὶ μὲ φιλότις, εἰ δ' ἴμαρ αἶβρος ἰδέσθαι
 Εὐπροσύνῃς πλείων καθαρῇ πληρῦμεν αἶεν
 Ἀμβροσίων ὀχατ' ὅδε δέν· ὅδιν' ἔστιν ἐρώτων
 Πάμπαντα καὶ γλυκερὴ πνοὴ καὶ γένεμα αἰδήρ.

Of the meaning of which Verses that the Reader may not quite be deprived, I shall render their sense in this careless paraphrase:

*Now the blest meetings thou arriv'st unto
 Of th' airy Genii, where soft winds do blow,
 Where Friendship, Love, & gentle sweet Desire
 Fill their thrice-welcome guests with joys entire,
 Ever supply'd from that immortal Spring
 Whose streams pure Nectar from great Love
 doe bring:*

*Whence kind converse and amorous eloquence
 Warm their chaste minds into the highest sense
 Of Heav'nly Love, whose myst'ries they declare
 Midst the fresh breathings of the peaceful Aire.*

And he holds on, naming the happy company the Soul of Plotinus was to associate with, viz. Pythagoras, Plato, and the purer

Spirits of the Golden Age, and all such as made up the Chorus of immortal *Love* and *Friendship*. These sing, and play, and dance together, reaping the lawful pleasures of the very *Animal life*, in a far higher degree than we are capable of in this World. For every thing here does as it were tast of the cask, and has some coarseness and foulness with it. The sweet motions of the Spirits in the passion of *Love* can very hardly be commanded off from too near bordering upon the shameful sense of *Lust*; the Fabrick of the terrestrial Body almost necessitating them to that deviation. The tenderer *Ea* cannot but feel the rude thumpings of the wood, and gratings of the rosin, the harshness, or some harshness and untunableness or other, in the best consorts of Musical Instruments and Voices. The judicious *Eye* cannot but espy some considerable defect in either the proportion, colour, or the aire of the face, in the most fam'd and most admired beauties of either Sex: to say nothing of the inconcinnity of their deportment and habits. But in that other state, where the Fancy consults with that first Exemplar of Beauty, *Intellectual Love* and *Vertue*, and the Body is wholly obedient to the imagination of the Minde, and will to every Punctilio yield to the impresses of that inward pattern;

tern; nothing there can be found amiss, every touch and stroak of motion and Beauty being conveyed from so judicious a power through so delicate and depurate a Medium. Wherefore they cannot but enravish one anothers Souls, while they are mutual Spectators of the perfect pulcritude of one anothers persons, and comely carriage, of their graceful dancing, their melodious singing and playing, with accents so sweet and soft, as if we should imagine the Aire here of it self to compose Lessons, and send forth Musical sounds without the help of any terrestrial Instrument. These, and such like Pastimes as these, are part of the happiness of the best sort of the aerial *Genii*.

5. Which the more certain knowledge of what is done amongst the inferiour *Demons* will further assure us of. For it is very probable that their Conventicles, into which Witches and Wizzards are admitted, are but a depraved adumbration of the friendly meetings of the superiour *Genii*. And what Musick, Dancing and Feasting there is in these, the free confession of those Wretches, or fortuitous detection of others, has made manifest to the World, viz. How Humane and Angelical *Beauty* is transformed there into Bestial *Deformity*, the chief in the company ordinarily appearing in the Figures of

Satyres, Apes, Goats, or such like ugly Animals; how the comely deportments of Body, into ridiculous gesticulations, perverse postures and antick dances; and how innocuous love and pure friendship degenerates into the most brutish lust and abominable obscenity that can be imagined: of which I will adde nothing more, having spoke enough of this matter in the Appendix to my *Antidote* Chap. 12.

6. What is most material for the present, is to consider, whether as the Musick and Dancing of these lower and more deeply-lapsed *Demons*, are a distorted imitation of what the higher and more pure *Demons* doe in their Regions; so their Feasting may not be a perverted resemblance of the others Banquetings also: that is to say, it is worth our enquiring into, whether they doe not eat and drink as well as these. For the rich amongst us must have their repast as well as the poor, and Princes feed as well as Prisoners, though there be a great difference in their diet. And I must confess, there is no small difficulty in both, whence the good or bad *Genii* may have their food; though it be easy enough to conceive that they may feed and refresh their Vehicles. For supposing they doe vitally actuate some particular portion of the Aire that they drive along with

with them, which is of a certain extent, it is most natural to conceive, that partly by local motion, and partly by the activity of their thoughts, they set some particles of their Vehicles into a more then usual agitation, which being thus moved, scatter and perspire; and that so the Vehicle lessens in some measure, and therefore admits of a recruite: which must be either by formal repast, or by drawing in the crude Aire only, which haply may be enough; but it being so like it self alwaies, the pleasure will be more flat. Wherefore it is not improbable but that both may have their times of Refection, for pleasure at least, if not necessity; which will be the greater advantage for the *Good*, and the more exquisite misery for the *Bad*, they being punishable in this regard also.

7. But, as I said, the greatest difficulty is to give a rationall account whence the bad *Genii* have their food, in their execrable feasts, so formally made up into dishes. That the materials of it is a vaporous aire, appears as well from the faintness and emptiness of them that have been entertained at those feasts, as from their forbidding the use of *Salt* at them, it having a virtue of dissolving of all aqueous substances, as well as hindering their congelation, but how the

Aire is moulded up into that form and consistency, it is very hard to conceive: whether it be done by the meer power of Imagination upon their own Vehicles, first dabled in some humidities that are the fittest for their design, which they change into these forms of Viands, and then withdraw, when they have given them such a figure, colour, and consistency, with some small touch of such a sapour or tincture: or whether it be the priviledge of these *Aerial Creatures*, by a sharp Desire and keen Imagination, to pierce the *Spirit of Nature*, so as to awaken her activity, and engage her to the compleating in a moment, as it were, the full design of their own wishes, but in such matter as the Element they are in is capable of, which is this crude and vaporous Aire; whence their food must be very dilute and flashie, and rather a mockery then any solid satisfaction and pleasure.

8. But those Superiour *Demons*, which inhabit that part of the Aire that no storm nor tempest can reach, need be put to no such shifts, though they may be as able in them as the other. For in the tranquillity of those upper Regions, that *Promus-Conducus* of the *Universe*, the *Spirit of Nature*, may silently send forth whole Gardens and Orchards of most delectable fruits and flowers, of an
requi-

equilibrinous ponderosity to the parts of the Aire they grow in, to whose shape and colours the transparency of these Plants may add a particular lustre, as we see it is in precious Stones. And the *Chymists* are never quiet till the heat of their fancy have calcined and vitrified the Earth into a crystalline pellucidity, conceiting that it will be then a very fine thing indeed, and all that then growes out of it : which desirable Spectacle they may haply enjoy in a more perfect manner, whenever they are admitted into those higher Regions of the Aire. For the very Soile then under them shall be transparent, in which they may trace the very Roots of the Trees of this *Superiour Paradise* with their eyes, and if it may not offend them, see this opake Earth through it, bounding their sight with such a white splendour as is discovered in the full Moon, with that difference of brightness that will arise from the distinction of Land and Water ; and if they will recreate their palats, may tast of such Fruits, as whose natural juice will vie with their noblest Extractions and Quintessences. For such certainly will they there find the blood of the Grape, the rubie-coloured Cherries, and Nectarines. And if for the compleating of the pleasantness of these habitations, that they

they may look less like a silent and dead solitude, they meet with Birds & Beasts of curious shapes and colours, the single accents of whose voices are very grateful to the ear, and the varying of their notes perfect musical harmony; they would doe very kindly to bring us word back of the certainty of these things, and make this more then a *Philosophical Conjecture*. But that there may be *Food* and *Feasting* in those higher aerial Regions, is less doubted by the Platonists; which makes *Maximus Tyrinus* call the Soul, when she has left the Body, *θρέμμα αἰθέριον* and the above-cited Oracle of *Apollo* describes the felicity of that Chorus of immortal Lovers he mentions there, from feasting together with the blessed *Genii*,

—Ὅσοις κἄρ ἐν θαλίῃσιν
Ἄϊεν εὐφροσυνῶσιν ἰαίνεσθαι.

So that the *Nectar* and *Ambrosia* of the Poets may not be a meer fable. For the *Spirit of Nature*, which is the immediate instrument of God, may enrich the fruits of these *Aerial Paradises* with such liquors, as being received into the bodies of these purer *Demons*, and diffusing it self through their Vehicles, may cause such grateful motions analogical to our tast, and excite such a more then ordinary quickness in their mindes,
and

and benign cheerfulness, that it may far transcend the most delicate Refection that the greatest Epicures could ever invent upon Earth; and that without all satiety and burdensomeness, it filling them with nothing but Divine Love, Joy, and Devotion.

CHAP. X.

1. *How hard it is to define any thing concerning the Aerial or Æthereal Elysiums.*
2. *That there is Political order and Lawes amongst these airy Dæmons.*
3. *That this Chain of Government reaches down from the highest Æthereal Powers through the Aerial to the very Inhabitants of the Earth.*
4. *The great security we live in thereby.*
5. *How easily detectible and punishable wicked Spirits are by those of their own Tribe.*
6. *Other reasons of the security we find our selves in from the gross infestations of evil Spirits.*
7. *What kind of punishments the Aerial Officers inflict upon their Malefactours.*

1. **I** Might enlarge my self much on this Subject, by representing the many Concamerations of the Aerial and Æthereal Elysiums,

Elysiums, depainting them out in all the variety of their Ornaments : but there is no prudence of being lavish of ones pen in a matter so lubricous and Conjectural. Of the bare existence whereof we have no other ground, then that otherwise the greatest part of the Universe by infinite measure, and the most noble, would lye as it were uncultivate, like a desert of Sand, wherein a man can spie neither Plant nor living Creature. Which though it may seem as strange, as if Nature should have restrained all the Varieties she would put forth to one contemptible Mole-hil, and have made all the rest of the Earth one Homogeneal surface of dry clay or stone, on which not one sprig of Grass, much less any Flower or Tree, should grow, nor Bird nor Beast be found once to set their foot thereon: yet the *Spirits* of us *Mortals* being too pusillanimous to be able to grapple with such vast Objects, we must resolve to rest either ignorant, or sceptical, in this matter.

2. And therefore let us consider what will more easily fall under our comprehension, and that is the *Polity* of the *asery Demons*. Concerning which, that in general there is such a thing among them, is the most assuredly true in it self, and of the most use to us to be perswaded of. To know their

their particular *orders* and *customs* is a more needles Curiosity. But that they doe lye under the restraint of Government, is not onely the opinion of the *Pythagoreans* (who have even to the nicity of *Grammatical Criticisme* assigned distinct names to the Law that belongs to these Three distinct ranks of Beings, ἀνθρώποι, δαίμονες and θεοί, calling the Law that belongs to the first Νομος, the second Δίκη, and the third Θέμις) but it is also the easy and obvious suggestion of ordinary Reason, that it must needs be so, and especially amongst the Aerial *Genii* in these lower Regions, they being a mixt rabble of good and bad, wise and foolish, in such a sense as we may say the Inhabitants of the Earth are so, and therefore they must naturally fall under a Government, and submit to Lawes, as well & for the same reasons as Men doe. For otherwise they cannot tolerably subsist, nor enjoy what rights may some way or other appertain to them. For the Souls of men deceased and the *Demons*, being endued with corporeal Sense, by Axiome 30. and therefore capable of *Pleasure* and *Pain*, and consequently of both Injury and Punishment, it is manifest, that having the use of Reason, they cannot fail to mould themselves into some Political form or other, and so to be divided

divided into Nations and Provinces, and to have their Officers of State, from the King on his Throne to the very lowest and most abhorred Executioners of Justice.

3. Which invisible Government is not circumscribed within the compass of the airy Regions, but takes hold also on the Inhabitants of the Earth, as the Government of Men does on several sorts of brute Beasts, and the *Æthereal* Powers also have a Right and Exercise of Rule over the Aerial. Whence nothing can be committed in the World against the more indispensable Laws thereof, but a most severe and inevitable punishment will follow: every Nation, City, Family and Person, being in some manner the *Peculium*, and therefore in the tutelage, of some invisible Power or other, as I have above intimated.

4. And such Transgressions as are against those Laws without whose observance the Creation could not subsist, we may be assured are punished with Torture intolerable, and infinitely above any Pleasure imaginable the evil *Genii* can take in doing of those of their own Order, or us Mortals, any mischief. Whence it is manifest that we are as secure from their gross outrages (such as the firing of our houses, the stealing away our jewels, or more necessary Utensils, murdering

dering our selves or children, destroying our cattle, corn, and other things of the like sort,) as if they were not *in rerum natura*. Unless they have some special permission to act, or we our selves enable them by our rash and indiscreet tampering with them, or suffer from the malice of some person that is in league with them. For their greatest liberty of doing mischief is upon that account; which yet is very much limited, in that all these Actions must pass the consent of a visible person, not hard to be discovered in these unlawful practices, and easy to be punished by the Law of Men.

5. And the Aerial *Genii* can with as much ease inflict punishment on one another, as we Mortals can apprehend, imprison, and punish such as transgress against our Laws. For though these *Demons* be invisible to us, yet they are not so to their own Tribe: nor can the activity and subtilty of the Bad over-master the Good Commonwealthsmen there, that uphold the Laws better then they are amongst us. Nor may the various Transfiguration of their shapes conceal their persons, no more then the disguises that are used by fraudulent men. For they are as able to discern what is fictitious from what is true. and natural amongst themselves, as we are amongst our selves. And every Aerial

rial Spirit being part of some *Political Subdivision*, upon any outrage committed, it will be an easy matter to hunt out the Malefactor. No *Demon* being able so to transfigure himself, but upon command he will be forced to appear in his natural and usual form, not daring to deny upon examination to what particular *Subdivision* he belongs. Whence the easy discovery of their miscarriages, and certainty of insupportable torment, will secure the World from all the disorder that some scrupulous wits suspect would arise from this kinde of Creatures, if they were in Being.

6. To which we may adde also, That what we have, is useles to them, and that it is very hard to conceive that there are many Rational Beings so degenerate as to take pleasure in ill, when it is no good to themselves. That *Socrates* his Aphorism, Πᾶς ὁ μυχθὲρ ἀγνοεῖ, may be in no small measure true in the other World, as well as in this. That all that these evil Spirits desire, may be onely our lapse into as great a degree of Apostasy from God as themselves, and to be full partakers with them of their false Liberty; as debauched persons in this life love to make Proselytes, and to have respect from their Nurslings in wickedness. And several other Considerations there

there are that serve for the taking away this Panick fear of the incursions and molestations of these aerial Inhabitants, and might further silence the suspicious Atheist; which I willingly omit, having said more then enough of this Subject already. See Cap. 3. Sect. 7, 8.

7. If any be so curious, as to demand what kinde of Punishment this *People of the Air* inflict upon their Malefactors, I had rather referre them to the Fancies of *Cornelius Agrippa, De Occult. Philosoph. Lib. 3. Cap. 41.* then be laught at my self for venturing to descend to such particularities. Amongst other things he names their Incarceration, or confinement to most vile and squalid Habitations. His own words are very significant: *Accedunt etiam vilissimorum ac teterrimorum locorum habitacula, ubi Aethæi ignes, aquarum ingluvies, fulgurum & tonitruorum concussus, terrarum voragine, ubi Regio lucis inops, nec radiorum Solis capax, ignaræque splendoris syderum, perpetua tenebris & noctis specie caligat.* Whence he would make us believe, that the subterraneous caverns of the Earth are made use of for Dungeons for the wicked *Demons* to be punished in: as if the several *Volcano's*, such as *Aetna, Vesuvius, Hecla*, and many others, especially in *America*, were so many Prisons

or houses of Correction for the unruly *Genii*. That there is a tedious restraint upon them upon villanies committed, and that intolerable, is without all question; they being endued with corporeal Sense, and that more quick and passive then ours, and therefore more subject to the highest degrees of torment. So that not onely by incarcerating them, & keeping them in by a watch, in the caverns of burning Mountains, where the heat of those infernal Chambers and the steam of Brimstone cannot but excruciate them exceedingly, but also by commanding them into sundry other Hollows of the ground, noysome by several fumes and vapours, they may torture them in several fashions and degrees, fully proportionable to the greatest crime that is in their power to commit, and farre above what the cruellest Tyranny has inflicted here, either upon the guilty or innocent. But how these Confinements and Torments are inflicted on them, and by what Degrees and Relaxations, is a thing neither easy to determine, nor needful to understand. Wherefore we will surcease from pursuing any further so unprofitable a Subject, and come to the Third general Head we mentioned, which is, *What the Moral condition of the Soul is when she has left this Body.*

CHAP. XI.

1. Three things to be considered before we come to the moral condition of the Soul after death: namely, her Memory of transactions in this life. 2. The peculiar feature and individual Character of her Aerial Vehicle. 3. The Retainment of the same Name. 4. How her ill deportment here lays the train of her Misery hereafter. 5. The unspeakable torments of Conscience worse then Death, and not to be avoided by dying. 6. Of the hideous tortures of external sense on them, whose searedness of Conscience may seem to make them incapable of her Lashes. 7. Of the state of the Souls of the more innocent and conscientious Pagans. 8. Of the natural accruments of After-happiness to the morally good in this life. 9. How the Soul enjoys her attainings or sufferings in this Life for an indispensable Cause, when she has passed to the other. 10. That the reason is proportionably the same in things of less consequence. 11. What mischief men may create to themselves in the other world by their Zealous mistakes in this. 12. That though there were no Memory after Death, yet the manner of our Life here may sow

the seeds of the Souls future happiness or misery.

2. **FOR** the better solution of this Question, there is another first in nature to be decided; namely, *Whether the Soul remembers any thing of this Life after Death.* For *Aristotle* and *Cardan* seem to deny it; but I do not remember any reasons in either that will make good their Opinion. But that the contrary is true, appears from what we have already proved *Lib. 2. Cap. 11. viz. That the immediate seat of Memory is the Soul her self, and that all Representations with their circumstances are reserved in her, not in the Spirits* (a thing which *Vaninus* himself cannot deny) *nor in any part of the Body.* And that the Spirits are onely a necessary Instrument whereby the Soul works; which while they are too cool and gross and watery, Oblivion creeps upon her, in that measure that the Spirits are thus distempered; but the disease being chased away, and the temper of the Spirits rectified, the Soul forthwith recovers the memory of what things she could not well command before, as being now in a better state of Activity. Whence, by the 33. Axiome, it will follow, that her Memory will be rather more perfect after Death, and Conscience more nimble

imble to excuse or accuse her according to her Deeds here.

2. It is not altogether beside the purpose to take notice also, That the natural and usual Figure of the Souls *Aerial Vehicle* bears a resemblance with the feature of the party in this life; it being most obvious for the *Plastick part* (at the command of the Will to put forth into personal shape) to fall as near to that in this life as the new state will permit. With which act the *Spirit of Nature* haply does concur, as in the figuration of the *Fetus*; but with such limits as becomes the Aerial Congruity of life, of which we have spoke already: as also how the proper Idea or Figure of every Soul (though it may deflect something by the power of the Parents Imagination in the act of Conception, or Gestation, yet) may return more near to its peculiar semblance afterwards, and so be an unconcealable Note of *Individuality*.

3. We will adde to all this, the Retainment of the same Name which the deceased had here, unless there be some special reason to change it: so that their persons will be as punctually distinguisht and circumscribed as any of ours in this life. All which things, as they are most probable in themselves, that they will thus naturally fall out,

so they are very convenient for administration of Justice, and keeping of Order in the other State.

4. These things therefore premised, it will not be hard to conceive how the condition of the Soul after this life depends on her *Moral* deportment here. For *Memory* ceasing not, *Conscience* may very likely awake more furiously then ever; the Mind becoming a more clear Judge of evil Actions past, then she could be in the *Flesh*, being now stript of all those circumstances and concurrences of things that kept her off from the opportunity of calling her self to account, or of perceiving the ugliness of her own ways. Besides, there being that communication betwixt the *Earth* and the *Air*, that at least the fame of things will arrive to their cognoscence that have left this life; the after ill success of their wicked enterprises and unreasonable transactions may arm their tormenting *Conscience* with new whips and stings, when they shall either hear, or see with their eyes, what they have unjustly built up, to run with shame to ruine, and behold all their designs come to nought, and their fame blasted upon *Earth*.

5. This is the state of such Souls as are capable of a sense of dislike of their past actions:

actions : and a man would think they need no other punishment then this, if he consider the mighty power of the Minde over her own Vehicle, and how vulnerable it is from her self. These Passions therefore of the Soule that follow an ill Conscience, must needs bring her airy body into intolerable distempers, worse then Death it self. Nor yet can she die if she would, neither by fire, nor sword, nor any means imaginable ; no not if she should fling her self into the flames of smoaking *Aetna*. For suppose she could keep her self so long there, as to indure that hideous pain of destroying the *vital Congruity* of her Vehicle by that sulphureous fire ; she would be no sooner released, but she would catch life again in the Aire, and all the former troubles and vexations would return, besides the overplus of these pangs of Death. For Memory would return, and an ill Conscience would return, and all those busie Furies, those disordered Passions which follow it. And thus it would be, though the Soule should kill her self a thousand and a thousand times ; she could but pain and punish her self, not destroy her self.

6. But if we could suppose some mens Consciences seared in the next state as well as this, (for certainly there are that make

it their business to obliterate all sense of difference of Good and Evil out of their minds; & hold it to be an high strain of wit (though it be nothing else but a piece of bestial stupidity) to think there is no such thing as *Vice* and *Vertue*, and that it is a principall part of perfection, to be so degenerate as to act according to this Principle without any remorse at all;) these men may seem to have an excellent priviledge in the other world, they being thus armour-proof against all the fiery darts of that domestick Devil: As if the greatest security in the other life were, to have been compleatly wicked in this. But it is not out of the reach of meer Reason and Philosophy to discover, that such bold and impudent wretches as have lost all *inward* sense of Good and Evil; may there against their wills feel a lash in the *outward*. For the divine *Nemesis* is excluded out of no part of the Universe; and Goodness and Justice, which they condemn here, will be acquainted with them in that other state, whether they will or no. I speak of such course Spirits that can swallow down Murder, Perjury, Extortion, Adultery, Buggery, and the like gross crimes, without the least disgust, and think they have a right to satisfy their own Lust, though it be by never so great injury against their

their Neighbour. If these men should carry
it with impunity, there were really no Pro-
vidence, and themselves were the truest
Prophets and faithfulllest Instructors of man-
kind, divulging the choicest *Arcanum* they
have to impart to them, namely *That there*
is no God. But the case stands quite otherwise.
For whether it be by the importunity of
them they injure in this life, who may meet
with them afterward, as *Cardan* by way of
objection suggests in his Treatise of this
Subject; or whether by a general deser-
tion by all of the other world that are able
to protect, (such Monsters as I describe be-
ing haply far less in proportion to the num-
ber of the other state, then these here are to
this,) they will be necessarily exposed to
those grim and remorseless *Officers of Justice*,
who are as devoid of all sense of what is
good as those that they shall punish. So that
their penalty shall be inflicted from such as
are of the same principles with themselves,
who watch for such booties as these, and
when they can catch them, dress them and
adorn them according to the multifarious
petulancy of their own unaccountable hu-
mours; and taking a speciall pride and plea-
sure in the making and seeing Creatures
miserable, fall upon their prey with all eage-
rness and alacrity, as the hungry Lions on a
condemned

condemned malefactor, but with more ferocity and insultation by far. For having more wit, and, if it be possible, less goodness than the Soule they thus assault, they satiate their lascivient cruelty with all manner of abuses and torments they can imagine, giving her onely so much respite as will serve to receive their new inventions with a fresher smart and more distinct pain. Neither can any Reason or Rhetorick prevail with them, no Expostulation, Petition or Submission. For to what purpose can it be, to expostulate about injury and violence with them whose deepest reach of wit is to understand this one main Principle, *That every ones Lust, when he can act with impunity, is the most sacred and sovereign Law*. Or what can either Petitions or Submissions doe with those who hold it the most contemptible piece of fondness and silliness that is, to be intreated to recede from their own Interest? And they acknowledging no such thing as *Vertue* and *Vice*, make it their onely interest to please themselves in what is agreeable to their own desires: and their main pleasure is, to excruciate and torture, in the most exquisite wayes they can, as many as Opportunity delivers up to their power. And thus we see how, in the other life, the proud conceited *Atheist* may at last feel the

had inconvenience of his own Practises and Principles. For even those that pleased themselves in helping him forward, while he was in this life, to that high pitch of wickedness, may haply take as much pleasure to see him punisht by those *grim Executioners*, in the other. Like that sportful cruelty (which some would appropriate to *Nero's* person) of causing the *Vestal* virgins to be ravishd, and then putting them to death for being so.

7. But this Subject would be too tedious and too Tragical to insist on any longer. Let us cast our eyes therefore upon a more tolerable Object, and that is The state of the Soul that has, according to the best opportunity she had of knowledge, liv'd vertuously and conscientiously, in what part or Age of the world soever. For though this *Moral Innocency* amongst the *Pagans* will not amount to what our Religion calls *Salvation*; yet it cannot but be advantageous to them in the other state, according to the several degrees thereof; they being more or less Happy or Miserable, as they have been more or less Vertuous in this life. For we cannot imagine why God should be more harsh to them in the other world then in this, nothing having happened to them to alienate his affection but Death; which was not in their power

power to avoid, and looks more like a punishment than a fault: though it be neither to those that are well-meaning and conscientious, and not professed contemners of the wholesome suggestions of the light of Nature, but are lovers of Humanity and Vertue. For to these it is onely an entrance into another life,

— *Ad amœna vireta*

Fortunatorum nemorum, sedesq; beata.

Which Truth I could not conceal, it being a great prejudice to *Divine Providence* to think otherwise. For to those that are free, her wayes will seem as unintelligible in overloading the simple with punishment, as in not rewarding the more perfectly righteous and illuminate. For from a fault in either they will be tempted to a misbelief of the whole, and hold no Providence at all.

8. Let there therefore be peculiar privileges of Morality, every where, to those that pass into the other State. For unless God make a stop on purpose, it will naturally follow, that Memory after Death suggesting nothing but what the Conscience allows of, much Tranquillity of minde must result from thence, and a certain health and beauty of the Aerial Vehicle; also better
Company

Company and Converse, and more pleasant Tracts and Regions to inhabit. For what *Platinus* speaks of the extreme degrees, *Ennead. 4. Lib. 4. Cap. 45.* is also true of the intermediate, else Divine Justice would be very maime. For a man, saith he, having once appropriated to himself a pravity of temper, and united with it, is known well what he is; and according to his nature is thrust forward to what he propends to, both here, and departed hence, and so shall be pulled by the drawings of Nature into a futable place. But the Good man his Receptions and Communications shall be of another sort, by the drawing as it were of certain hidden strings transposed and pulled by Natures own fingers. So admirable is the power and order of the Universe, all things being carried on in a silent way of Justice, which none can avoid, and which the wicked man has no perception nor understanding of, but is drawn, knowing nothing whither in the Universe he ought to be carried. But the good man both knows and goes whither he ought, and discerns before he departs hence where he must inhabit, and is full of hopes that it shall be with the Gods. This large Paragraph of *Platinus* is not without some small Truth in it, if rightly limited and understood; but seems not to reach at all the Circumstances and accruments of happiness to the Soul in
the

the other State, which will naturally follow her from her transactions in this life.

9. For certainly, according to the several degrees of Benignity of Spirit, and the desire of doing good to mankind in this life, and the more ample opportunities of doing it, the felicity of the other World is redoubled upon them; there being so certain communication and intercourse betwixt both. And therefore they that *act* or *suffer* deeply in such Causes as God will maintain in the World, and are just and holy at the bottome, (and there are some Principles that are indispensably such, which Providence has countenanced both by Miracles, the suffrages of the Wisest men in all Ages, and the common voice of Nature) those that have been the most Heroical Abettors and Promoters of these things in this life, will naturally receive the greater contentment of Minde after it, being conscious to themselves how seriously they have assisted what God will never desert, and that Truth is mighty, and must at last prevail; which they are better assured of out of the Body, then when they were in it.

10. Nor is this kinde of access of Happiness to be confined onely to our furtherance of what is of the highest and most indispensable consideration here, but in proportion

portion touches all transactions that proceed from a vertuous and good principle, whereof there are several degrees: amongst which those may not be esteemed the meanest that refer to a National good. And therefore those that, out of a natural generosity of Spirit and successful fortitude in Warre, have delivered their Country from bondage, or have been so wise and understanding in Politicks, as to have contrived wholesome Laws for the greater happiness and comfort of the People, while such a Nation prospers and is in being, it cannot but be an accrument of happiness to these so considerable Benefactors, unless we should imagine them less generous and good in the other World, where they have the advantage of being Better. And what I have said in this more notable instance, is in a degree true in things of smaller concernment, which would be infinite to rehearse. But whole Nations, with their Laws and Orders of Men, and Families may fail, and therefore these accessions be cut off; but he that laies out his pains in this life, for the carrying on such designs as will take place so long as the World endures, and must have a compleat Triumph at last, such a one laies a train for an everlasting advantage in the other World, which, in despite of all the tumblings

blings and turnings of unsetled fortune, will be sure to take effect.

11. But this matter requires Judgement as well as Heat and Forwardness. For pragmatical Ignorance, though accompanied with some measure of Sincerity and well-meaning, may set a-foot such things in the World, or set upon record such either false, or impertinent and unseasonable, Principles, as being made ill use of, may very much prejudice the Cause one desires to promote, which will be a sad spectacle for them in the other State. For though their simplicity may be pardonable, yet they will not fail to finde the ill effect of their mistake upon themselves. As he that kills a friend in stead of an enemy, though he may satisfy his Conscience that rightly pleads his innocency, yet he cannot avoid the sense of shame and sorrow that naturally follows so mischievous an error.

12. Such accruencies as these there may be to our enjoyments in the other World, from the durable traces of our transactions in this, if we have any *Memory* of things after Death, as I have already demonstrated that we have. But if we had not, but *Aristotles* and *Cardan's* Opinion were true, yet *Vertue* and *Piety* will not prove *onely* useful for this present state. Because according to
our

our living here, we shall hereafter, by a hidden concatenation of Causes, be drawn to a condition answerable to the purity or impurity of our Souls in this life: that silent *Nemesis* that passes through the whole contexture of the Universe, ever fatally contriving us into such a state as we our selves have fitted our selves for by our accustomed actions. Of so great consequence is it, while we have opportunity, to aspire to the best things.

CHAP. XII.

1. *What the Spirit of Nature is.* 2. *Experiments that argue its real Existence; such as that of two strings tuned Unisons.*
3. *Sympathetick Cures and Tortures.*
4. *The Sympathy betwixt the Earthly and Astral Body.* 5. *Monstrous Births.* 6. *The Attraction of the Loadstone and Roundness of the Sun and Stars.*

1. **WE** had now quite finished our Discourse, did I not think it convenient to answer a double expectation of the Reader. The one is touching the *Spirit of Nature*, the other the producing of Objections that may be made against our con-

cluded Assertion of the Souls Immortality. For as for the former, I can easily imagine he may well desire a more punctual account of that Principle I have had so often recourse to, then I have hitherto given, and will think it fit that I should somewhere more fully explain what I mean by the terms, and shew him my strongest grounds why I conceive there is any such Being in the World. To hold him therefore no longer in suspense, I shall doe both in this place. *The Spirit of Nature* therefore, according to that notion I have of it, is, *A substance incorporeal, but without Sense and Animadversion, pervading the whole Matter of the Universe, and exercising a plastical power therein according to the sundry predispositions and occasions in the parts it works upon, raising such Phanomena in the World, by directing the parts of the Matter and their Motion, as cannot be resolved into meer Mechanical powers.* This rude Description may serve to convey to any one a conception determinate enough of the nature of the thing. And that it is not a meer Notion, but a real Being, besides what I have occasionally hinted already (and shall here again confirm by new instances) there are several other considerations may perswade us.

2. The first whereof shall be concerning those

those experiments of *Sympathetick Pains*,
Asswagements and Cures, of which there
are many Examples, approved by the most
scrupulous Pretenders to sobriety and judg-
ment, and of all which I cannot forbear to
pronounce, that I suspect them to come to
pass by some such power as makes strings
that be tuned Unisons (though on several
Instruments) the one being touched, the
other to tremble and move very sensibly;
and to cast off a straw or pin or any such
small thing laid upon it. Which cannot be
resolved into any *Mechanical* Principle,
though some have ingeniously gone about
it. For before they attempted to shew the
reason, why that string that is not *Unison*
to that which is struck should not leap and
move, as it doth that is, they should have
demonstrated, that by the meer Vibration
of the Aire that which is *Unison* can be so
moved; for if it could, these Vibrations
would not fail to move other Bodies more
movable by farre then the string it self that
is thus moved. As for example, if one hung
loose near the string that is struck a small
thread of silk or an hair with some light
thing at the end of it, they must needs re-
ceive those reciprocal Vibrations that are
communicated to the *Unison* string at a far
greater distance, If the meer motion of the

material Aire caused the subsultation of the string tuned Unison. Which yet is contrary to experience. Besides that, if it were the meer Vibration of the Aire that caused this tremor in the *Unison* string, the effect would not be considerable, unless both the strings lay well-nigh in the same Plane, and that the Vibration of the string that is struck be made in that Plane they both lie in. But let the string be struck so as to cut the Plane perpendicularly by its tremulous excursions, or let both the strings be in two several Planes at a good distance above one another, the event is much-what the same, though the Aire cannot rationally be conceived to vibrate backwards and forwards, but well-nigh in the very Planes wherein the strings are moved. All which things do clearly shew, that pure *corporeal* causes cannot produce this effect: and that therefore we must suppose, that both the strings are united with some one *incorporeal* Being, which has a different *Unity* and *Activity* from *Matter*, but yet a *Sympathy* therewith, which affecting this *immaterial* Being, makes it affect the *Matter* in the same manner in another place, where it does symbolize with that other in some predisposition or qualification, as these two strings doe in being tuned *Unisons* to one another: and this, with-

out

out sending any particles to the Matter it does thus act upon; as my thought of moving of my Toe being represented within my Brain, by the power of my Soul I can, without sending Spirits into my Toe, but onely by making use of them that are there, move my Toe as I please, by reason of that *Unity* and *Activity* that is peculiar to my Soul as a spiritual substance that pervades my whole Body. Whence I would conclude also, that there is some such Principle as we call the *Spirit of Nature*, or the *Inferiour Soul of the World*, into which such Phænomena as these are to be resolved.

3. And I account *Sympathetick Cures*, Pains and Asswagements to be such. As for example, when in the use of those *Magnetick Remedies*, as some call them, they can make the wound dolorously hot or chill at a great distance, or can put it into perfect ease, this is not by any agency of emissary Atoms. For these hot Atoms would cool sufficiently in their progress to the party through the frigid aire; and the cold Atoms, if they could be so active as to dispatch so far, would be warm enough by their journey in the Summer Sun. The inflammations also of the Cowes Udder by the boyling over of the milk into the fire, the scalding of mens entrails at a distance by the burning of their

excrements, with other pranks of the like nature, these cannot be rationally resolved into the recourse of the Spirits of Men or Kine mingled with fiery Atoms, and so repairing the parts thus affected, because the minuteness of those Atoms argues the futility of their extinction, as the smallest wires made red hot soonest cool. To all which you may adde that notable example of the Wines working when the Vines are in the flower, and that this sympathetick effect must be from the Vines of that country from which they came: whence these exhalations of the Vineyards must spread as far as from *Spain* and the *Canaries* to *England*; and by the same reason must reach round about every way as far from the *Canaries*, besides their journey upwards into the Aire. So that there will be an Hemisphere of vineall Atoms of an incredible extent, unless they part themselves into trains, and march onely to those places whither their Wines are carried. But what corporeal cause can guide them thither? Which question may be made of other Phænomena of the like nature. Whence again it will be necessary to establish the Principle I drive at, though the effects were caused by the transmission of Atoms.

4. The notablest examples of this *Mundane*

dance Sympathy are in histories more uncertain and obscure, and such as, though I have been very credibly informed, yet, as I have already declared my self, I dare onely avouch as possible, viz. the Soules of men leaving their Bodies, and appearing in shapes suppose of *Cats, Pigeons, Wezels*, and sometimes of Men, and that whatever hurt befalls them in these *Astral* bodies, as the *Paracelsians* love to call them, the same is inflicted upon their *Terrestrial* lying in the mean time in their beds or on the ground. As if their *Astral bodies* be scalded, wounded, have the back broke, the same certainly happens to their *Earthly bodies*. Which things if they be true, in all likelihood they are to be resolved into this Principle we speak of, and that the *Spirit of Nature* is snatched into consent with the imagination of the Soules in these *Astral* bodies or *airy Vehicles*. Which act of imagining must needs be strong in them, it being so set on and assisted by a quick and sharp pain and fright in these scaldings, woundings, and stroaks on the back; some such thing happening here as in women with child, whose Fancies made keen by a suddain fear, have deprived their children of their arms, yea and of their heads too, as also appears by two remarkable stories Sr. *Kenelme Digby* re-

lates in his witty and eloquent *Discourse of the Cure of Wounds by the powder of Sympathy*, besides what we have already recited out of *Helmont*. See *Lib. 2. Cap. 15. Scil.* 8, 9, 10.

5. Which effects I suppose to be beyond the power of any humane Fancy unassisted by some more forceable Agent; as also that prodigious birth he mentions of a woman of *Carcaffona*, who by her overmuch sporting and pleasing her self with an Ape while she was with Child, brought forth a Monster exactly of that shape. And if we should conclude with that learned Writer, that it was a real Ape, it is no more wonderfull, nor so much, as that birth of a Crabfish or Lobster we have above mentioned out of *Fortunius Licetus*; as we might also other more usual, though no less monstrous births for the wombs of women to bear. Of which the Soul of the Mother cannot be suspected to be the cause, she not so much as being the efformer of her own *Fetus*, as that judicious Naturalist *Dr. Harvey* has determined. And if the Mothers Soule could be the efformer of the *Fetus*, in all reason her *Plastick* power would be ever particular and specifick as the Soul it self is particular. What remains therefore but the *universal Soule of the World* or *Spirit of Nature* that

(can)

can doe these feats : who, *Vertumnus* like, is ready to change his own Activity and the yielding matter into any mode and shape indifferently as occasion engages him, and so to prepare an edifice, at least the more rude stroaks and delineaments thereof, for any specifick Soule whatsoever, and in any place where the Matter will yield to his operations. But the time of the arrival thither of the particular guest it is intended for, though we cannot say how soon it is, yet we may be sure it is not later then a clear discovery of Sensation as well as Vegetation and organization in the Matter.

6. The Attraction of the Load-stone seems to have some affinity with these instances of *Sympathy*. This mystery *Des-Cartes* has explained with admirable artifice as to the immediate corporeal causes thereof, to wit, those wreathed particles which he makes to pass certain screw-pores in the Load-stone and Iron. But how the efformation of these particles is above the reach of the meer mechanical powers in Matter, as also the exquisite direction of their motion, whereby they make their peculiar *Vortex* he describes about the Earth from Pole to Pole, and thread an incrustated Star, passing in a right line in so long a journey as the Diameter thereof without being swung

to the sides ; how these things, I say, are beyond the powers of Matter, I have fully enough declared & proved in a large Letter of mine to V. C. and therefore that I may not *actum agere*, shall forbear speaking any farther thereof in this place. To which you may adde, that meer corporeal motion in Matter, without any other guide, would never so much as produce a round *Sun* or *Star*, of which figure notwithstanding *Des-Cartes* acknowledges them to be. But my reasons why it cannot be effected by the simple Mechanical powers of Matter, I have particularly set down in my Letters to that excellent Philosopher.

CHAP. XIII.

1. *That the Descent of heavy Bodies argues the existence of the Spirit of Nature, because else they would either hang in the Air where they are placed,*
2. *Or would be diverted from a perpendicular as they fall near a Plate of Metall set sloping,*
3. *That the endeavour of the Ether or Aire from the Centre to the Circumference is not the cause of Gravity, against Mr. Hobbs.*
4. *A full confutation of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion.*


5. An ocular Demonstration of the absurd consequence thereof. 6. An absolute Demonstration that Gravity cannot be the effect of meer Mechanical powers. 7. The Latitude of the operations of the Spirit of Nature, how large and where bounded. 8. The reason of its name. 9. Its grand office of transmitting Souls into rightly-prepared Matter.

1. **A**ND a farther confirmation that I am not mistaken therein, is what we daily here experience upon Earth, which is the descending of heavy Bodies, as we call them. Concerning the motion whereof I agree with *Des-Cartes* in the assignation of the immediate corporeal cause, to wit, the *Aethereal* matter, which is so plentifully in the Air over it is in grosser Bodies; but withall doe vehemently surmise, that there must be some immaterial cause, such as we call the *Spirit of Nature* or *Inferiour Soule of the World*, that must direct the motions of the *Aethereal* particles to act upon these grosser Bodies to drive them towards the Earth. For that surplussage of Agitation of the *globular* particles of the *Aether* above what they spend in turning the Earth about, is carried every way indifferently, according to his own concession,

sion; by which motion the drops of liquors are formed into round figures, as he ingeniously concludes. From whence it is apparent, that a bullet of iron, silver or gold placed in the aire is equally assailed on all sides by the occursion of these æthereal particles, and therefore will be moved no more downwards then upwards, but hang *in æquilibrio*, as a piece of Cork rests on the water, where there is neither winde nor stream, but is equally plaid against by the particles of water on all sides.

2. Nor is it imaginable how the occursions of this æthereal Element here against the surface of the Earth, being it is so fluid a Body, should make it endeavour to lift it self from the Earth at so great a distance as the middle Region of the Aire and further. Besides, that this is not the cause of the descent of heavy Bodies is manifest, because then a broad Plate of the most solid Metal and most perfectly polisht, such as is able to reflect the æthereal particles most efficaciously, being placed slooping would change the course of the descent of things, and make them fall perpendicularly to it, and not to the Plane of the Horizon; as for example, not from A to B, but from A to C: which is against experience. For the heavy Body will always fall down from


A to



A to B, though the recession of the æthereal Matter must needs be from C to A according to this Hypothesis.

3. Nor can the endeavour of the celestial Matter from the centre to the circumference take place here. For besides that *Descartes*, the profoundest Master of Mechanics, has declin'd that way himself (though *Mr. Hobbs* has taken it up,) it would follow, that near the Poles of the Earth there would be no descent of heavy Bodies at all, and in the very Clime we live in none perpendicular. To say nothing how this way will not salve the union of that great Water that adheres to the body of the Moon.

4. But to make good what I said, by undeniable proof that heavy Bodies in the very Clime where we live will not descend perpendicularly to the Earth, if *Mr. Hobbs* his solution of the Phænomenon of Gravity be true; we shall evidently demonstrate both to the Eye and to Reason the proportion of their declination from a perpendicular in any Elevation of the Pole. In the Circle



Circle therefore A B D, let the *Aequator* be B D, and from the point C draw a line to E, parallel to B D: which line C E will cut the circle in F 60. degrees, suppose, from B. Imagine now a heavy Body at E, according to Mr. *Hobbs* his solution of the Probleme of Gravity, it must fall towards the Earth in a line parallel to the *Aequator*, viz. in the line E F; which, say I, declines from the line H F drawn perpendicular to the Horizon L K two third parts of a right angle, that is to say, 60. degrees. For the E F H is equal to G F R, which again is equal to the alternate angle B G F, which is two third parts of a right angle *ex thep.* Whence it is plain that E F declines from a perpendicular no less then 60. degrees. By the same reason, if we had drawn the Scheme for the elevation of 30. which is

more

more Southern then our Clime, we might demonstrate that the descent of heavy Bodies declines from a perpendicular to the Horizon 50 degrees, or $\frac{1}{2}$ of a right angle, and so of the rest. From whence it will follow, that men cannot walk upright, but declining, in the elevation suppose of 60. degrees, as near to the ground as E F is to F L, and much nearer in the more remote parts of the North, as in *Norway, Russia, Frisland, Island, Scricfinnia, Greenland* and others; and there is proportionably the same reason in other Climes less Northern. So that Mr. *Hobbs* need not send us so farre off as to the Poles to make the experiment.

3. For if for example we drew a Scheme for the Parallel under which we live, suppose about 52. degrees of Elevation, we might represent truly to the eye in what posture men would walk at *London* or *Cambridge*, according to Mr. *Hobbs* his determination of the causes of Gravity. For it is plain



from

from what has been above demonstrated, that the natural posture of their Bodies upon the Horizon $L K$ would be in the line $E F$, out of which if they did force themselves towards the perpendicular $H F$, it would be much pain to them, neither could they place themselves in the line $H F$, without being born headlong to the ground, and laid flat upon the Horizon $F K$; the force of the Aire or whatever more subtile Elements therein pressing in lines parallel to $E F$, and therefore necessarily bearing down whatever is placed loose in the line $H F$, as is plain to any one at first sight. But we finding no such thing in experience, it is evident that Mr. *Hobbs* his solution is false; nay I may say that he has not rendred so much as a possible cause of this so ordinary a Phænomenon. A thing truly much to be lamented in one who, upon pretence that all the Appearances in the Universe may be resolved into meer Corporeal causes, has with unparallell'd confidence, and not without some wit, derided and exploded all immaterial Substance out of the World; whenas in the mean time he does not produce so much as possible Corporeal causes of the most ordinary effects in Nature. But to leave Mr. *Hobbs* to his own ways, and to return to *Des-Cartes*,

6. Adde unto all this, that if the motion of gross Bodies were according to meer Mechanical laws, a Bullet, suppose of Lead or Gold, cast up into the aire, would never descend again, but would persist in a rectilinear motion. For it being farre more solid then so much Aire & Æther put together as would fill its place, and being moved with no less swiftnes then that wherewith the Earth is carried about in twenty four hours, it must needs break out in a straight line through the thin aire, and never return again to the Earth, but get away as a *Comet* does out of a *Vortex*. And that *de facto* a Cannon Bullet has been shot so high that it never fell back again upon the ground, *Descartes* does admit of as a true experiment. Of which, for my own part, I can imagine no other unexceptionable reason, but that at a certain distance the *Spirit of Nature* in some regards leaves the motion of Matter to the pure laws of Mechanicks, but within other bounds checks it, whence it is that the Water does not swill out of the Moon.

7. Now if the pure Mechanick powers in Matter and Corporeal motion will not amount to so simple a Phænomenon as the falling of a stone to the Earth, how shall we hope they will be the adæquate cause of

H h

sundry

sundry sorts of Plants and other things, that have farre more artifice and curiosity then the direct descent of a stone to the ground. Not are we beaten back again by this discovery into that dotage of the confounded *Schools*, who have indued almost every different Object of our Senses with a distinct *Substantial form*, and then puzzle themselves with endless scrupulosities about the generation, corruption, and mixtion of them. For I affirm with *Des-Cartes*, that nothing affects our Senses, but such variations of Matter as are made by difference of Motion, Figure, Situation of parts, &c. but I dissent from him in this, in that I hold it is not meer and pure mechanical motion that causes all these sensible Modifications in Matter, but that many times the immediate Director thereof is this *Spirit of Nature* (I speak of) one and the same every where, and acting alwaies alike upon like occasions, as a clear-minded man and of a solid judgment gives alwaies the same verdict in the same circumstances. For this *Spirit of Nature* intermeddling with the efformation of the *Fatus* of Animals (as I have already shewn more then once) where notwithstanding there seems not so much need, there being in them a more particular Agent for that purpose; 'tis exceeding rational that

all

all Plants and Flowers of all sorts (in which we have no argument to prove there is any particular Souls) should be the effects of this *Universal Soule of the World*. Which Hypothesis, besides that it is most reasonable in it self, according to that ordinary Axiome, *Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora*, is also very serviceable for the preventing many hard Problems about the *divisibility* of the Soules of Plants, their *Transmutations* into other *Species*, the growing of Slips, and the like. For there is one Soule ready every where to pursue the advantages of prepared Matter. Which is the common and onely λογ. σπερματικis of all *Plantal appearances*, or of whatever other *Phænomena* there be, greater or smaller, that exceed the pure Mechanical powers of Matter. We except onely *Men* and *Beasts*, who having all of them the capacity of some sort of enjoyments or other, it was fit they should have particular Souls for the multiplying of the sense of those enjoyments which the transcendent Wisdom of the Creatour has contrived.

8. I have now plainly enough set down what I mean by the *Spirit of Nature*, and sufficiently proved its Existence. Out of what has been said may be easily conceived why I give it this name, it being a Principle that

is of so great influence and activity in the *Nascency*, as I may so call it, & *Coalescency* of things: And this not onely in the production of Plants, with all other *Concretions* of an inferiour nature, and yet above the meer *Mechanicall* lawes of Matter; but also in respect of the *birth* of *Animals*, whereunto it is preparatory and assistent. I know not whether I may entitle it also to the guidance of *Animals* in the chiefeft of those actions which we usually impute to *natural Instinct*. Amongst which none so famous as the Birds making their Nests, and particularly the artificial structure of the Martins nests under the arches of Church-windowes. In which there being so notable a design unknown to themselves, and so small a pleasure to present Sense, it looks as if they were actuated by another, inspired and carried away in a natural rapture by this *Spirit of Nature* to doe they know not what, though it be really a necessary provision and accommodation for laying their Eggs, and hatching their young, in the efformation whereof this *Inferiour Soule of the World* is so rationally conceived to assist and intermeddle: and therefore may the better be supposed to over-power the Fancy, and make use of the members of the Birds to build these convenient Receptacles, as certain shops to lay up the

the Matter whereon she intends to work, namely the Eggs of these Birds whom she thus guides in making of their nests.

9. But this argument being too lubricous, I will not much insist upon it. The most notable of those offices that can be assigned to the *Spirit of Nature*, and that suitably to his name, is the Translocation of the Souls of Beasts into such Matter as is most fitting for them, he being the common *Prosesnet* or *Contractor* of all natural Matches and Marriages betwixt *forms* and *matter*, if we may also speak Metaphors as well as *Aristotle*, whole Aphorisme it is, that *Materia appetit formam ut femina virum*. This Spirit therefore may have not onely the power of directing the motion of Matter at hand, but also of transporting of particular Souls and Spirits in their state of *Silence* and *Inactivity* to such Matter as they are in a fitness to catch life in again. Which Transportation or Transmission may very well be at immense distances, the effect of this *Sympathy* and *Coactivity* being so great in the working of Wines, as has been above noted, though a thing of less concernment. Whence, to conclude, we may look upon this *Spirit of Nature* as the great *Quarter-master-General* of divine Providence, but able alone, without any under-Officers, to

lodge every Soule according to her rank and merit whenever she leaves the Body: And would prove a very serviceable Hypothesis for those that fancy the præexistence of humane Souls; to declare how they may be conveighed into Bodies here, be they at what distance they will before; and how Matter haply may be so fitted, that the best of them may be fetcht from the purest æthereal Regions into an humane Body, without serving any long Apprentiship in the intermediate Aire: as also how the Souls of Brutes, though the Earth were made perfectly inept for the life of any Animal, need not lye for ever useless in the Universe. But such speculations as these are of so vast a comprehension and impenetrable obscurity, that I cannot have the confidence to dwell any longer thereon; especially they not touching so essentially our present designe, and being more fit to fill a volume themselves, than to be comprised within the narrow limits of my now almost-finished Discourse.

CHAP. XIV.

1. *Objections against the Soule's Immortality from her condition in Infancy, Old age, Sleep and Sicknesſes.* 2. *Other Objections taken from Experiments that ſeem to prove her Diſcernibility.* 3. *As alſo from the ſeldome appearing of the Soules of the de- ceaſed.* 4. *And from our natural fear of Death.* 5. *A Subterfuge of the adverſo party, in ſuppoſing but one Soule common to all Creatures.* 6. *An Answer concerning the Littleneſſ of the Soule in Infancy.* 7. *As alſo concerning the weakneſſ of her Intel- lectualls then, and in Old age.* 8. *That Sleep does not at all argue the Soule's Mor- tality, but rather illuſtrate her Immorta- lity.* 9. *An Answer to the Objection from Apoplexies and Catalepsies.* 10. *As alſo to that from Madneſſ.* 11. *That the vari- ous depravations of her Intellectual Facul- ties doe no more argue her Mortality, then the worſer Modifications of Matter its na- tural Annihilability. And why God crea- ted Soules ſympathizing with Matter.*

1. **A**S for the Objections that are uſually made againſt the Immortality of the Soule; to propound them all, were both

tedious and useles, there being scarce above one in twenty that can appear of any moment to but an indifferent Wit and Judgment. But the greatest difficulties that can be urged I shall bring into play; that the Truth we doe maintain may be the more fully cleared, and the more firmly believed. The most material Objections that I know against the Souls Immortality, are these five. The First is from the consideration of the condition of the Soule in *Infancy*, and *Old age*, as also in *Madness*, *Sleep*, and *Apoplexies*. For if we doe but observe the great difference of our Intellectual operations in *Infancy* and *Dotage* from what they are when we are in the prime of our years, and how that our Wit grows up by degrees, flourishes for a time, and at last decays, keeping the same pace with the changes that Age and Years bring into our Body, which observes the same lawes that Flowers and Plants; what can we suspect, but that the Soule of Man, which is so magnificently spoken of amongst the learned, is nothing else but a Temperature of Body, and that it grows and spreads with it, both in bigness and virtues, and withers and dies as the Body does, or at least that it does wholly depend on the Body in its Operations, and therefore that there is no sense nor percep-

tion

tion of any thing after death? And when the Soule has the best advantage of years, she is not then exempted from those Eclipses of the powers of the Minde that proceed from *Sleep, Madneſs, Apoplexies*, and other Diseases of that nature. All which shew her condition, whatever more exalted Wits surmise of her, that she is but a poor mortal and corporeal thing.

3. The Second Objection is taken from such Experiments as are thought to prove the Soule *divisible* in the grossest sense, that is to say, *discerpible* into pieces. And it seems a clear case in those more contemptible Animals which are called *Insects*, especially the *πὰ μακρὰ ἔχ' πολυποδα*, as *Aristotle* describes them, and doth acknowledge that being cut into pieces, each segment will have its motion and sense apart to it self. The most notable Instance of this kind is in the *Scolopendra*, whose parts *Aristotle* (*Histor. Animal. Lib. 4. Cap. 7.*) affirms to live a long time divided, and to run backwards and forwards, and therefore he will have it to look like many living Creatures growing together, rather than one single one, *Εοίκασι γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζώων πολλοῖς ζώοις συμπεφυκόσι. De Juvent. & Senect. Cap. 2.* But yet he will not afford them the priviledge of Plants, whose Slips will

will live and grow, being set in the Earth. But the instances that belong to this Object on ascend higher, for they pretend that the parts of perfect Animals will also live asunder. There are two main instances thereof. The one, that of the Eagle *Fromondus* mentions, whose head being chopt off by an angry Clown, for quarrelling with his dog, the Body flew over the barn near the place of this rude execution. This was done at *Fromondus* his fathers house: nor is the story improbable, if we consider what ordinarily happens in Pigeons and Ducks, when their heads are cut off. The other instance is, of a Malefactor beheaded at *Antwerp*, whose head when it had given some few jumps into the crowd, and a Dog fell a licking the blood, caught the Dogs eare in its teeth, and held it so fast, that he being frighted ran away with the mans head hanging at his eare, to the great astonishment and confusion of the people. This was told *Fromondus* by an eye-witness of the fact. From which two examples they think may be safely inferred, that the Souls of Men, as well as of the more perfect kinde of Brutes, are also *discerpible*. That example in the same Authour out of *Josephus Acosta*, if true, yet is small to this purpose. For the speaking of the sacrificed Captive, when

his

his Heart was cut out, may be a further confirmation indeed that the Brain is the Seat of the Common Sense, but no argument of the Divisibility of the Soule, she remaining at that time entire in the Body, after the cutting out of the Heart, whose office it is to afford Spirits, which were not so far yet dissipated, but that they sufficed for that suddain operation of life.

3. The Third Objection is from the seldom appearance of the Souls of the deceased. For if they can at all appear, why do they not oftner? if they never appear, it is a strong suspicion that they are not at all in Being.

4. The Fourth is from the Fear of Death, and an inward down-bearing sense in us at sometimes, that we are utterly mortal, and that there is nothing to be expected after this life.

5. The Fifth and last is rather a Subterfuge than an Objection, That there is but *One Common Soul* in all Men and Beasts, that operates according to the variety of Animals and Persons it does actuate and vivificate, bearing a seeming particularity according to the particular pieces of Matter it informs, but is one in all; and that this particularity of Body being lost, this particular Man or Beast is lost, and so every living creature is properly and intirely mortal.

These

These are the reallest and most pertinent Objections I could ever meet withall, or can excogitate, concerning the Souls Immortality: to which I shall answer in order,

6. And to the First, which seems to be the shrewdest, I say, that neither the *Contractedness* of the Soule in *Infancy*, nor the *Weakness* of her Intellectual Operations either *then* or in *extream Old age*, are sufficient proofs of her *Corporeity* or *Mortality*. For what wonder is it that the Soule, faln into this low and fatal condition, where she must submit to the course of Nature, and the lawes of other Animals that are generated here on Earth, should display her self by degrees, from smaller dimensions to the ordinary size of men; whenas this faculty of *contracting and dilating* of themselves is in the very essence and notion of all Spirits: as I have noted already *Lib. 1. Cap. 5.* So she does but that leisurely and naturally now, being subjected to the lawes of this terrestrial Fate, which she does, exempt from this condition, suddainly and freely: not growing by *Juxta-position* of parts, or *Intrusion* of Matter, but inlarging of her self with the Body meerly by the *dilatation* of her own Substance, which is one and the same alwaies.

7. As for the *Debility* of her Intellectuals

in

in *Infancy* and *Old age*, this consideration has less force to evince her a meer corporeal essence then the former, and touches not our Principles at all, who have provided for the very worst surmise concerning the operations of the Minde, in acknowledging them, of my own accord, to depend very intimately on the temper and tenour of the Souls immediate instrument, the Spirits; which being more torpid and watry in Children and Old men, must needs hinder her in such operations as require another constitution of Spirits then is usually in *Age* and *Childhood*: though I will not profess my self absolutely confident, that the Soule cannot act without all dependence on Matter. But if it does not, which is most probable, it must needs follow, that its Operations will keep the lawes of the Body it is united with. Whence it is demonstrable how necessary *Purity* and *Temperance* is to preserve and advance a mans Parts.

8. As for *Sleep*, which the dying Philosopher called the Brother of Death, I doe not see how it argues the Souls Mortality, more then a mans inability to wake again: but rather helps us to conceive, how that though the stounds and agonies of Death seem utterly to take away all the hopes of the Souls living after them; yet upon a recovery

recovery of a quicker Vehicle of Aire, she may suddainly awake into fuller and fresher participation of life then before. But I may answer also, that Sleep being onely the ligation of the outward Senses, and the interception of motion from the external world, argues no more any radical defect of Life and Immortality in the Soule, then the having a mans Sight bounded within the walls of his chamber by Shuts, does argue any blindness in the immured party: who haply is busy reading by candle-light, and that with ease, so small a print as would trouble an ordinary Sight to read it by day. And that the Soule is not perpetually employed in sleep, is very hard for any to demonstrate; we so often remembring our dreams meerly by occasions, which if they had not occurred, we had never suspected we had dreamed that night.

9. Which Answer, as also the former, is applicable to *Apoplexies*, *Catalepsies*, and whatever other Diseases partake of their nature, and witness how nimble the Soule is to act upon the suppeditation of due Matter, and how Life and Sense and Memory and Reason, and all return, upon return of the fitting temper of the Spirits, suitable to that *vital Congruity* that then is predominant in the Soule.

10. And as for *Madness*, there are no Apprehensions so frantick but are arguments of the Souls Immortality, not as they are frantick, but as Apprehensions. For *Matter* cannot apprehend any thing, either wildly or soberly, as I have already sufficiently demonstrated. And it is as irrational for a man to conclude, that the depraved Operations of the Soule argue her Mortality, as that the worser tempers, or figures, or whatever more contemptible modifications there are of Matter, should argue its annihilation by the meer power of Nature; which no man that understands himself will ever admit. The Soule indeed is indued with several Faculties, and some of them very fatally passive, such as those are that have the nearest commerce with Matter, and are not so absolutely in her own power, but that her levity and mindlesness of the divine light may bring her into subjection to them; as all are, in too sad a sort, that are incarcerated in this terrestrial Body, but some have better luck then other some in this wild and audacious ramble from a more secure state. Of which Apostasy if there be some that are made more tragick examples then others of their stragling from their sovereign Happiness; it is but a merciful admonition of the danger we all have incurred,

curr'd, by being where we are ; and very few so well escaped, but that if they could examine their Desires, Designs, and Transactions here, by that Truth they were once masters of, they would very freely confess, that the mistakes and errours of their life are not inferior to, but of worse consequence than, those of natural Fools and Mad-men, whom all either hoot at for their folly, or else lament their misery. And questionless the Souls of Men, if they were once reduced to that sobriety they are capable of, would be as much ashamed of such Desires and Notions they are now wholly engaged in, as any mad-man, reduced to his right Senses, is of those freaks he played when he was out of his wits.

II. But the variety of degrees, or kinds of depravation in the Intellective faculties of the Soule, her Substance being *indiscernible*, cannot at all argue her *Mortality*, no more then the different modifications of Matter the *Annihilability* thereof, as I have already intimated. Nor need a man trouble himself how there should be such a Sympathy betwixt Body and Soule, when it is so demonstrable that there is. For it is sufficient to consider, that it is their immediate nature so to be by the will and ordinance of Him that has made all things. And that if

Matter has no Sense nor Cogitation it self, as we have demonstrated it has not, it had been in vain, if God had not put forth into Being that Order of immaterial Creatures which we call Souls, vitally unitable with the Matter: Which therefore, according to the several modifications thereof, will necessarily have a different effect upon the Soule, the Soule abiding still as unperishable as the Matter that is more mutable then it. For the Matter is *dissipable*, but the Soule is *indissipable*.

 CHAP. XV.

1. *An Answer to the experiment of the Scolopendra cut into pieces.* 2. *And to the flying of an headless Eagle over a barn, as also to that of the Malefactor's head biting a Dog by the ear.* 3. *A superaddition of a difficulty concerning Monsters born with two or more Heads and but one Body and Heart.* 4. *A solution of the difficulty.* 5. *An answer touching the seldome appearing of the Souls of the deceased:* 6. *As also concerning the fear of Death;* 7. *And a down-bearing sense that sometimes so forcibly obtrudes upon us the belief of the*

Souls Mortality. 8. Of the Tragical Pompe and dreadful Preludes of Death, with some corroborative Considerations Against such sad spectacles. 9. That there is nothing really sad and miserable in the Universe, unless to the wicked and impious.

NO R doe those Instances in the second Objection prove any thing to the contrary, as if the Soule it self were really divisible. The most forcible Example is that of the *Scolopendra*, the motion of the divided parts being so quick and nimble, and so lasting. But it is easy to conceive, that the activity of the Spirits in the Mechanical conformation of the pieces of that Insect, till motion has dissipated them, will as necessarily make them run up and down, as Gunpowder in a squib will cause its motion. And therefore the Soule of the *Scolopendra* will be but in one of those Segments, and uncertain in which, but likely according as the Segments be made. For cut a Wasps head off from the Body, the Soule retires out of the head into the Body; but cut her in the waist, leaving the upper part of the Body to the head, the Soule then retires into that forepart of the Wasp. And therefore it is no wonder that the head being cut off, the Body of the Wasp will fly and flutter

later so long, the Soule being still in it, and haply conferring to the direction of the Spirits for motion, not out of Sense, but from custome or nature: as we walk not thinking of it, or play of the Lute though our minde be running on something else, as I have noted before. But when the waist is left to the head, it is less wonder, for then the Animal may not be destitute of sense and fancy, to conveigh the Spirits to move the wings.

2. The former case will fit that of the headless Eagle that flew over the Barn. But the mans head that caught the Dog by the ear would have more difficulty in it (it not seeming so perfectly referrible to the latter case of the Wasp) did not we consider how hard the teeth will set in a swoon. As this Head therefore was gasping while the Dog was licking the blood thereof, his ear danced to dangle into the mouth of it, which closing together as the ear hung into it, pinched it so fast that it could not fall off. Besides it is not altogether improbable, especially considering that some men die upwards, and some downwards, that the Soul may, as it happens, sometimes retire into the Head, and sometimes into the Body, in these decollations, according as they are more or less replenisht with Spirits, and by

the lusty jumping of this Head, it should seem it was very full of them. Many such things as these also may happen by the activity of the *Spirit of Nature*, who, its like, may be as busy in the ruines of Animals, while the Spirits last, as it is in the rudiments of them when they are generated. But the former answers being sufficient, it is needless to enlarge our selves upon this new Theme.

3. To this second Objection might have been added such monstrous Births, as seem to imply the *Perceptive part* of the Soul divided actually into two or more parts. For *Aristotle* seems expressly to affirm, *De Genera. Animal. Lib. 4. Cap. 4.* that that monstrous birth that has two hearts is two Animals, but that which has but one heart is but one. From whence it will follow that there is but one Soul also in that one-hearted Monster, though it have two or more heads; whereas it is also evident, that the *Perceptive part* of that one Soule must be actually divided into two or more. This opinion of *Aristotle Senertus* subscribes to, and therefore conceives that that monstrous child that was borne at *Emmaus*, in *Theodosius* his time, with two heads and two hearts, was two persons; but that other borne Anno 1531. with two heads & but one heart, who lived till he was

a man, was but one person. Which he conceives appears the plainer, in that both the heads professed their agreement perpetually in the same actions, in that they had the same appetite, the same hunger and thirst, spoke alike, had the same desire to lye with their wife, and of all other acts of exonerating nature. But for that other that had two hearts, and was divided to the Navel, there was not this identity of affection and desire, but sometimes one would have a mind to a thing, and sometimes another, sometimes they would play with one another, and sometimes fight. See *Sennert. Epitom. Scient. Natural. Lib. 6. Cap. 1.*

4. But I answer, and first to *Aristotles* authority, that he does not so confidently assert, that every Monster that has but one heart is but one *Animal*. For his words run thus; *Εν δ' ὅτ' ὁ ζῶον ὃ περὶ τῶν δεινῶν πλείων ἀμπεφυκότα δ' εἰ νομίζοντες. ἢ ἀρχὴν ὅσον εἰς πᾶν τὸν πῦρ ἐστὶν ἡ καρδία μέγιστον, τὸ μὲν μίαν ἔχον καρδίαν ἐν ζῶον.* Where he onely speaks hypothetically, not peremptorily, that the Heart is that part where the first Principle of life is, and from which the rest of life in Soul or Body is to be derived. For indeed he makes it elsewhere the seat of Common Sense, but that it is a mistake we have already demonstrated, and himself seems not

confident of his own Opinion, and therefore we may with the less offence decline it, and affirm (and that without all hesitancy) that a Monster is either one or more Animals according to the number of the heads of it, and that there are as many distinct Souls as there are heads in a monstrous Birth. But from the heads downwards the Body being but one, and the heart but one, that there must needs be a wonderful exact concord in the sense of affections in these heads, they having their Blood and Spirits from one fountain, and one common seat of their passions and desires. But questionless whenever one head winked, he could not then see by the eyes of the other; or if one had pricked one of these heads, the other would not have felt it: though whatever was inflicted below, it is likely they both felt alike, both the Souls equally acting the Body of this Monster, but the heads being actuated by them onely in several. Which is a sufficient answer to *Sennertus*.

5. The weakness of the third Objection is manifest, in that it takes away the Existence of all Spirits, as well as the Souls of the deceased. Of whose Being notwithstanding none can doubt that are not dotingly incredulous. We say therefore that the Souls of men, being in the same condition
that

that other Spirits are, appear sometimes, though but seldome. The cause in both being, partly the difficulty of bringing their Vehicles to an unnatural consistency, and partly they having no occasion so to doe, and lastly it being not permitted to them to doe as they please, or to be where they have a minde to be.

6. As for the *Fear of Death*, and that *un-bearring sense* that sometimes so uncontrollably suggests to us that we are wholly mortal: To the first I answer, that it is a necessary result of our union with the Body, and if we should admit it one of the imperfections or infirmities we contract by being in this state, it were a solid Answer. And therefore this fear and presage of ill in Death is no argument that there is any ill in it, nor any more to be heeded then the predictions of any fanatical fellow that will pretend to prophecie. But besides this, it is fitting that there should be in us this fear and abhorrency, to make us keep this station Providence has plac't us in; otherwise every little pet would invite us to pack our selves out of this World, and try our fortunes in the other, and so leave the Earth to be inhabited onely by Beasts, whenas it is to be ordered and cultivated by Men.

7. To the second I answer, that such

peremptory conclusions are nothing but the impostures of Melancholy, or some other dull and fulsome distempers of blood that corrupt the Imagination; but that Fancy proves nothing, by Axiome 4. And that though the Soul enthroned in her *Ethereal Vehicle* be a very magnificent thing, full of Divine Love, Majesty and Tranquillity, yet in this present state she is inclogg'd and accloy'd with the foulness and darkness of this *Terrestrial Body*, she is subject to many fears and jealousies, and other disturbing passions, whose Objects though but a mockery, yet are a real disquiet to her minde in this her Captivity and Imprisonment. Which condition of hers is lively set out by that incomparable Poet and Platonist, *Aeneid. 6.* where, comparing that more free and pure state of our Souls in their celestial or fiery Vehicles with their restraint in this earthly Dungeon, he makes this short and true description of the whole matter.

*Ignens est ollis, vigor, & cælestis origo
Seminibus; quantum non noxia corpora tardant,
Terreniq; hebetant artus, moribundâq; membra.
Hinc metunt, cupiuntque, dolent, gaudentque,
(nec antra
Respiciunt, clausi tenebris & carcere cæco.*

To this sense,

*A fiery vigour from an heavenly source
Is in these seeds, so far as the dull force
Of noxious Bodies does not them retard,
In heavy earth and dying limbs imbar'd.
Hence, fool'd with fears, foul lusts, sharp grief,*

vain joy,

*In this dark Gaol they low and groveling lie,
Nor with one glance of their oblivious minde
Look back to that free Aire they left behinde.*

This is the sad estate of the more deeply-lapsed Souls upon Earth; who are so wholly mastered by the motions of the Body, that they are carried headlong into an assent to all the suggestions and imaginations that it so confidently obtrudes upon them; of which that of our mortality is not the weakest. But such melancholy fancies, that would beare us down so peremptorily that we are utterly extinct in death, are no more argument thereof, then those of them that have been perswaded they were dead already, while they were alive; and therefore would not eat, because they thought the dead never take any repast, till they were cheated into an appetite, by seeing some of their friends disguised in winding-sheets feed heartily at the table, whose example then they thought fit to follow, and so were kept alive.

8. I cannot but confess, that the Tragick pomp and preparation to dying, that lays wast the operations of the minde, putting her into fits of dotage or fury, making the very visage look ghastly and distracted, and at the best sadly pale and consumed, as if Life and Soule were even almost quite extinct, cannot but imprint strange impressions even upon the stoutest minde, and raise suspicions that all is lost in so great a change. But the Knowing and Benign Spirit though he may flow in tears at so dismal a Spectacle, yet it does not at all suppress his hope and confidence of the Souls safe passage into the other world; and is no otherwise moved then the more passionate Spectatours of some cunningly-contrived Tragedy, where persons whose either Vertue, or misfortunes, or both, have wonne the affection of the beholders, are at last seen wallowing in their blood, and after some horrid groans and gasps, lye stretcht stark dead upon the stage: but being once drawn off, find themselves well and alive, and are ready to tast a cup of wine with their friends in the attiring room, to solace themselves really, after their fictitious pangs of death, and leave the easy-natur'd multitude to indulge to their soft passions for an evil that never befell them.

9. The fear and abhorrency therefore we have of Death, and the sorrow that accompanies it, is no argument but that we may live after it, and are but due affections for those that are to be spectators of the great *Tragick-Comedy* of the World; the whole plot whereof being contrived by infinite Wisdom and Goodness, we cannot but surmise that the most sad representations are but a *shew*, but the delight *real* to such as are not wicked and impious; and that what the ignorant call *Evil* in this Universe is but as the shadowy stroaks in a fair picture, or the mournful notes in Musick, by which the beauty of the one is more lively and express, and the melody of the other more pleasing and melting.

CHAP. XVI.

1. That that which we properly are is both *Sensitive and Intellectual*.
2. What is the true notion of a Soul being One.
3. That if there be but One Soule in the world, it is both *Rational and Sensitive*.
4. The most favourable representation of their Opinion that hold but One.
5. A confutation of the foregoing representation.
6. A Reply to the
confu-

confutation. 7. *An answer to the Reply.*
 8. *That the Soule of Man is not properly*
any Ray either of God or the Soule of the
World. 9. *And yet if she were so, it would*
be no prejudice to her Immortality: whence
the folly of Pomponatius is noted. 10. *A*
further animadversion upon Pomponatius
his folly, in admitting a certain number of
remote Intelligencies, and denying Par-
ticular Immaterial Substances in Men and
Brutes.

I. **A**S for the last Objection, or rather Sub-
 terfuge, of such as have no minde to
 finde their Souls immortal, pretending in-
 deed they have none distinct from that one
 Universal Soule of the World, whereby
 notwithstanding they acknowledge that the
 operations we are conscious to our selves
 of, of Reason and other Faculties, cannot
 be without one; we shall easily discover
 either the fallness or unserviceableness of
 this conceit for their design, who would so
 fain sink out of Being, after the mad freaks
 they have played in this Life. For it is ma-
 nifestly true, that a man is most properly
 that, whatever it is, that *animadvert*s in him;
 for that is such an operation that no Be-
 ing but himself can doe it for him. And
 that which *animadvert*s in us does not onely
 perceive

perceive and take notice of its *Intellectual* and *Rational* operations, but of all *Sensations* whatsoever that we are conscious of, whether they terminate in our Body or on some outward Object. From whence it is plain, that *That which we are* is both *Sensitive* and *Intellectual*.

2. Now if we rightly consider what is comprehended in the true and usual notion of the *Unity* of a Soule, it is very manifest that the *Animadversive* thereof is but *one*, and that there is no Sensation nor Perception of any kinde in the Soule, but what is communicated to and perceived by the whole *Animadversive*.

3. Which things being premised, it necessarily follows, that if there be but *one Soule* in the World, that Soule is both *Rational* and *Sensitive*, and that there cannot be any Pain, Pleasure or Speculation, in *one* mans Soule, but the same would be in *all*, nay that a man cannot lash a Dog, or spur a Horse, but himself would feel the smart of it: which is flatly against all experience, and therefore palpably false. Of this wilde Supposition I have spoken so fully in my *Poems*, that I need adde nothing here in this place, having sufficiently confuted it there.

4. But not to cut them so very short, let us

us imagine the most favourable contrivance of their opinion we can, and conceit that though this *Soule of the World* be of it self every where alike, and that the *Animadversive* faculty is in it all in like vigour, yet it being engaged in severally-tempered Bodies, *Animadversion* is confin'd to that part of Matter onely which it actuates, and is stupid and unsensible of all other operations, whether Sensitive or Intellectual, that are transacted by her without, in other persons: a thing very hard to conceive, and quite repugnant to the Idea of the *Unity* of a Soule, not to be conscious to her self of her own perceptions. But let it pass for a possibility, and let us suppose that one part of the Soule of the World informs one man, and another another, or at least some vital Ray there, yet notwithstanding, this opinion will be incumbered with very harsh difficulties. For if several parts of the Soul of the World inform several parts of the Matter, when a man changes his place, he either tears one part of the Soul of the World from another, or else changes Souls every step; and therefore it is a wonder that he changes not his Wits too, and loses his Memory. Unless they will say that every part of the *Soul of the World*, upon the application of a new Body, acts just so in it as that
part

part acted which is left, if there be no change or alteration thereof: whence every part of the Soul of the World will have the self-same Thoughts, Errors, Truths, Remembrances, Pains, Pleasures, that the part had the Body newly left. So that a man shall always fancy it is himself, wherever he goes, though this self be nothing but the Soul of the World acting in such a particular Body, and retaining and renewing to her self the Memory of all Accidents, Impressions, Motions and Cogitations, she had the perception of in this particular piece of organized Matter. This is the most advantageous representation of this Opinion that can possibly be excogitated. But I leave it to those that love to amuse themselves in such mysteries, to try if they can make any good sense of it.

And he that can fancy it as a thing possible, I would demand of him, upon this supposition, who *himself* is; and he cannot deny but that he is a Being *Perceptive* and *Animadversive*, which the *Body* is not; and therefore that himself is not the *Body*; wherefore he is that in him which is properly called *Soul*: But not its *Operations*, for the former reason; because they perceive nothing, but the Soul perceives them in exerting them: nor the *Faculties*, for they perceive

perceive not one anothers Operations; but that which is a mans *Self* perceives them all: Wherefore he must say he is the *Soul*; and there being but one Soul in the World, he must be forc'd to vaunt himself to be the *Soul of the World*. But this boasting must suddainly fall again, if he but consider that the Soul of the World will be every mans personal *Ipseity* as well as his; whence every one man will be *all* men, and *all* men but one Individual man: which is a perfect contradiction to all the Laws of *Metaphysicks* and *Logick*.

6. But reminded of these inconveniences, he will pronounce more cautiously, and affirm that he is not the Soul of the World at large, but onely so far forth as she expedites or exerts her self into the Sense and Remembrance of all those Notions or Impresses that happen to her, whereever she is joyned with his Body; but that so soon as this Body of his is dissipated and dissolved, that she will no longer raise any such determinate Thoughts or Senses that referre to that Union, and that so the Memory of such Actions, Notions and Impressions, that were held together in relation to a particular Body, being lost and laid aside upon the failing of the Body to which they did referre, this *Ipseity* or *Personality* which

confi-

consistd mainly in this, does necessarily perish in death. This certainly is that (if they know their own meaning) which many Libertines would have, who are afraid to meet themselves in the other World, for fear they should quarrel with themselves there for their transactions in this. And it is the handsomest Hypothesis that they can frame in favour of themselves, and farre beyond that dull conceit, *That there is nothing but meer Matter in the World*; which is infinitely more lyable to confutation.

7. And yet this is too scant a covering to shelter them and secure them from the sad after-claps they may justly suspect in the other life. For first, it is necessary for them to confess that they have in this life as particular and proper sense of Torment, of Pleasure, of Peace, and Pangs of Conscience, and of other impressions, as if they had an individual Soul of their own distinct from that of the World, and from every ones else; and that if there be any *Demons* or *Genii*, as certainly there are, that it is so with them too. We have also demonstrated, that all Sense and Perception is immediately excited in the Soul by the Spirits; wherefore with what confidence can they promise themselves that the death of this earthly Body will quite obliterate all the

tracts of their Being here on earth : when-
as the subtiler ruines thereof, in all likeli-
hood, may determine the Thoughts of the
Soul of the World to the same tenour as be-
fore, and draw from her the memory of all
the Transactions of this life, and make her
exercise her judgement upon them, and
cause her to contrive the most vital exhalations of the terrestrial Body into an aerial
Vehicle, of like nature with the ferment of
these material rudiments of life, saved out
of the ruines of death. For any slight touch
is enough to engage her to perfect the whole
Scene, and so a man shall be represented to
himself and others in the other state, whe-
ther he will or no; and have as distinct a per-
sonal *Ipseity* there as he had in this life.
Whence it is plain, that this false *Hypothesis*,
That we are nothing but the Soul of the World
acting in our Bodies, will not serve their
turns at all that would have it so; nor se-
cure them from future danger, though it
were admitted to be true. But I have de-
monstrated it false already, from the notion
of the *Unity* of a Soul. Of the truth of which
Demonstration we shall be the better assu-
red, if we consider that the subtile Elements,
which are the immediate conveyers of Per-
ceptions in our Souls, are continued
throughout in the *Soul of the World*, and in-
sinuate

inuate into all living Creatures. So that the Soul of the World will be necessarily informed in every one, what she thinks or feels every where, if she be the onely Soul that actuates every Animal upon Earth.

8. That other conceit, of our Souls being a *Vital Ray of the Soul of the World*, may gain much countenance by expressions in ancient Authors that seem to favour the Opinion: as that of *Epiſtetus*, who saith that the Souls of men are *συναφῆς τῷ θεῷ, ἐν αὐτῷ μέγα ὕσαι καὶ ἀποπάσματα*. And *Philo* calls the Minde of Man, *τὸ θεῖος ψυχῆς ἀποπάσμα ἢ ἀχειρετόν* and *Trismegist*, *ὁ νῦν οὐ ἔστιν ἀποτίμωσις. τὸ ὑσιότιον. τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἡπλωμένον καὶ δεῖσιν τὸ τῷ ἡλίῳ φῶς*. All which expressions make the Soul of man a *Ray* or *Beam* of the *Soul of the World* or of *God*. But we are to take notice that they are but Metaphorical phrases, and that what is understood thereby, is, *that there is an emanation of a secondary substance from the several parts of the Soul of the World, resembling the Rayes of the Sun*. Which way of conception, though it be more easy then the other, yet it has difficulties enough. For this *Vital Ray* must have some head from whence it is stretched, and so the Body would be like a Bird in a string, which would be drawn to a great

length when one takes long voyages, suppose to the East or West *Indies*. Or if you will not have it a *linear Ray*, but an *Orb* of particular life; every such particular *Orb* must be hugely vast, that the Body may not travel out of the reach of the Soul. Besides, this *Orb* will strike through other Bodies as well as its own, and its own be in several parts of it; which are such incongruities and inconcinnities as are very harsh and displeasing to our Rational faculties. Wherefore that notion is infinitely more neat and safe, that proportions the Soul to the dimensions of the Body, and makes her independent on any thing but the Will of her Creator; in which respect of dependence she may be said to be a *Ray* of him, as the rest of the Creation also; but in no other sense that I know of, unless of likeness and similitude, she being the *Image* of God, as the *Rays* of Light are of the *Sun*.

9. But let every particular Soul be so many *Rays* of the Soul of the World, what gain they by this, whenas these *Rays* may be as capable of all the several congruities of life, as the Soul is in that sense we have described? and therefore *Personality*, *Memory* and *Conscience* will as surely return or continue in the other state, according to this Hypothesis, as the other more usual

one.

one. Which also discovers the great folly of *Pomponatius* (and of as many as are of the same leaven with him) who indeed is so modest and judicious as not to deny *Apparitions*, but attributes all to the influence of the Stars, or rather the *Intelligencies* of the Celestial Orbs. For they giving life and animation to brute Animals, why may they not also, upon occasion, animate and actuate the Aire into shape and form, even to the making of them speak and discourse one shape with another? For so *Pomponatius* argues in his Book of the *Immortality of the Soul*, from *Aquinas* his concession, that Angels and Souls separate may figure the Aire into shape, and speak through it; *Quare igitur Intelligencia moventes corpora caelestia hac facere non possunt cum suis instrumentis quae ut ac tanta possunt quae faciunt Psittacos, Picos, Corvos & Merulas, loqui?* And a little after, he plainly reasons from the power the *Intelligencies* have of generating Animals, that it is not at all strange that they should raise such kinde of *Apparitions* as are recorded in History. But if these Celestial *Intelligencies* be confined to their own Orbs, so as that no *secondary Essence* reach these inferior Regions, it is impossible to conceive how they can actuate the Matter here below, But if there be any such *essential emanations*

from them, whereby they actuate the Matter into these living Species we see in the World, of Men and Brutes; nothing hinders but the same emanations remaining, may actuate the Aire when this earthly fabric fails, and retain the memory of things transacted in this life, and that still our *Personality* will be conserved as perfect and distinct as it was here.

10. But this conceit of *Pomponatius* is farre more foolish then theirs that make onely one *Anima Mundi* that passes through all the Matter of the World, and is present in every place, to doe all feats that there are to be done. But to acknowledge so many several *Intellectual Beings* as there be fancied Celestial Orbs, and to scruple, or rather to seein confident, that there are not so many particular Souls as there be Men here on Earth, is nothing but Humour and Madnes. For it is as rational to acknowledge eight hundred thousand Myriads of *Intellectual* and *Immaterial Beings*, really distinct from one another, as eight; and an infinite number, as but one, that could not create the Matter of the World. For then two Substances, wholly independent on one another, would be granted, as also the Infinite parts of Matter that have no dependence one on the other. Why may

not

not there be therefore infinite numbers of Spirits or Souls that have as little dependence one on another, as well as there should be eight *Intelligencies*? whenas the motions and operations of every Animal are a more certain argument of an *Immaterial Being* residing there, then the motions of the Heavens of any distinct *Intelligencies* in their Orbs, if they could be granted to have any: And it is no stranger a thing to conceive an Infinite multitude of *Immaterial*, as well as *Material*, *Essences*, independent on one another, then but two, namely the Matter and the Soule of the World. But if there be so excellent a principle existent as can *create* Beings, as certainly there is; we are still the more assured that there are such multitudes of spiritual *Essences*, surviving all the chances of this present life, as the most sober and knowing men in all Ages have professed there are.

CHAP. XVII.

1. *That the Authour having safely conducted the Soule into her Aerial condition through the dangers of Death, might well be excused from attending her any further.*
2. *What reasons urge him to consider what fates may*

K k
4
be fall

befall her afterwards. 3. Three hazards the Soule runs after this life, whereby she may again become obnoxious to death, according to the opinion of some. 4. That the aerial Genii are mortal, confirmed by three testimonies. 5. The one from the Vision of Facius Cardanus, in which the Spirits that appeared to him profest themselves mortal. 6. The time they stayed with him, and the matters they disputed of. 7. What credit Hieronymus Cardanus gives to his Fathers Vision. 8. The other testimony out of Plutarch, concerning the Death of the great God Pan. 9. The third and last of Hesiod, whose opinion Plutarch has polishd and refined. 10. An Enumeration of the several Paradoxes contained in Facius Cardanus his Vision. 11. What must be the sense of the third Paradox, if those Aerial Speculators spake as they thought. 12. Another Hypothesis to the same purpose. 13. The craft of these Dæmons, in shuffling in poysonous error amongst solid Truths. 14. What makes the story of the death of Pan less to the present matter, with an addition of Demetrius his observations touching the Sacred Islands neare Britain. 15. That Hesiod his opinion is the most unexceptionable, and that the harshness therein is but seeming, not real. 16. That

the

the *Æthereal Vehicle* instates the Soule in a condition of perfect Immortality. 17. That there is no internal impediment to those that are Heroically good, but that they may attain an everlasting happiness after Death.

1. WE have now, maugre all the oppositions and Objections made to the contrary, safely conducted the Soule into the other state, and installed her into the same condition with the *Aerial Genii*. I might be very well excused, if I took leave of her here, and committed her to that fortune that attends those of the Invisible World: it being more seasonable for them that are there, to meditate and prefigure in their mindes all futurities belonging to them, then for us that are on this side the passage. It is enough that I have demonstrated, that neither the Essence nor Operations of the Soule are extinct by Death; but that they either not intermit, or suddainly revive upon the recovery of her airy Body.

2. But seeing that those that take any pleasure at all in thinking of these things, can seldome command the ranging of their thoughts within what compass they please, and that it is obvious for them to doubt whether the Soule can be secure of her permanency

manency in life in the other world, (it implying no contradiction, That her Vital Congruity, appropriate to this or that Element, may either of it self expire, or that she may by some carelesness debilitate one *Congruity*, and awaken another, in some measure, and so make her self obnoxious to Fate,) we cannot but think it in a manner necessary to extricate such difficulties as these, that we may not seem in this after-game to loose all we won in the former; and make men suspect that the Soule is not at all immortal, if her Immortality will not secure her against all future fates.

3. To which she seems liable upon three accounts. The one we have named already, and respects an intrinsical Principle, the *Periodical terms* of her *Vital Congruity*, or else the Levity and Miscarriage of her own Will. Which obnoxiousness of hers is still more fully argued from what is affirmed of the *Aerial Genii* (whose companion and fellow-Citizen she is) whom sundry Philosophers assert to be *Mortal*. The other two hazards she runs are from without, to wit, the *Conflagration* of the *World*, and the *Extinction* of the *Sun*.

4. That the *Aerial Genii* are mortal, three main Testimonies are alledged for it. The Vision of *Facius Cardanus*, the Death of the

the great God *Pan*, in *Plutarch*, and the Opinion of *Hesiod*. I will set them all down fully, as I finde them, and then answer to them. The Vision of *Facius Cardanus* is punctually recited by his son *Hieronymus* in his *De Subtilitate Lib. 19.* in this manner.

5. That his Father *Facius Cardanus*, who confessed that he had the society of a familiar Spirit for about thirty years together, told him this following Story often when he was alive, and after his death he found the exact relation of it committed to writing, which was this. *The 13. day of August 1491. after I had done my holy things, at the 20. houre of the day, there appeared to me, after their usual manner, seven men cloathed in silk garments, with cloaks after the Greek mode, with purple stockings and crimson Cassocks, red and shining on their breasts; nor were they all thus clad, but onely two of them who were the chief. On the ruddier and taller of these two other two waited, but the less and paler had three attendants; so that they made up seven in all. They were about forty years of age, but lookt as if they had not reacht thirty. When they were asked who they were, they answered that they were Homines aerii, Aerial Men, who are born and die as we; but that their life is much longer then ours, as reaching to 300. years. Being asked*

asked concerning the Immortality of our Souls, they answered, *Nihil quod cuique proprium esset superesse*, That they were of a nearer affinity with the Divi than we; but yet infinitely different from them: and that their happiness or misery as much transcended ours, as ours does the brute Beasts. That they knew all things that are hid, whether Monies or Books. And that the lowest sort of them were the Genii of the best and noblest men, as the basest men are the trainers up of the best sort of Dogs. That the tenuity of their Bodies was such, that they can doe us neither good nor hurt, saving in what they may be able to doe by Spectres and Terrours, and impartment of Knowledge. That they were both publick Professors in an Academy, and that he of the lesser stature had 300. disciples, the other 200. Cardan's Father further asking them why they would not reveal such treasures as they knew unto men; they answered, that there was a special law against it, upon a very grievous penalty.

6. These aerial Inhabitants staid at least three hours with Facius Cardanus, disputing and arguing of sundry things, amongst which one was the Original of the World. The taller denied that God made the world ab æterno: the lesser affirmed that he so created it every moment, that if he should desist but one

moment,

moment, it would perish. Whereupon the other cited some things out of the Disputations of Avenroes, which Book was not yet extant, and named several other Treatises, part whereof are known, part not, which were all of Avenroes his writing, and withall did openly profess himself to be an Avenroist.

7. The record of this Apparition Cardan found amongst his Fathers Papers, but seems unwilling to determine whether it be a true history or a Fable, but disputes against it in such a shuffling manner, as if he was perswaded it were true, and had a mind that others should think it so. I am sure he most-what steers his course in his Metaphysical adventures according to this *Cynosura*, which is no obscure indication of his assent and belief.

8. That of the Death of the great God Pan, you may read in Plutarch in his *De defectu Oraculorum*; where Philippus, for the proof of the Mortality of Demons, recites a Story which he heard from one *Emilianus* a Roman, & one that was remov'd far enough from all either stupidity or vanity: How his Father Epitherfes being shipt for Italy, in the evening, near the Echinades, the winde sailed them; and their Ship being carried by an uncertain course upon the Island Paxæ, that most of the Passengers being waken, many
of

of them drinking merrily after Supper, there was a voice suddenly heard from the Island, which called to Thamus by name, who was an Egyptian by birth, and the Pilot of the Ship: which the Passengers much wondered at, few of them having taken notice of the Pilot's name before. He was twice called to before he gave any sign that he attended to the voice, but after giving express attention, a clear and distinct voice was heard from the Island, uttering these words, "Ὅταν γένηται ὁ Παλῶδης, ἀπαγγέλλον, ὅτι Πάν ὁ μέγας τέθνηκεν." The company was much astonished at the hearing of the voice: and after much debate amongst themselves, Thamus resolved that, if the wind blew fair, he would sail by and say nothing; but if they were becalmed there, he would deliver his Message: and therefore they being becalmed when they came to Palodes, neither wind nor tide carrying them on, Thamus looking out of the poop of the Ship toward the shore, delivered his Message, telling them that the great Pan was dead. Upon which was suddenly heard as it were a joynt groaning of a multitude together, mingled with a murmurous admiration.

9. The opinion of Hesiod also is, that the Genii or Demons within a certain period of years do die; but he attributes a considerable Longævity to them, to wit of nine thou-

thousand seven hundred and twenty years, which is the utmost that any allow them, most men less. *Plutarch*, under the person of others, has polisht this Opinion into a more curious and distinct dress: for out of the mortality of the *Demons*, and the several ranks which *Hesiod* mentions of *Rational Beings*, viz. Θεοὶ, δαίμονες, ἥρωες, and ἄνθρωποι, he has affixed a certain manner and law of their passing out of one state into another, making them to change their Elements as well as Dignities; Ἐπεὶ δὲ, saith he, μεταβολῶν τῆς τε σώμασιν ὁμοίως ποιῶσι καὶ ψυχαῖς· ὥσπερ ἐκ γῆς ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ ὕδατος αἶθρ, ἐκ δὲ αἶθρος πῦρ γινώμενον ὁρᾶται, καὶ ὑσίας αἰὼν φερομένης ὕψος ἐκ μὲν ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἥρωας, ἐκ δὲ ἥρων εἰς δαίμονας αἱ βελτίονες ψυχαὶ καὶ μεταβολῶν λαμβάνουσιν, ἐκ δὲ δαιμόνων ὀλίγαι μὲν χρόνον πολλὰ δὲ ἀρετῆς καρτερῶσαι πάντα· τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν μελέχουν. But other, he saith, μὴ καρτερῶσαι ἑαυτῶν, not having sufficient command of themselves, are again wrought down into humane Bodies, to live there an evanid and obscure life, ἀλαμπῆ καὶ ἀμυδρῶν ζωῶν ἱσχυοί, as he phrases it.

10. These are the most notable Testimonies for the Mortality of *Demons* that I have met withall, and therefore the more worth our reviewing. That Vision of *Facinus Cardanus*, if it be not a Fable, contains many Paradoxes.

As

As first, *That these Aerial Genii are born at set times as well as we.* Not that any the *Demons* are brought to bed of them, but that they seem to have a beginning of their Existence, from which they may be reckoned to have continued, some more years and some less. A thing unconceivable, unless we should imagine that there is still a lapse or descent of Souls out of the higher Regions of the Aire into these lower, or that these that leave these earthly Bodies pass into the number of the airy *Demon*. As neither their death can so well be understood, unless we should fancy that their Souls pass into more pure Vehicles, or else descend into *Terrestrial* Bodies. For *Cædan* himself acknowledges they perish not; which also is agreeable with his Opinion of the Præexistence of our Souls.

Secondly, *That these Aerial Genii live but about 300. years,* which is against *Hesiod* and the greatest number of the *Platonists*, unless they should speak of that particular Order themselves were of; for it is likely there may be as much difference in their ages, as there is in the ages of several kinds of Birds and Beasts.

Thirdly, *That our Souls are so farre mortal, as that there is nothing proper to us remaining after death.*

Fourthly,

Fourthly, *That they were nearer allied to the Gods then we by farre, and that there was as much difference betwixt them and us, as there is betwixt us and Beasts.* Which they must understand then concerning the excellency of their Vehicles, and the natural activity of them, not the preeminency of their Intellectual Faculties. Or if they doe, they must be understood of the better sort of those *Aerial Spirits*. Or if they mean it of all their Orders, it may be a mistake out of pride: as those that are rich and powerful as well as speculative amongst us, take it for granted that they are more judicious and discerning then the poor and despicable, let them be never so wise.

Fifthly, *That they know all secret things, whether hidden Books or Monies:* which men might doe too, if they could stand by concealedly from them that hide them.

Sixthly, *That the lowest sort of them were the Genii of the Noblest men, as the baser sort of Men are the Keepers and Educators of the better kinde of Dogs and Horses.* This clause of the Vision also is inveloped with obscurity, they having not defined whether this meanness of condition of the Tutelar *Genii* be to be understood in a *Political* or *Physical* sense; whether the meanness of rank and power, or of natural wit and sagacity; in

which many times the Groom exceeds the young Gallant who assigns him to keep his Dogs and Horses.

Seventhly, *That such is the thinness and lightness of their Bodies, that they can doe neither good nor hurt thereby, though they may send strange Sights and Terrors, and communicate Knowledge*; which then must be chiefly of such things as belong to their aerial Region. For concerning matters in the Sea, the Fishes, if they could speak, might inform men better then they. And for their corporeal debility, it is uncertain whether they may not pretend it, to animate their Confabulators to a more secure converse, or whether the thing be really true in some kindes of them. For that it is not in all, may be evinced by that Narration that *Cardan* a little after recites out of *Erasmus*, of the Devil that carried a Witch into the Aire, and set her on the top of a Chimney, giving her a Pot, and bidding her turn the mouth downwards, which done the whole Town was fired, and burnt down within the space of an hour. This hapned *April* the 10. *Anno* 1533. The Towns name was *Schiltach*, eight German miles distant from *Friburg*. The Story is so well attested, and guarded with such unexceptionable circumstances, that though *Cardan* love to shew

his

III.
the
his
and
nei-
may
ms-
be
ae-
the
ght
their
ther
their
e, or
ome
all,
Ca-
was,
the
ney,
the
hole
the
to,
bil-
Fri-
and
am-
new
his

CAP. 17. *of the Soule.*

515

his wit in cavilling at most he recites,
yet he finds nothing at all to quarrel at in
this.

Eighthly, *That there are Students and Pro-
fessors of Philosophy in the Aerial World, and
are divided into Sects and Opinions there, as
well as we are here.* Which cannot possibly
be true, unless they set some value upon
knowledge, and are at an eager loss how
to finde it, and are faine to hew out their
way by arguing and reasoning as we doe.

Ninthly and lastly, *That they are reduced
under a Political Government, and are afraid
of the infliction of punishment.*

II. These are the main matters compre-
hended in *Facinus* his Vision, which how
true they all are, would be too much trouble
to determine. But one clause, which is the
third, I cannot let pass, it so nearly concer-
ning the present Subject, and seeming to
intercept all hopes of the Souls Immorta-
lity. To speak therefore to the summe of
the whole business; we must either con-
ceive these aerial Philosophers to instruct
Facinus Cardanus as well as they could, they
being guilty of nothing but a forward
pride, to offer themselves as dictating O-
racles to that doubtful Exorcist (for his son
Cardan acknowledges that his Father had
a form of Conjurat[i]on that a Spaniard

L l a

gave

gave him at his death;) or else we must suppose them to take the liberty of equivocating, if not of downright lying. Now if they had a minde to inform *Facius Cardanus* of these things directly as they themselves thought of them, it being altogether unlikely but that there appeared to them, in their aerial Regions, such sights as represented the persons of men here deceased, it is impossible that they should think otherwise then as we have described their Opinion in the fore-going Chapter, that hold there is but one Soul in the World, by which all living Creatures are actuated. Which, though but a meer possibility, if so much, yet some or other of these aerial Speculators may as well hold to it as some doe amongst us. For *Pomponatius* and others of the *Avenroists* are as ridiculously pertinacious as they. And therefore these *Avenroistical Demons* answered punctually according to the Conclusions of their own School, *Nihil proprium cuiquam superesse post mortem*. For the Minde or Soul being a Substance common to all, and now distributed from those Terrestrial Bodies which it actuated in *Plato*, suppose, or *Socrates*, and these Bodies dead and dissipated, and onely the common Soul of the World surviving, there being nothing but this Soul

and

and these Bodies to make up *Socrates* and *Plato*; they conclude it is a plain case, that nothing that is proper survives after death. And therefore, though they see the representation of *Socrates* and *Plato* in the other World, owning also their own personalities, with all the actions they did, and accidents that befell them in this life; yet according to the sullen subtilties and curiosities of their School, they may think and profess, that to speak accurately and Philosophically it is none of them, there being no Substance proper to them remaining after death, but onely the Soul of the World, renewing the thoughts to her self of what appertained to those parties in this life.

12. This is one Hypothesis consistent enough with the veracity of these Dæmons; but there is also another, not at all impossible, viz. That the Vehicles of the Souls of men departed are as invisible to this Order of the *Genii* that confabulated with *Fabius Cardanus* as that Order is to us: and that therefore, though there be the appearances of the Ghosts of Men deceased to them as well as to us; yet it being but for a time, it moves them no more then our confirmed *Epicureans* in this world are moved thereby: especially it being prone

for them to think that they are nothing but some ludicrous spectacles that the universal Soule of the World represents to her self and other Spectatours, when, and how long a time she pleases, and the vaporious reliques of the dead body administer occasion. Now that the Vehicles of the Souls of men departed this life, after they are come to a settled condition, may be farre thinner and more invisible then those of the fore-named *Demons*, without committing any inconcinnity in Nature, may appear from hence: For the excellency of the inward Spirit is not alwaies according to the consistency of the Element with which it does incorporate; otherwise those Fishes that are of humane shape, and are at set times taken in the Indian Sea, should have a higher degree of Reason and Religion then we that live upon Earth, and have bodies made of that Element. Whence nothing hinders but that the Spirit of Man may be more noble then the Spirit of some of the aerial *Demons*. And Nature not alwaies running in Arithmetical, but also in Geometrical Progression, one Remove one may reach far above what is before it for the present in the other degrees of Progression, As a creeping worm is above a gad-worm, and any four-footed beasts above

the birds, till they can use their leggs as well as they ; but they are no sooner even with them, but they are straight far above them, and cannot onely goe, but fly. As a Peasant is above an imprison'd Prince, and has more command ; but this Prince can be no sooner set free and become even with the Peasant in his liberty, but he is infinitely above him. And so it may be naturally with the Souls of men when they are freed from this prison of the Body, their steps being made in Geometrical Progression, as soon as they seem equal to that Order of *Demons* we speak of, they may mount far above them in tenuity and subtilty of Body, and so become invisible to them ; and therefore leave them in a capacity of falsely surmising that they are not at all, because they cannot see them.

13. But if they thought that there is either some particular Ray of the Soule of the World, that belongs peculiarly suppose to *Socrates* or *Plato*, or that they had proper Souls really distinct ; then it is evident that they did either equivocate or lye. Which their pride and scorn of mankind (they looking upon us but as Beasts in comparison of themselves) might easily permit ; they making no more conscience to deceive us, then we doe to put a dodge upon a dog, to

make our selves merry. But if they had design to winde us into some dangerous error, it is very likely that they would shuffle it in amongst many Truths, that those Truths being examined, and found solid at the bottome, we might not suspect any one of their dictates to be false. Wherefore this Vision being ill meant, the poison intended was, that of the Souls Mortality; the dangerous falseness of which opinion was to be covered by the mixture of others that are true.

14. As for that Relation of *Emilianns*, which he heard from his Father *Epitherses*, it would come still more home to the purpose, if the conclusion of the Philologers at Rome, after *Thamus* had been sent for, and averred the truth thereof to *Tiberius Cæsar*, could be thought authentick, namely, that this *Pan*, the news of whose death *Thamus* told to the *Demons* at *Palodes*, was the Son of *Mercury* and *Penelope*; for then 'tis plain that *Pan* was an humane Soule, and therefore concerns the present question more nearly. But this Narration being applicable to a more sacred and venerable Subject, it looses so much of its force and fitness for the present use. That which *Demetrius* adds, concerning certain Holy Islands neare *Britain*, had been more fit in this regard.

Whither

Whither when *Demetrius* came, suddainly upon his arrival there happened a great commotion of the air, mighty tempests & prodigious whirlwinds. After the ceasing whereof, the Inhabitants pronounced, *Ὁ πῦρ κρείττονων πνός ἐκλεψίς γήρηνεν*, *That some of a nature more then humane was dead.* Upon which *Plutarch*, according to his usual Rhetorick, descants after this manner, *Ὡς γὰρ λύχνης ἀναπτόμενος φάναι δεινὸν ἔδεν ἔχει, σβεννύμενος δὲ πολλοῖς λυπηρὸς ἐστίν· ὅπως αἱ μεταλλαί ψυχῶν πῶς μὲν ἀναλάμψας εὐμενῆς καὶ ἀλύπτης ἔχουσιν, αἱ δὲ σβέσας αὐτῶν καὶ φθοραὶ πολλὰς μὲν, ὥς τυτὴ, πνεύματα καὶ ζῆλας τρέψουσιν, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ λοιμικοῖς παθεσὶν αἰεὶ φαρμάτῃσιν*, i. e. *As the lightning of a lamp brings no grievance with it, but the extinction of it is offensive to many; so great Souls, while they remain kindled into life, shine forth harmlesly and benignly, but their extinction or corruption often stirs up windes and tempests, as in this present example, and often infects the aire with pestilential annoyances.*

15. But the last Testimony is the most unexceptionable, though the least pretending to be infallible, and seems to strike dead both waies. For whether the Souls of men that goe out of these earthly bodies be vertuous or vitious, they must die to their

Aerial

Aerial Vehicles. Which seems a sad story at first sight, and as if Righteousness could not deliver from Death. But if it be more carefully perused, the terrour will be found onely to concern the Wicked. For the profoundest pitch of Death is the Descent into this Terrestrial Body, in which, besides that we necessarily forget whatever is past, we doe for the present lead ἀλαμπῇ καὶ ἀμυδίῳ ζῶντι, a dark and obscure life, as Plutarch speaks, dragging this weight of Earth along with us, as Prisoners and Malefactours doe their heavy shackles in their sordid and secluse confinements. But in our return back from this state, Life is naturally more large to them that are prepared to make good use of that advantage they have of their *Airy Vehicle*. But if they be not masters of themselves in that state, they will be fatally remanded back to their former Prison in process of time; which is the most gross Death imaginable. But for the Good and vertuous Souls, that after many Ages change their *Aerial Vehicle* for an *Aethereal* one, that is no Death to them, but an higher ascent into life. And a man may as well say of an Infant, that has left the dark Wombe of his Mother, that this change of his is Death, as that a *Genius* dies by leaving the gross Aire, and emerging into that Vehicle

of

of Light, which they ordinarily call *Aethereal* or *Celestial*.

16. There may be therefore, by Axiome 36. a dangerous relapse out of the *Aerial* Vehicle into the *Terrestrial*, which is properly the Death of the Soule that is thus retrograde. But for those that ever reach the *Aethereal state*, the periods of life there are infinite; & though they may have their *Perige's* as well as *Apoge's*, yet these Circuits being of so vast a compass, and their *Perige's* so rare and short, and their return as certain to their former *Apsis*, as that of the *Cœlestial Bodies*, and their *aethereal* sense never leaving them in their lowest touches towards the Earth; it is manifest that they have arrived to that life that is justly styled *Eternal*.

17. Whence it is plain, that perseverance in Vertue, if no *external Fate* hinder, will carry Man to an *Immortal life*. But whether those that be thus *Heroically good*, be so by discipline and endeavour, or *Δείξις τῶν μοιρῶν*, by a special favour and irresistible design of God, is not to be disputed in this place; though it be at large discussed somewhere in the Dialogues of *Plato*. But in the mean time we will not doubt to conclude, that there is no *Internal impediment* to those that are highly and *Heroically virtuous*, but that, in process of time, they may

may arrive to an everlasting security of *Life* and *Happiness*, after they have left this earthly Body.

CHAP. XVIII.

1. *The Conflagration of the World an Opinion of the Stoicks.* 2. *Two ways of destroying the World the Ancients have taken notice of, & especially that by Fire.* 3. *That the Conflagration of the World, so far as it respects us, is to be understood onely of the burning of the Earth.* 4. *That the ends of the Stoicks Conflagration is competitible onely to the Earths burning.* 5. *An acknowledgement that the Earth may be burnt, though the proof thereof be impertinent to this place.* 6. *That the Conflagration thereof will prove very fatal to the Souls of Wicked men and Dæmons.* 7. *Five several Opinions concerning their state after the Conflagration; whereof the first is, That they are quite destroy'd by Fire.* 8. *The second, That they are annihilated by a special act of Omnipotency.* 9. *The third, That they lye senseless in an eternal Death.* 10. *The fourth, That they are in a perpetual furious and painful*

painful Dream. 11. *The fifth and last, That they will revive again, and that the Earth and Aire will be inhabited by them.* 12. *That this last seems to be fram'd from the fictitious παλινγενεσία of the Stoicks, who were very sorry Metaphysicians, and as ill Naturallists.* 13. *An Animadversion upon a self-contradicting sentence of Seneca.* 14. *The unintelligibleness of the state of the Souls of the Wicked after the Conflagration.* 15. *That the Æthereal Inhabitants will be safe. And what will then become of Good men and Dæmons on the Earth and in the Aire. And how they cannot be delivered but by a supernatural power.*

1. **A**S for the External impediments, we shall now examine them, and see of what force they will be, and whether they be at all. The former of which is the *Conflagration of the World*. Which is an ancient Opinion, believed and entertain'd, not onely by Religious, but by Philosophers also; the *Stoicks* especially, who affirm that the Souls of Men doe subsist indeed after Death, but cannot continue any longer in being then to the *Conflagration* of the World. But it is not so much material what they thought, as to consider what is the

the condition indeed of the Souls of Men and *Demons* after that sad Fate.

2. Those that will not have the World eternal have found out two ways to destroy it, *ἔκλυδα πῶσι* or *ἐκπύρωσι*, by *Water* or by *Fire*. Which, they say, does as naturally happen in a vast Period of Time, which they call *Annus magnus*, as Winter and Summer doe in our ordinary year. *Inundatio non secus quam Hyems, quam Aestas lege Mundi venit*. But for this *ἔκλυδα πῶσι*, it not being so famous, nor so frequently spoken of, nor so destructive, nor so likely to end the World as the other way, nor belonging so properly to our enquiry, we shall let it pass. The general Prognostick is concerning *Fire* now, not onely of the *Stoicks*, as *Zeno*, *Cleanthes*, *Chrysippus*, *Seneca*; but of several also of different Sects, as *Heraclitus*, *Epicurus*, *Cicero*, *Pliny*, *Aristocles*, *Numenius*, and sundry others.

3. But though there be so great and unanimous consent that the World shall be burnt, yet they doe not expresse themselves all alike in the business. *Seneca's* vote is the most madly explicite of any, making the very Stars run and dash one against another, and so set all on fire. But *Posidonius* and *Panatius* had more wit, who did not hold that *ἐκπύρωσις τῷ ὅλῳ* which the other
Stoicks

III.
Men
world
roy
by
ally
hey
ner
se-
ndi
ing
of,
he
so
fs,
re
le-
al
u-
ad
q.
e
es
e
e
e
d
d
r
s

Stoicks did. For the destroying of the *Aethereal* Regions by *Fire* is as foolish a fancy as the sentencing of the *Eele* to be drown'd, because the matter of the *Aether* is too fine and subtile for *Fire* to rage in, it being indeed nothing but a pure light or fire it self. And yet this *Aethereal* Matter is infinitely the greatest portion of the World. Wherefore the World cannot be said properly to be lyable to the destruction of *Fire* from any natural causes, as the *Stoicks* would have it. Which is demonstratively true upon *Des-Cartes* his Principles, who makes *Fire* nothing but the motion of certain little particles of Matter, and holds that there is no more motion at one time in the World then at another; because one part of the Matter cannot impress any agitation upon another, but it must lose so much it self. This hideous noise therefore of the *Conflagration* of the World must be restrain'd to the firing of the *Earth* onely, so farre as it concerns us. For there is nothing else combustibile in the Universe but the *Earth*, and other *Planets*, and what Vapours and Exhalations arise from them.

4. This *Conflagration* therefore that *Philosophers*, *Poets*, *Sibyls*, and all have fill'd the World with the fame of, is nothing but the

the burning of the *Earth*. And the ends the *Stoicks* pretend of their *εὐτυχισμὸς*, may be competent to it, but not to the burning of the *Heavens* or *Aether* at all; as any but meanly skilled in Philosophy cannot but acknowledge. For their nature is so simple that they cannot corrupt, and therefore want no renovation, as the *Earth* does. Nor do the Inhabitants of those heavenly Regions defile themselves with any vice; or if they do, they sink from their material Station as well as moral, and fall towards these terrestrial dreggs. And therefore that part of the happy *δυναμισμὸς* Seneca speaks of, *Omne animal ex integro generabitur, dabiturque terris homo inscius scelerum, & melioribus auspiciis natus*, will take no place with those *Aethereal* Creatures.

5. We are willing then to be born down, by this common and loud cry of Fire that must burn the World, into an acknowledgment that the *Earth* may within a certain Period of time be burnt, with all those things that are upon it or near it. But what concurse of natural causes may contribute to this dismal spectacle, is not proper for me to dispute, especially in this place. I shall onely take a view of what sad effects this *Conflagration* may have upon the Souls of *Demons* and *Men*. For that those those that have

have recovered their *Aethereal Vehicles* are exempt from this fate, is evident, the remoteness of their habitation securing them from both the rage and noisomeness of these sulphureous flames.

6. The most certain and most destructive execution that this Fire will do, must be upon the unrecovered Souls of Wicked Men and Demons; those that are so deeply sunk and drown'd in *vice*, that the very consistency of their Vehicles does imprison them within the confines of this thick *caliginous* air. These Souls or Spirits therefore that have so inextricably entangled themselves in the Fate of this lower World, giving up all their Senses to the momentary pleasures of the most luxurious Principles, which is the very seat of Death; these, in the mystical Philosophy of the Ancients, are the Nymphs, to whom though they allot a long Series of years, yet they do not exempt them from mortality and fate. And *Demetrius* in *Plutarch* pronounces expressly out of *Hesiod*, that their life will be terminated with the Conflagration of the World; from what the Poet intimates *Enigmatically*, *Καὶ ὁ λόγος ὅλον μίχεται δοκεῖ τῷ Ἄνθρωπῳ ὡς ἡ ὀκνηρόν, ὀκνητὰ σκευάζειν τὸν τοῦ ὕδατος αἰκὴς ὅτι τὰς Νύμφας,*

— Αἴ τ' ἄλσιν χαλὰ νίμονται
 Καὶ πῦρ ποταμῶν καὶ πείσιν ποταμῶν.

7. But to leave these Poetical Riddles, and take a more serious and distinct view of the condition of the Soul after the *Conflagration* of the Earth; we shall finde five several sorts of Opinions concerning it. The first hold, *That this unmerciful heat and fire will at last destroy and consume the Soul as well as the Body.* But this seems to me impossible, that any created Substance should utterly destroy another Substance, so as to reduce it to nothing. For no part of Matter, acting the most furiously upon another part thereof, does effect that. It can onely attenuate, dissipate and disperse the parts, and make them invisible. But the Substance of the Soul is *indissipable* and *indiscernible*, and therefore remains entire, whatever becomes of the Body or Vehicle.

8. The second Opinion is, *That after long and tedious torture in these flames, the Soul by a special act of Omnipotency is annihilated.* But, me thinks, this is to put Providence too much to her shifts, as if God were so brought to a plunge in his creating a Creature of it self immortal, that he must be fain to uncreate it again, that is to say to annihilate it. Besides that that divine Neme-

is that lies within the compass of Philosophy, never supposes any such forcible eruptions of the Deity into extraordinary effects, but that all things are brought about by a wise and infallible or inevitable train of Secondary Causes, whether natural or free Agents.

9. The third therefore to avoid these absurdities, denies both *absorption by Fire* and *annihilation*; but conceives, *That tediousness and extremity of pain makes the Soul at last, of her self, shrink from all commerce with Matter*; the immediate Principle of Union, which we call *Vital Congruity*, consisting of a certain modification of the Body or Vehicle as well as of the Soul, which being spoiled and lost, and the Soul thereby quite loosened from all sympathy with Body or Matter, *she becomes perfectly dead, and senseless to all things*, by Axiome 36. and, as they say, *will so remain for ever*. But this seems not so rational; for, as *Aristotle* somewhere has it, Ἐγὼ δὲ, ὡς ἔστιν ἐνέπρηστα, ἔστιν ἐνέπρηστα ἰσχυρῶς. Wherefore so many entire immaterial Substances would be continued in being to all Eternity to no end nor purpose, notwithstanding they may be made use of, and actuate Matter again as well as ever.

10. A fourth sort therefore of Speculators there is, who conceive that after this

solution of the Souls or Spirits of Wicked
Men and *Demons* from their Vehicles, *That*
their pain is continued to them even in the
separate state, they falling into an unquiet
sleep, full of furious tormenting Dreams, that
act as fiercely upon their Spirits, as the ex-
ternal Fire did upon their Bodies. But others
 except against ~~this~~ Opinion as a very uncer-
 tain Conjecture, it supposing that which to
 them seems not so sound, *vi*z. That the
 Soul can act when it has lost all vital Union
 with the Matter; which seems repugnant
 with that so intimate and essential aptitude
 it has to be united therewith. And the
 Dreams of the Soul in the Body are not
 transacted without the help of the Animal
 Spirits in the Brain, they usually symboli-
 zing with their temper. Whence they con-
 clude, that there is no certain ground to
 establish this Opinion upon.

11. The last therefore, to make all sure,
 that there may be no inconvenience in ad-
 mitting that the Souls or Spirits as well of
 evil *Demons* as wicked *Men*, disjoyned from
 their Vehicles by the force of that fatal
Conflagration, may subsist, have excogitated
 an odde and unexpected Hypothesis, *That*
when this firing of the World has done due
execution upon that unfortunate Crue, and ter-
rible and direful torture has wearied their af-
flicted

disturb'd Ghosts into an utter recess from all Matter, and thereby into a profound sleep or death; that after a long Series of years, when not onely the fury of the Fire is utterly slaked, but that vast Atmosphere of smoak and vapours, which was sent up during the time of the Earths Conflagration, has returned back in copious showres of rain (which will again make Seas and Rivers, will binde and consolidate the ground, and, falling exceeding plentifully all over, make the soil pleasant and fruitful, and the Aire cool and wholesome) that Nature recovering thus to her advantage, and becoming youthful again, and full of genital salt and moisture, the Souls of all living Creatures belonging to these lower Regions of the Earth and Aire will awaken orderly in their proper places. The Seas and Rivers will be again replenished with Fish; the Earth will send forth all manner of Fowls, four-footed Beasts, and creeping things; and the Souls of Men also shall then catch life from the more pure and balsamick parts of the Earth, and be clothed again in terrestrial Bodies; and lastly, the Aerial Genii, that Element becoming again wholesome and vital, shall, in due order and time, awaken and revive in the cool rorid Aire. Which Expergetation into life is accompanied, say they, with

propensions answerable to those resolutions they made with themselves in those fiery torments, and with which they fell into their long sleep.

12. But the whole Hypothesis seems to be framed out of that dream of the *Stoicks*, concerning the ἀποκαταστάσις or παλιγγενεσία of the World after the ἀνάστασις or ἐκπαύσεως thereof. As if that of *Seneca* belonged to this case, *Epist. 36. Mors, quam peritimescimus ac recusamus, intermittit vitam, non eripit. Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponet dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret.* But how courfly the *Stoicks* Philosophize when they are once turned out of their rode-way of moral Sentences, any one but moderately skilled in Nature and Metaphysicks may easily discern. For what Errors can be more gross then those that they entertain of *God*, of the *Soul*, and of the *Stars*, they making the two former Corporeal Substances, and feeding the latter with the Vapours of the Earth, affirming that the Sun sups up the water of the great Ocean to quench his thirst, but that the Moon drinks off the lesser Rivers and Brooks; which is as true as that the *Asis* drunk up the Moon. Such conceits are more fit for *Anacreon* in a drunken fit to stumble upon, who to invite his Com-

panions

panions to tippie, composed that Catch,

Πίνει δ' αλασα δ' αὔρας,
'Ο δ' ἥλιος δ' αλασαν,

then for to be either found out or owned by a serious and sober Philosopher. And yet *Seneca* mightily triumphs in this notion of foddering the Stars with the thick foggs of the Earth, and declares his opinion with no mean strains of eloquence: but I loving solid sense better then fine words, shall not take the pains to recite them.

13. At what a pitch his understanding was set, may be easily discerned by my last quotation, wherein there seems a palpable contradiction. *Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponet dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret.* If *nos*, how *oblitos*? If *oblitos*, how *nos*? For we are not we, unless we remember that we are so. And if madmen may be said, and that truly, to be besides themselves, or not to be themselves, because they have lost their wits; certainly they will be far from being themselves that have quite lost the Memory of themselves, but must be as if they had never been before. As *Lucretius* has excellently well declared himself, *De rerum natura Lib. 3.*

*Nec, si materiam nostram conlegerit atas
 Post obitū, rursusq; redegerit ut sita nunc est,
 Atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vita,
 Pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque
 factum,
 Interrupta semel cum sit retinentia nostri.*

Where the Poet seems industriously to explode all the hopes of any benefit of this *Stoical* *παραγενεσις*, and to profess that he is as if he had never been, that cannot remember he has ever been before. From whence it would follow, that though the Souls of men should revive after the *Conflagration* of the World, yet they have not escaped a perpetual and permanent death.

14. We see therefore how desperately undemonstrable the condition of the Soule is after the Conflagration of the Earth, all these five Opinions being accompanied with so much lubricity and uncertainty. And therefore they are to be looked upon rather as some Night-landskap to feed our amused Melancholy, than a clear and distinct draught of comprehensible Truth to inform our Judgment.

15. All that we can be assured of is, that these Souls that have obtained their *ethered Vehicles* are out of the reach of that sad fate that followes this Conflagration; and that
 the

the wicked Souls of *Men* and *Demons* will be involved in it. But there are a middle sort betwixt these, concerning whom not onely curiosity but good will would make a man solicitous. For it is possible, that the *Conflagration* of the World may surprise many thousands of Souls, that neither the course of Time, nor Nature, nor any higher Principle has wrought up into an *Æthereal Congenity* of life, but yet may be very holy, innocent and vertuous. Which we may easily believe, if we consider that these very Earthly Bodies are not so great impediments to the goodness and sincerity of the Minde, but that many, even in this life, have given great examples thereof. Nor can that Aerial state be less capable of, nor well be without, the *good Genii*, no more then the Earth without good men, who are the most immediate Ministers of the Goodness and Justice of God. But exemption from certain fates in the world is not alwaies entailed upon *Innocency*, but most ordinarily upon *natural power*. And therefore there may be numbers of the good *Genii*, and of very holy and innocuous Spirits of men departed, the consistency of whose Vehicles may be such, that they can no more quit these aerial Regions, then we can fly into them, that have heavy bodies, without wings. To say nothing

nothing of those vertuous and pious men that may haply be then found alive, and so be liable to be overtaken by this storm of fire. Undoubtedly, unless there appear, before the approach of this fate. some visible *Zeus σωτήρ* or *Jupiter Sospitator*, as the heathens would call him, they must necessarily be involved in the ruine of the wicked. Which would be a great eye-sore in that exact and irreprehensible frame of Providence, that all men promise to themselves who acknowledge that there is a God. Wherefore according to the light of Reason, there must be some supernatural means to rescue those innocuous and benign Spirits out of this common calamity. But to describe the manner of it here how it must be done, would be to entitle natural Light and Philosophy to greater abilities then they are guilty of; and therefore that Subject must be reserved for its proper place.

CHAP. XIX.

1. *That the Extinction of the Sun is no Panick feare, but may be rationally suspected from the Records of History and grounds of Natural Philosophy.* 2. *The sad Influence*

of this Extinction upon Man and Beast, and all the aerial Dæmons imprison'd within their several Atmospheres in our Vortex. 3. That it will doe little or no damage to the *Æthereal Inhabitants* in reference to heat or warmth. 4. Nor will they find much want of his light. 5. And if they did, they may pass out of one Vortex into another, by the Priviledge of their *Æthereal Vehicles*; 6. And that without any labour or toile, and as maturely as they please. 7. The vast incomprehensibleness of the tracts and compasses of the waies of Providence. 8. A short Recapitulation of the whole Discourse. 9. An Explication of the Persians two Principles of Light and Darkness, which they called *Θεός* and *Δαίμων*, and when and where the Principle of Light gets the full victory. 10. That Philosophy, or something more sacred then Philosophy, is the onely Guide to a true *Αποβίωσις*.

1. **T**HE last danger that threatens the separate Soule is the *Extinction* of the *Sun*; which though it may seem a meer *Panick* fear at first sight, yet if the matter be examined, there will appear no contemptible reasons that may induce men to suspect that it may at last fall out, there having

been, at certain times, such near offers in Nature towards this sad accident already. *Pliny*, though he instances but in one example, yet speaks of it as a thing that several times comes to pass. *Fiunt*, saith he, *prodigiosi & longiores solis defectus, qualis occiso Dictatore Casare, & Antoniano bello, totius anni pallore continuo*. The like happened in *Justinians* time, as *Cedrenus* writes; when, for a whole year together, the Sun was of a very dim and dusky hue, as if he had been in a perpetuall Eclipse. And in the time of *Irene* the Empress it was so dark for seventeen dayes together, that the ships lost their way on the sea, and were ready to run against one another, as *Theophanes* relates. But the late accurate discovery of the spots of the Sun by *Shiner*, and the appearing and disappearing of fixt Stars, and the excursions of Comets into the remoter parts of our *Vortex*, as also the very intrinsecal texture of that admirable Philosophy of *Des-Cartes*, doe argue it more then possible that, after some vast periods of time, the Sun may be so inextricably involved by the *Macula* that he is never free from, that he may quite loose his light.

2: The Preambles of which *Extinction* will be very hideous, and intolerable to all the Inhabitants of the Planets in our *Vortex*, if

the

the Planets have then any Inhabitants at all. For this defect of light and heat coming on by degrees, must needs weary out poor mortals with heavy languishments, both for want of the comfort of the usual warmth of the Sun, whereby the Bodies of men are recreated, and also by reason of his inability to ripen the fruits of the Soile; whence necessarily must follow Famine, Plagues, Sickneses, and at length an utter devastation and destruction of both *Man* and *Beasts*. Nor can the *Aerial Demons* scape free, but that the *vital eye* to their Vehicles necessarily confining them to their several *Atmospheres*, they will be inevitably imprisoned in more then *Cimmerian* darkness. For the *Extinction* of the *Sun* will put out the light of all their *Moons*; and nothing but Ice, and Frost, and flakes of Snow, and thick mists, as palpable as that of *Egypt*, will possess the Regions of their habitation. Of which sad spectacle though those twinkling eyes of heaven, the Stars, might be compassionate spectatours; yet they cannot send out one ray of light to succour or visit them, their tender and remote beams not being able to pierce, much less to dissipate, the clammy and stiff consistency of that long and fatal Night.

3. Wherefore calling our mind off from

so

so dismal a sight, let us place it upon a more hopeful Object; and consider the condition of those Souls that have arrived to their *Aethereal Vehicle*, and see how far this fate can take hold of them. And it is plain at first sight, that they are out of the reach of this misty dungeon, as being already mounted into the secure mansions of the purer *Aether*. The worst that can be imagined of them is, that they may finde themselves in a condition something like that of ours when we walk out in a clear, starlight, frosty night, which to them that are sound is rather a pleasure then offence. And if we can beare it with some delight in these Earthly Bodies, whose parts will grow hard and stiff for want of due heat, it can prove nothing else but a new modification of tactual pleasure to those *Aethereal Inhabitants*, whose bodies are not constipated as ours, but are themselves a kinde of agile light and fire. All that can be conceived is, that the spherical particles of their Vehicles may stand a little more closely and firmly together then usual, whence the triangular intervals being more straight, the subtillest element will move something more quick in them, which will raise a sense of greater vigour and alacrity then usual. So little formidable is this fate to them in this regard.

4. But

4. But their light, you'l say, will be obscured, the Sun being put out, whose shining seems to concern the *Gods* as well as *Men*, as *Homer* would intimate,

"Ἦπρ' ἴν' ἀδανάτοις φάει φέρη' ἡδὲ βροτοῖσι.

But I answer, that that of *Homer* is chiefly to be understood of the *Aerial Demons*, not the *Aethereal Deities*, who can turn themselves into a pure actual Light when they please. So that there is no fear but that their personal converse will be as chearful and distinct as before, white letters being as legible upon black paper as black upon white. But this is to suppose them in the dark, which they are not, but in a more soft and mild light, which is but a change of pleasure, as it is to see the Moon shine fair into a roome after the putting out of the Candle. And certainly the contribution of the light of the Stars is more to their quick and tender Senses, then the clearest Moon-shine night is to ours; though we should suppose them no nearer any Star then we are. But such great changes as these may have their conveniences for such as Providence will favour, as well as their inconveniences. And the *Extinction* of our *Sun* may be the *Augmentation* of Light in some Star of a neighbouring *Vortex*. Which though

though it may not be able to pierce those *Cimmerian* Prisons I spake of before, yet it may give sufficient light to these *Spirits* that are free. Besides that the Discription and spoil of our *Vortex*, that will then happen, will necessarily bring us very much nearer the Centre of some other, whose Star will administer sufficient light to the *Aethereal Genii*, though it be too weak to relieve the *Aerial*. And that so remote a distance from these central Luminaries of the *Vortexes* is consistent with the perfectest happiness, we may discern partly, in that the Celestial Matter above *Saturn*, till the very marge of the *Vortex*, is more strongly agitated then that betwixt him and the Sun, and therefore has less need of the Suns beams to conserve its agility and liquidity; and partly, in that those huge vast Regions of *Aether* would be lost, and in vain in a manner, if they were not frequented by *Aethereal Inhabitants*, which in all reason and likelihood are of the noblest kinde, according to the nature of their Element. And therefore all the *Aethereal* People may retire thither upon such an exigency as this, and there rest secure in joy and happiness in these true *Intermundia Deorum* which *Epicurus* dream'd of.

5. Which we may easily admit, if we consider

sider the grand Priviledges of the *Aethereal Vehicle*, wherein so great a power of the Soul is awakened, that she can moderate the motion of the particles thereof as she pleases, by adding or diminishing the degrees of agitation, Axiome 32. whereby she is also able to temper the solidity thereof, and, according to this contemperation of her Vehicle, to ascend or descend in the *Vortex* as she lists her self, and that with a great variety of swiftness, according to her own pleasure. By the improvement of which Priviledge she may also, if she please, pass from one *Vortex* into another, and receive the warmth of a new *Vesta*, so that no fate imaginable shall be ever able to lay hold upon her.

6. Nor will this be any more labour to her, then sailing down the stream. For she, having once fitted the agitation and solidity of her *Vehicle* for her celestial voiage, will be as naturally carried whither she is bound, as a stone goes downward, or the fire upward. So that there is no fear of any lassitude, no more then by being rowed in a Boat, or carried in a Sedan. For the celestial Matter that environs her Vehicle, works her upward or downward, toward the Centre or from the Centre of a *Vortex*, at its own proper pains and charges. Lastly, such is the tenuity and subtilty of the Senses of

the *Aethereal* Inhabitants, that their provision and sagacity must be, beyond all conceit, above that of ours, besides that there will be warnings and premonitions of this future disaster, both many, and those very visible and continued, before the Sun shall fail so far, as that they shall at all be concerned in his decay; so that the least blast of misfortune shall never be able to blow upon them, nor the least evil imaginable overtake them.

7. This is a small glance at the Mysteries of Providence, whose fetches are so large, and Circuits so immense, that they may very well seem utterly incomprehensible to the *Incredulous* and *Idiots*, who are exceeding prone to think that all things will ever be as they are, and desire they should be so: though it be as rude and irrational, as if one that comes into a *Ball*, and is taken much with the first Dance he sees, would have none danced but that, or have them move no further one from another than they did when he first came into the room; whenas they are to trace nearer one another, or further off, according to the measures of the Musick, and the law of the Dance they are in. And the whole Matter of the Universe, and all the parts thereof, are ever upon Motion, and in such a Dance,

as whose traces backwards and forwards take a vast compass; and what seems to have made the longest stand, must again move; according to the modulations and accents of that Musick, that is indeed out of the hearing of the acutest ears, but yet perceptible by the purest Minds and the sharpest Wits. The truth whereof none would dare to oppose, if the breath of the gainer could but tell its own story, and declare through how many *Stars* and *Portices* it has been strained, before the particles thereof met, to be abused to the framing of so rash a contradiction.

8. We have now finisht our whole *Discourse*, the summary result whereof is this; That there is an incorporeal Substance, and that in Man, which we call his Soul. That this Soul of his subsists and acts after the death of his Body, and that usually first in an Aerial Vehicle, as other *Demons* doe; wherein she is not quite exempt from fate, but is then perfect and secure, when she has obtain'd her *Aethereal* one, she being then out of the reach of that evil Principle, whose dominion is commensurable with misery and death. Which power the *Persian Magi* termed *Arimanius*, and resembled him to *Darkness*, as the other good Principle, which they called *Oromazes*, to *Light*, styling one

by the name of Δαίμων, the other by the name of Θεός.

9. Of which there can be no other meaning that will prove allowable, but an adumbration of those two grand parts of Providence, the one working in the *Demoniacal*, the other in the *Divine* Orders. Betwixt which natures there is perpetually more or less strife and contest, both inwardly and outwardly. But if *Theopompus* his prophecy be true in *Plutarch*, who was initiated into these *Arcana*, the power of the *Benign Principle* will get the upper hand at last, Τέλος δ' ἀπολείπεσθαι τὸ ἄδλω, &c. At length *Hades* or *Arimanius* will be left in the lurch, who so strongly holds us captive, ἐν τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ εὐδαίμονας ἔσθαι, μήτε τροφῆς δεόμενοι, μήτε σκιάν ποίουντες, and men shall then be perfectly happy, needing no food, nor casting any shadow. For what shadow can that Body cast that is a pure and transparent light, such as the *Ethereal Vehicle* is? And therefore that Oracle is then fulfilled, when the Soul has ascended into that condition we have already described, in which alone it is out of the reach of *Fate* and *Mortality*.

10. This is the true Ἀποδεωσις, to speak according to the *Persian* Language, with whose empty title Emperours and great Potentates of the Earth have been ambitious

to adorn their memory after death; but is so high a Priviledge of the Soul of Man, that meer *Political* vertues, as *Plotinus* calls them, can never advance her to that pitch of Happinefs. Either Philosophy, or something more sacred then Philosophy, must be her Guide to so transcendent a condition. And not being curious to dispute, whether the *Pythagoreans* ever arrived to it by living according to the precepts of their Master, I shall notwithstanding with confidence averre, that what they aimed at, is the sublimest felicity our nature is capable of; and being the utmost Discovery this *Treatise* could pretend to, I shall conclude all with a *Distich* of theirs (which I have elsewhere taken notice of upon like occasion) it comprehending the furthest scope, not onely of their Philosophy, but of this present Discourse.

Ἦν δ' ἀπολείπαι σῶμα ἐς αἰθέρ' ἐλεύθερον ἔλθῃ,
 Ἐσσεαι ἀθάνατοι, διὸς ἄμβροτον ἐκίπῃ θνητός.

To this sense,
 Who after death once reach th' aethereal Plain
 Are straight made Gods, and never die again.

28th July 1881
Dear Sir
I have the pleasure to
acknowledge the receipt of
your letter of the 26th inst.

and in reply to inform you
that the same has been
forwarded to the
proper authorities for their
consideration.

I am, Sir, very
truly yours,
J. H. [Signature]

Enclosed for you are
two copies of the
report of the
Committee on the
subject of the
proposed alterations to the
regulations governing the
conduct of the
examinations for the
degree of Bachelor of
Science.

I am, Sir, very
truly yours,
J. H. [Signature]

I am, Sir, very
truly yours,
J. H. [Signature]

TI

C

1.

den

our

bea

3.

4.

5.

led

is d

but

Fin

am

Th

For

the

9.

10

N

per

The Contents of the several Chapters contained in this Treatise.

BOOK I.

Chap. 1.

1. **T**HE usefulness of the present Speculation for the understanding of Providence, and the management of our lives for our greatest happiness; 2. For the moderate bearing the death and disasters of our Friends; 3. For the begetting true Magnanimity in us, 4. and Peace and Tranquillity of Minde, 5. That so weighty a Theory is not to be handled perfunctorily. Pag. 1

- Chap. 2. 1. That the Souls Immortality is demonstrable, by the Authors method, to all but meer Scepticks. 2. An Illustration of his First Axiome. 3. A confirmation and example of the Second. 4. An explication of the Third. 5. An explication and proof of the Fourth. 6. A proof of the Fifth. 7. Of the Sixth. 8. An example of the Seventh. 9. A confirmation of the truth of the Eighth. 10. A demonstration and example of the Ninth. 11. Penetrability the immediate property of Incorporeal substance. 12. As also

The Contents.

Indiscerpibility. 13. *A proof and illustration of the tenth Axiome.* 4

Chap. 3. 1. *The general notions of Body and Spirit.* 2. *That the notion of Spirit is altogether as intelligible as that of Body.* 3. *Whether there be any Substance of a mixt nature, betwixt Body and Spirit.* 16

Chap. 4. 1. *That the notions of the several kinds of Immaterial Beings have no Inconsistency nor Incongruity in them.* 2. *That the nature of God is as intelligible as the nature of any Being whatsoever.* 3. *The true notion of his Ubiquity, and how intelligible it is.* 4. *Of the union of the Divine Essence.* 5. *Of his power of Creation.* 20

Chap. 5. 1. *The Definition belonging to all Finite and Created Spirits.* 2. *Of Indiscerpibility, a symbolical representation thereof.* 3. *An Objection answered against that representation.* 24

Chap. 6. 1. *Axiomes that tend to the demonstrating how the Centre or First point of the Primary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscerpible.* 2. *Several others that demonstrate how the Secondary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscerpible.* 3. *An application of*

The Contents.

of these Principles. 4. Of the union of the Secondary Substance considered transversely. 5. That the notion of a Spirit has less difficulty then that of Matter. 6. An answer to an Objection from the Rational faculty. 7. Answers to Objections suggested from Fancy. 8. A more compendious satisfaction concerning the notion of a Spirit. 29

Chap. 7. 1. Of the Self-motion of a Spirit. 2. Of Self-penetration. 3. Of Self-contraction and dilatation. 4. The power of penetrating of Matter. 5. The power of moving, 6. And of altering the Matter. 42

Chap. 8. 1. Four main Species of Spirits. 2. How they are to be defined. 3. The definition of a Seminal Form; 4. Of the Soul of a Brute; 5. Of the Soul of a Man. 6. The difference betwixt the Soul of an Angel and an humane Soul. 7. The definition of an Angelical Soul. 8. Of the Platonical Noas and Evades. 1. That Des-Cartes his Demonstration of the Existence of the Humane Soul does at least conclude the possibility of a Spirit. 49

Chap. 9. 1. That it is of no small consequence to have proved the Possibility of the Existence of a Spirit. 2. The necessity of examining Mr. Hobbs his Reasons to the contrary.

The Contents.

trary. 3. The first Excerption out of Mr. Hobbs. 4. The second Excerption. 5. The third. 6. The fourth. 7. The fifth. 8. The sixth. 9. The seventh. 10. The eighth and last Excerption. 55

Chap. 10. 1. An Answer to the first Excerption. 2. To the second. 3. An Answer to the third. 4. To the fourth Excerption. 5. An Answer to the fifth. 6. To the sixth. 7. To the seventh. 8. An Answer to the eighth and last. 9. A brief Recapitulation of what has been said hitherto. 64

Chap. 11. 1. Three grounds to prove the Existence of an Immaterial Substance, whereof the first is fetcht from the Nature of God. 2. The second from the Phenomenon of Motion in the world. 3. That the Matter is not self-moveable. 4. An Objection that the Matter may be part self-moved, part not. 5. The first Answer to the Objection. 6. The second Answer. 7. Other Evasions answered. 8. The Conclusion, That no Matter is self-moved, but that a certain quantity of motion was impressed upon it at its first Creation by God. 75

Chap. 12. 1. That the Order and Nature of things in the Universe argue an Essence Spiritual or Incorporeal. 2. The Evasion of this Argu-

The Contents.

Argument. 3. A preparation out of Mr. Hobbs to answer the Evasion. 4. The first Answer. 5. The second Answer. 6. Mr. Hobbs his mistake, of making the Ignorance of Second Causes the onely Seed of Religion. 84

Chap. 13. 1. The last proof of Incorporeal Substances from Apparitions. 2. The first Evasion of the force of such Arguings. 3. An answer to that Evasion. 4. The second Evasion. 5. The first kinde of the second Evasion. 6. A description out of Virgil of that Genius that suggests the dictates of the Epicurean Philosophy. 7. The more full and refined sense of that Philosophy now-a-days. 8. The great efficacy of the Stars (which they suppose to consist of nothing but Motion and Matter) for production of all manner of Creatures in the world. 89

Chap. 14. 1. That the Splendor of the Celestial Bodies proves no Fore-sight nor Sovereignty that they have over us. 2. That the Stars can have no knowledge of us, Mathematically demonstrated. 3. The same Conclusion again demonstrated more familiarly. 4. That the Stars cannot communicate Thoughts, neither with the Sun nor with one another. 5. That the Sun has no knowledge of our affairs. 6. Principles laid down for the inferring that
Con-

The Contents.

Conclusion. 7. A demonstration that he cannot see us. 8. That he can have no other kind of knowledge of us, nor of the frame of any Animal on Earth. 9. That though the Sun had the knowledge of the right frame of an Animal, he could not transmit it into Terrestrial matter. 10. An Answer to that Instance of the Signature of the Foetus. 11, 12. Further Answers thereto. 13. A short Increpation of the confident Exploders of Incorporeal Substance out of the world.

97

BOOK II.

Chap. I.

1. **A**N addition of more Axiomes for the demonstrating that there is a Spirit or Immaterial Substance in Man.
2. The Truth of the first of these Axiomes confirmed from the testimony of Mr. Hobbs.
3. The proof of the second Axiome.
4. The proof of the third.
5. The confirmation of the fourth from the testimony of Mr. Hobbs, as also from Reason.
6. An explication and proof of the fifth.
7. A further proof thereof.
8. A third Argument of the Truth thereof.
9. An Answer to an Evasion.
10. Another Evasion answered.
11. A further Answer thereto.
12. A third Answer.
13. A fourth Answer, wherein is mainly contained

The Contents.

tained a confirmation of the first Answer to the second Evasion. 14. The plainness of the sixth Axiome. 15. The proof of the seventh.

109

Chap. 2. 1. That if Matter be capable of Sense, Inanimate things are so too: And of Mr. Hobbs his wavering in that point. 2. An Enumeration of several Faculties in us that Matter is utterly incapable of. 3. That Matter in no kind of Temperature is capable of Sense. 4. That no one point of Matter can be the Common Sensorium. 5. Nor a multitude of such Points receiving singly the entire image of the Object. 6. Nor yet receiving part part, and the whole the whole. 7. That Memory is incompetent to Matter. 8. That the Matter is incapable of the notes of some circumstances of the Object which we remembred. 9. That Matter cannot be the seat of second Notions. 10. Mr. Hobbs his Evasion of the foregoing Demonstration clearly confuted. 11. That the freedom of our Will evinces that there is a Substance in us distinct from Matter. 12. That Mr. Hobbs therefore acknowledges all our actions necessary.

123

Chap. 3. 1. Mr. Hobbs his Arguments whereby he would prove all our actions necessitated. His first Argument. 2. His second Argument. 3. His third Argument. 4. His fourth Argument.

The Contents.

ment. 5. What must be the meaning of those words, Nothing taketh beginning from it self, in the first Argument of Mr. Hobbs. 6. A fuller and more determinate explication of the foregoing words, whose sense is evidently convinced to be, That no Essence of it self can vary its modification. 7. That this is onely said by Mr. Hobbs, not proved, and a full confutation of his Assertion. 8. Mr. Hobbs imposed upon by his own Sophistry. 9. That one part of this first Argument of his is groundles, the other sophistical. 10. The plain proposal of his Argument, whence appears more fully the weakness and sophistry thereof. 11. An answer to his second Argument. 12. An answer to the third. 13. An answer to a difficulty concerning the Truth and Falshood of future Propositions. 14. An answer to Mr. Hobbs his fourth Argument, which, though slighted by himself, is the strongest of them all. 15. The difficulty of reconciling Free-will with Divine Prescience and Prophecies. 16. That the faculty of Free-will is seldome put in use. 17. That the use of it is properly in Moral conflict. 18. That the Soul is not invincible there neither. 19. That Divine decrees either finde fit Instruments or make them. 20. That the more exact we make Divine Prescience, even to the comprehension of any thing that implies no contradiction in it self to be comprehended, the

more

The Contents.

more clear it is that mans Will may be sometimes free: 21. Which is sufficient to make good my last Argument against Mr. Hobbs.

137

Chap. 4. 1. An Enumeration of sundry Opinions concerning the Seat of Common Sense. 2. Upon supposition that we are nothing but meer Matter, That the whole Body cannot be the Common Sensorium; 3. Nor the Orifice of the Stomack; 4. Nor the Heart; 5. Nor the Brain; 6. Nor the Membranes; 7. Nor the Septum lucidum; 8. Nor Regius his small and perfectly solid Particle. 9. The probability of the Conarion being the common Seat of Sense.

154

Chap. 5. 1. How Perception of external Objects, Spontaneous Motion, Memory and Imagination, are pretended to be performed by the Conarion, Spirits and Muscles, without a Soul. 2. That the Conarion, devoid of a Soul, cannot be the common Percipient, demonstrated out of Des-Cartes himself. 3. That the Conarion, with the Spirits and organization of the Parts of the Body, is not a sufficient Principle of Spontaneous motion, without a Soul. 4. A description of the use of the Valvulae in the Nerves of the Muscles for Spontaneous motion. 5. The insufficiency of this contrivance for that purpose. 6. A further demonstration

The Contents.

monstration of the insufficiency thereof, from whence is clearly evinced that Brutes have Souls. 7. That Memory cannot be salved the way above described; 8. Nor Imagination. 9. A Distribution out of Des-Cartes of the Functions in us, some appertaining to the Body, and others to the Soul. 10. The Authors Observations thereupon. 161

Chap.6. 1. That no part of the Spinal Marrow can be the Common Sentorium without a Soul in the Body. 2. That the Animal Spirits are more likely to be that Common Percipient. 3. But yet it is demonstrable they are not: 4. As not being so much as capable of Sensation; 5. Nor of directing Motion into the Muscles; 6. Much less of Imagination and rational Invention; 7. Nor of Memory. 8. An answer to an Evasion. 9. The Authors reason, why he has confuted so particularly all the Suppositions of the Seat of Common Sense, when few of them have been asserted with the exclusion of a Soul. 173

Chap.7. 1. His enquiry after the Seat of Common Sense, upon supposition there is a Soul in the Body. 2. That there is some particular part in the Body that is the Seat of Common Sense. 3. A general division of their Opinions concerning the place of Common Sense.

The Contents.

Sense. 4. That of those that place it out of the Head there are two sorts. 5. The Invalidity of Helmont's reasons, whereby he would prove the Orifice of the Stomack to be the principal Seat of the Soul. 6. An answer to Helmont's stories for that purpose. 7. A further confutation out of his own concessions. 8. Mr. Hobbs his Opinion confuted, that makes the Heart the Seat of Common Sense. 9. A further confutation thereof from Experience. 10. That the Common Sense is seated somewhere in the Head. 11. A caution for the choice of the particular place thereof. 12. That the whole Brain is not it; 13. Nor Regius his small solid Particle; 14. Nor any external Membrane of the Brain, nor the Septum Lucidum. 15. The three most likely places. 16. Objections against Cartesius his Opinion concerning the Conarion answered. 17. That the Conarion is not the Seat of Common Sense; 18. Nor that part of the Spinal Marrow where the Nerves are conceived to concur; but the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.

182

Chap. 8. 1. The first reason of his Opinion, the convenient Situation of these Spirits. 2. The second, that the Spirits are the immediate instrument of the Soul in all her functions. 3. The proof of the second Reason from

O O

the

The Contents.

the general authority of Philosophers, and particularly of Hippocrates; 4. From our Sympathizing with the changes of the Aire; 5. From the celerity of Motion and Cogitation; 6. From what is observed generally in the Generation of things; 7. From Regius his experiment of a Snail in a glass; 8. From the running round of Images in a Vertigo; 9. From the constitution of the Eye, and motion of the Spirits there; 10. From the dependency of the actions of the Soul upon the Body, whether in Meditation or corporeal Motion; 11. From the recovery of Motion and Sense into a stupified part; 12. And lastly from what is observed in swooning fits, of paleness and sharpness of visage, &c. 13. The inference from all this, That the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle are the seat of Common Sense, and that the main use of the Brain and Nerves is to preserve the Spirits.

198

Chap. 9. 1. Several Objections against Animal Spirits. 2. An Answer to the first Objection touching the Porosity of the Nerves. 3. To the second and third from the Extravasion of the Spirits and pituitous Excrements found in the Brain. 4. To the fourth fetcht from the incredible swiftness of motion in the Spirits. 5. To the last from Ligation. 6. Undeniable Demonstrations that
there

The Contents.

There are Animal Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain.

109

Chap. 10. 1. *That the Soul is not confined to the Common Sensorium.* 2. *The first Argument from the Plastick power of the Soul.* 3. *Which is confirmed from the gradual dignity of the Souls Faculties, of which this Plastick is the lowest;* 4. *External Sensation the next;* 5. *After that Imagination, and then Reason.* 6. *The second Argument from Passions and Sympathies in Animals.* 7. *An illustration of the manner of natural Magick.* 8. *The third Argument from the Perception of Pain in the exterior parts of the Body.* 9. *The fourth and last from the nature of Sight.*

215

Chap. 11. 1. *That neither the Soul without the Spirits, nor the Spirits without the presence of the Soul in the Organ, are sufficient causes of Sensation.* 2. *A brief declaration how Sensation is made.* 3. *How Imagination.* 4. *Of Reason and Memory, and whether there be any Marks in the Brain.* 5. *That the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in Memory also; and how Memory arises;* 6. *As also Forgetfulness.* 7. *How spontaneous Motion is performed.* 8. *How we walk, sing, and play, though think-*

O o 2

ing

The Contents.

ing of something else. 9. That though the Spirits be not alike fine every where, yet the Sensiferous Impression will pass to the Common Sensorium. 10. That there is an Heterogeneity in the very Soul her self; and what it is in her we call the Root, the Centre, and the Eye; and what the Rayes and Branches. 11. That the sober and allowable Distribution of her into Parts, is into Perceptive and Plastick.

216

Chap. 12. 1. *An Answer to an Objection, That our Arguments will as well prove the Immortality of the Souls of Brutes, as of Men. 2. Another Objection inferring the Praeexistence of Brutes Souls, and consequently of ours. 3. The first Answer to the Objection. 4. The second Answer consisting of four parts. 5. First, That the Hypothesis of Praeexistence is more agreeable to Reason then any other Hypothesis. 6. And not onely so, but that it is very solid in it self. 7. That the Wisdome and Goodness of God argue the truth thereof. 8. As also the face of Providence in the World. 9. The second part of the second Answer, That the Praeexistence of the Soul has the suffrage of all Philosophers in all Ages, that held it Incorporeal. 10. That the Gymnosophists of Aegypt, the Indian Brachmans, the Persian Magi, and all the learned*

of

The Contents.

of the Jews were of this Opinion. 11. A Catalogue of particular famous persons that held the same. 12. That Aristotle was also of the same minde. 13. Another more clear place in Aristotle to this purpose, with Sennertus his Interpretation. 14. An Answer to an Evasion of that Interpretation. 15. The last and clearest place of all out of Aristotles Writings. 237

Chap.13. 1. The third part of the second Answer, That the forgetting of the former state is no good argument against the Souls Præexistence. 2. What are the chief causes of Forgetfulness. 3. That they all conspire, and that in the highest degree, to destroy the memory of the other state. 4. That Mischances and Diseases have quite taken away the Memory of things here in this life. 5. That it is impossible for the Soul to remember her former condition without a Miracle. 6. The fourth part of the second Answer, That the entrance of a Præexistent Soul into a Body is as intelligible as either Creation or Traduction. 252

Chap.14. 1. The knowledge of the difference of Vehicles, and the Souls Union with them, necessary for the understanding how she enters into this Earthly Body. 2. That
O o 3 though

The Contents.

though the name of Vehicle be not in Aristotle, yet the thing is there. 3. A clearing of Aristotles notion of the Vehicle, out of the Philosophy of Des-Cartes. 4 A full interpretation of his Text. 5. That Aristotle makes onely two Vehicles, Terrestrial and Æthereal; which is more then sufficient to prove the Souls Oblivion of her former state. 6. That the ordinary Vehicle of the Soul after death is Aire. 7. The duration of the Soul in her several Vehicles. 8. That the Union of the Soul with her Vehicle does not consist in Mechanical Congruity, but Vital. 9. In what Vital congruity of the Matter consists. 10. in what Vital congruity of the Soul consists, and how it changing, the Soul may be free from her aiery Vehicle, without violent precipitation out of it. 11. Of the manner of the descent of Souls into Earthly Bodies. 12. That there is so little absurdity in the Præexistence of Souls, that the concession thereof can be but a very small prejudice to our Demonstrations of her Immortality. 257

Chap. 15. 1. *What is meant by the Separation of the Soul, with a confutation of Regius, who would stop her in the dead Corps. 2. An answer to those that profess themselves puzzled how the Soul can get out of the Body. 3. That there is a threefold Vital Congruity*

The Contents.

to be found in three several Subjects. 4. That this triple Congruity is also competible to one Subject, viz. the Soul of Man. 5. That upon this Hypothesis it is very intelligible how the Soul may leave the Body. 6. That her Union with the aerial Vehicle may be very suddain, and as it were in a moment. 7. That the Soul is actually separate from the Body is to be proved either by History or Reason. Examples of the former kinde out of Pliny, Herodotus, Ficinus. 8. Whether the Ecstasie of Witches prove an actual separation of the Soul from the Body. 9. That this real separation of the Soul in Ecstasie is very possible. 10. How the Soul may be loosned and leave the Body, and yet return thither again. 11. That though Reason and Will cannot in this life release the Soul from the Body, yet Passion may; and yet so that she may return again. 12. The peculiar power of Desire for this purpose. 13. Of Cardans Ecstasies, and the Ointment of Witches, and what truth there may be in their Confessions.

267

Chap. 16. 1. That Souls departed communicate Dreams. 2. Examples of Apparitions of Souls deceased. 3. Of Apparitions in fields where pitch Battels have been fought; as also of those in Church-yards, and other vaporous places. 4. That the Spissitude of

The Contents.

the Aire may well contribute to the easiness of the appearing of Ghosts and Spectres. 5. A further proof thereof from sundry examples. 6. Of Marfilius Ficinus his appearing after death. 7. With what sort of people such examples as these avail little. 8. Reasons to perswade the unprejudiced that ordinarily those Apparitions that bear the shape and person of the deceased, are indeed the Souls of them.

286

Chap. 17. 1. *The praeminence of Arguments drawn from Reason above those from Story. 2. The first step towards a Demonstration of Reason that the Soul acts out of her Body, for that she is an immaterial Substance separable therefrom. 3. The second, That the immediate instruments for Sense, Motion, and Organization of the Body, are certain subtile and tenuious Spirits. 4. A comparison betwixt the Soul in the Body and the Aerial Genii. 5. Of the nature of Dæmons from the account of Marcus the Eremite, and how the Soul is presently such, having once left this Body. 6. An Objection concerning the Souls of Brutes: to which is answered, First by way of concession; 7. Secondly, by confuting the Arguments for the former concession. 8. That there is no rational doubt at all of the Humane Soul acting after death. 9. A further*

The Contents.

ther Argument of her activity out of this Body, from her conflicts with it while she is in it. 10. As also from the general hope and belief of all Nations, that they shall live after death.

297

Chap. 18. 1. That the Faculties of our Souls, and the nature of the immediate instrument of them, the Spirits, doe so nearly symbolize with those of Demons, that it seems reasonable, if God did not on purpose hinder it, that they would not fail to act out of this earthly Body. 2. Or if they would, his power and wisdom could easily implant in their essence a double or triple Vital Congruity, to make all sure. 3. A further demonstration of the present Truth from the Veracity of God. 4. An Answer to an Objection against the foregoing Argument. 5. Another Demonstration from His Justice. 6. An Answer to an Objection. 7. An Answer to another Objection. 8. Another Argument from the Justice of God. 9. An Objection answered. 10. An invincible Demonstration of the Souls Immortality from the Divine Goodness. 11. A more particular enforcement of that Argument, and who they are upon whom it will work least. 12. That the noblest and most vertuous Spirit is the most as- surable of the Souls Immortality. 311

BOOK

The Contents.

BOOK III.

Chap. 1.

1. **W**H^Y the Author treats of the State of the Soul after Death, and in what Method. 2. Arguments to prove that the Soul is ever united vitally with some Matter or other. 3. Further Reasons to evince the same. 4. That the Soul is capable of an airy and æthereal Body, as well as a terrestrial. 5. That she ordinarily passes out of an earthly into an aerial Vehicle first. 6. That in her airy Vehicle she is capable of Sense, Pleasure, and Pain. 7. That the main power of the Soul over her aerial Vehicle is the direction of Motion in the particles thereof. 8. That she may also adde or diminish Motion in her æthereal. 9. How the purity of the Vehicle confers to the quickness of Sense and Knowledge. 10. Of the Souls power of changing the temper of her aerial Vehicle; 11. As also the shape thereof. 12. The plainness of the last Axiome. 326

Chap. 2. 1. Of the Dimensions of the Soul considered barely in her self. 2. Of the Figure of the Souls Dimensions. 3. Of the Heterogeneity of her Essence. 4. That there

The Contents.

is an Heterogeneity in her Plastick part distinct from the Perceptive. 5. Of the acting of this Plastick part in her framing of the Vehicle. 6. The excellency of Des-Cartes his Philosophy. 7. That the Vehicles of Ghosts have as much of solid corporeal Substance in them as the Bodies of Men. 8. The folly of the contrary Opinion evinced. 9. The advantage of the Soul, for matter of Body, in the other state, above this. 340

Chap. 3. 1. That the natural abode of the Soul after death is the Aire. 2. That she cannot quit the Aerial Regions till the Æthereal Congruity of life be awakened in her. 3. That all Souls are not in the same Region of the Aire. 4. Cardans conceit of placing all Dæmons in the upper Region. 5. The use of this conceit for the shewing the reason of their seldome appearing. 6. That this Phenomenon is salved by a more rational Hypothesis. 7. A further confutation of Cardans Opinion. 8. More tending to the same scope. 9. The Original of Cardans error concerning the remote operations of Dæmons. 10. An Objection how Dæmons and Souls separate can be in this lower Region, where Winds and Tempests are so frequent. 11. A preparation to an Answer from the consideration of the nature of the winds. 12. Particular

The Contents.

cular Answers to the Objection. 13. *A further Answer from the nature of the Statick Faculty of the Soul.* 14. *Another from the suddain power of actuating her Vehicle.* 15. *What incommodations she suffers from hail, rain, &c.* 350

Chap. 4. 1. *That the Soul once having quitted this earthly Body becomes a Dæmon.* 2. *Of the External Senses of the Soul separate, their number and limits in the Vehicle.* 3. *Of Sight in a Vehicle organized and unorganized.* 4. *How Dæmons and separate Souls hear and see at a vast Distance: and whence it is that though they may so easily hear or see us, we may neither see nor hear them.* 5. *That they have Hearing as well as Sight.* 6. *Of the Touch, Smell, Taste, and Nourishment of Dæmons.* 7. *The external employment that the Genii and Souls deceased may have out of the Body.* 8. *That the actions of Separate Souls, in reference to us, are most-what conformable to their life here on Earth.* 9. *What their entertainments are in reference to themselves.* 10. *The distinction of orders of Dæmons from the places they most frequent.* 364

Chap. 5. 1. *That the Separate Soul spends not all her time in Solitude.* 2. *That*
her

The Contents.

her converse with us seems more intelligible than that with the Genii. 3. How the Genii may be visible one to another, though they be to us invisible. 4. Of their approaches, and of the limits of their swiftness of motion: 5. And how they farre exceed us in celerity. 6. Of the figure or shape of their Vehicles, and of their privacy, when they would be invisible. 7. That they cannot well converse in a meer simple Orbicular form. 8. That they converse in humane shape, at least the better sort of them. 9. Whether the shape they be in proceed meerly from the Imperium of their Will and Fancy, or is regulated by a natural Character of the Plastick part of the Soul. 10. That the personal shape of a Soul or Genius is partly from the Will, and partly from the Plastick power. 11. That considering how the Soul organizes the Foetus in the Womb, and moves our limbs at pleasure; it were a wonder if Spirits should not have such command over their Vehicles as is believed. 12. A further Argument from an excessive vertue some have given to Imagination. 376

Chap. 6. 1. More credible Instances of the effects of Imagination. 2. A special and peculiar Instance in Signatures of the Foetus. 3. That what Fienus grants, who has so cautiously bounded the power of Fancy, is sufficient
ere

The Contents.

ent for the present purpose. 4. Examples approved of by Fienus. 5. Certain Examples rejected by him, and yet approved of by Ver-nelius and Sennertus. 6. Three notorious Stories of the power of the Mothers Imagination on the Foetus, out of Helmont. 7. A conjectural inference from those Stories, what influence the Spirit of Nature has in all Plastick operations. 8. A further confirmation of the Conjecture from Signatures on the Foetus. 9. An application thereof to the transfiguration of the Vehicles of Dæmons.

387

Chap. 7. 1. Three notable Examples of Signatures, rejected by Fienus: 2. And yet so farre allowed for possible, as will fit our design. 3. That Helmonts Cherry and Licetus his Crab-fish are shrewd Arguments that the Soul of the World has to doe with all Efformations of both Animals and Plants. 4. An Example of a most exact and lively Signature out of Kircher: 5. With his judgement thereupon. 6. Another Example out of him of a Child with gray hairs. 7. An application of what has been said hitherto, concerning the Signatures of the Foetus, to the transfiguration of the airy Vehicles of separate Souls and Dæmons. 8. Of their personal transformation visible to us.

398

Chap.

The Contents.

Chap. 8. 1. *That the Better sort of Genii converse in Humane shape, the Baser sometimes in Bestial.* 2. *How they are disposed to turn themselves into several Bestial forms.* 3. *Of Psellus his αὐγὰι πνευμάτων, or Igneous splendours of Dæmons, how they are made.* 4. *That the external beauty of the Genii is according to the degree of the inward vertue of their minds.* 5. *That their aerial form need not be purely transparent, but more finely opaque, and coloured.* 6. *That there is a distinction of Masculine and Feminine Beauty in their personal figurations.* 407

Chap. 9. 1. *A general account of the mutual entertains of the Genii in the other world.* 2. *Of their Philosophical and Political Conferences.* 3. *Of their Religious Exercises.* 4. *Of the innocent Pastimes and Recreations of the better sort of them.* 5. *A confirmation thereof from the Conventicles of Witches.* 6. *Whether the purer Dæmons have their times of repast or no.* 7. *Whence the bad Genii have their food.* 8. *Of the food and feasting of the better sort of Genii.* 414

Chap. 10. 1. *How hard it is to define any thing concerning the Aerial or Æthereal Elysiums.* 2. *That there is Political Order and Laws amongst these airy Dæmons.* 3. *That this*

The Contents.

this Chain of Government reaches down from the highest Æthereal Powers through the Aerial to the very Inhabitants of the Earth.

4. The great security we live in thereby.

5. How easily detectible and punishable wicked Spirits are by those of their own Tribe.

6. Other reasons of the security we find our selves in from the gross infestations of evil Spirits.

7. What kinde of punishments the Aerial Officers inflict upon their Malefactors. 427

Chap. II. 1. Three things to be considered before we come to the moral condition of the Soul after death: namely, her Memory of transactions in this life. 2. The peculiar feature and individual Character of her Aerial Vehicle. 3. The Retainment of the same Name. 4. How her ill deportment here lays the train of her Misery hereafter. 5. The unspeakable torments of Conscience worse then Death, and not to be avoided by dying. 6. Of the hideous tortures of external sense on them, whose searedness of Conscience may seem to make them incapable of her Lashes. 7. Of the state of the Souls of the more innocent and conscientious Pagans. 8. Of the natural accruments of After-happiness to the morally good in this life. 9. How the Soul enjoys her actions or sufferings in this Life for an indispensable Cause, when she has passed to the other,

The Contents.

other. 10. *That the reason is proportionably the same in things of less consequence.* 11. *What mischief men may create to themselves in the other World by their Zealous mistakes in this.* 12. *That though there were no Memory after Death, yet the manner of our Life here may sow the seeds of the Souls future happiness or misery.* 435

Chap. 12. 1. *What the Spirit of Nature is.* 2. *Experiments that argue its real Existence; such as that of two strings tuned Unisons.* 3. *Sympathetick Cures and Tortures.* 4. *The Sympathy betwixt the Earthly and Astral Body.* 5. *Monstrous Births.* 6. *The Attraction of the Loadstone and Roundness of the Sun and Stars.* 449

Chap. 13. 1. *That the Descent of heavy Bodies argues the existence of the Spirit of Nature, because else they would either hang in the Aire as they are placed,* 2. *Or would be diverted from a perpendicular as they fall near a Plate of Metal set sloping.* 3. *That the endeavour of the Ether or Aire from the Centre to the Circumference is not the cause of Gravity, against Mr. Hobbs.* 4. *A full confutation of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion.* 5. *An ocular Demonstration of the absurd consequence thereof,* 6. *An absolute Demonstration that*

The Contents.

Gravity cannot be the effect of meer Mechanical powers. 7. The Latitude of the operations of the Spirit of Nature, how large and where bounded. 8. The reason of its name. 9. Its grand office of transmitting Souls into rightly-prepared Matter.

458

Chap. 14. 1. *Objections against the Souls Immortality from her condition in Infancy, Old age, Sleep and Sickneses. 2. Other Objections taken from Experiments that seem to prove her Discerpibility. 3. As also from the seldome appearing of the Souls of the deceased; 4. And from our natural fear of Death. 5. A Subterfuge of the adverse party, in supposing but one Soul common to all Creatures. 6. An Answer concerning the Little-ness of the Soul in Infancy: 7. As also concerning the weakness of her Intellectuals then, and in Old age. 8. That Sleep does not at all argue the Souls Mortality, but rather illustrate her Immortality. 9. An Answer to the Objection from Apoplexies and Catalepsies: 10. As also to that from Madnes. 11. That the various depravations of her Intellectual Faculties doe no more argue her Mortality, then the worser Modifications of Matter its natural Annihilability. And why God created Souls sympathizing with Matter.*

471

Chap.

The Contents.

Chap. 15. 1. *An Answer to the experiment of the Scolopendra cut into pieces.* 2. *And to the flying of an headless Eagle over a barn, as also to that of the Malefactors head biting a Dog by the ear.* 3. *A Superaddition of a difficulty concerning Monsters born with two or more Heads and but one Body and Heart.* 4. *A solution of the difficulty.* 5. *An Answer touching the seldome appearing of the Souls of the deceased:* 6. *As also concerning the fear of Death;* 7. *And a down-bearing sense that sometimes so forcibly obtrudes upon us the belief of the Souls Mortality.* 8. *Of the Tragical Pomp and dreadful Preludes of Death, with some corroborative Considerations against such sad spectacles.* 9. *That there is nothing really sad and miserable in the Universe, unless to the wicked and impious.*

481

Chap. 16. 1. *That that which we properly are is both Sensitive and Intellectual.* 2. *What is the true notion of a Soul being One.* 3. *That if there be but One Soul in the World, it is both Rational and Sensitive.* 4. *The most favourable representation of their Opinion that hold but One.* 5. *A confutation of the foregoing representation.* 6. *A Reply to the confutation.* 7. *An Answer to the Reply.* 8. *That the Soul of Man is not properly any*

P p 2

Ray

The Contents.

Ray either of God or the Soul of the World.
9. *And yet if she were so, it would be no prejudice to her Immortality: whence the folly of Pomponatius is noted.* 10. *A further animadversion upon Pomponatius his folly, in admitting a certain number of remote Inteligencies, and denying Particular Immaterial Substances in Men and Brutes.* 491

Chap. 17. 1. *That the Author having safely conducted the Soul into her Aerial condition through the dangers of Death, might well be excused from attending her any further.* 2. *What reasons urge him to consider what fates may befall her afterwards.* 3. *Three hazards the Soul runs after this life, whereby she may again become obnoxious to death, according to the opinion of some.* 4. *That the aerial Genii are mortal, confirmed by three testimonies.* 5. *The one from the Vision of Fa-cius Cardanus, in which the Spirits that appeared to him profest themselves mortal.* 6. *The time they staid with him, and the matters they disputed of.* 7. *What credit Hieronymus Cardanus gives to his Fathers Vision.* 8. *The other testimony out of Plutarch, concerning the Death of the great God Pan.* 9. *The third and last of Hesiod, whose opinion Plutarch has polishd and refined.* 10. *An Enumeration of the several Paradoxes contained*

The Contents.

tained in *Facius Cardanus his Vision.*
 11. *What must be the sense of the third Paradox, if those Aerial Speculators spake as they thought.* 12. *Another Hypothesis to the same purpose.* 13. *The craft of these Dæmons, in shuffling in poysonous Errorr amongst solid Truths.* 14. *What makes the story of the death of Pan less to the present matter, with an addition of Demetrius his observations touching the Sacred Islands near Britain.* 15. *That Hesiod his opinion is the most unexceptionable, and that the harshness therein is but seeming, not real.* 16. *That the Æthereal Vehicle instates the Soul in a condition of perfect Immortality.* 17. *That there is no internal impediment to those that are Heroically good, but that they may attain an everlasting happiness after Death.*

503

Chap. 18. 1. *The Conflagration of the World an Opinion of the Stoicks.* 2. *Two ways of destroying the World the Ancients have taken notice of, and especially that by Fire.* 3. *That the Conflagration of the World, so farre as it respects us, is to be understood onely of the burning of the Earth.* 4. *That the ends of the Stoicks Conflagration are competible onely to the Earths burning.* 5. *An acknowledgement that the Earth may be burnt, though the proof thereof be impertinent*

The Contents.

to this place. 6. That the Conflagration thereof will prove very fatal to the Souls of wicked Men and Dæmons. 7. Five several Opinions concerning their state after the Conflagration; whereof the first is, That they are quite destroy'd by Fire. 8. The second, That they are annihilated by a special act of Omnipotency. 9. The third, That they lie senseless in an eternal Death. 10. The fourth, That they are in a perpetual furious and painful Dream. 11. The fifth and last, That they will revive again, and that the Earth and Aire will be inhabited by them. 12. That this last seems to be fram'd from the fictitious παλιγγενεσία of the Stoicks, who were very sorry Metaphysicians, and as ill Naturalists. 13. An Animadversion upon a self-contradicting sentence of Seneca. 14. The unintelligibleness of the state of the Souls of the Wicked after the Conflagration. 15. That the Æthereal Inhabitants will be safe. And what will then become of Good men and Dæmons on the Earth and in the Aire. And how they cannot be delivered but by a supernatural power.

524

Chap. 19. 1. *That the Extinction of the Sun is no Panick feare, but may be rationally suspected from the Records of History and grounds of Natural Philosophy. 2. The sad*
Influ-

The Contents.

Influence of this Extinction upon Man and Beast, and all the aerial Dæmons imprison'd within their several Atmospheres in our Vortex. 3. That it will doe little or no damage to the Æthereal Inhabitants in reference to heat or warmth. 4. Nor will they find much want of his light. 5. And if they did, they may pass out of one Vortex into another, by the Priviledge of their Æthereal Vehicles; 6. And that without any labour or toil, and as maturely as they please. 7. The vast incomprehensibleness of the tracts and compasses of the waies of Providence. 8. A short Recapitulation of the whole Discourse. 9. An Explication of the Persians two Principles of Light and Darkness, which they called Θεός and Δαίμων, and when and where the Principle of Light gets the full victory. 10. That Philosophy, or something more sacred then Philosophy, is the onely Guide to a true Αποθεωσις.

F I N I S.

Errata.

- P Ag. 212. l. 5. for Gamaitus, read Gamaieu's.
234. l. 10. for *Tye*, r. *Tye*.
327. l. 2. for Immortality, r. Immo-
rality.
458. l. 22. for *stooping*, r. *slooping*.
462. l. 13. for E & H; r. angle E F H.
488. l. 9. for in:logg'd, r. in, clogg'd.
521. l. 16. for *lightning*, r. *lighting*.
528. l. ult. dele those.